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Surrogacy is an alternative means of reproduction that has been described as a 
controversial practice raising important ethico-legal considerations relating to alleged 
risks to autonomy, welfare and justice. However, many arguments against it are made 
without support from empirical data or despite such evidence as exists. Surrogacy is 
governed by diverse regulation worldwide, but such regulation generally has not been 
shaped by the perspectives of those involved in it, while the incidence of surrogacy 
both at national and international levels is increasing. 
In this thesis, I explore how surrogacy should be regulated in law through a sustained 
comparative socio-legal approach informed by a feminist perspective. I argue that 
respect for autonomy entails that individuals should be allowed to make use of 
surrogacy, provided that there are no good reasons for preventing them from doing so.  
I consider a range of such reasons – grounded in concerns for the welfare of the 
participants and social justice – and determine that surrogacy should be permitted, if 
it is properly regulated. I then go on to consider the parameters of good regulation 
using Greece and the UK as examples, and explore what, if anything, each regime 
might learn from the other and how they can most effectively reflect the experiences 
and protect the interests of the surrogacy participants. 
Greece and the UK offer the basis for a novel, interesting and fruitful comparative 
socio-legal study. Greek law provides for an intention-based model of parenthood 
founded on altruistic gestational surrogacy agreements which, if pre-approved by the 
judiciary, can become enforceable upon the child’s birth, leading to an automatic 
acknowledgement of the intended parents’ parenthood. UK law allows gestational and 
traditional altruistic surrogacy arrangements, but only regulates those taking place in 
UK clinics. UK surrogacy agreements are unenforceable, parenthood is based on 
gestation and birth, and intended parents may acquire parenthood through a post-birth 
parental order granted by the courts if certain conditions are met. 
Despite how unusual and novel the Greek legal approach is, it is poorly explored 
within the international literature. This thesis fills this gap. It also adds to the existing, 
limited data about people’s experiences of surrogacy regulation in the UK, both 
confirming some findings of previous studies and challenging certain assumptions, as 
well as introducing a range of new concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Background and Rationale 
Reproduction is perhaps the most intimate and private process in one’s life, and of 
upmost significance to some individuals.1 Additionally, decisions about human 
reproduction have social, religious, cultural, and ethico-legal dimensions;2 they affect 
the future of society, and link to several ideological and socio-political concerns.3 In 
modern times, such decisions have a different, more active, and arguably more 
profound role than in the past, because, since the development and introduction of 
assisted reproductive treatments (ARTs) and contraceptive technology in the late 
1970s,4 reproduction is a matter of choice, not chance.5 
Surrogacy refers to the practice ‘whereby one woman [(the surrogate) agrees to 
become] pregnant with the intention that the child should be handed over to the 
commissioning couple after birth’.6 For many people, surrogacy is a ‘last resort 
alternative’ to parenthood,7 for some it is the only way to (at least partial) biological 
parenthood,8 while others treat it as an alternative way of reproduction. Although 
                                                          
1 Robertson JA, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton 
University Press 1994) 24. 
2 Cook RJ, Dickens BM and Fathalla MF, Reproductive Health and Human Rights: Integrating 
Medicine, Ethics, and Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 3. 
3 Home Office (1999) Supporting Families. London: Government Offices: ‘Families are at the heart of 
our Society and the basis of our future as a country’; Cook et al (ibid). 
4 The greatest development was IVF.  Louise Brown, the first IVF-baby, was born in England in July 
1978. She recently published an autobiography (Brown L, My Life as the World's First Tube-Baby 
(Bristol Books 2015). 
5 Buchanan A and others, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge University Press 
2000); Robertson (n1). 
6 Jackson E, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2001) 828. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the woman who gives birth to the child will be referred to as 
‘surrogate’, and the person/people who enter into a surrogacy arrangement to have a child as ‘intended 
parents’ (IPs). 
7 Kerian CL, 'Surrogacy: A last resort alternative for infertile women or a commodification of women’s 
bodies and children?' (1997) 12 Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal; Blyth E, 'Not a Primrose Path: 
Commissioning Parents’ Experience of Surrogacy Arrangements in Britain' (1995) 13 Journal of 
Reproductive and Infant Psychology 188. Certainly, adoption is always a way to parenthood, but, due 
to the rising numbers of infertile persons, the demand for adoption is higher than the supply of children 
available to be adopted (Freundlich M, ‘Supply and Demand: The Forces Shaping the Future of Infant 
Adoption’ (1998) 2(1) Adoption Quarterly 21). 
8 Namely same-sex couples, and women born without a uterus or other wit  other serious conditions 
rendering them unable to achieve or complete a healthy pregnancy. 
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surrogacy had existed before the introduction of ARTs,9 these treatments offered new 
prospects to those wishing to have a child through surrogacy. In the wake of the UK 
‘Baby Cotton’ case,10 and the US ‘Baby M’ case,11 surrogacy sparked vivid debate. It 
was viewed with suspicion, principally by some feminists, who believed it meant 
women were used only as a means of reproduction,12 a d by social traditionalists, who 
thought it challenged ‘traditional’ ideas about reproduction, the family, and the 
meaning of motherhood.13 Additionally, amid widespread fear and panic about the 
effects of surrogacy on society and women, scholars and regulators were concerned 
with whether surrogacy should be regulated and what this regulation should look like. 
Due to fears that a surrogacy industry would develop, some countries banned all forms 
of surrogacy.14 However, some left it unregulated,15 while others, such as Greece, the 
UK,16 some states in the US and elsewhere, permitted the practice but with 
conditions.17 At the EU level, there is still no agreement as to the regulation of 
                                                          
9 References to surrogacy exist in The Bible (Genesis 16). 
10 Re C (A Minor)(Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846; BBC News. '1985: Inquiry over 'baby for 
cash' deal' (4/01/1985) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/4/newsid_2495000/2495857.stm> accessed 
on 27/09/2015. 
11 In The Matter of Baby M, 217 NJ Super 313 (Ch Div 1987) rev’d 109 NJ 396(1988). 
12 Much like the story in Atwood’s dystopian novel: Atwood M, The Handmaid's Tale (Toronto, 
McCelland and Stewart 1985). 
13 Hatzis says ‘[t]he recent attack on [surrogacy on] moral grounds is rather a result of the distrust of 
certain groups for reproductive technologies in general, and of an image of “unnaturalness” attributed 
to the surrogate mother’ (Hatzis A, Just in the oven: A Law and Economics Approach to Gestational 
Surrogacy Contracts (Boele-Welki, K. ed, Perspectives for the Unification and H rmonisation of 
Family Law in Europe, Intersentia 2003) 419). For a critique on traditional ideas about ‘the family’: 
Fineman M, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies (Routledge 1995). 
14 Surrogacy can be commercial or altruistic, though the terms are contentious and can mean different 
things. Here, I use altruistic to mean not that the surrogate is entirely unpaid, but that she is neither out 
of pocket, nor does she profit financially for her agreement, and commercial to mean that the surrogate 
is being paid and profits from it financially. All forms of surrogacy are illegal in Finland, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Pakistan (Armour KL, 'An Overview of Surrogacy Around 
the World' (2012) 16(3) Nursing for Women's Health 231).  
15 For example, Sweden, Czech Republic, Nigeria (ibid). 
16 By ‘UK’ I mean England and Wales, since Scotland and Northern Ireland have a different approach 
to surrogacy, the exploration of which falls outside the remit of this the is due to lack of space. The 
relevant literature makes mention to ‘the UK law’, and I follow this terminology throughout the thesis. 
17 In Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, India, Israel, the Netherlands and Belgium, South Africa, New 




surrogacy,18 and it is clearly difficult to reach any kind of global consensus on 
surrogacy.19 
In the era of the Internet and of cheap and easy travelling, a total legal prohibition 
against surrogacy may risk IPs finding information and traveling to other jurisdictions, 
where surrogacy is legal, but may be less well-regulated or totally unregulated. This 
can be dangerous, and cause legal complexities.20 Notably, lack of surrogacy-specific 
regulation does not necessarily mean that there is an area which is free of law. Rather, 
people can still form informal surrogacy arrangements, which may have problematic 
consequences,21 not least due to various general legal principles which impact on 
surrogacy but regulate it poorly. In other words, the choice is not between having a 
surrogacy law or not; it is between having inappropriate and ineffective law, or law 
that is specially designed, appropriate, and effective. 
The key aim of this project is to explore how surrogacy should be regulated and to 
consider the law’s role and purpose in relation to surrogacy. To this end, I chose to 
investigate two existing regulatory examples, namely those of Greece and the UK, and 
examine what, if anything, each jurisdiction might learn from the other. I also aim to 
evaluate how regulation can most effectively reflect the experiences and protect the 
interests of the parties in a surrogacy arrangement. 
                                                          
18 McCandless, J. et al (2013) (A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surr gacy in EU Member States), 
European Parliament http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474403/IPOL-
JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf; ESHRE, 2010. Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted 
Reproduction in the EU: Regulation and Technologies (SANCO/2008/C6/051) 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/blood_ tissues_organs/docs/study_eshre_en.pdf. Recently, the Council of 
Europe rejected proposals about the regulation of surrogacy at EU level (Blackburn-Starza, A. 'Council 
of Europe rejects surrogacy guidelines' (17/10/2016) <http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_715312.asp> 
accessed on 19/10/2016). In Russia, Georgia, Poland, and the Ukraine comm r ial surrogacy is allowed, 
whereas altruistic surrogacy is allowed in Greece, the UK, and now in Cyprus, and Portugal (Raposo 
VL, 'The New Portuguese Law on Surrogacy - The story of how a promising law does not really regulate 
surrogacy arrangements' (2017) 21(3) JBRA Assisted Reproduction 230). Within the EU, surrogacy 
agreements are enforceable only in Greece.  
19 The Hague Conference on Private International Law (2014) ‘The Desirability and Feasibility of 
Further Work on the Parentage/ Surrogacy Project’ Preliminary Document No.3B, April 2014. 
20 Jackson E, 'UK Law and International Commercial Surrogacy: 'the very antithesis of sensible'' (2016) 
4(3) JMLE 197-214; Hudson N and others, 'Cross-border reproductive care: A review of the literature' 
(2011) 22 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 673–685; Whittaker A and Speier A, '‘Cycling overseas’: 
Care, commodification and stratification in cross-border reproductive travel' (2010) 29 Medical 
Anthropology 363–383; Crawshaw M, Blyth E and van den Akker O, 'The changing profile of 
surrogacy in the UK. Implications for national and international policy and practice' (2012) 34(3) 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law. 
21 Jackson E, 'The law and DIY assisted conception' in Horsey, K. (ed), R visiting the Regulation of 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge 2015). Also, as will be seen later, this is evidenced 
by recent UK case law. 
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1.2 Importance and Contribution of the thesis 
My research shows that many arguments against surrogacy are made without support 
from empirical data or despite what evidence exists.22 I argue that respect for 
autonomy entails that individuals should be allowed to make use of surrogacy, 
provided that there are no good reasons for preventing them from doing so, and that 
regulation can mitigate or eliminate any risks.  
Many scholars have attempted to tackle on a theoretical level the puzzle of how best 
to regulate surrogacy. Some have done so by looking to international examples of 
regulation for inspiration. My research is the first to employ a detailed socio-legal 
comparison of the Greek and UK regimes. These two countries offer the potential for 
interesting and fruitful comparative study: they have both recognised the need to 
regulate surrogacy, but they vary significantly concerning the content of regulation, 
and present very interesting and significant points of convergence and stark 
divergence between them. 
Greek law provides for an intention-based model of parenthood founded on altruistic 
gestational surrogacy agreements,23 which, if pre-approved by the judiciary, can 
become enforceable upon the child’s birth, leading to an automatic acknowledgement 
of the intended parents’ (IPs’) parenthood. Despite how unusual and novel the Greek 
legal approach is, it is severely under-researched by Greek scholars, and is typically 
missing from the international literature. This thesis attempts to fill this gap. 
                                                          
22 Empirical evidence shows that former UK surrogates have had positive experiences, a d children 
face no adjustment or other psychological issues. See references in n27-29 below, and Blake L and 
others, 'Gay father surrogacy families: relationships with surrogates and egg donors and parental 
disclosure of children's origins' (2016) 106(6) Fertility and Sterility 1503; Jadva V, Imrie S and 
Golombok S, 'Surrogate mothers 10 years on: a longitudinal study of psychological well-being and 
relationships between the parents and child' (2015) 30(2) Human Reproduction 373; Golombok S and 
others, 'Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements: Parent–Child Relationships in the 1st Year 
of Life' (2004) 40(3) Developmental Psychology; Golombok S and others, 'Surrogacy families: parental 
functioning, parent–child relationships and children’s psychological development at age 2' (2006) 47(2) 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 213; Golombok S and others, 'Non-genetic and non-
gestational parenthood: consequences for parent–child relationships and the psychological well-being 
of mothers, fathers and children at age 3' (2006) 21(7) Hum Reprod; Golombok S and others, 'Families 
created through surrogacy: Mother-child relationships and children’s psychological adjustment at age 
7' (2011) 47(6) Dev Psychol; Readings J and others, 'Secrecy, dis losure and everything in-between: 
decisions of parents of children conceived by donor insemination, egg donation and surrogacy' (2011) 
22(5) Reproductive BioMedicine Online 485; Jadva V and Imrie S, 'Children of surrogate mothers: 
Psychological well-being, family relationships and experiences of surrogacy' (2013) 29(1) Human 
Reproduction 9. 
23 Surrogacy can be gestational (where the surrogate is not genetically related to the child and pregnancy 
can be attained only through IVF); and traditional surrogacy (where the surrogate is genetically related 
to the child, and pregnancy is attained in a clinic or at home). 
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In the UK, surrogacy has been partially regulated since 1985, but not as clearly and 
concisely as in Greece, which can potentially place IPs and children in an emotional 
and legal limbo.24 As in Greece, UK law allows only altruistic surrogacy. It provides 
for both gestational and traditional, but only regulates surrogacy that takes place in 
UK clinics. Although there is regulation regarding ARTs in clinics, there is no specific 
formal regulation for the practice of surrogacy in clinics, (traditional) at-home 
surrogacy is wholly unregulated, and there is no state oversight before and during the 
surrogacy arrangement. Moreover, law only refers to legal parenthood after surrogacy, 
but it is not necessary to go through a clinic for the parenthood rules to apply. 
Parenthood following surrogacy is based on gestation and birth, and surrogacy 
agreements are unenforceable. IPs may acquire parenthood post-birth through a 
parental order (PO) granted by the courts if certain conditions are met. The UK regime 
has been heavily criticised as confusing, incomplete, unrepresentative of the modern 
realities of surrogacy, and in dire need of reform.25 
Problematically, good, up-to-date empirical data about people’s experiences of 
surrogacy and its regulation are very limited in both countries, especially in Greece. 
Ragoné’s 1994 study exploring the motivations and the experiences of US surrogates 
is still the most cited in texts discussing the accounts of surrogates,26 but it is old, and 
focuses on the US context. Blyth’s 1994 UK research leads the field of empirical 
evidence regarding the incentives of surrogates,27 but that too is old. Other UK studies 
examine surrogates’ emotional responses to relinquishment,28 but do not offer a 
detailed depiction of people’s experiences of surrogacy regulation. More recent 
                                                          
24 Elsworth M and Gamble N, 'Are Contracts and Pre-Birth Orders the Way Forward for UK Surrogacy?' 
(2015) IF 157-161. 
25 For example: Fox M, 'The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: Tinkering At the Margins' 
(2009) 17 Feminist Legal Studies 334; McCandless J and Sheldon S, 'The HumanFertilisation and 
Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family' (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review 
175,180; Horsey K and Sheldon S, 'Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy' 
(2012) 20 Med Law Rev 74; Horsey K, Swept Under the Carpet: Why Surrogacy Law Needs Urgent 
Review, vol 5 (Wrigley, A. and N. Priaulx eds, Ethics, Law and Society, Ashgate 2013). 
26 Ragoné H., Surrogate Motherhood – Conception in the Heart (Westview Press, Colorado, USA 
1994). 
27 Blyth E, '“I wanted to be interesting, I wanted to be able to say ‘I’ve done something interesting with 
my life’”: Interviews with Surrogate Mothers in Britain' (1994) 12 Journal of Reproductive and Infant 
Psychology. 
28 Snowdon C, 'What makes a mother? Interviews with women involved in egg donation and surrogacy' 
(1994) 21(2) Birth 77–84; Baslington H, 'The social organization of surrogacy: relinquishing a baby 
and the role of payment in the psychological detachment process' (2002) 7 Journal of Health Psychology 
57-71; van den Akker OBA, 'A longitudinal pre-pregnancy to post-delivery comparison of genetic and 
gestational surrogate and intended mothers: Confidence and genealogy' (2005) 26 Journal of 
Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynecology. 
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studies focus on the psychological aspects of surrogacy,29 or on public attitudes 
towards it.30 
Furthermore, Busby and Vun’s study of US and UK surrogates provides important and 
interesting evidence, but the discussion centres around suggestions for legal reform in 
Canada only.31 Lastly, Horsey’s study is the only one that provides a more complete 
image of the participants’ experience of legal processes around UK surrogacy, but it 
has a quantitative approach.32 In Greece, the availability of good empirical data with 
regards to surrogacy is even more limited.33 One small-scale study explored public 
perceptions towards surrogacy,34 and another provided interesting data based on 
transcripts of judicial decisions authorising surrogacy,35 but did not examine how 
people experience the regulation. 
While the exact number of surrogacy arrangements is unknown, and impossible to 
estimate,36 surrogacy appears to be gaining social acceptance in the UK, as evidenced 
                                                          
29 van den Akker O, 'Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of Surrogacy' (2003) 21 
Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology; Jadva V and others, 'Su rogacy: The Experience of 
Surrogate Mothers' (2003)(18) Human Reproduction; Edelmann RJ, 'Surrogacy: The Psychological 
Issues' (2004) 22(2) Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 123-136; Ciccarelli JC and 
Beckman LJ, 'Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy' 
(2005)(61) Journal of Social Issues; Jadva et al, 'Surrogate mothers 10 years on’ (n22). 
30 Poote AE and van den Akker OBA, 'British Women's Attitudes to Surrogacy' (2009) 24(1) Human 
Reproduction 139-145; Appleton T, 'IVF (host) surrogacy' (1990) 4 The British infertility counselling 
Newsletter 7-15; Wiess G, 'Public attitudes about surrogate motherhood' (1992) 6 Mich Sociol Rev 15-
27; Chliaoutakis J, Koukouli S and Papadakaki M, 'Using attitudinal indicators to explain the public’s 
intention to have recourse to gamete donation and surrogacy' (2002) 17 Hum Reprod 2995–3002; van 
den Akker OBA, 'Psychological trait and state characteristics, social support and attitu es to the 
surrogate pregnancy and baby' (2007) 22(8) Hum Reprod 2287– 95; Jordan W, 'British Public: 
Legalise Paid Surrogacy' (08/08/2014) <http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/08/08/british-public-legalise-
commercial-surrogacies/> accessed on 27/09/2014. 
31 Busby K and Vun D, 'Revisiting the Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research 
on Surrogate Mothers' (2010) (26) Canadian Journal of Family Law.
32 Horsey K, Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform (Report of the Surrogacy UK Working 
Group on Surrogacy Law Reform, Surrogacy UK November 2015) 49. 
33 Chliaoutakis JE, 'A relationship between traditionally motivated patterns and gamete donation and 
surrogacy in urban areas of Greece' (2002) 17(8) Human Reproducti n 2187-2191; Hatzis A, 'From soft 
to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece' (2009) 49(3) 
Portuguese Economic Journal 205-220; Ravdas P, Surrogate Motherhood: The legislator's expectations 
tested by statistical data (Papachristou, T. K. and others eds, 21st Century Family Law: Coincidental 
and Fundamental Reforms - Law and Society in 21st century, Sakkoul s 2012); Papaligoura Z, New 
Routes to Motherhood (Papazisi 2013). 
34 Panagos K, Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework-criminal law 
perspectives (Sakkoulas: Athens-Thessaloniki 2011) 113-128. This study presents the views of an 
extremely limited group of interviewees, students at a University in Greece, young (18-23 years old), 
and with no experience of either infertility or parenting. 
35 Ravdas (n33) explored 136 judicial approvals of surrogacy issued between November 2009 and 
December 2011. 
36 Teman E, 'The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the 
Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood' (2008) 67 Social Science and Medicine 1104. 
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both by surveys exploring the public attitudes towards surrogacy,37 and the increased 
number of PO applications in UK courts.38 The situation in Greece appears to be quite 
similar; studies report that surrogacy has increased in recent years,39 and that up to 67 
fertility centres offer (or have offered) ARTs, including surrogacy.40 Also, there may 
be more surrogacy arrangements which occur informally and remain unreported in 
both countries. All the above suggests a need for socio-legal research and for more 
experience-led regulation in this area. 
Evidence from my empirical research casts light on how regulation in these countries 
is experienced by a range of key actors, including surrogates, IPs, representatives of 
surrogacy organisations, medical and legal practitioners, academics, and policy-
makers. Especially regarding Greece, my work reveals facts and experiences we have 
almost no knowledge of. My UK evidence confirms findings of previous studies and 
enriches the existing literature by challenging certain assumptions (which have 
affected policy) and by introducing a range of new concerns. 
Moreover, the questions addressed in my research are both important and topical. A 
2014 reform of Greek surrogacy law lifted the domicile requirement, opening the 
possibility for foreign couples to seek surrogacy in Greece. This amendment could 
make Greece yet another popular destination to those willing to travel for international 
surrogacy,41 and renders the critical evaluation of Greek surrogacy law an imperative. 
In the UK, surrogacy is about to be reviewed by the Law Commission,42 having been 
                                                          
37 Jordan (n30). A study by YouGov reported that 59% of British adults now approve of the process 
called gestational surrogacy, and only 21% disapprove it. 
http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/ubj8or4iat/InternalResults_140805_Surrogate_M
other.pdf accessed on 27/09/2014.  
38 Crawshaw et al (n20); Holly Rodger (Cafcass), Cafcass Study of Parental Order Applications made 
in 2013/14 (July 2015) 3; Horsey’s study (n32) 15,34. 
39 Ravdas (n33); Hatzis (n33). 
40 Note that these centres had been operating without monitoring and a licencefor many years (Karlatira 
P. '67 fertility centres [operating] without licence in our country [Greece]' (15/10/2014) 
http://www.protothema.gr/ugeia/article/418527/horis-adeia-oi-67-monades-upovoithoumenis-
anaparagogis-sti-hora-mas/  accessed on 19/11/2014). 
41 Stéphane Kovacs, ‘Greece: the Eldorado of surrogacy’ Le Figaro (3/10/2014) (in French) 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/mon-figaro/2014/10/03/10001-20141003ARTFIG00288-en-grece-l-eldorado-
de-la-gpa.php 
42 A project on surrogacy will feature as part of the Law Commission’s 13th Programme of Law Reform 
(Law Com No.377, 2017). Also, in late 2017, the government submitted a proposal for a remedial order 
that, if approved, will extend PO eligibility to single IPs (Hansard, Written satement-HLWS282). 
Lastly, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) recently published guidance to IPs, 
surrogates, and medical professionals about surrogacy, which is as evidence of the government’s 
support behind the Law Commission review: DHSC, Care in Surrogacy. Guidance for the care of 
surrogates and intended parents in surrogate births in England and Wales (28/02/2018); DHSC, The 
Surrogacy Pathway. Surrogacy and the legal process for intended parents and surrogates in England 
and Wales (28/02/2018). 
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the subject of parliamentary debates over the past few years.43 My findings might thus 
usefully feed into any such reform process. 
1.3 Chapter Overview 
In Chapter 2, I argue that autonomy grounds a prima facie right to have a child through 
‘traditional’ or artificial means, including surrogacy, unless there is a reason, based on 
autonomy and harm concerns, to impose limitations. I also demonstrate that, while 
none of these objections can justify the prohibition of surrogacy, when taken together 
with justice considerations, they suggest a need for specially designed, appropriate, 
and effective regulation of surrogacy. 
Drawing on existing theoretical and empirical literature, I proceed to envision the 
criteria of a ‘good’ surrogacy law. I suggest that these criteria relate to concerns 
regarding access to surrogacy, its regulation, and the determination of parenthood. In 
the chapters to follow, I use these three broad concerns as a way of structuring my 
socio-legal evaluation of the Greek and UK regulation of surrogacy, highlighting those 
aspects of the regulation that are interesting, significant, potentially problematic, and 
different between the two countries. These themes also served as the basis for the 
broad structure of my interviews. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I explore how and to what extent the Greek and UK surrogacy 
regimes, respectively, have attended to the concerns raised by the literature in the 
context of these three themes. I provide an overview of the historical development of 
each regime and examine the factors impacting on access to formal legal surrogacy, 
how each regulates issues arising during surrogacy arrangements, and how each 
determines parenthood following surrogacy. 
In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I focus in more detail on the three themes of access, regulation, 
and parenthood. Drawing on my interview data and the literature, I offer a closer 
examination of how the Greek and UK laws work in practice. In Chapter 5, I explore 
the factors identified by my interviewees as influencing access to surrogacy in these 
countries and evaluate how and to what extent statutory limitations on autonomy and 
equality are justifiable in light of welfare concerns. I also examine a range of factors 
other than regulation which exert important influence on access to surrogacy in Greece 
                                                          
43 House of Commons Debate (14 October 2014) Col 1WH; House of Lords Debate (14 December 
2016) Vol 777. 
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and the UK. In Chapter 6, I discuss how and how well these regimes regulate issues 
that arise (or may arise) during a surrogacy arrangement, and whether the statutory 
limitations on autonomy and equality are justified by harm concerns. In Chapter 7, I 
explore how well the Greek and UK legal parenthood provisions work, and whether 
limitations on autonomy are appropriate, proportionate, and effective. 
Finally, Chapter 8 offers a conclusion to the thesis and the opportunity to revisit the 
key arguments and findings of my research. I re-consider the strengths and the 
limitations of each regime, re-evaluate how each of them expresses and protects the 
interests of those involved in surrogacy arrangements, and reflect on what principles 
may underpin ‘good’ surrogacy regulation. I also discuss the wider contribution of my 
thesis and show how further socio-legal research is imperative. 
1.4 Methodology and Research Design 
My research is guided by a comparative socio-legal qualitative approach informed by 
a feminist perspective. This methodology offers the potential for rich insights into how 
we should strive to inform and reconstruct feminist socio-political ideas about 
surrogacy, family and regulation, and allows us to envision measures which will help 
modernise surrogacy law and make it more fit for purpose in Greece, the UK, and 
beyond. 
1.4.1. Feminist perspective combined with ethical analysis 
A feminist perspective combined with ethical analysis offers the basis for a sustained 
normative evaluation of surrogacy law, which pays particularly close attention to 
women’s experience, gendered harms and context. Christine Overall notes that, 
although feminist writers disagree on whether ARTs, including surrogacy, are harmful 
to women or if they offer an opportunity for women’s empowerment, it is important 
to continue feminist discussions in this field.44 Moreover, feminist ethics in 
reproduction ‘acknowledges the significance of women’s experience in all areas of 
reproduction…[and] challenges perceived opinions about reproduction’.45 
As is further discussed in Chapter 2, much of the literature is frequently very 
dismissive of surrogacy due to a presumed harm to women and their sense of self 
                                                          
44 Overall C, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis, vol 6 (Routledge Library Editions: 
Feminist Theory, Routledge 1987) 1, 116-18. 
45 Ibid 11. 
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without empirical evidence of such harm or, indeed, despite such evidence as does 
exist. I challenge these assumptions by citing specific empirical evidence 
demonstrating these claims are not only unfounded, but also unhelpful in advancing 
and resolving the surrogacy debate and in increasing reproductive autonomy and 
equality.46 Far from a justification for banning surrogacy, these concerns rather 
suggest the need for appropriate and effective regulation informed by empirical 
evidence that takes account of, in particular, women’s experience of surrogacy. 
Foregrounding the needs and experiences of women in this context might also serve 
to protect the interests of children, because they would most likely not have been born 
otherwise, and men, because, although they are not directly affected by the gender-
related concerns arising from surrogacy and cannot bear and experience pregnancy 
directly, they, too, are involved in the surrogacy arrangement and possibly in need of 
protection. 
My thesis is informed by a strong commitment to include the voices of women, 
allowing them to express their experiences, beliefs and ideas about surrogacy, its 
practice, and its regulation. This is done especially by contextualising the arguments 
against surrogacy within existing empirical research and supplemented by the findings 
of my own empirical research in Greece and the UK. This offers a more robust 
evidence-base for understanding the lived experience of surrogacy in Greece, the UK, 
and elsewhere. Although I interviewed a relatively small number of women (six 
women in Greece and five in the UK who are or have been surrogates or intended 
mothers (IMs)), their understanding is accompanied by evidence from other 
interviewees, who have extensive direct experience of working with surrogates and 
IPs or in designing regulatory framings. This evidence is particularly valuable 
regarding the Greek case, due to the scarcity of knowledge about the surrogacy 
experience. Additionally, my UK evidence helps update existing knowledge and 
understanding. 
The feminist perspective of this research also informed its refusal to rely upon a typical 
theoretical binary classification of interviewees according to their presumed expertise 
and knowledge. Traditional theoretical understandings of empirical qualitative 
                                                          
46 Sherwin argues that for medical ethics to be thought feminist, they must be put into a certain context 
and must attend ‘to the effect of these practices on women’s pursuit of greater power in a society that 
currently subordinates them’ (Sherwin S, 'Feminist and Medical Ethics: Two Different Approaches to 
Contextual Ethics' (1989) 4(2) Hypatia 68). 
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sampling assume that evidence produced from interviews with people who would be 
considered ‘experts’ in the field carry more authority than those produced from 
interviews with ‘non-experts’ or lay persons,47 which is why expert interviewing is 
very popular in empirical qualitative research.48 In order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the surrogacy practice and regulation in Greece and the UK, I chose 
to recruit participants with a variety of experiences and different kinds of involvement 
with surrogacy. 
Although I started from the assumption that the ‘experts’/’non-experts’ divide would 
work in this context, while talking to people who might be considered ‘experts’, I 
realised there were many aspects of the surrogacy practice and regulation of which 
they had very limited or no knowledge. In contrast, those who had direct experience 
as surrogates or IPs, and might be considered ‘non-experts’, often provided extremely 
valuable insights and detailed knowledge of relevant regulation, either because of their 
many personal experiences of surrogacy, and/or because they were actively involved 
in informal surrogacy practices, as for example volunteer work in UK surrogacy 
organisations which are unregulated, or non-clinical roles in fertility centres providing 
surrogacy. 
Surrogacy is unusual in the sense that current flaws in regulation mean that surrogates 
and IPs are required to develop a high level of expertise in order to navigate it. 
Therefore, in this context, it was important to disrupt the ‘experts’/’non-experts’ 
divide and give equal weight to the evidence collected by my entire sample. Turner 
has suggested that this approach can be advantageous, because it attributes equal 
authority to those who would otherwise have been less heard, and allows for a more 
democratic and holistic empirical qualitative analysis.49 Lastly, in another attempt to 
break down the divide between ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’, I also asked surrogates 
and IPs to extrapolate from what they had learned from their own experience of 
                                                          
47 Meuser M and Nagel U, Expertlnneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht. Ein Beitrag zur 
qualitativen Methodendiskussion (Bogner, A., B. Littig and W. Menz ds, Das Experteninterview, 
Opladen: Leske & Budxich 2002) 46; Flick U, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (SAGE 2009) 
165; Dorussen H, Lenz H and Blavoukos S, 'Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Expert Interviews' 
(2005) 6(3) European Union Politics 317; Bogner A, Littig B and Menz W, Introduction: Expert 
Interviews - An Introduction to a New Methodological Debate (Bogner, A., B. Littig. and W. Menz eds, 
Interviewing Experts. Research Methods Series, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2009) 2. 
48 Bogner et al (ibid) 1-2. 
49 Turner S, 'What is the Problem with Experts?' (2002) 31 Social Studies of Science 123-149. 
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surrogacy in Greece and the UK to offer more general reflections on appropriate, 
effective regulation, which yielded useful insights. 
1.4.2. Socio-legal comparative methodology 
Comparative methodology allows us to reflect on the specificity and contingency of 
the legal regimes under comparison and increases our understanding of social life and 
of policy issues.50 Patrick Glenn argues that comparative law can be used as a tool of 
learning and knowledge; as a way to identify common evolutions, diachronic changes, 
and legal families; as a way to contribute to understand and develop one’s own legal 
regime; and as a way to harmonise law.51 Ralf Michaels adds that comparing legal 
regimes allows us to build a system of rules, to determine the ‘better’ law, to unify 
law, and to produce a nuanced critical appraisal of it.52 
However, comparing only at the level of legislation and case law will not always 
provide the whole picture. Rather, a ‘law in action’ (as opposed to ‘law in the books’) 
approach offers a more nuanced and accurate understanding of how people experience 
law, and its effectiveness in practice.53 Moreover, if one is interested in the study of 
legal transplants, namely in exploring which legal rules and concepts could be 
transferred into the legal system of a different country, and how this could be best 
accomplished,54 one should adopt a socio-legal, law-in-context approach. This offers 
a more meaningful and accurate comparison of the different legal systems,55 and a 
deeper understanding of how and why policies are similar and/or different, how they 
impact on people, and whether and to what extent some rules can be adopted by other 
jurisdictions.56 
                                                          
50 Banakar R and Travers M, Studying legal culture (Banakar, R. and M. Travers eds, Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research, Hart Publishing 2005) 240. 
51 Glenn PH, The Aims of Comparative Law (Smits, J. M. ed, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006) 57-65. 
52 Michaels R, The Functional Method of Comparative Law (Reimann, M. and R. Zimmerman eds, 
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53 Roscoe Pound developed the ‘Law in Action’ theory (Pound R, 'Law in Books and Law in Action' 
(1910) 44(12) AM L Rev. Also, Van Hoecke M, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research' (2015) 
(12) Boom Juridisch 7,16). 
54 Michaels (n52) 341; Graziadei M, The Functionalist Heritage (Legrand, P. and R. Munday eds, 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, CUP 2003). 
55 Örücü calls this the ‘functional institutional approach’ (Örücü E, Developing Comparative Law 
(Örücü, E. and D. Nelken eds, Comparative Law: A Handbook, Hart Publishing 2007) 52); May T, 
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Other than the potential for a fruitful study offered by the Greek and UK regimes, 
another factor for choosing them was my linguistic ability and general cultural 
awareness, which is valuable when pursuing comparative research.57 Considering the 
scarcity of English-written research material regarding the Greek regime, this 
knowledge was necessary for the successful completion of this research. 
1.4.3. Qualitative empirical methodology 
My research employs a qualitative empirical methodology, which comprises of semi-
structured interviews in Greece and the UK. I chose this approach because I was 
interested in how surrogacy regulation works in practice, not merely how it looks on 
paper. Moreover, up-to-date good qualitative evidence on people’s experience of 
surrogacy regulation are either missing, as in the case of Greece, or very limited, as in 
the UK. I undertook my own qualitative research in both countries, drawing on the 
experiences of a range of key actors.58 While I initially categorised my interviewees 
as ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’, I later decided to disrupt this division, because this 
binary categorisation did not work for the entirety of my sample. 
I chose in-depth individual interviews among other methods of qualitative research 
(such as focus groups, online surveys, or participant observation) for various reasons. 
This method allows the researcher to ‘focus on the individual’,59 thus offering the 
‘opportunity for detailed investigation of each person’s perspective, for in-depth 
understanding of the personal context within which the research phenomenon is 
located, and for very detailed subject coverage’.60 Focus groups and group discussions 
give individuals less opportunity to express their personal accounts and experiences.61 
In addition, research aiming to ‘understand...motivations and decisions, or explor[e] 
                                                          
57 Van Hoecke (n53). 
58 I decided not to interview surrogate-born children, because there is already pl nty of evidence about 
the effects of surrogacy on children, specially through the series of research by the University of 
Cambridge Family and Child Psychology Research Centre (n22). Furthermore, children are considered 
a ‘vulnerable group’ (Tee SR and Lathlean JA, 'The ethics of conducting a co-operative inquiry with 
vulnerable people' (2004) 47(5) Journal of Advanced Nursing 536-54 ; Allmark P, 'The Ethics of 
Research with Children' (2002) 10 Nurse Researcher 7-19), and such interviews require a skilled 
researcher (Hewitt J, 'Ethical Components of Researcher–Researched Relationships in Qualitative 
Interviewing' (2007) 17(8) Qualitative Health Research 1153,1156). Lastly, I was able to find sufficient 
evidence about how regulation can better protect children’s interests through other interviewees. 
59 Van Hoecke (n53). 
60 Lewis J, Design Issues (Ritchie, J. and J. Lewis eds, Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social 




impacts and outcomes’ are better dealt with in an individual interview context, rather 
than a group discussion.62 
Another aim was to seek depth, richness, and diversity of experience, allowing for 
depth of analysis, instead of possibly a larger number of responses. Therefore, I 
decided early on that a survey would not be appropriate. Further, a structured 
questionnaire could not possibly record the deeply personal experience of surrogates 
and IPs and would provide less space for participants to analyse the problems with the 
current regime, while offering less opportunity to discuss possible measures for future 
legal reform. Importantly, due to the lack of organised systems for surrogacy in both 
countries, especially Greece, it would have been difficult to disseminate the survey 
and get sufficient and significant quantitative evidence. 
Furthermore, individual in-depth interviews were deemed more appropriate because 
this project touches upon very personal and delicate issues. Denscombe argues that in-
depth interviews can be useful for gathering evidence on emotions, experiences, and 
feelings, especially when the topic to be explored is highly sensitive and personal.63 
Surrogacy is often a way of alleviating infertility, which is a distressful and devastating 
experience for some individuals.64 Also, surrogacy is not an easy choice: IPs risk being 
harmed in various ways, and they often have to deal with labyrinthine laws and 
regulations, and lack of guidance and support by professionals. Surrogates may also 
experience harms.65 This method of interviewing provided a safe space for deeply 
personal experiences to be expressed. 
Lastly, I chose to use semi-structured interviews, because, compared to structured 
interviews, they allow more freedom to the researcher to ‘seek both clarification and 
elaboration on the answers given’ through probe questions.66 This provides the 
opportunity, and advantage compared with other qualitative research methods, to 
                                                          
62 Ibid 
63 Denscombe M, The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Proje ts (OUP 2003). 
Also, May T.(n55) 120. 
64 Menning BE, 'The emotional needs of infertile couples' (1980) 34 Fertil Steril 313-9; Berger DM, 
'Infertility: a psychiatrist’s perspective' (1980) 25 Can J Psychiatry; Harrison RF and others, Stress in 
infertile couples (Bunnar, J. and W. Thomson eds, Fertility and Sterility, Lancaster: MTP Press 1984); 
Link PW and Darling CA, 'Couples undergoing treatment for infertility: Dimensions of life satisfaction' 
(1986) 12 J Sex Marital Ther 46-59; Pfeffer N and Woollet A, The Experience of Infertility (London: 
Virago Press 1983); Keye JWR, 'Psychosexual responses to infertility' (1984) 27 Clin Obstet Gynaecol 
760-766. 
65 The possible harms to IPs and surrogates will be explored in Chapter 2. 
66 May T.(n55) 123; Lewis (n60) 58. 
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‘probe beyond the answers and…enter into a dialogue with the interviewee’.67 
Moreover, it gives room to the interviewees to ‘answer more on their own terms than 
the standardised interview permits’,68 but still enables the researcher to have ‘a greater 
structure for comparability over that of the focused interview’.69 In this context, it 
allowed for the distinctive elements of both regimes to be crystallised, and for 
suggestions for legal reform to be tested. 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE QUALITATIVE PART OF THE PROJECT 
1.4.3.1 Research sample - Recruitment and access: 
The selection of my interviewees was a mixture of convenience and purposeful 
sampling,70 aimed at representing the diversity of experience of surrogacy regulation 
in Greece and the UK. The most important criterion was the level of the participants’ 
involvement with surrogacy in those countries and the relevance of their experience 
to the theory. I was able to perform 28 interviews, 14 in each country, and my sample 
includes IPs, surrogates, academics from three different disciplines (law, psychology, 
and medicine), representatives of UK surrogacy organisations, policy-makers, and 
medical and legal practitioners. 
This relatively small pool of evidence makes a significant contribution to the literature, 
particularly given the paucity of empirical work done in Greece.71 Though my sample 
cannot capture the full variety of experiences of surrogacy in these countries, it does 
serve to emphasise specific limitations of the current regulation. The diversity of 
experiences and knowledge within my sample enabled me to ‘develop the theoretical 
ideas that [emerge from my] theory and [my] data’,72 and achieve saturation. Despite 
this diversity, there was a high level of consensus among my interviewees. 
Furthermore, I was more interested in accomplishing depth of analysis rather than a 
                                                          
67 Lewis ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 Ritchie R, Lewis R and Elam G, Designing and Selecting Samples (Ritchie, J. and J. Lewis eds, 
Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social Science Research Students and Researchers, London: 
Sage 2003) 107. A complete list of interviewees is included in Appendix C. 
71 For opinions about the optimal sampling size of a qualitative study see: S. E. Baker and R.  Edwards, 
How many qualitative interviews is enough? (NCRM 2016) < 
http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/4/how_many_interviews.pdf> accessed on 20/06/2016. Also, Kvale and 
Brinkmann mention that the usual size in interview studies is around 15, plus or minus 10 (Kvale S and 
Brinkmann S, Interviews. Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing (2nd edn, London: 
Sage 2009) 113). 
72 Edwards R and Holland J, What is Qualitative Interviewing? (Bloomsbury 2013) 6. 
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large sample, as this was more feasible in terms of time constrains and the aims of this 
project. 
Overall, despite criticisms of certain aspects of the regulation in each country, my 
interviewees believed that surrogacy in Greece and the UK works well, but, in some 
cases, this was despite the regulation, not because of it. Nevertheless, I accept that 
there may be more dangerous and exploitative practices of surrogacy that I was unable 
to access. The vast majority of the surrogates I interviewed in both countries were 
repeat-surrogates, namely they had done surrogacy more than once, which also 
suggests they had positive experiences. 
Although I later came to disrupt the ‘experts’/’non-experts’ binary, I initially 
conceived of these as two separate groups and adopted different methods of 
recruitment. I contacted all key actor interviewees (medical and legal practitioners, 
academics, and clinicians) through email to ask about their interest participate in my 
research and provided information about the content and aim of the research, the 
process and expected duration of the interview, and attached the information sheet 
(included in Appendix D). I then asked about their availability for interview, 
requesting they propose a location for the interview to take place. What was important 
and interesting as a research finding in itself was that many key actor interviewees in 
both countries, asked who else I had interviewed. When I revealed some of the names, 
excluding one lawyer who wished to remain anonymous, they suggested names of 
other individuals who I could and/or should contact. Therefore, they became 
gatekeepers. As Mikecz explains, ‘the researcher’s “track record” of interviews serves 
as proof of trustworthiness’,73 and results in facilitating the research process.   
Different methods were employed for the recruitment of IPs and surrogates. As I 
explain below, I recruited most through social media, through posts on other online 
sources,74 through personal contact made either during surrogacy conferences I 
attended during my studies, and/or through personal acquaintances. These 
participants, then, put me in touch with other valuable contacts and potential 
interviewees. The next section discusses recruitment of research participants in the 
                                                          
73 Mikecz R, 'Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues' (2012) 18(6) Qualitative Inquiry 
490. 
74 Kvale and Brinkmann (n71) 149; Fielding NG, Lee RM, Blank G (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of 
Online Research Methods (London: Sage 2008). 
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UK, followed by a section on recruitment of Greek interviewees. I end with a section 
on how interviews were conducted, and what ethical issues featured in this research. 
Recruitment of research participants in the UK: 
Regarding the choice of UK key actors to be interviewed, I was guided by my 
supervisors as to who would be most suitable for the purposes and objectives of my 
project. I approached key academics, representatives from all three reputable UK 
surrogacy organisations, and legal and medical practitioners that currently deal with 
UK surrogacy. Most of those contacted responded positively. 
One rejection came from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), 
the UK’s independent regulator of treatment using eggs and sperm, and of treatment 
and research involving human embryos, with responsibility for monitoring and 
licensing UK clinics. As some surrogacies involve treatment in UK clinics, I assumed 
the HFEA has a role in monitoring those practices. However, an HFEA representative 
informed me that no one from the HFEA could provide any information about how 
surrogacy works in the UK.75 This might be part of the HFEA’s attempt to demarcate 
the boundaries of its remit in a way that clearly excludes surrogacy. Nevertheless, the 
lack of evidence from the HFEA does not reduce the significance of my findings; I 
gathered valuable evidence about the HFEA’s role through a UK medical practitioner, 
and through representatives of UK surrogacy organisations. 
I also approached the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service 
(Cafcass), a non-departmental UK public body that represents children in family court 
cases, including PO applications, with a view to interview one of their representatives. 
However, I was informed I would have to go through a quality assurance process via 
their research governance committee (RGC), and that it would take approximately four 
weeks to get a response. After reading the guidelines for the RGC application, I 
realised that my application would most likely be rejected.76 Moreover, given that this 
was not an essential interview, it did not justify the bureaucracy involved. Instead, I 
aimed at collecting evidence about the role of Cafcass through IPs and surrogates who 
have gone through the PO process, and through legal practitioners. 
                                                          
75 Evidence from personal communication with an HFEA policy director on 18/03/2016. 
76 Their policy stated ‘PG students will not normally be supported’ (Cafcass Research Governance 
Framework, https://www.cafcass.gov.uk/media/214217/cafcass_research_governance_framework.pdf 
accessed on 01/10/2016) 
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I used various contact methods to recruit IPs and surrogates in the UK. First, I tried to 
recruit participants through three reputable UK surrogacy organisations: Surrogacy 
UK (SUK), Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS), and Brilliant 
Beginnings (BB). I believed this would yield positive responses, because these 
organisations generally promote openness and disclosure. I approached surrogates and 
IPs in conferences where they had shared their experiences, asking if they would be 
interested in being interviewed, and whether they could help me find me more 
potential participants. Three individuals agreed to be interviewed (Sarah and Natalie 
from SUK, and Marina from COTS), and assisted my search for further participants 
in two ways: firstly, they invited me to join their Facebook groups, where I posted 
about my research and shared my contact details with other members; secondly, they 
shared my information sheet on their message boards. This publicity attracted one 
SUK surrogate (Lauren), who then introduced me to her IPs (Simon and Steve), also 
SUK members. 
Additionally, I sought to speak to members of COTS and BB to understand the 
similarities and differences concerning the processes, ethics, and values of each 
organisation. However, after posting on their social media and their message boards, 
I received only one response from a COTS surrogate. By that time, I already had 
evidence from Marina (COTS surrogate) and had completed all interviews in the UK. 
My research is missing insights from surrogates and IPs from BB, because no one 
responded to my interview invitation. 
Lastly, I sought to interview surrogates and IPs who have chosen not to go through a 
surrogacy organisation and have (independent) informal surrogacy arrangements. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this aspect of surrogacy practice is unregulated, and, in many 
instances, UK judges have warned against independent surrogacy and matching 
online. Also, it is often assumed that those involved in independent surrogacy 
arrangements are more prone to exploitation. Since there is almost no empirical 
evidence available, I was interested to see how such arrangements work in practice, 
and whether these assumptions are accurate. I joined a few Facebook groups that 
facilitate independent surrogacy in the UK,77 and was successful in recruiting one 
surrogate (Jamie). 
                                                          
77 Note that these groups are ‘closed’ (only open to members). To gain access, one needs to request to 
join. Subsequently, the group administrator contacts the applicant and asks the reasons for joining 
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In summary, I interviewed four experienced surrogates (Sarah, Marina, Lauren, 
Jamie),78 each of whom had different involvement in UK surrogacy practice. Sarah is 
an experienced SUK surrogate and the organisation’s Chair. Marina is an experienced 
COTS surrogate, member of the Board at COTS, and a professional counsellor. Lauren 
is a SUK surrogate and, finally, Jamie is an independent surrogate and an administrator 
of a Facebook group that provides a space for IPs and surrogates to meet each other, 
match, and support one another. 
I also interviewed three IPs (Natalie, a mother of twins through SUK, who was also 
an SUK Trustee; and Simon and Steve, a gay couple who have become parents through 
SUK); two legal academics (Dr Kirsty Horsey, who recently performed a major 
quantitative study into UK surrogacy;79 and Professor Margaret Brazier, who chaired 
the Brazier Committee for UK surrogacy), one psychology academic (Dr Vasanti 
Jadva, a research member of the University of Cambridge Family and Child 
Psychology Research Centre), one clinician (Dr Sue Avery), two legal practitioners 
experienced in surrogacy cases (Natalie Gamble, family law solicitor and co-founder 
of BB; and Andrew Powell, family law barrister), and Helen Prosser who has co-
founded BB. Generally, in the UK, I experienced a high level of response to my 
invitations to interview, and a culture of openness and transparency regarding 
surrogacy. This is a point of stark difference between the UK and Greece, where I 
found a lot of secrecy. 
Recruitment of research participants in Greece: 
As regards the recruitment of surrogacy professionals in Greece, I first identified who 
would be more suitable, and contacted them directly through email. Since Greek 
surrogacy is not institutionalised through surrogacy organisations, as most UK 
surrogacy is, I had to employ a range of methods to engage IPs and surrogates. Even 
after extensive and continuous posting on social media (through Facebook groups and 
other infertility and parenthood online forums), on message boards of the largest 
fertility clinics in Greece, and promotion by the administrators of those groups and 
forums, I was able to interview only three surrogates and three IMs. Four interviewees 
                                                          
before allowing access. Therefore, these group administrators act as gatekeepers of access to 
independent surrogacy. 
78 Each had at least one successful surrogate pregnancy experience. As I explain below (under 
‘Anonymity’), I cite the first names of IPs and surrogates to (partially) protect their anonymity and offer 
the desired recognition. 
79 Horsey’s study (n32). 
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(Lena, Aria, Katerina, Giota) were introduced to me through personal acquaintances; 
the others found my details on online forums and contacted me (Elina and Areti). 
I interviewed two surrogates (Elina and Lena). Lena initially spoke under her role as 
a clients’ manager in a large Greek fertility centre. She also agreed to help me find 
surrogates and IPs to interview through online forums. Three months later, because 
she saw that all my efforts to find potential interviewees had been fruitless, she 
revealed that she had twice acted as a surrogate and agreed to be interviewed. 
However, she only consented to an email interview, refusing a telephone or Skype 
interview,80 because she was afraid of being overheard, putting her in breach of the 
non-disclosure agreement she had signed with her IPs. 
After Lena’s interview, I continued posting on online forums in search of other 
interviewees, and many months later I was contacted by Elina, who had been a 
surrogate for a couple in Greece. The IM was a Greek national who was medically 
unable to have a child and lived abroad with her (non-Greek national) husband. 
Additionally, I interviewed Katerina, a partner in a lesbian relationship, who acted as 
a ‘surrogate’ for her partner, because the clinic would not treat them otherwise.81 
Furthermore, I spoke to three IMs (Giota, who was looking for a surrogate at the time; 
Areti, a mother of twins through formal legal surrogacy in Greece; and Aria, 
Katerina’s partner). 
Also, I spoke to four medical practitioners (Dr Konstantinos Pantos, Ms Alexia 
Chatziparasidou, Dr Basil Tarlatzis, and Mr Haris Cazlaris). Three of them were in 
charge of clinics practising surrogacy at the time (Dr Pantos, Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr 
Tarlatzis), and two had been involved in policy-making for ARTs and in the National 
Authority for Medically Assisted Reproduction (NAMAR), equivalent to the UK’s 
HFEA (Dr Tarlatzis, Mr Cazlaris). Lastly, I interviewed one lawyer experienced in 
handling surrogacy cases in Greek courts, who asked to remain anonymous, one legal 
academic (Professor Aristides Hatzis), and a legal academic and advisor at the 
Hellenic National Bioethics Commission (Takis Vidalis). While my sample is small, 
the paucity of empirical research available about the surrogacy experience in Greece 
                                                          
80 A face-to-face interview was impossible, since I was not in Greece at the time, and was unable to 
travel due to my teaching commitments in the UK. 
81 Same-sex couples’ access to ARTs is unregulated in Greece, and the only option available to this 
couple was surrogacy. 
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means that the evidence gleaned from my Greek interviewees is significant and 
enlightening. 
As with the HFEA in the UK, I could not gather evidence from NAMAR. I emailed 
my request for an interview twice and called NAMAR’s offices three times, and all 
remained unanswered. It is possible that NAMAR was under-resourced and under-
staffed at the time, since it had started operations only a year before I made contact. 
Moreover, NAMAR is probably less used to dealing with researchers than the HFEA. 
Alternatively, this could be an attempt for NAMAR to demarcate its remit, as with the 
HFEA. 
Generally, there was significant reluctance to participate on the part of IPs and 
surrogates in Greece, despite my promise of full anonymity and confidentiality. This 
could be due to cultural grounds, and the popular Greek tradition pertaining that 
‘sexuality, reproduction, family relations belong to the realm of private domesticity’,82 
and should be kept secret from the public.83 This may also explain why ARTs (and 
surrogacy, in particular) are so under-researched in Greece,84 and vice versa; because 
ARTs are so under-researched, people are unwilling to participate. 
1.4.3.2 Conduct of interviews: 
Before I conducted my interviews in both countries, I sought and secured (June 2015) 
ethical approval from Kent Law School’s Research Governance Committee. Since 
                                                          
82 A. Chatjouli, I. Daskalaki and V. Kantsa, Out of Body, Out of Home. Assisted Reproduction, Gender 
and Family in Greece ((In)FERCIT, University of the Aegean 2015) 23, in English. Secrecy regarding 
infertility by Greeks was also observed in an earlier study: Tarlatzis I and others, 'Psychosocial impacts 
of infertility on Greek couples' (1993) 8(3) Human Reproduction 398, in English (as I mention in 
Chapter 3 (n1), almost all written material about Greek ARTs and surrogacy cited in this thesis is in 
Greek, unless otherwise stated, and I translated the citations in English). 
83 This is based on the Greek popular proverb ‘ta en oiko mi en dimo’, meaning that whatever happens 
at a household [oikos] should not be made public [dimos]. (Chatjouli et a  (ibid)). 
84 Chatjouli et al (n82: 19) claim ‘the majority of relevant research is about its legal dimensions with a 
few publications on its psychological aspects’ (for example: Abatzoglou G and others (eds), 
Approaches to medically assisted reproduction (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press 2006); 
Papaligoura Z, 'The Effects of In-Vitro Fertilization on Parent-Infant Communication' (PhD Thesis 
University of Edinburgh 1992), in English; Papaligoura (n33)). Ethnographic studies are still relatively 
rare: Paxson H, 'Reproduction as spiritual kin work: Orthodoxy, IVF, and the moral economy of 
motherhood in Greece' (2006) 30 Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 481-505, in English; Kantsa V (ed), 
Motherhood in the forefront. Recent research in Greek ethnography (Alexandria 2013); Kantsa V, 
‘Late’, ‘early’, ‘never’: Time, gender and technology in assisted reproduction (Moravec, M. ed, 
Motherhood Online, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle 2011); Tountasaki 《, Biological’, 
‘genetic’ and ‘socio-emotional’ mother: Conceptualisations of motherhood and familiarity in 
Parliament discourse related to assistance in human reproduction (Kantsa, V. ed, Motherhood in the 
forefront. Recent research in Greek ethnography, Alexandria 2013); Tountasaki E, "The child growing 
inside you will take from you too". Egg donation, motherhood an ki ship (Patakis 2015)). 
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ethical considerations should be an ongoing part of research,85 I showed due respect 
of them throughout the research process, namely before, during and after research.86 
Only one interview raised questions about whether advance approval from the NHS 
Research Ethics Committee (REC) was necessary, namely with Dr Sue Avery, the 
Director of the Birmingham Women's Fertility Centre that is based at Birmingham 
Women's NHS Foundation Trust. Having first consulted the NHS REC guidelines,87 
as well as the Health Research Authority (HRA) guidelines,88 I confirmed that such 
approval was unnecessary.89 
The interviewing process started in September 2015 (with two pilot interviews in 
Greece). The bulk of my Greek interviews were conducted by September 2016, with 
just one taking place later, in December 2016. The UK interviewing process started in 
March 2016 (with two pilot interviews) and was completed in June 2016. The 
interviewees that took part in the pilot interviews did not indicate that changes to the 
interview schedule were needed, and I continued with the same list of questions, 
probes and prompts for the rest of the interviews. 
The interview schedule was structured around the themes identified in Chapter 2, but 
I also allowed space for new themes to arise from the interviews to avoid biased 
interpretations.90 Due to the differences in surrogacy regulation in the two countries, I 
adopted slightly different interview schedules for each of them (Appendix F for the 
UK schedule, and Appendix G for the Greek one). To allow for comparability, I would 
explain the legal situation of surrogacy in the other country of research and ask 
interviewees to comment on the perceived and assumed strengths and weaknesses of 
both regimes. More importantly, I asked them whether they would consider adopting 
some elements of the other country’s regime and why (or why not). 
                                                          
85 Miller T and Bell L, Consenting to what? Issues of access, gate-keeping and ‘informed’ consent 
(Mauthner, M. and others eds, Ethics in Qualitative Research, London: Sage 2002). 
86 R. Wiles, S. Heath, G. Crow and V. Charles, Informed Consent in Social Research: A Literature 
Review (ESRC National Centre for Research Methods NCRM Methods Review Papers, NCRM/001, 
2005) 279. Also, Guidance 6.5, SLSA Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice (2003) 
http://www.slsa.ac.uk/index.php/8-general-information/4-slsa-statement-of-principles-of-ethical-
research-practice (hereafter SLSA Guidance). 
87https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-legislation/governance-
arrangement-research-ethics-committees/ . 
88 https://www.hra.nhs.uk/approvals-amendments/what-approvals-do-i-need/hra-approval/  
89 I confirmed this together with my supervisor on 10/11/2016 (private email communication with 
Professor Sally Sheldon). Also, official confirmation in Appendix B. 
90 Kvale and Brinkmann (n71) 236,238. 
43 
 
The prescribed time for the interviews was an hour to 90 minutes. With the exception 
of one interview that lasted only one hour, the rest of them lasted between 90 minutes 
to two hours, with two instances where the interview lasted more than two and a half 
hours. During the interviews, I used a digital recording device to record the 
conversation (if the participants agreed), and kept further notes to capture feelings, 
facial expressions and body language. Only one interviewee (the Greek lawyer) 
refused recording of our face-to face interview but allowed me to take extensive notes 
of our conversation. 
Due to the comparative socio-legal aspects of this project, the study involved travelling 
and conducting interviews within both Greece and the UK. The preferred method of 
interviewing was face-to-face interviews, because it allowed for the maximum level 
of active and simultaneous interaction between me and the research participants.91 
With regards to Greece, I realised that the key actors I wished to interview all lived in 
the two major cities:  Athens and Thessaloniki. All face-to-face interviews took place 
in these cities, except for my interviews with Lena, who agreed only to a telephone 
and email interview, and Areti, who agreed to a telephone interview, because she lived 
outside Greece at the time. 
All key actor interviews in Greece took place in the participants’ work offices, and 
most interviews with IPs and surrogates were conducted in the participants’ homes, 
except for Elina’s interview which took place in a quiet café Elina chose. Two other 
interviews took place virtually. My first interview with Lena, when she spoke as a 
clients’ manager at a large Greek fertility clinic, was by telephone, because I was not 
in Greece at the time, and our second interview, when she spoke as a surrogate, 
through email. As well as the privacy aspect mentioned above, she preferred to talk 
about her experience through emails, as she could reply in her own time. As the 
literature notes, email exchanges are asynchronous, and ‘the interviewer and 
interviewee are separated in time as well as space’.92 However, there were also 
important advantages. The interview required no transcription, and possibly allowed 
Lena ‘greater scope to think about any questions asked and, (…) encourage[d] more 
descriptive and well-thought out responses’.93 
                                                          
91 Ibid 82.  
92 Edwards and Holland (n72) 49. 
93 Lewis J, 'Making order out of a contested disorder: the utilisation of line support groups in social 
science research' (2006) 3 Qualitative Researcher 5; Meho LI, 'E-Mail Interviewing in Qualitative 
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For the UK interviews, I found that most key actors were based in or near London, 
except for Professor Brazier (Manchester), Dr Sue Avery (Birmingham), and Dr 
Vasanti Jadva (Cambridge). All key actor interviews took place in the interviewees’ 
offices, except for my interview with Dr Kirsty Horsey, which was conducted in a 
mutually agreed office space within the University of Kent in Canterbury. Most 
interviews with UK surrogates and IPs took place in their homes. Apart from Natalie, 
who lives in London, the rest lived quite far away from Canterbury, where I resided at 
the time of the interviews. For two of my interviews I travelled to the interviewees’ 
homes, and one interview with a surrogate (Lauren) was conducted at my home at her 
request.94 Some other interviews took place virtually, when a face-to-face meeting was 
not possible or desirable by the interviewee. One interview with a surrogate (Sarah) 
was conducted through telephone, and two through FaceTime (with Marina and 
Jamie), because they lived far away. The virtual interviews did not detract from the 
personal contact between the interviewer and the interviewee.95 However, I did 
experience a problem with my telephone interview with Sarah. After it was completed, 
I realised that certain parts of the recording were inaudible as the phone interfered with 
the digital recorder. Luckily, I was able to partly fix the problem through the sound 
editing software ‘Audacity’. 
1.4.3.3 Ethical issues: 
As in any social science research involving human participants, the study raised 
various ethical issues. Douglas mentions that professional ethics are useful as a 
guarantee against infringements on freedom of speech and research.96 Tim May adds 
that ethics ‘serve to remind social researchers about their obligation in the conduct of 
their work’.97 However, there is a sensitive balance to be struck, as extensive and 
inflexible ethical rules and complex research governance processes may lead some 
researchers to believe it is better to refrain from social research altogether.98 
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Throughout this research study I followed the Society of Legal Scholars Association 
(SLSA) guidelines. These state that researchers ‘should not undertake work of a kind 
that they are not competent to carry out’.99 From the early outset of my studies, I 
sought training in qualitative research methodologies and in conducting interviews. I 
attended a module run by the School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research 
(SSPSSR) for one term, which included an overview of literature on various 
qualitative research methodologies, and training in conducting, transcribing, and 
analysing interviews.  
Since my study involved interviews with human subjects, I was required to secure an 
ethics approval before I could go ahead. As mentioned above, this was sought and 
obtained in June 2015 (the clearance lasting until April 2017, as mentioned in 
Appendix A). I proceeded to contact potential research participants and performed two 
pilot interviews in each country to test my interview schedule (with Takis Vidalis and 
Aristides Hatzis in Greece, and with Vasanti Jadva, and Natalie in the UK). Attention 
to ethical issues was ongoing throughout the study. 
I will now discuss the following ethical issues: informed consent, anonymity and 
confidentiality, protection of the participants from harm, and protection of the 
researcher from harm. This is in accordance with the SLSA guidance that researchers 
‘should strive to protect the rights of those they study, their interests, sensitivities and 
privacy, while recognising the difficulty of balancing potentially conflicting 
interests’.100 
Informed consent 
The literature on ethics in social research highlights the importance of freely given 
informed consent of research participants prior to the conduct of such research.101 
Informed consent requires that ‘subjects have been provided with adequate 
information on what it is being asked of them, the limits of their participation, as well 
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as any potential risks that may incur in taking part in research’.102 The SLSA Guidelines 
also note that the researcher has a responsibility ‘to explain as fully as possible and in 
terms meaningful to participants, what the research is about, who is undertaking and 
financing it, why it is being undertaken, what risks, if any, are involved, what the 
research methods are and how it is to be disseminated’.103 Other scholars add that it is 
equally important to make research participants aware of their right to refuse to 
participate, the limits of confidentiality and anonymity, and of their right to renegotiate 
consent during the research, for example by withdrawing from it completely at any 
point, or by refusing to respond to some questions.104 This information can be 
communicated to the participants by way of a covering letter outlining the above.105 
Securing informed consent from the research participants in my study was extremely 
important, given that many of them would be talking about deeply personal issues. I 
created an information sheet (included in Appendix D) that contained all information 
about the purpose and aims of this research, information about ensuring and keeping 
anonymity and confidentiality, the process of interviewing, the duration of research, 
the collection and storage of the data, and the dissemination and publication of 
research results. I also informed participants of their right to withdraw at any time 
before, during, or after the interview without giving a reason, and to ask that any data 
relating to them be destroyed at any time before publication. Lastly, I informed them 
that they could refuse permission to record the interview. 
The information sheet was sent to all participants prior to the interview via email, and 
other forms of online messaging (such as through Facebook private messaging). 
During the first few minutes of my interaction with the interview participants, I asked 
whether they had read the information sheet, and if they had any questions. If they had 
not read the sheet, I provided them with a copy and requested that they take some time 
to read it. I then provided the consent form (included in Appendix E), asked them to 
read it carefully, and consider signing it. The form requested the participants to check 
the following: whether they had read and understood the information sheet, whether 
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they had been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and issues of 
confidentiality; whether they had been made aware that they can stop the interview at 
any point and/or withdraw from the research; whether they agreed for the interview to 
be recorded; and whether they agreed for quotations to be attributed to them in any 
publications, reports, web pages, and/or other research outputs. 
Inclusion of quotations in research outputs was subject to participants having the 
opportunity to see and to revise any quotations before they were used. I considered 
this to be a significant component of consent, and an opportunity to form a balanced 
research relationship between interviewer and interviewee, based on trust, openness, 
and transparency.106 Participants were also asked to provide a secure email address 
which would be used for the dissemination of the research results, and the approval of 
quotations. They were, however, reminded that, after the approval of the quotation, 
they could not amend or withdraw it. In fact, reviewing the full interview transcript 
was deemed important by many of my interviewees, and for some (especially key actor 
interviewees) a prerequisite to their provision of consent. For reasons of equality, I 
sent the full interview transcript to all my interviewees with specific indications about 
which quotations I intended to use for this thesis. In most cases, getting the 
participants’ approval for the use of quotations was unproblematic and 
straightforward, but in three cases, all involving key actors (an academic, a clinician, 
and a legal practitioner), the participants made numerous amendments in the interview 
text, and asked that some quotations be deleted, meaning I could not use them in my 
research. This required some negotiation to happen between me and the interviewees, 
but, in the end, I was allowed to use most of the quotations on the proviso that some 
amendments would be made which addressed the interviewees’ concerns.107 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
Another important ethical concern relates to ensuring the confidentiality of research 
participants. As Lewis explains, ‘anonymity means the identity of those taking part 
not being known outside the research team’,108 or, in the case of individual research, 
that the identity of the research subjects not being known to anyone apart from the 
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researcher. Confidential ty is related to ‘avoiding the attribution of comments, in 
reports or presentations, to identified participants’,109 if they wished for their identity 
to remain unknown. 
My interviewees were able to choose how they would like their personal information 
to be presented in my research. They could opt for complete anonymity, be ‘on the 
record’, or to allow some information (such as first name, place of residence and/or 
work, and professional affiliation relating to surrogacy practice, where appropriate) to 
be shared. As regards the IPs and surrogates, I gave them the option of complete 
anonymity, because I assumed they would want to keep their information private, 
particularly where that relates to intimate experiences or those that may carry some 
stigma. I also gave this choice to representatives of surrogacy organisations, because 
I assumed that it would be easier for them to disclose information about the practices 
in their organisations without fearing they could be identified. Lastly, the option of 
anonymity was given to key actor participants for reasons of equality and justice, 
though I expected that they would not object to speaking ‘on the record’, as this is 
usual practice. 
All surrogates and IPs agreed for their first names to be known to readers of my current 
and future work. In fact, some agreed for their full names to be disclosed, because they 
felt proud of what they did, and wished to encourage others to do the same. As Parker 
notes, anonymity can protect participants, but it can also ‘deny them the very voice in 
the research’.110 To balance the concern for the interviewees’ welfare, and the concern 
for making their voices heard, I decided (after consultation with those interviewees 
during the rapport phase) to share their real first names and the way of their 
involvement with surrogacy, which offers them the desired recognition. Notably, it is 
possible that these details make some interviewees readily identifiable, but they 
approved this approach. Although it does not completely reject the ‘expert’/’non-
expert’ binary, it does disrupt it. 
While the trustworthiness of the evidence is not compromised by not sharing the full 
names of these interviewees, it could be an issue in the case of key actor interviewees. 
Since the ‘expert’ interviewees in this study were purposefully chosen because of their 
expertise and high level of involvement in the regulation and practice of surrogacy in 
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Greece and the UK, their names and professional activities in surrogacy carry a 
particular weight, and possibly add reliability to the results of this research. All UK 
key actor participants agreed for their names and professional affiliations to be shared 
in this study and in subsequent publications. In Greece, one key actor, a Greek lawyer, 
did not consent to being named and did not wish for the interview to be recorded. 
The unwillingness of the Greek lawyer to speak ‘on the record’ is interesting, and 
unusual, but also evidences the secrecy around surrogacy in Greece. As many of my 
interviewees indicated, legal (and medical) practitioners in Greece are gatekeepers of 
access to surrogacy. Therefore, the lawyer probably wanted to remain anonymous to 
protect his/her good name in the field, and not compromise his/her future involvement 
in surrogacy. Moreover, Greek law makes it a criminal offence to act as an 
intermediary for surrogacy. Hence, it is possible that this practitioner refused to speak 
‘on the record’ in fear of being accused of acting as a mediator. This concern highlights 
the need for better regulation of surrogacy in Greece. Although anonymity removes 
the assumed authority that would accompany the evidence of a named key actor, the 
evidence provided is still important in helping to address the noteworthy scarcity of 
evidence about how Greek surrogacy works. 
Furthermore, ensuring confidentiality does not only affect ‘what information should 
be available to whom’;111 it also ‘has implications for data storage’,112 meaning that 
documents relating to the empirical component of the research should not compromise 
the participants’ anonymity in any way. The interview recordings were not accessible 
to anyone apart from me, and all documents containing person-identifiable 
information were kept safe and locked away. All digitally saved data were saved in 
password-protected and encrypted folders on my personal laptop, and an external hard 
drive. My interview notes are locked in a drawer in my home office, in separate folders 
from consent forms and other documents containing person-identifiable information. 
The recorded interviews were transcribed and, where appropriate, translated (from 
Greek to English) by me in full, and subsequently saved in my personal laptop in an 
encrypted folder, and stored separately from the recording and the rest of the person-
identifying information (for those who asked to remain fully or partly anonymous). 
After the transcription was completed, I sent the interviewees the contextualised 
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quotations, so that they could read them and decide if they wanted to amend them 
before being included in my work. I also ensured that I removed parts the interviewees 
explicitly told me during the interview not to include in my study, as well as potentially 
identifying details of third parties (for example, where names of people, firms, clinics, 
and other surrogacy organisations were mentioned). This was done not only to respect 
the limits that the participants themselves had placed on their consent, but also to 
protect third parties from potential harm in case someone could identify them without 
their consent. 
Protection of the research participants from harm 
Though risks relating to this project were deemed minimal, and while none of my 
interviewees belonged to a vulnerable group, I did take seriously the duty to ensure 
the interviewees’ welfare and safety throughout this research.113 I assumed that 
participants with a professional involvement with surrogacy were unlikely to 
experience any distress, and in fact they did not, as they were not discussing personal 
experiences. It was, however, possible that some emotional distress could be caused 
if some individuals, particularly the surrogates and IPs, had had a bad experience of 
surrogacy and would find it hard to discuss.  
However, the IPs that I interviewed in both countries were a self-selected group and 
none appeared to find it particularly hard to discuss their experiences. Where a small 
number of questions risked making participants feel uncomfortable (an unavoidable 
aspect of research into sensitive topics), I re-emphasised that everything said in the 
interviews was confidential and participants had the right to speak off the record 
whenever they wished. Also, I reminded participants about their right to set aside 
certain questions for later, or disregard questions in their entirety.  
With regards to interviews with surrogates, although I mostly focused on their 
experiences with the legal aspects of the process, which are less emotionally charged, 
I anticipated that relinquishing a child could have been emotionally difficult. 
Nevertheless, I was struck by the way in which the surrogates who participated in my 
study experienced this process. Contrary to my expectations, they said they were not 
distressed by the experience, but had found it very affirming and fulfilling. The most 
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significant emotion displayed by the surrogates rather came out when they recounted 
how hard it was for the IPs to deal with their difficulty in having a child. 
On two occasions of interviewing surrogates, one in Greece and one in the UK, the 
women teared up when discussing how difficult it was for the IPs to complete their 
journey to parenthood. In both cases, I immediately offered to stop the interview and 
take a moment to re-group, reminding participants that they could refuse to answer 
further questions, but both wished for the interview to continue as normal. Also, one 
IP in Greece became upset while discussing how hard it was for her to find a surrogate, 
given the lack of systems to help IPs to do so. Again, I offered her the option to pause 
for a moment or to stop the interview completely, but she refused, and we continued 
our discussion. 
Protection of the researcher from harm 
It is important to also consider the researcher’s wellbeing during the conduct of 
research. Lewis notes that ‘risk arises in different ways in public areas (such as 
when…travelling to appointments) and in private fieldwork venues (such as the 
participants’ homes)’.114 As part of the location of research was outside the UK (where 
I was based at as a researcher), I had to become familiar with the UK government’s 
foreign travel advice guidelines.115 Greece was not deemed to be a high risk country 
to travel to and, given that I am a Greek native, I was familiar with local customs and 
etiquette. 
I also arranged to maintain contact with others before and after the end of each 
interview. My supervisors had knowledge of my interview schedule, and, depending 
on the location of research, other people were always aware of my whereabouts during 
the interviews. For interviews conducted in Thessaloniki, I had continuous contact 
(before and after the interviews) with my parents, who live there. The point of contact 
for the time spent researching in Athens was my partner who lives there. Lastly, when 
I conducted interviews in the UK, I maintained contact with my house-mate. I made 
sure that my phone was always charged and kept in close reach, and had also provided 
all the individuals mentioned above and the University with the name and telephone 
                                                          




numbers of my emergency contacts in Greece and the UK (my father and partner in 
Greece, and my supervisors and house-mate in the UK).  
Given that one of the interviews was conducted in my own home, I took different 
measures to ensure my safety. My house-mate knew about my meeting and was 
awaiting a text from me as to whether the interviewee had arrived. My house-mate 
arrived at the house a little after the interviewee, but did not enter the living room, 
where the interview was taking place, so as not to disrupt us, and to avoid breaching 
the interviewee’s confidentiality. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the background and rationale of this doctoral research and 
provided a summary of the research questions and aims, as well as an overview of the 
thesis chapters. Furthermore, it offered a summary of the methodological approaches 
engaged in my study. The next chapter examines how surrogacy should be regulated 




Surrogacy in Context – Normative Framework 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the major ethical considerations regarding surrogacy. I argue 
that respect for autonomy grounds a strong presumption that individuals should be free 
to enter surrogacy arrangements, unless there are good reasons for preventing them 
from so doing, and that any restrictions must be necessary and proportionate to the 
harm to be prevented. The autonomy principle is crucial in surrogacy because it can 
‘tell us whether surrogacy should be legal, whether commercial surrogacy is an option, 
and what freedoms the pregnant woman should have to make decisions during 
pregnancy’,1 which essentially covers most of the problematic issues relating to the 
practice. 
I thus begin by setting out why we should care about autonomy in this context, before 
turning to explore a range of objections to surrogacy that purport to offer good reasons 
why autonomy should be limited.  These ‘good reasons’ fall broadly into three 
grounds: first, it is claimed that the exercise of true autonomy is impossible in 
surrogacy; secondly, that surrogacy causes harm; and thirdly, that surrogacy practices 
offend against a concern with justice. I conclude that while none of these objections 
offers a convincing reason to go as far as to prohibit surrogacy, that between them, 
they raise a range of concerns suggesting the need for robust regulation, which can 
ensure autonomous choice, prevent harm, and promote equal, fair, and affordable 
access and practice of surrogacy. I end by summarising what responding to these 
disparate concerns requires of the work to be done by a ‘good’ surrogacy regime. 
These criteria subsequently form a basis in evaluating how well the Greek and UK 
legal models regulate surrogacy. 
                                                          




2.2 Autonomy in the context of reproduction 
2.2.1 What is autonomy? 
Autonomy is significant in debates relating to philosophy, law and policy, and an 
important tool in reproductive decision-making. A general definition refers to one’s 
ability ‘to live [one’s] own life, in accordance with [one’s] own values and desires’;2 
simply put, one’s ability to evaluate one’s needs and desires, make decisions, and act 
upon them. While the literature on autonomy is enormous, ‘there is little agreement 
about the nature of autonomy and its meaning in moral or political philosophy, applied 
ethics and law’.3 As Dworkin notes, ‘autonomy’ is a broad and abstract concept that 
has been employed 
‘sometimes as an equivalent of liberty…[and] to self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes 
as identical with freedom of the will. It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, 
independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of self-
assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom of obligation, with absence of external 
causation, with knowledge of one’s own interests’.4 
Historically, the problematisation of the meaning and significance of ‘autonomy’ finds 
its origins in the Enlightenment and Immanuel Kant’s philosophy on morals. Kant 
argues that autonomy is based on one’s ability for practical reason,5 which, as 
Christman explains, refers to one’s ‘ability to use reasons to choose [one’s] own 
actions’,6 and one’s ability to stay true to these self-imposed rules, so that they become 
universal moral law. Therefore, autonomy is not only limited to one considering what 
would make oneself happy; one also has to consider what other rational persons would 
choose to do if in that position, and how this decision might affect other people’s ends.7 
For Kant, autonomy is the ability of one’s will to be a universal law that would treat 
other individuals with respect, as ends in themselves, ‘never merely as a means to an 
end’.8 
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However, more contemporary understandings of ‘autonomy’ appear to centre around 
individualism, namely the freedom of personal choice and one’s ability to govern 
one’s own life as suits one best.9 In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that one ought 
to be free to do as one wishes, to be the author of one’s life.10 Mill contends that this 
freedom might justifiably be limited only when one’s actions pose harm to another 
individual (commonly known as ‘the harm principle’).11 Furthermore, contemporary 
understandings of autonomy are closely related to liberalism, a theory that begs us to 
look at the relationship between the individual and the State, and protect the individual 
from unwarranted interventions from the State.12 
In bioethics literature, autonomy is generally linked to patient autonomy, and to 
‘liberal ideas about the self and about the individual’s role in making healthcare 
decisions’.13 Beauchamp and Childress, define autonomy as the patient’s freedom of 
choice in decision-making.14 They further argue that it is possible for one to be 
autonomous but unable to make an autonomous decision due to lack of information or 
to coercion, and that the determining factor of autonomy in healthcare settings relates 
to informed consent.15 While justifications for autonomy and its precise nature are 
contested,16 it is broadly accepted that autonomy is important.17 
2.2.2 Prerequisites for autonomous decision-making and relational autonomy 
Most theories of autonomy refer to two conditions enabling autonomous choice: 
authenticity and competency.18 As Nelson explains, authenticity is associated with ‘the 
ability to reflect on and endorse or identify with one’s “first-order” desires, so that one 
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is able to act on values that in some concrete sense are one’s own’.19 Competency 
relates to other features and conditions enabling the individual to be autonomous and 
flourish;20 these might ‘include the capacity for “self-control”, rational thought, and 
freedom from debilitating pathologies, systematic self-deception and so on’.21 
Additionally, competency could be linked to one’s ability to be ‘relatively unimpeded’ 
by circumstances preventing one to self-reflect, such as coercion, manipulation, and 
deception.22 
Also, some feminist accounts of autonomy emphasise the existence of social 
conditions that might either promote and increase autonomy, or impede autonomous 
action.23 According to a feminist view, society creates conditions which are oppressive 
to women, and this impacts on our choices, which eventually are not or cannot be fully 
autonomous.24 Yet, the mere existence of unequal and oppressive conditions does not 
completely rule out the possibility of autonomous action. What is critical is that social 
conditions are constructed to ensure and promote autonomy even within situations of 
more general oppression.25 
The conception of autonomy based on the socialisation of human conditions is defined 
as ‘relational autonomy’.26 It stems from the feminist struggles that aimed to give 
women the liberty ‘to shape [their] own lives, to define who…each [of them] are, 
rather than accepting the definition given to [women] by others (namely men, and 
male-dominated society in particular)’.27 Some argue that by recognising relational 
autonomy, we give women a voice, one that is arguably different from that of men,28 
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because the value women place on relationships is higher.29 Lastly, relational 
autonomy is a useful tool, because it might help to develop ‘better laws and 
institutions’,30 which will show more respect for women’s experiences. 
Nevertheless, relational autonomy has been criticised for placing undue importance 
on relationships and less on individuals, namely it might lead one to think that ‘if you 
are not in the right kinds of relationships, or if you are in the “wrong” kinds, you are 
not autonomous’.31 Nelson proposes the adoption of ‘a more nuanced and 
contextualised understanding of autonomy’,32 which recognises the existence of 
oppressive socialisation but also places the individual at the centre of the debate. This 
conceptualisation involves both the ability and capacity to make choices, and the duty 
to ‘ameliorate the conditions that lead to oppressive socialisation by educating and 
counselling individuals making healthcare decisions’.33 
In other words, every individual who has the capacity to evaluate her values and 
desires and make her own choices should be free to do so, and the State has a 
corresponding duty to refrain from erecting unjustified barriers to the exercise of this 
choice, and, following Nelson, possibly also to promote the conditions that enable the 
exercise of autonomy.34 This theorisation helps us better understand the meaning and 
importance of reproductive autonomy (and autonomy in surrogacy in particular), 
because it not only places the individual at the centre of the debate, along with social 
(and sometimes oppressive) conditions relating to reproductive decisions, which are 
complex and personal; it also poses the question about whether the State has not only 
a negative duty of non-interference but also a positive duty to ensure that all 
individuals can exercise their autonomy and do it freely, fairly and equitably. 
2.2.3 What is ‘reproductive autonomy’ and why does it matter? 
As discussed earlier, reproductive decisions are potentially the most intimate choices 
in human endeavour, and autonomy is very important in this context.35 Formal legal 
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recognition of procreative freedom is found in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR),36 and English common law, where it is not clearly stated but 
implied.37 Other countries have acknowledged reproductive freedom as a fundamental 
constitutional right.38 However, there is still much ambiguity as to what reproductive 
autonomy entails, and what the legal implications of the recognition of such a right 
may be. 
A concern with reproductive autonomy may be seen as originating in the struggles for 
access to birth control from the mid-nineteenth century,39 but, with advances in 
reproductive medicine and artificial reproduction, autonomy came to mean something 
more.40 Robertson suggests hat ‘full procreative freedom includes both the freedom 
not to reproduce and the freedom to reproduce when, with whom, and by what means 
one chooses’,41 either through ‘traditional’ or artificial means, limited only in cases 
where ‘tangible harm [was caused] to the interests of others’.42 Also, as discussed 
above, according to more contemporary understandings of autonomy, the negative 
aspect of reproductive autonomy would include that the State does not erect any 
barriers on the individual’s freedom of choice. 
Drawing on the general definition of ‘autonomy’, ‘reproductive autonomy’ involves 
one’s prima facie right and ability to make one’s own choices regarding reproduction 
after having considered one’s own values, needs and desires, and one’s ability to act 
upon these decisions.43 However, any such right should be balanced against harm that 
may be caused to others as a result. This concern is particularly important in the 
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36 Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for family life). 
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example, in Evans v The United Kingdom (Application no.6339/05). 
38 Article 5(1) Greek Constitution recognises the freedom of expression, which includes the right to 
reproduce though traditional or artificial means (Trokanas (n7)). Canadian jurisprudence recognised a 
right to procreate in R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30, 63 OR (2d) 281. Also, Robertson argues that 
US courts have accepted such a right (Robertson JA, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New 
Reproductive Technologies (Princeton University Press 1994)). 
39 Robertson (n35) 405. 
40 O’Neil O, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2002) 57-58. 
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43 Jackson E, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2001) 828; 
McLeod (n18) 2. 
59 
 
reproductive context, because ARTs involve ‘the cooperation of others’,44 who might 
incur harm and have an interest in being protected; this may justify limitations on 
autonomy. More specifically, surrogacy involves both the decision about whether or 
not to reproduce, but also the decision to use another woman’s body for a very intimate 
purpose. 
In 1990s, some feminists believed that autonomy is and should not be the only 
principle that matters in reproduction,45 and some demanded a ban on ARTs, including 
surrogacy, based on concerns about harm to women’s bodily autonomy,46 because 
assisted reproduction involves procedures that are intrusive, potentially dangerous for 
woman’s physical and emotional health and have limited success.47 Others asserted 
ARTs forced ‘women…to negate their own bodies, [and] treat…their bodies as 
instruments for their own or someone else’s reproductive goals’.48 Moreover, some 
claimed that ARTs reinforced gender norms depicting women as nurturers and care-
givers, and defined motherhood as women’s ‘destiny’.49 Others argued that ARTs 
strengthened the negative effects of medicalisation on women (since they are the main 
recipients of infertility treatments), and ultimately rendered women unable to control 
their own bodies and reproductive capacities, thus increasing male dominance.50 
Lastly, some claimed true consent to ARTs is impossible, because social oppression 
influenced women’s reproductive decisions rendering them non-autonomous.51 
Whilst these feminist critiques are significant, they cannot and should not lead to a 
total prohibition of ARTs, including surrogacy, because this would be a denial of 
women’s autonomy. Rather, respect for reproductive autonomy means that ARTs are 
available to and accessible by all, and that we should ‘focus our attention on whether 
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48 Raymond (n45) 205; Radin M, 'Market inalienability' (1987) 100 Harvard L w Review. 
49 Callahan, C. and Roberts, D.E., ‘A Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting 
Technologies: A Case-Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory’, Kentucky Law Journal, 1995,1211. 
50 Corea (n47); Raymond (n45); Overall C, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist 
Analysis (Allen and Unwin, Boston, MA 1987) 124,167-170; Satz D, 'Markets in Women’s 
Reproductive Labor' (1992) 21(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
51 Corea (n47); Franklin (n45). 
60 
 
conditions exist that actually permit (or foster) the meaningful exercise of reproductive 
choice’.52 As such, the feminist concerns noted above should be treated as creating a 
rebuttable presumption about the potential negative effects of ARTs on women, 
requiring attention to the question of whether appropriate regulation serves to protect 
women’s interests and to enable them to fully participate in society as autonomous 
members.53 Moreover, any restriction on autonomy should be necessary and 
proportionate to the harm to be prevented.  This means that the question of whether 
appropriate regulation is sufficient is an empirical one, requiring not just theoretical 
analysis but also a detailed, concrete consideration of how surrogacy operates in 
practice, and what role regulation can play in protecting the welfare of key 
participants. 
Furthermore, I argue for a negative right to autonomy, meaning that the State should 
not erect any barriers to surrogacy, but once surrogacy is permitted, the State, has a 
general duty to protect the vulnerable from exploitation in access to reproduction, to 
ensure equality and ease of access, to eliminate (or, at least, so far as possible to limit) 
the risk of harm that might arise in this context, and to prevent discrimination against 
certain groups through specially designed, appropriate and effective law and 
regulation. I have thus far shown that autonomy grounds a prima facie right to women 
to decide whether to act as surrogates and to IPs to try to have a child through 
surrogacy, unless any of the objections considered below offers sufficiently strong 
reasons to prohibit them from doing so. If these reasons are deemed insufficient to 
prohibit surrogacy, the State has a duty to foster the conditions that support the 
exercise of autonomous choice, and to guarantee equal, fair and effective regulation 
regarding access, regulation during surrogacy and determination of legal parenthood, 
which, as will become apparent from the analysis below, essentially respond to the 
major concerns arising from surrogacy. 
2.3 Objections to Surrogacy 
This section discusses the most important arguments against surrogacy. To facilitate 
the analysis in this complex and large body of literature, I divide the objections into 
two distinct groups. I begin by considering the autonomy-based objections, in which 
it is claimed that surrogacy is immoral and should be illegal because autonomy (and 
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thus valid consent) is impossible.54 I then examine harm-based objections, according 
to which surrogacy causes harm to the surrogate, the children, and/or the IPs. The 
claim that surrogacy objectifies women and/or children is dealt with here as part of the 
claim that they are harmed in surrogacy. I conclude that, while these objections raise 
significant concerns, they would only justify a ban on surrogacy if it were impossible 
to address them through appropriate regulation. 
2.3.1 Autonomy-based objections 
The claim here is that those entering surrogacy arrangements do not act autonomously, 
and, therefore, it makes no sense to justify surrogacy in terms of respect for autonomy. 
This argument may take three forms. First, it might be suggested that autonomy is 
impossible in surrogacy because the surrogate cannot predict her emotional response 
to pregnancy and relinquishment of a child in advance. Second, it might be claimed 
that autonomy is impossible because certain conditions influence the surrogate in her 
decision, which might invalidate her consent. Third, it might be suggested that 
autonomy is impossible because the surrogate’s consent cannot be fully informed. 
• Autonomy is impossible because no surrogate can truly know her own mind in 
advance 
The claim here is that the surrogate cannot provide valid advance consent to surrogacy, 
because she may come to bond with the child during pregnancy and may later find it 
hard, or even impossible, to relinquish her to the IPs.55 As Oakley highlights, this 
claim, ‘when conjoined with some moral principle about the justifiable limits on the 
ways others can be expected to exercise their autonomy on our behalf, is often taken 
to establish’ that surrogacy is unethical.56 However, the unpredictability of the 
surrogate’s response to pregnancy and relinquishment does not necessarily render her 
consent invalid, her decision less autonomous, and, thus, surrogacy unethical. Consent 
does not require one to have complete knowledge of one’s future emotional state.57 
This would require one to have first experienced a certain circumstance or to be able 
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to foresee one’s actual future psychological state for one’s consent to be deemed valid, 
which arguably is just too demanding a standard.58 
Moreover, it is illogical to say that all surrogates are non-autonomous. As Dodds and 
Jones rightly note, each woman experiences pregnancy differently; even the same 
woman may have different experiences in each pregnancy, if she has more than one.59 
They further note that sadly there can be no guarantee that the surrogate will not get 
attached to the child and she will not be devastated by relinquishing her to the IPs.60 
Nevertheless, they suggest that this is not a strong reason to prohibit surrogacy if 
autonomy might be respected through alternative, less restrictive measures, such as 
the offer of counselling services and monitoring of surrogacy arrangements through 
an independent surrogacy board.61 
Additionally, what is often stipulated in debates against surrogacy is that women 
cannot make an autonomous decision because ‘emotions have a kind of sui generis 
unpredictability, which…entails that we lack information about them which is crucial 
to decisions involving emotional risks’.62 Purdy, however, emphasises that this type 
of unpredictability of emotions during and after pregnancy is not unique to 
surrogacy.63 Rather, this might be the case for any pregnancy,64 therefore, surrogacy 
cannot be prohibited based on this argument.  
Oakley further argues that the unpredictability of the surrogates’ emotions is not 
enough of a reason to ban the practice, because it is possible to predict one’s future 
psychological state either by examining ‘the pattern of [one’s] past emotional 
responses to [similar] situations…[or by looking] for a pattern of response...via a 
certain emotion-type itself’.65 If the potential surrogate has not had any experience of 
pregnancy and relinquishment (such as, previously having given up a child for 
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adoption or having had an abortion), she can try to remember how she had felt when 
she was in a state of major grief and regret before she consents to surrogacy. Her later 
consent would be valid and autonomous. 
It could also be argued that the provision of professional counselling could help the 
surrogate reflect on any previous experiences of grief, and prepare herself to re-apply 
these coping mechanisms in the future if she experiences emotional pain due to 
relinquishment.66 Tieu, however, argues that this constitutes a denial of surrogates’ 
autonomy, because they are required to control their emotional responses be applying 
“cognitive dissonance” reduction strategies.67 
Beyond these theoretical concerns, there is also an important point to be made 
regarding the need for law and policy in this area to be evidence-based before any 
limitations are placed. In a study of 125 cases of surrogacy, Appleton reports that, 
despite the assumption that the surrogate might come to regret her initial decision, this 
is in fact rare.68 Van den Akker also argues that the surrogates she interviewed knew 
their minds from the start of the surrogacy journey until post-relinquishment and that 
they retained their autonomy after the arrangement was completed, which indicates 
that they have made an autonomous choice.69 Consequently, while this concern may 
suggest the need for further longitudinal empirical studies on the effects of surrogacy 
on surrogates’ psychology, the argument that surrogacy should be banned due to the 
unpredictability of the surrogate’s response to pregnancy and childbirth, appears to 
fail on empirical grounds.  And, in any case, it is insufficient to support a total ban on 
surrogacy unless and until it has been established that the concern might be addressed 
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through less restrictive means, for example through the offer of professional 
counselling to surrogates.70 
• Autonomy is impossible in surrogacy because the surrogate may be influenced by 
certain conditions that might invalidate her consent 
Some claim that a woman cannot make an autonomous choice to act as a surrogate, 
because her consent might be vitiated, for example by her potentially dire financial 
situation. She might then find it difficult to refuse an offer to earn a living by acting 
as a surrogate.71 In such a case, consent to surrogacy could be thought to be a product 
of some form of coercion,72 which is a reason to regard it invalid. The assumption is 
that ‘no one would choose to…rent their wombs, if there were any other economic 
options’,73 and, therefore, anyone who chooses to do so does not act voluntarily. 
The above line of argument relates, first and foremost, to commercial surrogacy 
arrangements. It suggests that the availability of payment (over and above ‘reasonable’ 
expenses) may leave the door open to poor and uneducated women offering to become 
surrogates for the benefit of more well-off infertile individuals or couples who may 
take unfair advantage of her.74 However, while, in principle, ‘to use someone’s 
desperation to leverage an outcome or behavior that that person would not otherwise 
offer is indeed exploitation’,75 it is far from certain that the only motivation for 
surrogacy is the promise of payment. 
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Ragoné’s studies show there is a variety of reasons behind women’s decisions to form 
commercial surrogacy arrangements, and that money ‘simply “isn’t enough”’.76 This 
was further demonstrated in Blyth’s study,77 and, more recently, in Baslington’s,78 and 
van den Akker’s UK studies,79  where it was found that it is difficult to classify 
surrogates’ motives as purely financial or purely altruistic, as, in most cases, it was a 
combination of both. What these studies suggest is that, while payments might give a 
strong incentive to a woman to act as a surrogate, because, for example, the money 
will allow her to cover some of her financial needs or even enable her to do things she 
could not otherwise do,80 it does not mean that it is the main motivation, and, therefore, 
her action is not coerced per se.81 A woman can make a free choice to earn money by 
becoming a surrogate notwithstanding all other existing alternative solutions. As 
Wilkinson points out, ‘it would seem strange to say…that if someone were faced with 
an entirely free choice between X, which is extremely good, and Y, which is extremely 
bad, that that person could not validly consent to X because of the lack of acceptable 
alternatives’.82 
With regards to coercion in cases of altruistic surrogacy arrangements, the argument 
is that the decision to become a surrogate is forced upon women by societal and sexist 
norms that reproduce and reinforce the pattern of pronatalism and gender 
stereotypes,83 which promote the view of women as nurturers and care-givers.84 Again, 
it is claimed that consent is coerced and invalid. However, I would argue, drawing on 
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Andrews’ work,85 that this argument is weak, since one’s choices and decisions are 
motivated by numerous influences, exactly because it would be impossible to separate 
the individual from the society she lives in.86 The mere existence of socialisation does 
not necessarily mean that a woman is incapable of making autonomous decisions.87 
Instead of deeming surrogacy unethical and illegal on these grounds, we should press 
for the amelioration of oppression.88 
Another argument is that women are non-autonomous because they are influenced in 
their decision to act as surrogates by low self-esteem and feelings of guilt, if, for 
example, they had previously placed a child for adoption or had an abortion.89 
However, even if the initial motive was indeed influenced by these feelings, the 
woman may view surrogacy as a therapeutic process offering psychological benefits, 
and it would be counter-intuitive to deny her this option on autonomy grounds.90 In 
any case, the problem with flawed autonomy resulting from feelings of guilt and regret 
might be addressed by less onerous means, for example, by the offer of counselling.91 
• Autonomy is impossible in surrogacy because consent can never be fully informed 
The claim here is that the surrogate can never provide fully informed consent, because 
she will never have all the necessary information and understanding of the risks 
involved. Drawing on Oakley,92 the authenticity and validity of an autonomous 
decision in surrogacy depends on three elements: 
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- lack of coercion, as discussed in the previous section;93 
- the provision of an adequate level of information that will help one make the 
decision; 
- an understanding of the general risks that might occur (what Oakley calls objective 
risks), but also an effort to understand the risks that the specific potential surrogate 
might have based on her individual values, character, and past experiences 
(subjective risks).94  
Two questions, then, arise: first, what kind of information should be given to the 
surrogate; and second, how much information is ‘enough’. Before the surrogate 
embarks on the surrogacy journey, she should be informed about actual and potential 
risks involved in her undertaking.95 This would include the biological risks linked to 
pregnancy and delivery, the emotional risks she is taking by becoming pregnant with 
a child she will then have to hand over to someone else, and other potential 
consequences associated with socio-cultural perceptions towards surrogacy.96 With 
regards to the quantity of information that would be ‘enough’, Faden and Beauchamp 
suggest that ‘autonomy in decision-making is a matter of degree’,97 and this degree 
will be different for every individual. ‘Enough’ information then means as much as 
the individual requires to have to come to a decision after having considered all 
possible consequences, which is in line with contemporary understandings of 
informed consent to medical treatment in the UK.98 Therefore, the answer might be 
that a potential surrogate should be given the opportunity to be as informed as she 
wants and needs; then her consent to surrogacy can be valid and robust. 
Also, it has been claimed that the surrogate’s informed consent is impossible because 
her emotional stability is affected by major hormonal changes during pregnancy and 
after delivery.99 However, it seems odd and deeply offensive to assume that a woman’s 
capacity to control herself and her emotions is diminished due to her biology,100 and 
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it ‘is a step backwards’ for women’s rights to allege this.101 Moreover, this is an 
empirical claim demanding proof, and the surrogates who have described their 
experiences to previous researchers simply do not offer evidence to support it. 
To conclude, I have so far shown that the autonomy-based objections to surrogacy are 
insufficient to justify its ban, but they do raise a case for regulation to ensure that 
consent is robust. This could be done by making information about the potential 
surrogacy-related risks readily available to and easily accessible by all interested 
parties, and by ensuring that appropriate support, advice, and counselling is offered to 
all surrogacy participants. 
2.3.2 Harm-based objections 
I now explore whether harm-based concerns might justify a total prohibition and/or 
whether they raise the need for appropriate further regulation. The discussion is 
structured around the three categories of individuals that might incur harm: (1) the 
surrogate, (2) the child, and (3) the intended parents (IPs). 
Harm to the surrogate 
The proponents of the view that surrogacy is harmful to surrogates have tended to 
characterise this harm in three ways: first, that surrogates unnecessarily expose 
themselves to numerous risks; second, that they might incur harm if the IPs decide to 
renege on the agreement; third, that surrogates are harmed by being exploited, 
commodified and objectified. 
• The surrogate is harmed because she is unnecessarily exposed to physical and 
emotional risks 
By agreeing to enter a surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate assumes certain physical 
risks which are associated with pregnancy, namely ‘fatigue, nausea, weight gain, 
discomfort, skin stretching, insomnia, altered or suspended sexual activity, 
miscarriage, caesarean section, labour pains’,102 and excessive bleeding. Additionally, 
there are other health risks associated with selective reduction in case of a multiple 
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pregnancy, late abortion, amniocentesis, and more.103 These might lead to short- or 
long-term health problems or even death. In addition, surrogates risk suffering from 
other physical and emotional risks related to fertility treatment, if pregnancy is 
accomplished through ARTs.104 Lastly, they might face psychological issues, such as 
post-partum depression.105 
However, these health risks are not unique to surrogate pregnancies. Women 
experiencing pregnancy (natural or IVF) and childbirth might face the same issues, 
and surrogacy in no way aggravates these risks.106 Moreover, it is unclear how the 
surrogate is harmed if she is aware of these risks in advance and consents to them. The 
argument against surrogacy might, then, be that she undertakes all these risks 
unnecessarily. While the woman who will raise the child herself can offset such risks 
and inconveniences against the joys of motherhood, the surrogate will not be able to 
do so, because the agreement requires her to surrender the child to the IP(s). 
Yet, it is unclear how this is harmful. Rather, to assert harm here without evidence 
regarding the extent of harm to the surrogate’s psychology is an entirely subjective 
and, thus, weak argument. Contrary to the assumptions made by the proponents of this 
argument, there is evidence that former surrogates were left with positive memories 
and increased sense of self-worth,107 and a sense of empowerment.108 Moreover, it has 
been noted that the surrogate may have certain financial and psychological gains from 
the arrangement; she gains from the IPs just as they gain from her,109 thus, it could not 
be said that her act is without personal benefit.110 As Purdy also notes, 
‘there are often good reasons to consider transferring burden and risk from one 
individual to another…Some women love being pregnant, others hate it; pregnancy 
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interferes with work for some, not for others; pregnancy also poses much higher levels 
of risk to health (or even life) for some, not for others’.111 
In absence of any empirical evidence proving that women are harmed by undertaking 
these risks specifically for the purposes of surrogacy, this claim cannot justify its 
prohibition, and it should also be empirically proven that restrictions on autonomy are 
necessary and proportionate to the harm to be prevented. 
• The surrogate might incur harm if the IPs renege on the arrangement 
Though this is considered very unlikely, the surrogate may be forced to raise a child 
she never intended to have if the IPs refuse to take the baby.112 In commercial 
surrogacy, surrogates also risk not being paid at all, or being paid too little.113 While 
these concerns cannot be used as a basis to ban surrogacy, they do stress the need for 
proper and effective regulation, which might consider, for example, making surrogacy 
contracts enforceable or giving IP(s) legal parenthood from birth. Moreover, this risk 
could further be mitigated through the establishment of a good relationship based on 
feelings of mutual respect and trust between the IP(s) and the surrogate,114 and through 
the availability of support to both parties throughout the arrangement, and after its 
completion.115 However, it is important to consider whether such measures are 
necessary and proportionate, especially due to the lack of evidence of this happening 
in practice beyond very few high-profile cases.116 
• The surrogate is harmed because she is degraded by being exploited, commodified 
and objectified 
It is often claimed that surrogacy causes an objective emotional harm to surrogates for 
two reasons: 
1. ‘a woman has an interest in not being [exploited,]  commodified, degraded, or 
treated merely as means…[and/or,] 
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2. a person can lose the respect of others or be degraded in their eyes, even if she does 
not lose self-respect or become degraded in her own eyes’.117 
The claim is that the surrogate is harmed because she has an interest in not being 
degraded, first, because she is exploited; second, because she is commodified, and, 
due to this, treated as means, a ‘reproductive machine’,118 namely as an object rather 
than a person. This implies that the surrogate is harmed because she feels that her 
personal value and dignity is undermined. 
With regards to the second claim, that the surrogate is harmed because she might lose 
respect of others, it is hard to envisage what kind of harm that is, and whether it is 
serious enough to give a good reason to prohibit surrogacy. This concern ignores 
empirical evidence that many surrogates are, in fact, very proud of what they have 
done to help others have a child. If it is a question of stigma being harmful to the 
surrogate, that should not outweigh her consent, if she has autonomously chosen to 
act. Importantly, if we consider the expressive function of law,119 a law that allows 
and appropriately regulates surrogacy arguably sends out a moral message that might 
serve to combat stigma, whereas prohibition will clearly compound it. 
• Sub-objection 1: The surrogate is degraded by being exploited 
This is an argument that is widely cited by several opponents of surrogacy.120 In the 
words of Schwartz, ‘to exploit something, in the most general sense, is simply to put 
it to use, not waste it, to take advantage of it[,]…to use it for a purpose’.121 From this 
definition it is not clear why exploitation is bad, and how the surrogate is harmed. 
Stephen Wilkinson asserts that ‘exploitation’ has a moral meaning, which relates to 
the idea of the ‘wrongful use’ of a person.122 Hence, the objectionable character of 
exploitation is founded on the unethical and improper use of the person to achieve 
someone else’s (the exploiter’s) aims. Namely, the person is not used as a means to 
her own ends, but merely/solely as means to someone else’s ends. In this sense, the 
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exploitative nature of surrogacy seems then to be circumstantial, and the claim is weak 
in the absence of empirical evidence of generalised harm.123 
Mary Shanley argues that surrogacy is a form of harmful exploitation because the 
surrogate lives under conditions that violate ‘[her] ongoing freedom…in a way that 
[they] restrict [her] future options’.124 Others argue that surrogacy is a form of slavery, 
because the surrogate ‘is never off-duty’ and ‘the contracting couple [IPs]…uses her 
womb and controls her life’,125 to the extent that they might also control her diet and 
any other activities, hiding their invasive conduct under the veil of the welfare of the 
child. According to this view, surrogacy should be illegal, because, by agreeing to be 
a surrogate, the woman consents to slavery, which cannot logically be an autonomous 
action, since ‘it is not a freedom, [for one] to be allowed to alienate [one’s own] 
freedom’;126 this would also be detrimental to the surrogate’s dignity, ‘her identity and 
self-understanding’.127 
However, the slavery analogy is flawed. A surrogacy agreement does not give any 
property rights to the IPs regarding the surrogate, and ‘there is no indication of the 
“alienation of will”, that is characteristic in slavery contracts’.128 In slavery, the owners 
‘sell, use and dominate’,129 and the slave has no control over her own life, whereas the 
surrogate still has control over herself and her body. This comparison also assumes 
that slavery is inherently immoral, which is not universally agreed,130 and, again, 
unjustifiably condemns surrogacy without support from empirical evidence of how 
and to what extent surrogates are being used as slaves by the IPs and whether they feel 
harmed because of it. On the contrary, as noted earlier, there is evidence that surrogates 
usually have positive experiences.  
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Perhaps, though, surrogates may be harmed not because they are being used as slaves 
by the IPs, but by other key actors in the surrogacy practice, in which case surrogacy 
could be banned. Anderson argues that the surrogate is harmed because she is obliged  
‘to obey all doctor's orders made in the interests of the child's health. These orders 
could include forcing her to give up her job, travel plans, and recreational activities. 
The doctor could confine her to bed, regulate her diet rigidly, and order her to submit 
to surgery and to take drugs’.131 
Yet, there is no evidence that such onerous restrictions on a surrogate’s freedom exist 
in practice, at least in the Greek and UK context, with which this primarily concerned. 
Moreover, it seems impossible that the surrogate would have a legal obligation to obey 
these orders, and it is difficult to imagine how this would be policed. Even if she has 
a moral obligation to conform to these orders,132 it is not clear how she is harmed if 
she freely consents to them. Further, these restrictions are true for all pregnant women, 
not only surrogates. 
Also, it could be argued that surrogacy is intrinsically bad and immoral, regardless of 
whether the woman does or does not feel harmed. However, provided that the 
surrogate is not treated merely as a means to an end, but also as an end in her own right 
(namely she is treated with respect), then surrogacy should not be banned.133 Rather, 
we need evidence of what happens in practice to know whether this is a real problem, 
and this may vary from country to country. Lastly, there are other groups of 
individuals, for example actors, models, sportsmen, or doctors, who are never 
completely off-duty and are restricted in their day-to-day activities due to their 
professional status, but who are not deemed to be wrongfully exploited by their 
employers.134 Surrogates are not harmed more so, if at all, than other individuals, and 
this condemnation is made without support from empirical evidence. Therefore, a ban 
on surrogacy would be unjustified. Nevertheless, exploitation concerns raise a case for 
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proper and efficient regulation of surrogacy to ensure that exploitation does not, as a 
matter of fact, take place.135 
• Sub-objection 2: The surrogate is degraded by being commodified and 
objectified 
As in the case of exploitation, commodification, namely the payment of money to the 
surrogate for her reproductive labour, is not necessarily harmful to the surrogate. In its 
non-moral sense, ‘commodification’ refers to ‘a social practice for treating things as 
commodities…, as properties that can be bought, sold, or rented’.136 Yet, it is not clear 
from this definition how commodification can harm the surrogate,137 specially if she 
freely and validly consents to being paid for using her own body to benefit someone 
else’s (the IPs’/IP’s) interests.138  
Some argue that surrogacy is problematic, as it essentially distinguishes pregnancy 
from the act of mothering a child.139 The argument is that these two are both so 
‘integral to [the woman’s] identity…that [they] should not be treated as 
[a]…commodity’ that can be alienated.140 This argument is primarily linked to 
commercial surrogacy arrangements, as it is thought that the monetary exchange leads 
to a fragmentation of the self. According to McLeod,  
‘in consenting to… commercial contract pregnancy, women might alienate from 
themselves more than just the physical act of reproductive labour. They might also 
lose some autonomy owing to manipulation, some integrity owing to regret, and some 
dignity owing to rejection’.141 
Radin further notes that a commercial surrogate sells certain attributes (her 
reproductive capacity or sexuality) that are non-detachable from herself, and is, 
therefore harmed because she loses the sense of herself.142 
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To provide support for their point, some compare surrogacy to prostitution, because 
the latter is usually considered harmful to women’s identity.143 However, this 
comparison is often made without arguing for or against the ethics of prostitution. By 
assuming that prostitution is immoral, and by trying to find similarities with surrogacy, 
they argue that surrogacy is also unethical.144 Even if we accept this assumption for 
the sake of argument, it is possible to show that those taking this position are 
misguided. Some argue that surrogacy is a form of prostitution because it essentially 
requires the separation of the woman from her reproductive body parts/organs, hence, 
the woman is not whole.145 Moreover, they argue, (commercial) surrogacy involves 
the sale of a woman’s body to satisfy the reproductive needs of others. 
Nevertheless, it is really the use of the surrogate’s gestational services that are the 
object of sale in commercial surrogacy, not the use of her body, and we generally 
accept that services can be alienable.146 Additionally, the prostitution argument is 
false, because the surrogate retains control over herself and her body before and 
throughout the pregnancy and during childbirth, as she must consent to all procedures, 
and can withdraw her consent in the same way as any other patient. In contrast, the 
prostitute might not be able to stop the sexual action until the client is satisfied.147 
Moreover, these practices ‘have… different objectives’;148 prostitution aims to provide 
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sexual pleasure, whereas surrogacy to circumvent infertility and bring a child into the 
world.149 
More significantly, the analogy between surrogacy and prostitution is not only flawed, 
but also dangerous;150 it generates and promotes negative connotations and 
stigmatising impressions in the absence of empirical evidence of harm. Arguably, it is 
odd for a so-called feminist position against surrogacy to have developed without first 
having asked women who have experienced it what they might think of it. Drawing 
vague comparisons with other practices that have different aims and effects and are 
usually harmful in a more intense way does not provide a good enough reason to 
prohibit surrogacy. 
Perhaps, however, the claim is that the surrogate might be harmed because she is 
participating in something immoral.151 In the moral sense, ‘commodification’ 
describes the circumstance whereby someone is wrongfully treated as if one was an 
object of sale, which constitutes an immoral objectification of persons.152 By allowing 
(commercial) surrogacy, we fail to respect the individual’s dignity, thereby breaching 
the second formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative that people should be 
treated as ends in themselves and not as means to someone else’s end.153 
Consequently, surrogacy is harmful because it allows for women to be degraded to 
objects of use, “human incubators” and “reproductive machines”, and serve as means 
to the IPs’ end.154 The question, then, is whether it is always bad to use someone as 
something; whether it is bad to objectify people. 
Nussbaum defines ‘objectification as the act of ‘[treating someone] as a (mere) 
object…something which [is not] really or (merely) an object’.155 This, taken together 
with Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative, creates ‘tension between 
personal dignity and the commodification of women’s bodies and their reproductive 
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functions’.156 However, ‘the Kantian imperative requires that persons are not to be 
used solely as means’ to an end,157 and one is not treated merely as a means to an end 
provided that one is also treated as an end in her own right, namely treated with respect. 
Again, this means we need evidence of what happens in practice to know whether it 
is a real problem. 
According to Raymond, objectification exists even in cases of altruistic surrogacy, 
where ‘the women are not only the gift-givers, but the gift as well’,158 and women act 
under societal norms requiring them to provide their reproductive services to male 
dominance to achieve ‘men’s genetic continuity and “biological fulfilment”’.159 In this 
way, surrogacy is an immoral practice that perpetuates gendered ideas of motherhood, 
and increases gender inequality.160 Yet, the proponents of this view,161 tend to 
overlook the fact that in most cases of surrogacy it is a joint enterprise between a 
couple (IPs) and a surrogate, and the surrogate serves to attain a joint aim, not strictly 
a man’s desire for a child.162 
More importantly, this claim does not take into account existent empirical evidence 
that surrogacy can sometimes help women gain self-confidence, pride and self-worth 
for doing something that is both personally and socially valuable,163 and it ‘presents 
women with a choice…[which] allows for a re-examination of motherhood and a 
reclaiming of procreative liberty’.164 The claim, however, might be that surrogacy is 
intrinsically bad, regardless of whether the surrogate feels harmed or not. As above, 
the question about whether the surrogate is being treated merely as means to an end is 
entirely subjective and requires empirical substantiation. Lastly, if this risk could be 
mitigated through less restrictive means, then it should be preferred. 
Up to this point, I have shown that, if surrogacy is mutually beneficial (to the surrogate 
and the IPs), if the surrogate freely and validly consents to it, and if she is not treated 
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as merely a means to an end, then surrogacy cannot be prohibited. Nevertheless, 
regulation is justified if necessary to ensure that such harm is prevented, but any 
restrictions must be appropriate and proportionate to that harm. 
Harm to the Child 
The proponents of the argument that surrogacy is harmful to surrogate-born children 
have tended to characterise this harm in three ways: first, that the child is harmed 
because there is uncertainty regarding legal parenthood; second, that the child incurs 
psychological harm when she finds out about the way she was created; and, third, that 
the child is harmed in because she is degraded by being commodified. 
• The child is harmed due to the legal uncertainty regarding parenthood 
Perhaps the most troublesome issue relating to surrogacy is the legal parenthood 
status. Most countries in the world where surrogacy is not prohibited consider 
surrogacy agreements non-enforceable, and parenthood is decided after the child’s 
birth. At the EU level, the exception is Greece, where surrogacy agreements are 
enforceable, and the IPs’ parenthood is automatically acknowledged upon the child’s 
birth. In the UK, surrogates are legal mothers at birth and until the IPs are granted a 
parental order (PO), a mechanism that confers parenthood to the IPs after the child’s 
birth, and after the child has lived with the IPs for some time. However, the outcome 
of the PO application is uncertain, and surrogacy agreements are unenforceable. 
If the IPs have surrogacy abroad, especially in parts of the world where surrogacy is 
wholly unregulated or less well-regulated, and the practice is illegal in the country of 
their origin, it is possible that the child may be rendered parentless and/or stateless.165 
In the meantime, the IPs are unable to register the child in their country(-ies) and issue 
a passport and other travel documents for the child.166 Moreover, until legal 
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parenthood is granted to the IPs, they cannot make decisions about the child’s life, her 
medical treatment and/or education,167 and the child cannot inherit from the IPs in the 
event of their death. 
While these concerns are real and serious, they cannot justify the legal prohibition of 
surrogacy if it is possible to address them through less restrictive means. Rather, they 
raise a case for proper regulation with clear and effective rules regarding the 
determination legal parenthood before or as soon as possible after the birth of the child, 
clear rules regarding dispute resolution during or following a surrogacy arrangement, 
and clear rules regarding the acknowledgment of citizenship rights to children born 
through a cross-border surrogacy arrangement. 
• The child incurs psychological harm when she finds out about the way she was 
created 
A claim often made against surrogacy is that the child might find it emotionally 
disturbing if, in the course of her life, she finds out that she was born through surrogacy 
(especially commercial arrangements),168 namely that she has two mothers, and that 
she was ‘created for the purpose of being given away to other parents’.169 Turner and 
Coyle’s study of donor-insemination children report a number of negative effects to 
the offspring’s psychology when they found out how they were conceived: negative 
sense of distinctiveness, concern of genetic lineage and frustration in the search for 
their biological parents.170 Some argue the same might apply to surrogate-born 
children as well, but this is wholly speculative. 
Rather, we now have evidence that there are no issues with the emotional stability of 
the child who learns of her coming to the world through surrogacy.171 In addition, it 
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accessed on 7/07/2015). 
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Hum Reprod 2041-2051. 
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has been shown that openness and disclosure of surrogacy from an early age between 
parents and children is the key to the child’s smooth psychological adjustment,172 and 
that IPs do disclose or intend to disclose the incidence of surrogacy to their children.173 
Furthermore, a recent study exploring whether parents disclose the incidence of donor 
conception, egg donation and surrogacy to their children proves that all IPs either have 
told or were planning on telling the child about surrogacy.174 Additionally, Robertson 
suggests that any kind of psychological or social problems that may affect the 
surrogacy-born child can be overcome,175 and, as surrogacy becomes more socially 
accepted and legally promulgated as a ‘good practice’,176 surrogate-born children 
would have no problems dealing with this reality. Although this concern cannot justify 
banning surrogacy, especially in the absence of concrete evidence of generalised 
psychological harm to children, it does suggest the need for further longitudinal 
studies to supplement the limited research currently available. 
• The child is harmed in an existential way because she is degraded by being 
commodified 
This argument propounds that surrogacy should be illegal because it is a form of baby-
selling. Anderson argues that, if we allow payments to be made for the creation of 
children, we allow children to be treated as commodities, which is disrespectful to the 
child, the same way as it is disrespectful to treat the surrogate as a commodity.177 
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ARTs. It would, then, be difficult to show what distinguishes surrogacy from other technologies in 
order to justify a ban on surrogacy alone. 
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Moreover, Kavka argues that the child born through a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement would have a “bad start” in life; she would have a ‘restricted life, a life 
that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that generally make 
human lives valuable and worth living’.178 Lastly, Anderson suggests that any 
sentiments of love that the IP(s) show to the child do not change the immorality of 
surrogacy, since the IPs’ relationship with the child is based on market norms rather 
than norms of intimate relationships.179 Anderson also argues that commercial 
surrogacy treats children as property and parental rights over children as trusts.180 
On the other hand, some note that the child cannot be harmed, because, were it not for 
this arrangement, she would not have been born at all,181 nd existing is better than 
non-existing.182 Moreover, some claim that arguing that commercial surrogacy 
constitutes baby-selling is illogical, because a child is not property, and cannot be 
treated as such.183 What is being agreed in surrogacy is the transfer of custodial rights 
from the woman who gestated and delivered the child to the IPs.184 McLachlan and 
Swales explain that the object of a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not the 
transfer of parental rights; the contract merely sets out the mutual obligations of the 
parties, and exists as a “safety net” in case of a breach or a relationship breakdown 
between the IPs and the surrogate.185 
In a sale exchange, the commodified object can be used and eventually be re-sold and 
handed over to the highest bidder; this is not what occurs in commercial surrogacy. 
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There is an agreement for a service which is performed for a financial benefit; the 
child is subsequently given to her parents, who cannot be regarded as owners, but 
rather as the child’s trustees, since custody cannot be transferred by agreement.186 
Lastly, the child cannot be given away again;187 her parents (or the state) are legally 
responsible for her care and well-being. Therefore, the ‘baby-selling’ analogy is 
inaccurate and flawed. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that surrogates or IPs view or treat the child as a 
commodity, which could potentially be harmful, or that children experience any 
psychosocial harm. Instead, recent studies show that no harm is experienced by 
children.188 Consequently, this claim is not strong enough to justify the prohibition of 
surrogacy, especially if there are other measures to mitigate these risks through 
appropriate and effective regulation that might consider, for example, requiring 
surrogacy arrangements be altruistic. 
Harm to the IPs 
Surrogacy has been described as a way to alleviate infertility,189 which is a distressful 
and devastating experience for some individuals.190 IPs’ decision to have a child 
through surrogacy is usually made only after a long period of infertility, miscarriages, 
and/or failed efforts to have a child either through traditional or artificial means,191 
and typically not done “for convenience”.192 
IPs run the risk of being harmed in various ways and being exploited by either the 
surrogate and/or by surrogacy agencies.193 The literature unjustifiably overlooks this 
issue, and generally only focuses on harm to the surrogate and/or the child. A notable 
exception is Rosemary Tong, who argues that IPs are in danger of ‘falling prey to 
blackmailing surrogate mothers who threaten abortion unless their fee is substantially 
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increased, or to reneging surrogates who suddenly protest that they cannot go through 
with the “deal”’.194 They might remain childless if the surrogate decides to keep the 
baby or choose to have an abortion.195 Furthermore, surrogacy agencies might take 
advantage of IPs’ desperation, and ask for a high price. 
Moreover, IPs have to deal with labyrinthine laws and regulations, and rarely receive 
any guidance by public authorities to help them in their surrogacy journey.196 
Additionally, the lack of effective regulation in IPs’ countries of origin may force them 
to consider alternative overseas destinations where commercial surrogacy is available 
but not always well-regulated and where there are concerns about how surrogates are 
treated. Moreover, undertaking surrogacy overseas can be very expensive, thus putting 
extreme strain on IPs’ finances.197 IPs might also experience difficulties in acquiring 
all the paperwork necessary to gain legal parenthood of the child, and/or to bring the 
child back to their country of origin.198 
Nevertheless, even though surrogacy might raise multiple problems for IPs, empirical 
evidence indicates that IPs have positive experiences.199 Some IPs also wanted to 
continue their relationship with the surrogate, and were open to talking about their 
experience of surrogacy to their friends, family, and the child.200 It should, though, be 
noted that there may be many IPs who have tried and failed to have a child through 
surrogacy, and we have almost no knowledge of what their experiences were. The 
evidence we have available does not support a prohibition of surrogacy. Further, 
restrictions must be proportionate and necessary to the harm to be prevented, and 
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regulation should strive to address these concerns through less restrictive means, for 
example through the availability of proper advice, support, and counselling to IPs 
throughout the arrangement and after its completion. 
2.4 Justice concerns 
Other than autonomy and harm, equality is an important principle in surrogacy. First, 
equality concerns might be a reason to ban surrogacy because surrogacy risks fuelling 
inequality (allowing rich people to exploit poorer women by having them carry their 
babies); second, if we think surrogacy should be permitted, we should be concerned 
with how it is made available, and this should reflect a concern for social justice. 
The first of these concerns has been discussed earlier, where I concluded that this claim 
is weak in the absence of empirical evidence proving that, even in commercial 
surrogacy arrangements, surrogates are not treated solely or merely as means and are 
not respected. Moreover, given the very substantial liberty interests at stake, and the 
enormous potential benefits to IPs and surrogates, restrictions must be proportionate 
and necessary to the harm to be prevented, and previous research does not support a 
prohibition. 
The second claim requires us to consider regulating surrogacy arrangements in ways 
that ensure equal, fair, and affordable access to treatment. This may relate to ensuring 
that all social groups would be eligible to access surrogacy, and that some public 
funding will be available to cover at least some relevant costs.201 As Nelson explains, 
‘even if eligibility criteria permit (or mandate) access for all who might wish to use 
ART treatment, financial constraints may effectively prevent it’,202 and we know that 
ARTs (including surrogacy) are an expensive undertaking.203 Nevertheless, it should 
be remembered that public funding is finite, and there are multiple criteria linked to 
its allocation.204 Social justice concerns, though, require that funding, however 
limited, is allocated fairly and equitably. 
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Further, nowadays, due to the existence and wide use of the Internet, and the relatively 
low cost and easiness of travel services,205 difficulties in accessing treatment within 
one’s home jurisdiction may lead one to seek treatment abroad, where access is 
easier,206 but where treatment may be less regulated or totally unregulated. Respect for 
equality means that regulation should provide for equal and fair access within one’s 
jurisdiction. Additionally, respect for equality means that we need to pay close 
attention to who is able to achieve parenthood through surrogacy. This requires close 
scrutiny of formal legal provisions or eligibility criteria for access to any form of 
(in)fertility treatment, including surrogacy, as well as the parenthood rules. 
2.5 CONCLUSION AND THE CRITERIA FOR ‘GOOD’ SURROGACY 
REGULATION 
This chapter provided an overview of the main ethico-legal objections to surrogacy 
and explored the challenges for regulation in this area. I argued that autonomy grounds 
a strong presumption that individuals should be free to enter surrogacy arrangements 
unless there are good reasons for preventing them from so doing.  The bulk of this 
chapter then explored a range of objections to surrogacy that purport to offer such 
good reasons: first, that true autonomy is impossible; second, that surrogacy may cause 
harm to the surrogate, the child, and the IPs. While much of the literature is critical of 
surrogacy on a theoretical level, claims are often made without support from empirical 
evidence, or despite such evidence as exists. I argued that while none of these 
objections offers a convincing reason to prohibit surrogacy, they do raise a range of 
concerns which highlight the need for robust regulation. 
To echo Kerian, this thesis will seek to demonstrate that, ‘when precautions are taken, 
surrogacy is a positive alternative with the potential to benefit the needs of each 
involved party’.207 Specifically, a ‘good’ law would allow surrogacy, within certain 
parameters, and be supported by appropriate guidelines. It should be informed by 
empirical evidence about the ‘real’ experience of surrogacy and should go some way 
to protecting all parties from potential harms. It should also ensure equal, fair and 
affordable access to surrogacy, within the constraints of current health budgets, and 
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provide effective guidelines about how to ensure fully informed and voluntary consent 
from all parties. Additionally, a ‘good’ surrogacy regulation should provide clear rules 
regarding legal parenthood following surrogacy, as well as rules for dispute-
resolution. Lastly, appropriate measures should be taken to mitigate or alleviate other 
conditions that might pose risks to reproductive autonomy, for example supporting 
research on the causes and effective treatment of infertility, limiting poverty, and 
raising awareness about why people might use and/or need ARTs and/or surrogacy. 
This set of criteria will assist in my critical evaluation of the legal regimes of Greece 
and the UK, which will also be informed by evidence of my own empirical work in 
these countries. The concerns raised about surrogacy fall broadly into three categories: 
problems with accessing surrogacy; problems during a surrogacy arrangement, and 
problems regarding legal parenthood, which is reflected in the structure of the work to 
follow. In the next chapter, I explore how Greek regulation addresses these concerns 
within the three broad categories noted above, and then proceed to do the same for the 
UK regime. Later, I evaluate in more detail how well these regimes respond to 
concerns regarding access, regulation, and parenthood in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, 




The Greek regulatory framework for surrogacy 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As identified in the previous chapter, surrogacy raises various ethico-legal concerns, 
but none strong enough to justify prohibiting the practice for fears of threats to 
autonomy, harm, and justice. Instead, these concerns imply the need for proper and 
effective regulation. Nevertheless, any restrictions should be necessary and 
appropriate to the harm to be prevented, and it should be ensured that the way 
surrogacy is practised does not fuel inequality. 
This chapter explores the Greek surrogacy regime, which has been described by Greek 
scholars as comprehensive and possibly the most progressive regime in the EU.1 
Greece is one of the few jurisdictions worldwide, and the only European one,2 where 
gestational surrogacy agreements are legal and enforceable after the child’s birth, 
provided they have been authorised by the court at the preconception stage, and where 
parenthood is based heavily on intention. Further, since Greek law allows only 
gestational surrogacy, pregnancy can only be achieved through IVF in a clinic, thus 
formal legal surrogacy is fully medicalised.3 Lastly, there is a regulator, namely the 
National Authority of Medically Assisted Reproduction (NAMAR), which monitors 
the clinical practice of ARTs, including surrogacy, and issues strictures with legal 
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force.4 I begin my analysis by providing an historical account of how Greek surrogacy 
law has developed, and then set out how the law has sought to address the concerns 
laid out in Chapter 2. 
3.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK ART 
AND SURROGACY LAWS 
Generally, Greek society places great importance on the institution of the family,5 and, 
in many instances, which will become evident from the analysis below, law 
emphasises traditional theories of ‘the family’ reflecting and reinforcing the nuclear 
‘sexual’ family model.6 Leon et al note that the ‘traditional’ Greek family presents 
three characteristics: first, young adults leave the parental household late and indeed 
after they get married; second, co-habiting unmarried couples with children are very 
rare, and divorce rates are relatively low; third, having a child ‘is delayed…[and] 
always connected with creating a nuclear family’.7 
Greece is a relatively small country, with a population of 11 million.8 Low birth rates,9 
together with high rates of infertility affecting almost 15-20 per cent of the adult 
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population in Greece,10 have caused a demographic problem, and a serious birth and 
death imbalance. For this reason, reproduction within marriage, even through IVF, is 
endorsed by the Christian Orthodox tradition,11 the dominant religion in the country, 
and is also reflected in Greek law and policy. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, most international jurisdictions do not recognise an express 
right to reproduce, but they do recognise a right not to reproduce. Although no Greek 
scholar disputes the existence of a constitutional right to have a child, they disagree 
on which specific provision of the Greek Constitution (GC) grounds such a right.12 
Some argue that it is based on the right to personal freedom,13 some on the principle 
regarding the protection of private and family life,14 and others on the social right for 
the protection of ‘the family’.15 The majority of commentators, though, believe that 
reproductive autonomy is grounded on freedom of expression.16 
According to many Greek scholars, reproductive autonomy engrains one’s ability and 
freedom to define oneself, as well as the freedom to plan and form one’s life in line 
                                                          
explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics_in_relation_to_economy,_parity,_education_nd_migration, 
accessed on 04/01/2018. 
10 Ravdas P, Surrogate Motherhood: The legislator's expectations tested by statistical 
data (Papachristou, T. K. and others eds, 21st Century Family Law: Coincidental and Fundamental 
Reforms - Law and Society in 21st century, Sakkoulas 2012) 69. 
11 The Greek Orthodox Church considers that procreation expresses a man’s and a woman’s wishes to 
partake in God’s creative work, but it rejects reproduction through gamete donation. Katsimigkas G., 
‘Regulation 135/1999. IVF under the Orthodox religious perspective’, 
http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/commitees/pastoral/katsimigas_exosomatiki.html accessed on 
23/02/2015; Dr Metropolitan Nikolaos, 'Symposium: Religion in assisted reproduction. The Greek 
Orthodox position on the ethics of assisted reproduction' (2008) 17(3) Reproductive BioMedicine 
Online 25-33; Paxson (n5); Kokota (n5). 
12 n5 and Milapidou M, Bodily integrity and assisted reproduction, vol 14 (Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou eds, Publications on Medical Law and 
Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2011) 11-18. 
13 Article 5(3) GC. Manitakis A, The legal abolishment of cloning and the right to reproduce (Artificial 
reproduction and genetic technology, Sakkoulas 2003) 33-84. He believes that the right to have a child 
is founded on personal freedom, and human cloning is founded on the freedom of expression. Mitrosyli 
argues that article 5(3) GC contains the freedom of the ARTs participants to choose the method that is 
more appropriate for them, and not their right to have a child (Mitrosyli M, 'Medically Assisted 
Reproduction 'Application of medically assisted reproduction' Act (3305/200, Greece): Presentation 
and Comments' (2007) 24(6) Archives of Hellenic Medicine 614). 
14 Article 9(1) GC. Vidalis T, 'Family project: the constitutionality of the law on 'medical assistance in 
human reproduction'' (2003) Legal Library 834-840; Vidalis T, Life without the person - The 
Constitution and the use of human genetic material (Sakkoulas 2003) 101. 
15 Article 21(1) GC. Chrysogonos (n5) 729-740. 
16 Article 5(1) GC. This interpretation is also accepted by the Memorandum-3089/20 2, I(4). For 
academic commentary see citations in n5 and Varka-Adami A, 'Law 3089/2002 on 'medical assistance 
to human reproduction'-first approach' (2003)(44) Greek Justice 1510-1518; Kriari-Katrani 
I, Biomedical developments and Constitutional Law - Constitutional [law] issue  about the methods of 
assisted reproduction and the applications of genetics (Sakkoulas 1994) 68; Marinos A, 'Genetic 
engineering and the law' (1998) 39 Greek Justice 1231; Manesis A, Constitutional rights, individual 
freedoms (Sakkoulas 1981) 68, 127; Fountedaki K, Human Reproduction and doctor liability, vol 4 
(Publications of Medical Law and Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2007) 158.  
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with one’s physical and emotional abilities and views in such a way that one develops 
and shapes one’s personality through having a child.17 However, this freedom is not 
absolute. Firstly, reproductive autonomy should not be exercised in a way that 
infringes any rights of others. Secondly, it cannot and should not override any 
fundamental rights and freedoms declared by the Constitution and any other laws. 
Thirdly, the exercise of individual autonomy should be in line with the social morals.18 
These limitations exist for any form of reproduction (‘traditional’ or artificial), but 
only ARTs are subject to regulation, because ‘traditional’ reproduction is impossible 
to police.19 
Since the early 1990s, the use of ARTs was quite widespread in Greece,20 though 
ARTs were unregulated until 2002. Other European jurisdictions have regulated ARTs 
since the mid-1980s and early 1990s.21 In 1999 and 2000, three cases reached the 
Greek courts,22 highlighting the need for regulation of ARTs.23 The first concerned an 
application for Greek citizenship of an unmarried Indian woman who had acted as a 
gestational surrogate for a Greek man.24 Following the child’s birth, the woman 
                                                          
17 Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1). Reproductive autonomy also includes the rigt not to reproduce (right 
to contraception, lawful abortion, selective sterilisation): Mitrosyli (n13) 61. Based on this definition 
for reproductive autonomy, Greece could rightfully be called a pro-natalist society. A 2014 Regulation 
established partial funding for ARTs, thereby encouraging individuals to u e ARTs to have a child 
(Explanatory Memorandum of Law 3305/2005 (hereafter ‘Memorandum-3305/2005) 9). Part of the 
cost may be covered through public funding, subject to a long bureauc atic process through an IVF 
Committee (Regulation of 6/06/2014, http://www.eopyy.gov.gr/). 
18 Article 5(2) GC. 
19 Mitrosyli (n13) 613; Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1: 16) notes that ‘natural’ reproduction belongs in 
the private sphere but ARTs in the public sphere, because they necssarily involve the interference of 
other people, and the use of medical technology. This may justify the introduction of certain restrictions. 
Papachristou argues that even i  ‘natural’/‘traditional’ reproduction, law intervenes for the 
determination of parenthood (Papachristou T, 'Articles 1455-1460' in Georgiadis, A. and M. 
Stathopoulos (eds), Civil Code (Sakkoulas, Athens 2003) 22,26. Consideri g the low birth rates in 
Greece, the state arguably has strong interest to interfere in ARTs (Minutes of th  parliamentary debates 
in 2002 in Agallopoulou P and Koutsouradis A (eds), Medical Assistance in Human Reproduction. Law 
3089/2002. Preparatory reports - Parliamentary debates (Sakkoulas 2004) 235,249,252,286; Minutes 
of the 2005 parliamentary debate: 526,535,541,547,549,572,582,593,600,606,659,665,667). On the 
public-private debate in reproduction, read Williams S, 'Comment: Autonomy and the Public–Private 
Distinction in Bioethics and Law' (2005) 12 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483-94; Eijkholt 
M, 'The Right to Found a Family as a Stillborn Right to Procreate' (2010) 18 Med Law Rev 127-151. 
20 Memorandum-3089/2002, I(2). Papazisi T, 'Borderline issues regardin adoption and assisted 
reproduction' (1995) Greek Justice 1000. Pazisi mentions that, at the time, surrogates were considered 
legal mothers by birth, and IPs acquired parenthood through adoption. 
21 Memorandum-3089/2002, I(3). 
22 Out of the three cases mentioned here, only the last two were cited in he Memorandum-Law 
389/2002 Law (I(2)). The first case was not part of this consideration because it involved a question of 
citizenship and fell under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court rather than the Civil Court (family 
division), which deals with surrogacy cases. However, the reasoning adopted by the Administrative 
court judges alluded to legal parenthood following surrogacy, which is why I cite it here. 
23 Memorandum, ibid; Minister of Justice Decision no.15795/22.11.2000 
24 Supreme Administrative Court no.157/1999. 
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requested Greek authorities cancel the deportation order against her, arguing that she 
was the mother of a Greek citizen,25 and, therefore, she should be registered as 
Greek.26 The administrative authority rejected her application, and ruled she was not 
to be regarded as the child’s mother, but rather as a gestational carrier. Later, the 
Supreme Administrative Court recognised her as the child’s legal mother by birth,27 
and granted her Greek citizenship. 
In another case, a heterosexual married couple sought to adopt twins who were 
genetically related to them and born by a surrogate.28 Under the then applicable law, 
motherhood was based on gestation and birth,29 hence the surrogate was the legal 
mother and IPs could only establish parenthood through adoption. However, the 
judiciary questioned the appropriateness of adoption law in this case,30 since adoption 
law requires the lack of a genetic link between the adopters and the adoptee(s).31 The 
judges decided to allow the adoption in this particular case but urged the legislature to 
regulate parenthood following surrogacy.32 This case caused lively academic 
controversy and debate about how parenthood should be determined in surrogacy 
cases.33 
The third case concerned the acknowledgement of paternity to children born through 
donor-IVF outside marriage.34 This case established intention as the basis for 
parenthood, with this principle later entrenched in Law 3089/2002 (2002 Law). An 
infertile married woman who had visited a clinic to have IVF formed an extra-marital 
relationship with her doctor. The treatment was successful, and twins were born as a 
result. Subsequently, the woman’s estranged husband successfully disputed his 
                                                          
25 The child had been awarded Greek citizenship at birth based on the father’s citizenship (Article 5A 
Greek Citizenship Code). 
26 Subject to the provisions of article 1(1) Greek Citizenship Code. 
27 Following the ancient mater semper certa est rule (“the mother is always certain”), according to 
which motherhood is based exclusively on birth (former article 1463(2) GCC). Also, Vidalis T, 
'Supreme Administrative Court no.157/1999' (2000) 48 Legal Library 553-557. 
28 Multi-Member District court of Heracleion no.31/5803/176/1999. 
29 Former Article 1463 GCC. 
30 Multi-Member District court of Heracleion no.31/5803/176/1999. 
31 Skorini-Paparrigopoulou F and Papachristou T, 'Multi-Member Court f Heracleion case 
no.31/5803/176/1999' (2000) 1 Critical Review 236. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Papachristou has argued the ruling was in line with the child’s best interests (Papachristou T, 'Critical 
observations on the Multi-Member Court of Heracleion case no.31/5803/176/1999' (2000) 48 Legal 
Library 57). Others found it incorrect, because it constituted wrong application of adoption law 
(Evaggelidou-Tsikrika F, 'Issues arising by the biological fragmentation of motherhood' (2002) 43 
Greek Justice 43; Skorini-Paparrigopoulou F, 'Observations on the Multi-Member Court of Heracleion 
case no.31/5803/176/1999' (2000) 48 Legal Library 498). 
34 Multi-Member Court of Athens no.6779/2000. 
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parenthood, which had been established automatically by virtue of his marriage to the 
mother, arguing that he had neither consented to the IVF nor was he genetically related 
to the children.35 The woman asked the court to legally oblige the doctor, who had 
consented to her IVF, to accept paternity.36 DNA tests proved that neither the woman 
nor the doctor were genetically related to the twins, because the pregnancy was a result 
of double gamete donation. The judges ruled that parenthood should be based on 
intention, which is proven by consent to ARTs.37 Hence, the doctor was recognised as 
the legal father of the twins based on his consent. Nevertheless, this ruling was 
overturned by the Appeal Court in 2002,38 with that decision subsequently confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in 2004.39 The Supreme Court judges deemed the doctor’s 
consent to IVF invalid as “against good morals”, because it was based on an immoral 
(extra-marital) relationship.40 This decision was criticised as anachronistic and 
mistaken, because the judges failed to apply the intention-based parenthood rule, 
which had by then become law.41 
In light of these cases, the 2000 Minister of Justice, Mihail Stathopoulos, appointed a 
Committee, led by law Professor Koumantos, ‘to study the effects of biotechnology 
and genetics on civil, and particularly family, law’.42 The Committee proposed the 
new parenthood rules be incorporated into the Greek Civil Code (GCC) instead of 
introducing separate legislation for ARTs.43 In this way, the Committee hoped to 
achieve a systematic handling of all parenthood issues and to modernise the GCC.44 
Surrogacy was to be considered a form of ARTs, aiming to cure or alleviate female 
infertility, and an alternative way to create ‘natural’ family relationships.45 
                                                          
35 Former article 1465 GCC. 
36 n33. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Appeal Court of Athens no.2171/2002. 
39 Greek Supreme Civil and Criminal Court (Areios Pagos) no.14/2004. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kounougeri-Manoledaki E, 'Observations on the High Court case no.14/2004' (2004) 4 Private Law 
Chronicles 609. Arguably, though, the decision was correct, since the law was not in place when the 
facts of the case took place. 
42 Minister of Justice Decision no.15795/22.11.2000. 
43 The Committee members were divided, but they agreed that it should be part of GCC (see Committee 
Meeting Minutes 22/11/2001, 23/01/2002, 14/02/2002 in Agallopoulou and Koutsouradis (n19). 
44 Memorandum-3089/2002, I(6).  
45 As opposed to an ‘artificial’ family relationship, which results from adoption (Document No.10 –
Minutes of 24/05/2001 (Agallopoulou and Koutsouradis, (n19) 66). Also, Kounougeri-Manoledaki 
E, Surrogate motherhood and adoption: seeking a "fair" interpretational solution (Justice in Particular, 
Sakkoulas 2007) 161-172. The author was a member of the 2002 draft law committee. 
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Additionally, the Committee suggested surrogacy agreements be enforceable; that 
they be authorised by the court at the preconception stage,46 nd that both gestational 
and traditional surrogacy be allowed.47 However, there was intense disagreement 
about payments for surrogacy.48 The Committee proposed that law should leave this 
unregulated, but the Memorandum should mention that, based on the social morals at 
the time, courts would probably have to deem such payments immoral and invalid.49 
This would, then, leave room for manoeuvre in the future, if social norms changed, to 
allow for commercial surrogacy agreements, without needing to change the law.50 
After public consultation,51 the Minister of Justice, Filippos Petsalnikos, submitted the 
draft law to Parliament. During the parliamentary debate, several MPs expressed 
concerns about surrogacy,52 and, in response, some provisions were amended: only 
altruistic gestational surrogacy would be allowed, and both parties would need to be 
permanent residents of Greece. Some MPs also argued that the proposed law was 
incomplete, because it did not regulate the clinical practice of ARTs.53 he Minister 
of Justice, though, noted that these issues would be covered by a different law to be 
introduced the Ministry of Health.54 Amid mild controversy, the 2002 Law was passed 
with a substantial majority, it being accepted that it would help address the problem 
                                                          
46 Draft 2002 ART Law. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Committee Meeting Minutes, 5/10/2001 (Agallopoulou and Koutsouradis (n19) 103). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Spokesmen of the Greek Orthodox Church, medical professionals, biologists, and geneticists part in 
the consultation process (Petsalnikos F (Minister of Justice), Parliamentary proceedings–21/11/2002). 
The Greek Orthodox Church strongly opposed many of the provisions in the draft 2002 Law, and called 
the withdrawal of the surrogacy provisions, arguing that surrogacy disrupts the structure of the 
traditional family, and that the judicial process needed clarification (Church of Greece Synod, 
Comments and Proposals on the Draft Law on Assisted Reproduction (06/11/2002), 
http://www.bioethics.org.gr/03_b.html#3).  
52 For example, MP Kosionis (communist party) and MP Kouvelis (leftist/environmentalist coalition) 
questioned whether modern law should create ideas about ‘appropriate motherhood and womanhood’ 
and referred to exploitation and commodification arguments. MP Tsiplakis (conservative party) and 
MP Ioannidis (socialist party) referred to prostitution and baby-selling arguments 
(http://www.parliament.gr/ERGASIES). 
53 Konstantopoulos and Koulouris, MPs (ibid 26/11/2002). 
54 Closing statement by Filippos Petsalnikos (Minister of Justice), ibid. 
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of infertility in Greece.55 The 2002 Law was subsequently enacted,56 and the GCC was 
amended accordingly.57 
Three years later, the then Minister of Health introduced the second, promised law, 
which sought to regulate ART practice in clinics.58 Law 3305/2005 (2005 Law) also 
established the ‘reasonable expenses’ rule for surrogacy, founded NAMAR, a 
regulatory body for ARTs, and set criminal and disciplinary sanctions for those who 
failed to abide by the statutory provisions or NAMAR’s strictures.59 In 2008, NAMAR 
introduced regulation pertaining to the ‘reasonable expenses’ rule for payments in 
surrogacy, setting a maximum limit for those expenses.60 
The most recent amendment in ART law occurred in July 2014,61 aiming to modernise 
and improve ART regulation by clarifying and simplifying some legal provisions.62 
Only one amendment related to surrogacy: the new law lifted the domicile 
requirement.63 Most recently, in 2017, NAMAR issued a legally binding Code of 
Practice, further regulating specific aspects of ART practice in clinics. I now move to 
discuss the main provisions of Greek ART law in detail, exploring them in the context 
of three themes: access, regulation during surrogacy arrangements, and determination 
of parenthood. 
                                                          
55 Rethymniotaki E, A comparative gendered reading of the changes in Fam ly L w after the regulation 
of biomedical technology of reproduction (Vosniadou, S. and V. Dendrinou eds, Gender, Body and the 
gendered difference: encounters of legal and social problematisation, National and Kapo istrian 
University of Athens, 2008) 59, 
http://thefyliscentre.uoa.gr/fileadmin/thefyliscentre.uoa.gr/uploads/thefylis_tomos_2.pdf. 
56 Government’s Gazette A’ 327/23.12.2002. 
57 Article 1 Law 3089/2002: ‘Article 1458 GCC will be amended as follows: The transfer of fertilized 
ova to another woman (the ova should not be hers) and pregnancy by her is allowed by a court 
authorization issued before the transfer, given that there is a written and, without any financial benefit, 
agreement between the involved parties, meaning the persons wishing to have a child and the surrogate 
mother and, in case that the latter is married, of her spouse, as wll. The court authorization is issued 
following an application of the woman who intends to have a child, provided that evidence is adduced 
not only in regard [to] the fact that she is medically unable to conceive but also [with regard to] the 
fact that the surrogate is in good health and able to conceive’ (the underlined parts were added by 
Parliament). English translation of the 2002 Law available at 
http://www.bioethics.gr/index.php/en/dikaio/nomothesia/138-medically-assisted-human-reproduction. 
58 Memorandum-3305/2005, Annex A. The 2005 Law was enacted on 27/01/2005 (Government’s 
Gazette A’ 17/27.01.2005). 
59 Ibid. 
60 NAMAR Decree 36/2008–Government’s Gazette 670/〈’/16.4.2008. 
61 Law 4272/2014 (hereafter ‘the 2014 Law). 
62 Explanatory Memorandum of Law 4272/2014, Annex C (hereafter Memorandum-4272/2014). 
63 Article 17, 2014 Law. The domicile rule had been established by article 8, 2002 Law. 
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3.3 GREEK LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR SURROGACY 
3.3.1 ACCESS 
Access to ARTs in Greece is limited to those who: can demonstrate a medical need 
for treatment; fall within certain age limits; have a particular relationship status; 
provide valid, informed consent; have been tested for certain health conditions; and 
meet the residence requirement. 
• Medical Need for assisted reproduction 
Though the Constitution provides a prima facie right to have a child, Greek law limits 
access to those who can demonstrate a need for ARTs. Treatment is only available to 
individuals unable to have a child by ‘traditional’ means,64 or those suffering from a 
severe genetic disease which might be transmitted to the child.65 Under Greek law, 
ARTs have a therapeutic role,66 and are not intended to be available as a choice over 
‘traditional’ reproduction.67 Therefore, it is not possible for a single fertile woman,68 
or a lesbian fertile woman who does not have a male partner,69 to access ARTs. Yet, 
some Greek scholars accept that ‘infertility’ includes cases of both biological/physical 
inability to reproduce ‘traditionally’ and of ‘unexplained infertility’.70 
To access surrogacy, the intended mother (IM) must prove to the court dealing with 
her application that she is medically unable to gestate a child.71 It has also been argued 
                                                          
64 This relates to ‘human infertility’ (Memorandum-3089/2002(II) comments on article 1455 GCC). 
65 Article 1455(1) GCC. 
66 Papachristou T, The right to have a child and its limits (Tsinorema, S. nd K. Louis eds, Issues of 
Bioethics - Life, Society and Nature before the biomedical challenges, Cretan University Pre s 2013); 
Koumantos G, 'Bioethics and Biolaw' (2003) Bioethical Issues, Polis Publications 92; Rethymniotaki 
E, Regulation or self-regulation? The example of medically assisted reproduction, vol 20 (Institutions 
of the Greek Society, 2003) 122; Skorini-Paparrigopoulou F, Greek Civil Code, Articles 1455-1456, 
vol 8 (Georgiadis, A. and M. Stathopoulos eds, Law and Economy, 2nd ed , Sakkoulas 2003) 16; 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1); Fountedaki (n16) 178. However, Vidalis argues that ARTs could, in the 
future, be a matter of choice without it being unlawful (Vidalis T, Biolaw, vol 10 (The person, 
Publications of Medical Law and Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2007) 208). 
67 Marinos (n16) 1231. 
68 Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 10; Fountedaki (n16) 178. 
69 Fountedaki argues that homosexuality should be regarded as a condition that restricts individuals to 
have a child through traditional means (n16: 177); Papazisi T, 'Same-sex family: depravity or equal 
treatment?' (2007) Private Law Chronicles 761-767; Trokanas (n1) 217-218; Kipouridou K and 
Milapidou M, 'The homosexuals' right to procreation in Greece' (2015) 1(1  Bioethica 39; 
Papadopoulou L, Restrictions in medically assisted reproduction in Greece (Kantsa, V. ed, Kinship and 
medical technology. Assisted reproduction in Greece, Aleksandreia Prublications 2015) 13. 
70 Papazisi T, 'Surrogate mother or mater semper certa est' in Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-
Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou (eds), Medical Assistance in Human Reproduction. 10 
years of the application of Law 3089/2002 (Sakkoulas 2013) 78. 
71 Article 1458 GCC. 
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that the medical need for surrogacy legal requirement is different than that for other 
ARTs.72 More specifically, an IM needs to prove either her inability to conceive,73 or 
her inability to bring a pregnancy to term.74 According to an academic commentary 
and the explanatory memorandum of the 2002 Law, the reason for this further 
limitation is that surrogacy is an extreme and unusual method of reproduction that 
should only be an option if it is absolutely necessary.75 In other words, this rule serves 
to prevent surrogacy ‘for convenience’, and is said to protect the potential surrogate 
from exploitation.76 For example, a woman cannot resort to surrogacy because she 
would like to continue her professional career without interruption, or because she 
prefers not to undergo pregnancy and childbirth for cosmetic reasons.77 
Some indicative conditions for which surrogacy is allowed are uterine absence, for 
instance due to a hereditary condition (e.g. Mayer-Rokitansky syndrome)78 or uterine 
cancer.79  Surrogacy is also available to women suffering from any illness that is 
known to affect fertility and render pregnancy dangerous, for example: diabetes, 
kidney failure, congenital heart disease,80 multiple miscarriages,81 and multiple IVF 
failures.82 
• Age limits 
Greek law requires ART participants to be at an age when ‘natural’ reproduction is 
still possible.83 The 2005 legislature set the age limit at 50 for women, because ‘this is 
usually the age when many women reach menopause’.84 In this way, the legislature 
                                                          
72 Karasis M, 'The new draft legislation on the application of methods of medical assistance to human 
reproduction (Issues of constitutionality and suggestions)' (2006) Armenopoulos 844; Kyriakaki E, 
'Comments on the Multi-member Court of Heracleion no.678/2755/671/2003 ruling' (2004) 52 Legal 
Library 280-281. 
73 Multi-member Court of Heracleion no.678/2755/671/2003. The court allowed a woman suffering 
from blocked fallopian tubes syndrome to have surrogacy. 
74 Kotzampasi A, 'The right to reproduce. Between the freedom of physical reproduction and the 
regulated right to artificial reproduction' (2006) Opinions and Ideas on interpre ative issues of Civil 
Law, City Publish 253. 
75 Trokanas (n1) 173; Memorandum-3089/2002 II, article 1455 GCC. 
76 Memorandum ibid, and Panagos (n1) 13-37. 
77 Memorandum ibid; Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 10; Skorini-Paparrigopoulou (n66) 16. 
78 Single-member court of Korinthos no.224/2006. 
79 Papazisi (n70). 
80 Ibid 
81 Single-member court of Heracleion no.678/2003. 
82 Single-member court of Athens no.1320/2004. 
83 Article 1455(1) GCC. The Committee suggested the age limit to be set at 60 (Agallopoulou and 
Koutsouradis (n19) 210) but Parliament rejected it. 
84 Article 4(1) 2005 Law. Also, Memorandum-3305/2005, B, comments on article 4. 
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aimed to discourage cases of postponed motherhood, which could endanger the 
pregnant woman’s and the child’s health.85 
Nevertheless, there is an exceptional case of a woman who was allowed to access 
ARTs despite having exceeded the legal age limit.86 She had cryopreserved her eggs 
before the enactment of the 2005 Law, and after the law’s enactment, asked NAMAR 
to grant her permission to have IVF using the cryopreserved eggs and her partner’s 
sperm. Her application was successful, because she could not have known that the law 
would change when she preserved her eggs.87 More recently, a 52-year-old infertile 
woman, who had cryopreserved her eggs at 42, succeeded in her surrogacy application, 
and it was deemed that her constitutional right to have a child superseded the age 
limitation set by ART law.88 
Greek ART law does not set an age limit for men. Arguably, such a limit would ensure 
that the child had a good chance of having two young parents.89 According to the 
majority of Greek scholars, the statutory age limit for women also applies to men when 
they seek ART together.90 In fact, one commentator argues that any diverse 
interpretation would constitute an unjustifiable gender discrimination.91 However, the 
law is unclear on this point, and it could be contended that as women grow older, they 
naturally completely lose their ability to reproduce, whereas the same does not apply 
to all men, so there is no case of bias per se. While men’s fertility declines with age, 
it is not completely lost. In this case, if the age limitation towards women alone 
remains, it could be taken to ensure that law seeks to promote the ‘traditional’ sexual 
family norm. 
                                                          
85 Ibid; Papazisi T, Legal and ethical issues regarding assisted reproduction after menopause (Medical 
Assistance in Human Reproduction - Critical Review Library, 1st edn, Sakkoulas 2002) 77. Moreover, 
Greek ART law sets an upper age limit for donors (40 years of age for sperm donors and 35 for egg 
donors. These limits may be increased to 50 years for men and 40 for women in “exceptional 
circumstances”, e.g. due to shortage in donated genetic material, with NAMAR’s permission (article 
8(7), 2005 Law). 
86 Recommendation of NAMAR no.2/29.11.2006, NAMAR’s 2006 Annual Report. 
87 Ibid 
88 Multi-member court of Patras no.248/2016. Moreover, the judges rul d that the age limitation was 
due to a concern on (the pregnant) women’s health, but here the IM would not gestate the child herself, 
rendering this concern irrelevant. 
89 Memorandum-3305/2005, article 4(1). However, it does not follow that younger parents will 
necessarily be better than older ones (Pennings G, 'Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the 
appropriate evaluation principle' (1999) 14(5) Human Reproduction 1149) 
90 Fountedaki (n16) 169; Skorini-Paparrigopoulou (n66) 27; Spyridakis I, Family Law (Sakkoulas 
2006) 404. 
91 Article 4(2) GC. See Fountedaki (n16) 170. However, Kounougeri-Manoledaki argues that the 
differential treatment towards women only is justifiable because a man’s reproductive capacity is not 
affected by his age, or at least not in he same way as the woman’s (n1: 13). 
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Until recently, Greek law set no upper age limit for surrogates.92 NAMAR changed 
this in 2017. While this is speculative, the previous lack of an age limit for surrogates 
could have been an oversight rather than design, or it could have suggested that age 
limits were justified by a concern to prevent older parents rather than by a concern for 
women’s health. In practice, the courts adopted a case-by-case approach with regards 
to the surrogate’s age, if she could demonstrate clinical evidence that she was 
sufficiently physically healthy to gestate and deliver a child.93 
In 2006, a Greek court gave permission to a 52-year-old woman to carry her grandchild 
on behalf of her daughter.94 This happened again in 2016, with a 67-year-old woman 
who reportedly became the world’s oldest surrogate.95 In the aftermath of the latter 
case, NAMAR issued a stricture (with legal force) that surrogates should be between 
25 and 45 years old.96 Although this is unconfirmed, this new rule is likely to change 
Greek surrogacy practice. Subsequently, NAMAR issued a statement explaining that 
the newly-introduced criteria for the surrogate are in line with evidence and guidance 
produced by the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology and the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine; namely that older women run more 
risks of experiencing complications during pregnancy and delivery, which could be 
fatal for the woman and the child.97 Therefore, the new age restriction is guided by 
concerns for both women’s health and the best interests of the child-to-be. 
• Relationship status 
Since the enactment of the 2002 Law, ARTs, including surrogacy, are available to 
(heterosexual) married couples, (heterosexual) couples in legally recognised 
                                                          
92 Agallopoulou, a member of the 2002 Committee, had suggested that surrogates should be younger 
than 35 years old, but it was rejected (Agallopoulou and Koutsouradis (n19) 69). 
93 Skorini-Paparrigopoulou (n66) 29. 
94 Single-Member Court of First Instance of Korinthos no.224/2006. Trokanas criticised this decision 
and suggested that the age limit should apply to surrogates and IMs, because the case-by-case scrutiny 
of applications for surrogacy may lead to the limitation of reproductive autonomy (Trokanas (n1) 203). 
95 Sawer, P. 'Greek grandmother becomes world's oldest surrogate mother' (23/12/2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/23/greek-grandmother-becomes-worlds-oldest-surrogate-
mother/> accessed on 04/01/2017. 
96 Article 9(1) Greek Code of Practice (CoP) 2017. Also, the surrogate should have a child of her own, 
and must have had no more than two caesarean sections. 
97 NAMAR’s statement regarding the Greek CoP’s criteria for surrogacy – Age limit for the surrogate 
at 45 (14/09/2017) http://eaiya.gov.gr/deltio-typou-19-04-2017/ accessed on 10/01/2018. 
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relationships,98 and single women.99 As the law currently stands, ARTs are not 
available to same-sex couples, and it is doubtful whether surrogacy can be accessed 
by single infertile men. The surrogacy provision refers to a woman (the IM) who sets 
the process in motion.100 Surrogacy is expressly available to single women,101 and all 
other permutations (married, in a legally recognised civil partnership (only available 
to opposite sex couples till recently), or in an enduring relationship), and the surrogate 
may also be married, in a civil partnership (legally recognised or not), or single. 
As regards the rights of individuals who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBTs), Greece cannot generally be described as 
progressive,102 which has a direct impact on their rights to access ARTs. Until recently, 
civil partnerships were not legally recognised as an option for same-sex couples,103 
which served indirectly to restrict their access to ARTs.104 In 2013, Greece was 
condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for discriminating against same-
sex couples on the basis of sexual orientation, because they could not form legal civil 
partnerships.105 This judgment pushed the legislature to reform the law. In December 
                                                          
98 ARTs were available to heterosexual partners in an enduring relationship even b fore the adoption 
of the civil partnerships regime (Law 3719/2008-Government Gazette 241/]'/26.11.2008), and while 
the public debate about whether to regulate these partnerships was on-going. This makes the 2002 Law 
a very forward-thinking legislation. 
99 Memorandum-3089/2002, I(5). 
100 Article 1458 GCC. 
101 Memorandum-3089/2002, I(5). The legislature did not oppose to single infertile women’s right to 
access ARTs, because ‘single-parent families were already a reality’ (Trokanas (n1) 172; Agallopoulou 
and Koutsouradis (n19) 281-282; Pantelidou K, 'Observations on the draft legislation on Medically 
Assistance to Human Reproduction' (2002) B Private Law Chronicles 588; Kounougeri-Manoledaki 
(n1) 63; Skorini-Paparrigopoulou (n66) 77). 
102 Homosexuality has been legal in Greece since 1951, and the rights of same-sex individuals are 
guaranteed by the GC: articles 4(1) (equality), 5(1) (freedom of expression), and 9(1) GC (protection 
of the private and family life). However, certain forms of bias against LGBT+ still exist in criminal and 
employment law (Papazisi T, 'European framework regarding homosexuality and the legal framework 
in Greece' (2000) Scientific Yearbook Armenopoulos 69-81; M. Pavlou, H mophobia in Greece. Love 
for Equality (Greek Institute for Rights- Equality and Diversity (i-red), 2009 http://www.i-
red.eu/resources/publications-files/i-red_homophobia_in_greece2009--6.pdf, accessed on 
25/05/2015).  
103 Papachristou T, 'Critical observations on the Law 3719/2008' (10/11/208) Applications of Civil 
Law 1018; Kounougeri-Manoledaki E, 'The new Law 3719/2008: primary evaluation' (10/11/2008) 
Applications of Civil Law 1018; Papadopoulou (n69); Kantsa V, 'The price of marriage: same-sex 
sexualities and citizenship in Greece' (2014) 17(7) Sexualities 818-836; Kipouridou and Milapidou 
(n69) 37-41. 
104 Skorini-Paparrigopoulou (n66) 58; Fountedaki (n16) 178. Others argue that same-sex have a right 
to access ARTs under the conditions for heterosexual infertile couples and single infertile women: 
Vellis G, 'Issues from Law 3089/2002 on medical assistance to human reproduction (artificial 
reproduction)' (2003) C Private Law Chronicles 496; Papachristou (n66) 35; Rethymniotaki E, Same-
sex couples and medically assisted reproduction: sexual freedom, family life and/or parental 
relationship, vol 18 (Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou 
eds, Assisted Reproduction and Alternative Family Schemas-Publications of Medical Law and 
Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2014) 147-180). 
105 Vallianatos and Others v Greece, ECtHR Application no.29381/09 and 32684/09, 7.11.2013. 
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2015, a new Civil Partnerships’ Law was enacted, under which same-sex couples gain 
the same tax and inheritance rights as married or registered civilly-partnered 
heterosexual couples.106 However, this law made no reference to whether same-sex 
couples who register as civil partners have an express right to access ARTs and/or 
adoption services, which has been characterised as a missed opportunity.107 I  2016, 
the Ministry of Justice announced that the government plans to reform Greek family 
law and provide such rights to same-sex couples.108  
Another possible statutory limitation to access concerns a single infertile man’s right 
to have a child through surrogacy. The only express right for a man to have a child 
through ARTs is if he consents to his female partner’s fertilisation.109 Therefore, a 
single man’s access to surrogacy is currently unregulated. Only one commentator 
argues for the extension of this right to single men, reasoning by analogy either based 
on his constitutional right to reproductive autonomy, or on the constitutional right for 
gender equality.110 
The opponents of this view argue that there is no case of gender discrimination, as 
there are important differences between men and women with regards to infertility.111 
Specifically, a man’s inability to reproduce does not fulfil the criterion of infertility 
because a man is not physically made to be able to carry a pregnancy and give birth.112 
Rather, his infertility is due to a physical inability typical for his gender, hence there 
is no gender bias. On the other hand, he may still face the same difficulty as an infertile 
                                                          
106 Law 4356/2015. Proposals for legislation regarding same-sex couples’ right to form civil 
partnerships had been completed since 2010 but had not been put to a vote until 2015. 
107 Hatzis A, Gay Adoption in Greece (Baros, V. and others eds, Childhood and Migration: Challenges 
for the Pedagogy of Diversity, Diadrasi: Athens 2016). 
108 --'Ministry of Justice: We are considering the matter of adoption by same-sex couples' (09/03/2016) 
<http://www2.iefimerida.gr/news/255515/ypoyrgeio-dikaiosynis-exetazoyme-zitima- s-yiothesias-
paidion-apo-omofyla-zeygaria> accessed on 20/02/2017. In mid-April 2018, a draft law was submitted 
to Parliament that, if approved, will provide rights to same-sex couples to fo ter a child, but no mention 
is made about their rights to adoption and/or to access ARTs (Kougiannou, A. 'Same-sex couples' right 
to foster children. What it means and how easily-achievable it is going to be.' (18/04/2018) 
https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/ti-semainei-to-dikaioma-anadoches-paidion-kai-se-omofela-
zeeyaria-kai-poso-eekolo-tha-einai_gr_5ad73d84e4b029ebe01fca22 a cessed on 20/04/2018). 
109 Article 1475(1) GCC. Also, Rethymniotaki (n104); Kipouridou and Milapidou (n69) 41. 
110 Spyridakis I, The new regulation of assisted reproduction and kinship (Sakkoulas 2003) 33; 
Spyridakis (n90) 32. 
111 Kotzampasi (n74) 270; Papadopoulou-Klamari D, Kinship. Establishment - Registration - 
Protection (Sakkoulas 2010) 223-24. 
112 Articles 1455 GCC and 13 of 2005 Law (inability to carry and bring a pregnancy to term). 
101 
 
woman. Arguably, as the infertile single woman compensates her inability to 
reproduce through sperm donation and surrogacy, so would an infertile single man.113
Moreover, surrogacy for single men is available in the case of post-mortem 
reproduction, if the deceased woman (and former wife/registered partner of the man) 
had previously preserved her eggs and given consent.114 Presumably, then, the dead 
wife renders the man’s request to be a single parent more acceptable.115 Therefore, by 
not providing an express right to single infertile men to access ARTs, Greek law 
seemingly shows its concern to protect the ‘traditional’ sexual family ideal, rather than 
a rejection and/or disapproval towards a single man’s parenting abilities. 
Greek judicial practice has dealt with two cases of single infertile men requesting 
permission for surrogacy. In 2008, a 43-year-old single man suffering from obstructive 
azoospermia was successful in his surrogacy application.116 The man and the surrogate 
proceeded to double donation IVF, and twins were born as a result. The following 
year, a different court authorised another single infertile man’s application for 
surrogacy.117 In both cases, the judges grounded the permission on the men’s 
constitutional rights to reproductive autonomy and gender equality.118 
 However, the Attorney General of the Appeal Court of Athens appealed against the 
first of the above cases, succeeding in reversing the first-instance decision.119 The 
reason given for the appeal was that there was no gender discrimination, because men 
are physically unable to carry a pregnancy, and the right to surrogacy is legally granted
only to single infertile women.120 Moreover, based on Greek law, judicial scrutiny in 
                                                          
113 Koumoutzis M, 'Greek Civil Code, Articles 1457-1458' in Georgiadis, A. and M. Stathopoulos 
(eds), Greek Civil Code (Law and Economy, 2nd edn, Sakkoulas 2003) 79; Trokanas (n1) 222. 
114 Memorandum-3089/2002, II, article 1457. Kounougeri-Manoledaki disagrees with the argument that 
surrogacy should be available to single men by analogy to a man’s right to post-mortem reproduction, 
because, in the latter case, we are still treating the deceased woman’s inability to carry and bring a 
pregnancy to term, as the law requires. In the single man’s surrogacy case, we are lacking the female 
infertility requirement ('Single-Member Court of Athens no.2827/2008' (2010) 9 Medical Law and 
Bioethics). 
115 There is an interesting parallel here with a famous UK case (R v HFEA (ex parte Blood) [1997] 2 
WLR 806), involving a widow’s right to be artificially inseminated with her late husband’s sperm, 
which she had preserved before his death, but the mean had not consented to post-mortem reproduction. 
Ms Blood won her long legal battle in 2002. It was contended that a dead husband made the request for 
treatment ‘respectable’, even though the husband would not be able to share parenting. A more recent 
case is L v HFEA & Secretary of State for Health [2008] EWHC 2149 (Fam). 
116 Single-Member court of Athens case no.2827/2008. For comments: Papachristou T, 'Single-Member 
Court of Athens no.2827/2008' (2009) e Private Law Chronicles 817-819. 
117 Single-Member Court of Thessaloniki no.13707/2009. 
118 Opposite view by Papachristou (n66) 29.  




surrogacy establishes the IM’s parenthood rights following the child’s birth, and 
extinguishes the birth mother’s (the surrogate’s) rights. If the legal presumption of 
motherhood is, by analogy, applied to fatherhood, then the child would be denied the 
right to ever have a mother, not even through adoption, since there would be no legal 
mother to consent to the adoption.121 
During the appeal, the man stated that between the time of the first instance decision 
and the birth of the twins, he had married a woman, and asked she be recognised as 
legal mother. However, the Appeal Court ruled this impossible; the woman did not 
participate in the surrogacy application and, therefore, she could only attain 
parenthood by adoption.122 As a result of the successful appeal, the surrogate was 
named the legal mother of the twins by gestation and birth,123 and the man was 
instructed to seek parenthood through adoption.124 The ruling was criticised by some 
commentators,125 and the media.126 While the 2008 decision of the Court of Athens 
was reversed, the 2009 decision of the Court of Thessaloniki, above, remains in place, 
meaning the law is still unclear regarding single infertile men’s right to access formal 
legal surrogacy. 
In summary then, under Greek law, surrogacy is available to women, whatever their 
relationship status, but it is debatable whether same-sex couples or single infertile men 
can access ARTs, including surrogacy.127 
• Welfare of the Child (WoC) 
Greek ART law lays down the protection of the ‘best interests’ of the child as its 
primary aim.128 This principle is important in the context of ART regulation, as it 
                                                          
121 Ibid. Also Lekkas GK, Medically assisted reproduction and parenthood under Greek law. 
Establishment of the 'socio-emotional' parenthood or the procreation without 
parenthood? (Papachristou, T. K. and others eds, 21st Century Family Law: Coincidental and 
Fundamental Reforms - Law and Society in 21st century, Sakkoulas 2012) 41-42. 
122 Appeal Court of Athens case no.3357/2010. 
123 Ibid, based on article 1463 GCC. 
124 Ibid 
125 Spyridakis (n110) 32; Spyridakis I, Assisted reproduction (Sakkoulas 2009); Vidalis (n66) 220. The 
majority of the theory follows a ‘black letter law’ approach (that surrogacy is only available to infertile 
women: Agallopoulou P, 'Surrogate Motherhood' (2004) Digesta 6; Kotzampasi (n74) 270; 
Papadopoulou-Klamari (n111); Lekkas (n121), and others). 
126 Tsimpoukis, P. 'The law denies twins from father who used a surrogate mother' (22/03/2014) 
http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/363934/o-nomos-sterei-apo-patera-t -diduma-pou-apektise-
me-parentheti-mitera/ accessed on 10/07/2017. 
127 It is also unclear whether transgender women can access ARTs in Greece. 
128 Article 1(2) 2005 Law. See also Kounougeri-Manoledaki E, 'The law as a tool of s cial monitoring 
of the medically assisted reproduction' (2001) 14 Indictus 149; Memorandum-3089/2002, II, article 1.  
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responds to the concern of avoiding causing harm to others.129 A  such, WoC may 
justify limitations to reproductive autonomy, in terms of access to ARTs and legal 
parenthood. 
Notably, the 2002 Law made no reference to a WoC provision.130 According to 
academic commentaries and the 2002 Law explanatory memorandum, Greek family 
law’s approach, in general, is entirely child-centred;131 ARTs are considered to benefit 
the child, who would not have been born otherwise,132 so an express reference to WoC 
was considered redundant.  However, the 2005 legislature introduced WoC to show 
that reproductive autonomy is subject to certain limits.133 Under the current 
framework, WoC is assessed by judges, who authorise surrogacy agreements, and 
clinics, where the parties in a surrogacy arrangement undergo IVF. 
Nevertheless, law does not specify any criteria for evaluating WoC,134 and makes no 
reference to the weight that WoC should be given relative to the interests of others.135 
According to Trokanas, WoC may give unlimited discretion, first, to judges and, 
secondly, to ART professionals, to act as gatekeepers of access to ARTs.136 Others 
suggest that WoC is to be considered merely as a declaration, rather than a tool to 
control people’s suitability to parent a child.137 Therefore, they argue, the principle 
                                                          
129 Article 5(2) GC. 
130 Some members of the 2005 draft law Committee objected to including WoC in ARTs law, because 
there is no certainty that a child will be born as a result (Koumoutzis (n113) 76). 
131 Trokanas T, The application of medically assisted reproductive methods and the welfare of the child 
to be born (Papachristou, T. K. and others eds, 21st Century Family Law: Coincidental and 
Fundamental Reforms - Law and Society in 21st century, Sakkoulas 2012) 121. Also, statement by 
Minister of Justice during the parliamentary debates for the 2002 legislation (26/11/2002), and 
Memorandum-3089/2002, 』(4): ‘a ban on the various forms of ARTs would not be the best measure, 
since it would victimise the most vulnerable party of all, the child born through a prohibited and 
unregulated practice.’ 
132 Fountedaki (n16) 154; Papadopoulou-Klamari (n111) 228. However, Karasis argues that ARTs do 
not serve WoC (n72: 834). 
133 Article 1(2) 2005 Law. Also, Agallopoulou and Koutsouradis (n19) 45, 68, 74); Koutsouradis A, 
'Issues of Surrogate Motherhood after the Law 3305/2005' (2006) 54 Legal Library 355. 
134 The existence of a stable and supporting environment is a crucial factor, as well as the IPs’ ages, 
their medical history, and their ability to fulfil the child’s needs (Athens Bar Association, 'Explanatory 
Report on Law 3305/2005' (2005) 53 Code of Legal Tribune 24; Koutsouradis (n133) 335). 
135 Memorandum-3305/2005 (II, article 1) cites the 2003 Code of Practice of th  British HFEA as the 
point of reference for the criteria regarding the child’s ‘best interests’ [3.12]. Also, Agallopoulou and 
Koutsouradis (n19) 45,68,74; Koutsouradis (n133) 355. 
136 Trokanas (n131) 123. 
137 Ibid 124; Karasis M, 'The crisis in Family Law after Law 3089/2002' (2004) Armenopoulos 1237; 
Koumoutzis (n113) 1237; Papadopoulou-Klamari (n111) 29; Papachristou T, Assisted reproduction in 
the Civil Code (Sakkoulas 2003) 213. 
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should be used only by the judiciary, and sparingly, namely only in instances where 
law expressly allows it, as for example in surrogacy cases.138  
With the exception of few court decisions placing importance on WoC, Greek judicial 
practice concerning surrogacy shows that WoC is an important principle but not the 
most important one. Hence, the child’s interests are weighed against the IPs’ 
interests.139 However, in some cases, WoC has been used as a tool to deem the IPs 
unsuitable to become parents,140 and, in some, it was linked to the IPs’ ability to 
provide ‘a real stable and supportive environment’ for the child-to-be, and was a 
decisive criterion for providing access to surrogacy.141 
• Consent to ART 
As I argued in Chapter 2, free and fully informed consent is central to reproductive 
autonomy, and, perhaps even more so, in the surrogacy context. According to two 
Greek scholars, the legal requirement for consent to ART shows that law recognises 
the reproductive autonomy of ART participants’,142 and externalises the individual’s 
will to form an agreement with the ART professional, and/or the clinic.143 Most 
importantly, consent to ART establishes parenthood.144 As will be seen in the 
following chapter, Greek law differs considerably from that of the UK on this point: 
UK law provides both for gestational and traditional surrogacy (in clinics, and at 
home). If the surrogate’s fertilisation takes place at home, consent is unregulated. 
Greek law requires ARTs participants to provide written consent before the start of 
clinical treatment.145 If the couple is married, the consent form is an informal written 
document. Single infertile women and unmarried (heterosexual) couples, however, 
must provide consent through a notarised document,146 which arguably makes it harder 
                                                          
138 Trokanas (n131); Koutsouradis (n133) 357. 
139 Trokanas (ibid). 
140 Single-member court of Thessaloniki nos.40820/2007; 16574/2009; 10350/2010; 10351/2010. 
141 Single-member court of Katerini no.408/2006; Single-member court of Rodopi no.400/2007; Single-
member court of Thessaloniki no.838/2010 and 14946/2010. In Single-member court of Thessaloniki 
no.395/2009 the judge mentioned that the IPs are ‘honest, they have a harmonious relationship, while 
their financial status is good, which will secure a comfortable life to the child-to-be’. Additionally, in 
Single-member court of Thessaloniki no.14946/2010 and 16574/2009 the judiciary took into account 
‘the exhausting and costly attempts of the [IP’s] to have a child through ARTs, which prove their innate 
desire to have a child and provide a loving and caring environment to the child-to-be’. 
142 Fountedaki (n16) 234. 
143 Trokanas (n1) 243. 
144 Ibid 244. 




for them access ARTs. The legislature explained that this extra formality is required 
because the man’s consent will lead to an irrefutable legal presumption of his 
paternity,147 hence he must be certain he wants to undertake this commitment. The 
unmarried woman’s notarised consent also establishes her intention and commitment 
to becoming a mother.148 Although potentially an inconvenience, it is doubtful it offers 
a significant obstacle in practice, since notaries are easily accessible across Greece, 
and the cost of this service is minimal.149 
Further, Greek law requires that consent is fully informed,150 and establishes a duty 
for medical professionals to provide information about a wide range of issues, 
including the medical process of the chosen treatment, the actual and potential health 
risks, and an account of the main social, legal, and financial implications of the 
decision to have ART.151 Additionally, regulation recognises the value of professional 
counselling in the context of ARTs. The recent Code of Practice establishes a duty on 
clinics to offer professional counselling to all ARTs participants, especially to those 
using surrogacy and/or donated gametes, and those having multiple embryos 
implanted.152 Lastly, as in any other case of ARTs, all parties in a surrogacy 
arrangement can freely withdraw their consent before the embryo is transferred into 
the surrogate’s body.153 
• Required health checks 
Under Greek law, before treatment starts, all ARTs participants must be tested for any 
condition that might affect a healthy pregnancy and delivery, and for any other serious 
illness, such as HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B and C, and/or syphilis, that might be 
transmitted to the child.154 In surrogacy, all parties (including the surrogate’s partner, 
                                                          
147 Memorandum-3089/2002, II, article 1456. This is based on the ‘treatment together’ rule that creates 
an irrefutable presumption of paternity (article 1475(2) GCC), which existed even before the enactment 
of the 2002 Law (Papadopoulou-Klamari D, 'Presumed father's consent to artificial fertilisation' (1994) 
2 Critical Review). 
148 Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 18. 
149 Nine notary associations, with more than 3,000 members, are located across Greece. The cost is
approximately 50€ (http://www.notarius.gr/info/1011). 
150 Article 5(2) 2005 Law. 
151 Ibid, and article 6 Greek CoP. See also Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 28. Moreover, medical 
professionals treating patients without their consent are liable to pay damages (articles 330 GCC and 8 
Law 2251/1994). 
152 Article 22 Greek CoP. 
153 Article 1456(2) GCC. 
154 Article 4(2) 2005 Law. 
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if she has one),155 must undergo these tests.156 Additionally, they must undergo 
detailed psychiatric evaluation to ensure their emotional stability and determination to 
complete the surrogacy arrangement.157 If the parties fail to prove this, they will be 
restricted from accessing surrogacy. This limitation is said to be guided by a concern 
for the welfare of the parties and of the child-to-be.158 
• Residence requirement for surrogacy 
Until recently, surrogacy was only allowed when both the IM and the surrogate were 
domiciled in Greece.159 It is noteworthy that the 2002 draft Law did not include a 
residence rule; it was added by the Minister of Justice during the parliamentary 
proceedings to reduce welfare concerns about exploitation, and potential “trafficking” 
of poor foreign women to act as surrogates in Greece.160 Later legislative amendments 
introduced criminal sanctions for violations of this provision.161 However, even if the 
domicile rule were violated, parenthood would remain unchanged.162 
The statutory limitation was not based on any empirical evidence of harm, and we 
have almost no knowledge of how the residence rule worked in practice. The Bioethics 
Commission reported in 2013 that ‘Greece is one of the most popular countries within 
Europe where “reproductive tourism” takes place’, and that cases of trafficking for 
egg donation and surrogacy had been brought to the Committee’s attention.163 Yet, 
due to the paucity of empirical evidence, these claims remain unconfirmed. 
According to Ravdas’ 2012 study, more than half of the women who have acted as 
surrogates in Greece were foreigners, with most of them having come from Eastern 
                                                          
155 Memorandum-3305/2005, B, article 4; article 13(3) 2005 Law. 
156 Article 13(2), (3) 2005 Law redirects to the medical checks of article 4. 
157 Ibid. Article 1458 GCC also refers to the surrogate’s ‘suitability’, which includes her good 
psychological health (Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 61). 
158 Memorandum-3305/2005, B. 
159 Article 8, 2002 Law. The domicile rule still applies under UK law. 
160 Minutes of parliamentary proceedings on 27/11/2002 and 3/12/2002. Also, Papazisi (n70) 81. 
161 Article 26(8) 2005 Law. 
162 Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 65. Also Single-Member Court of Chania no.122/2008, between 
Greek IPs and an Albanian surrogate who was not a permanent resident of Greece. The judge was ready 
to grant permission, but the surrogate’s husband’s consent was missing. A further hearing was 
scheduled, but the parties broke off the arrangement and withdrew the application. 
163 Hellenic National Bioethics Commission Annual Report (10/06/2013), available at 
http://www.bioethics.gr/images/pdf/ETHSIES/Annual_2012-2013.pdf accessed on 03/03/2015 
(hereafter Bioethics Commission 2012-2013 Report). This report also stressed the need for more 
stringent regulation for surrogacy through NAMAR, which had formally ceased operations in 2010, 




European countries and the Balkans.164 Nevertheless, there is no evidence that women 
have been trafficked to act as surrogates, and, despite the limited sample, there is also 
no clear evidence of intentional exploitation.165 Ravdas argues that, based on the 
judicial transcripts, judges considered the domicile requirement less important than 
other statutory requirements for surrogacy, and, in some cases, they were content with 
a vague statement that both women lived in Greece without requesting further proof.166 
In 2014, the legislature lifted the residence requirement, noting that the rule was not 
in line with the modern realities of surrogacy, and especially the phenomenon of cross-
country medical care.167 The new rule requires that one of the women, either the IM 
or the surrogate, reside in Greece at least temporarily.168 This makes formal legal 
surrogacy in Greece available to foreign couples, but also enables the state to monitor 
and regulate the practice.169 
However, some have expressed fears that Greece could become yet another popular 
destination for cross-border surrogacy,170 and that the risk of exploitation would 
increase without careful and efficient monitoring.171 For this reason, the legislature 
also re-established NAMAR, which, as will be discussed below, had only partly 
functioned for a limited time.172 A few months after the abolition of the residence rule, 
an Australian couple succeeded in accessing formal legal surrogacy in Greece.173 More 
                                                          
164 Ravdas (n10) conducted a study of 136 judicial decisions regarding surrogacy, which had been 
published by Greek courts during November 2009 and December 2011. He found that 91% of IMs were 
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came from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union and 21% of them came from the Balkans 
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166 Ibid. 
167 Memorandum-4272/2014, Chapter 3. 
168 Article 17 Law 4272/2014, Government’s Gazette A’ 145/11.07.2014. 
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170 Kovacs, Stéphane. 'Greece, The Eldorado of surrogacy', Le Figaro (3/10/2014), available in French 
at http://www.lefigaro.fr/mon-figaro/2014/10/03/10001-20141003ARTFIG00288-en-grece-l-
eldorado-de-la-gpa.php, accessed on 23/05/2015. 
171 Memorandum-4272/2014, Chapter 3(3). Papachristou argued that the change in the residence rule is 
against the law’s core objectives: the discouragement of reproductive tourism and the safeguarding 
against the risk of human trafficking (Papachristou TK, 'An unfortunate choice by the lawmaker' (2014) 
8 Private Law Chronicles). 
172 Article 21 Law 4272/2014. 
173 Norris-Ongso, P. 'Surrogacy in Greece. First Australian IPs Obtain Court App oval' (5/11/2015) 
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recently still, Ravdas’ ongoing research identified surrogacy applications involving 
foreign IPs, especially from France and Italy.174 
3.3.2 REGULATION OF SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
In this section, I consider how Greek law regulates surrogacy arrangements once 
access has been agreed. The Greek legal model provides for intense state-monitoring 
at the preconception stage, and almost no monitoring after the child’s birth, whereas, 
as we will see in the next chapter, in the UK, some surrogacy arrangements are 
completely unregulated, and others very little regulated at the start, but there is intense 
state-monitoring after the child’s birth, if the IPs seek for their parenthood to be legally 
recognised. 
• Monitoring of Greek surrogacy practice 
Under Greek law, surrogacy practice is regulated and monitored by the judiciary at the 
preconception stage, and by NAMAR. The IM requ sts the court’ to approve the 
surrogacy agreement that the parties drafted and signed.175 A judge must ensure that 
all legal requirements are met, that there are no clauses in the agreement that 
excessively restrict the surrogate’s freedom (such as her right to a lawful abortion,176 
or her right to consent to medical interventions), and to authorise access to formal legal 
surrogacy. There is no requirement for a formal legal document for the agreement, 
although, in practice, it is often signed off by a notary,177 which offers greater legal 
protection to the contracting parties. The IM must also submit a medical affidavit 
proving her medical need for surrogacy and the surrogate’s good physical and 
emotional health.178 
However, the judge’s power is very restricted: he/she can only check that all legal 
requirements are met and affirm that consent is valid. He/she cannot and will not 
                                                          
174 Ravdas P, ‘Surrogate Motherhood’ (working paper). 
175 Article 1458 GCC. According to Single-Member Court of Thessaloniki no.27035/2003 only the IM 
can apply for the court’s authorisation, and not her husband/partner. The court responsible for the 
review of surrogacy arrangements is the civil Single-Member Court of First Instance of the place of 
residence of either the IM or of the surrogate (articles 740 and 499(1) Code of Civil Procedure, as 
amended). 
176 Under the conditions of article 304 Criminal Code. However, a non-medically necessary abortion 
on the part of the surrogate may constitute a breach of contract, and the surrogate may be liable for 
damages to the IPs (Trokanas (n1) 358). Also, Vidalis (n14) 118; Papachristou (n66) 55). 
177 Papachristou (n66) 51; Kounougeri-Manoledaki (n1) 51; Koumoutzis (n113) 55; Vastaroucha, M. 
'A practical guide to fertility legislation in Greece' (21/03/2016) http://www.nomos.gr/en/fertility-law/ 
accessed on 10/09/2016; Single-member court of Thessaloniki no.13707/2009. 
178 Article 13, 2005 Law. 
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investigate the reasons for choosing surrogacy (other than to ensure that it is medically 
necessary), and will not look for evidence of a close relationship between the 
contracting parties, or a truly altruistic motivation.179 Consequently, the judicial 
scrutiny process can be depicted as more of a procedural requirement, a ‘rubber 
stamp’, rather than a detailed review of surrogacy cases. One commentator notes that 
the reason for this could be that the judiciary considers it a “good deed” to facilitate 
infertile women becoming mothers.180 
The 2005 Law established NAMAR as an organisation with powers to monitor ARTs 
in clinics and issue regulation. Surrogacy falls inside NAMAR’s remit; because there 
can be no genetic link between the surrogate and the child, the ova must come from 
the IM or a donor,181 and pregnancy can only be attained through IVF in a clinic 
licensed by NAMAR.182 Nevertheless, NAMAR never functioned fully, and all its 
members resigned in 2010. According to a statement by a former member, since its 
establishment, NAMAR lacked administrative and financial support, which made its 
operation very difficult.183 Hence, the practice of approximately 67 Greek fertility 
clinics, which were reportedly in operation, was unmonitored for many years, until 
recently.184 
However, before their resignation, the earlier members of NAMAR produced 
important work. In 2008, NAMAR issued two decrees; one stipulating what payments 
are legally acceptable in gamete donation and surrogacy, and another specifying the 
terms and conditions regarding the operation and monitoring of fertility clinics. The 
                                                          
179 Hatzis (n1). 
180 Papazisi (n70) 85. 
181 Kounougeri-Manoledaki E, 'Comments on the Single-Member Court of Heracleion no.678/2003' 
(2003) 57 Armenopoulos 1604; Agallopoulou P, 'Granting of permission for surrogacy' (2003) 2 
Critical Review 242. 
182 Article 16(1) 2005 Law. 
183 Skorini-Paparrigopoulou F, 'National Authority of Medically Assisted Reproduction: Experiences 
and future perspectives' in Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-
Kastanidou (eds), Medical Assistance in Human Reproduction. 10 years of the application of Law 
3089/2002 (Sakkoulas 2013) 125. NAMAR seems to have fallen victim of political turbulence and 
expense cuts in the public sector due to the financial crisis since 2009. 
184 Karlatira P. '67 fertility centres [operating] without licence in our country [Greece]' (ProtoThema, 
15/10/2014) http://www.protothema.gr/ugeia/article/418527/horis-adeia-oi-67-monades-
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Babu GP, 'The market for reproductive tourism:  analysis with special rference to Greece' (2017) 2(16) 
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latter required approval by the Minister of Health,185 which, after much delay, came 
in 2015,186 and gained legal force. The licensing process was completed in November 
2017 by the newly reformed NAMAR,187 which also issued a long-awaited Code of 
Practice introducing regulation with legal force. 
• Payments in surrogacy 
Surrogacy in Greece is allowed for altruistic reasons only.188 Initially, the 2002 
legislature deemed all payments for surrogacy illegal to avoid potential harm due to 
commodification,189 but the 2005 Law took a more practical approach: payments are 
still illegal and constitute a criminal offence,190 but there is an exception regarding 
payments for the surrogate’s ‘reasonable’ expenses.191 These cover the costs for the 
surrogate’s pregnancy, childbirth and childbed,192 as well as compensation for lost 
wages.193 In 2008, NAMAR further specified the legally acceptable amount of 
‘reasonable expenses’ at no more than €10,000 (approximately £8,865).194 However, 
Hatzis reports that, in reality, payments to surrogates frequently exceed €12,000 
(approximately £10,600) and refers to the possibility of payments “under the table” 
that go unmonitored.195 More importantly, Greek law contains no specific mechanism 
                                                          
185 Tarlatzis V, The effect of law on the clinical practice of medically assisted reproduction (Kaiafa-
Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou eds, Medical assistance in 
Human Reproduction 10 years of the application of Law 3089/2002, Sakkoul s 2013) 8. 
186 Presidential decree of 31/07/2015 for the licensing and regulation of ART units.
187 NAMAR’s Chairman, Dr Arntsaklis, reported that there are currently 44 fertility clinics in operation, 
and they have all received licenses from NAMAR (Kougiannou, A. 'Huffington Post's big study on IVF 
in Greece' (05/12/2017) http://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/e-meyale-ereena-tes-huffpost-yia-tis-
exosomatikes-sten-ellada_gr_5a25615de4b0a02abe928cf3 accessed on 10/12/2017). 
188 Articles 1458 GCC, 13 and 26(8) 2005 Law. 
189 Minister of Justice, parliamentary proceedings-21/11/2002. 
190 Article 26(8) 2005 Law declares sanctions of at least two years’ imprisonment and liability for 
damages of at least 1,500€. Moreover, excess payments arguably invalidate the surrogacy agreement 
(Koutsouradis (n133) 348). 
191 Article 13(4) 2005 Law.  
192 Pregnancy costs include payments for IVF, legal expenses, pregnancy clothing, costs of healthy 
nutrition and medical care during pregnancy, counselling costs, costs of life and health insurance, travel 
costs, and expenses for phone contact with the IPs. The costs of childbirth include payments for the 
surrogate’s postnatal care. (NAMAR Decree 36/2008, article 4; Trokanas (n1) 375). 
193 Article 13(4) 2005 Law. If the surrogate is unemployed, she can receive compensation for the 
equivalent of the basic pay (NAMAR Decree, ibid). 
194 NAMAR Decree ibid. 
195 Hatzis (n1) 13. This was confirmed by Ravdas (n10), who report d that, in 24% of surrogacy cases 
he studied, the surrogacy relationship could be described as ‘purely altruistic’ (the surrogate was the 
IM’s mother, sister, aunt, sister-in-law), and 30% of the cases made a vague statement about the 
surrogate being ‘a close friend’. In 20% of cases the surrogate was employed by the IM or her family 
but there were mentions of a friendship between the parties, and in 26% of the cases there was no 
reference to the social/professional relationship between. Two Greek clinics that participated in a small-




to control excessive payments to surrogates other than NAMAR’s duty to monitor 
ARTs in clinics and to report illegal activities to the courts.196 
The 2005 Law also bans the operation of commercial surrogacy agencies, and the 
advertisement of surrogacy services, but again makes no mention on how to monitor 
these practices.197 Rather, sanctions for payments in surrogacy practice are arguably 
intended to have a ‘chilling effect’ to prevent commercial surrogacy. The Bioethics 
Commission recently reported that commercial surrogacy takes place in Greece,198 and 
urged the state to control surrogacy practice more efficiently. Despite the lack of 
effective oversight, no cases involving harm due to illegal payments for surrogacy 
have ever reached Greek courts or been reported in the media. 
3.3.3 Determination of parenthood following surrogacy 
• Enforceability and intention-based parenthood 
Greek law introduces a particularly interesting process for the determination of 
parenthood that is starkly different to that in the UK and, indeed, most other countries. 
Greece is one of the few regimes worldwide that recognises intention as the basis of 
parenthood.199 According to this principle, the meaning of biological truth is 
diminished, and intention is more important.200 
Greek family law establishes the general presumption of motherhood based on the 
event of birth.201 However, in surrogacy, the preconception judicial decision creates a 
legal presumption that the child’s mother is not the one who gave birth to her, but 
rather the one who has obtained the court’s permission, namely the IM.202 This, in 
turn, leads to the surrogacy agreement becoming fully enforceable upon the child’s 
birth, which is an extension of the intention-based parenthood model. Parenthood is 
immediate, certain, and in favour of the IM. There is no process to be followed other 
than the event of birth itself, and the registration of the child in the National Registry 
                                                          
196 Article 20(1) 2005 Law. 
197 Article 26(8) ibid. 
198 Bioethics Commission 2012-2013 Report (n163). 
199 Horsey K, 'Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements' (2011) 22(4) 
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approach to parenthood following surrogacy arrangements in the UK. 
200 Memorandum-3089/2002, II(1). 
201 Article 1463 GCC. 
202 Article 1464(1) GCC. 
112 
 
under the IM’s name simply by submitting the court decision that authorised 
surrogacy. 
Due to the enforceability rule, there is no right to a ‘change of heart’ except if it is a 
‘mutual change of heart’,203 whereby the presumed legal mother can consent to the 
child being adopted by the surrogate. This does not affect the principle that the IM is 
the legal mother; it merely provides a legal avenue for reversing those effects. As noted 
above, the surrogate retains her autonomy during the surrogacy arrangement, since she 
must consent to all interventions. Consequently, enforceability only influences 
parenthood issues after the birth. 
In practical terms, enforceability means that the event of birth creates a legal mandate 
for the surrogate to hand the child over to the IM, and for the IM (and now presumed 
legal mother) to receive the child. If the surrogate refuses to hand over the child, the 
IM can request the civil court to order the surrogate to do so, and the surrogate may 
face criminal charges for child abduction.204 On the other hand, the surrogate can 
request the court to force the IM to take the child up if she refuses to do so. The IM 
may also face criminal charges for desertion.205 However, no case has reached the 
national courts, either civil or criminal, requesting the enforcement of a surrogacy 
agreement, meaning that the rule possibly works well. 
Nevertheless, the presumption of motherhood can be rebutted in court within six 
months after the child’s birth if the surrogate or the IM present sufficient proof that 
the child is genetically related to the surrogate.206 If the application is successful, the 
surrogate will be considered the child’s legal mother retrospectively, based on the 
general criterion of gestation and birth.207 Therefore, Greek law adopts the intention-
based model of parenthood, but sets a significant limitation upon it: the surrogate is 
not to be genetically related to the child,208 because then she would fulfil all criteria of 
motherhood (genetics, gestation and birth), and it would be considered extremely 
unfair to force her to give away a child that she is related to.209 Yet, this provision 
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creates an antithesis. Greek law takes intention very seriously, but places a lot of 
weight on genetics, too. This provision could be taken to show te law’s concern to 
ensure that the ‘gestational-only’ rule must be respected. 
According to the draft 2002 Law Committee, enforceability shows that the law trusts 
the sincerity of the parties’ intentions and respects their autonomy to make their own 
choices.210 Namely, the IPs are free to exercise their full reproductive autonomy and 
become parents, although they may not fulfil the criteria that traditionally establish 
kinship (genetic, coital and gestational components),211 and donors or surrogates also 
exercise their reproductive autonomy by offering their services without having to 
accept legal parenthood for a child they did not intend to raise.212 Moreover, it is 
considered that intention-based parenthood benefits the child, because it is in the 
child’s ‘best interests’ to be raised by the parents who wanted her.213 Secondly, 
enforceability is thought to protect the parties and the child from harm that could arise 
if one party decided to renege on the agreement.214 Lastly, enforceability is considered 
to serve WoC, as the child knows with certainty who her legal parents are at birth, and 
the legal reality reflects the social reality of parenthood.215 Arguably, it is also a way 
to decrease, or eliminate, the possibility of legal disputes over parenthood, which could 
be lengthy and stressful. On the other hand, altruism, which is also part of the Greek 
surrogacy regime, possibly does not bond well with enforceability. Perhaps the 
imbalance is owed to bad design; the draft 2002 Law did not exclude the practice of 
commercial surrogacy, but Parliament rejected it, thereby rendering the Greek regime 
a legal hybrid containing both altruistic and commercial elements. 
• Determination of fatherhood following surrogacy 
Under Greek law, fatherhood is based on two criteria: relationship status with the legal 
mother and consent. The man who is married to or in a legally recognised civil 
partnership with the legal mother is presumed to be the legal father upon the child’s 
birth.216 In surrogacy, the IM’s husband or registered (male) civil partner who had 
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signed the surrogacy agreement will be considered the child’s legal father immediately 
after birth by virtue of both his relationship with the legal mother and his consent.217 
It could, then, be argued that Greek law provides some weight to intention, but also a 
lot of weight to wanting to ensure that the ‘traditional’ sexual family ideal is preserved. 
In the case of a de facto (non-legally) recognised relationship, fatherhood is purely 
based on consent; hence, the IM’s (male) partner who consented to the surrogacy 
agreement and the surrogate’s IVF, will be regarded the child’s legal father,218 even if 
he is not genetically related to her. Greek law does not regulate parenthood in cases of 
same-sex couples who have had a child through ARTs, including surrogacy.219 
Consequently, a lesbian IM can gain legal parenthood, but her partner cannot.220 
In case of a successful rebuttal of the IM’s presumption of motherhood, the surrogate’s 
husband/registered (male) civil partner who had consented to surrogacy will 
automatically be considered the child’s legal father.221 If the surrogate (and now the 
child’s legal mother) was in a non-legally recognised relationship, her partner who 
consented to her IVF is automatically the child’s father by virtue of his consent.222 
Interestingly, in such a case, fatherhood is irrefutable.223 If the surrogate (and now 
legal mother) was single, the child will have no father at birth. The above provisions 
reflect the importance of robust advance consent to surrogacy, but also the law’s 
concern to protect the ‘traditional’ family ideal, and the child’s presumed interest to 
have parents who want her. Lastly, by virtue of the intention-based model of 
parenthood stipulated by Greek law, gamete donation is anonymous.224 Therefore, 
donors’ reproductive autonomy receives full protection. Yet, donor anonymity could 
arguably violate the child’s right to know her genetic origins.225 
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This chapter presented several interesting and distinctive factors of Greek law 
pertaining to surrogacy. Greek law recognises an express right to have a child through 
‘traditional’ or artificial means, including surrogacy, and places great importance on 
the principle of WoC. Unlike in the UK, WoC is not paramount in Greece, but is rather 
weighed in the balance with the IPs’ and the surrogate’s rights to autonomy and 
welfare. Access to surrogacy is restricted to women with a medical need for treatment, 
who are under 50 years old, and who are married or in a legally recognised civil 
partnership (which was only available to opposite sex couples only until recently). 
Surrogacy is only allowed for altruistic reasons, but compensation for ‘reasonable 
expenses’ up to €10,000 is permissible. Additionally, only gestational surrogacy is 
available in Greece, and it is only practised in clinics. 
The most distinctive features of Greek regulation concern the determination of 
parenthood following surrogacy: unlike the UK and most other jurisdictions in the 
world, in Greece, intention is the basis of parenthood and surrogacy agreements are 
enforceable after the child’s birth.  Greek law introduces a legal presumption of 
motherhood based on the preconception judicial authorisation for surrogacy, again 
placing weight on intention. For this reason, donor anonymity is strictly protected.  
Nevertheless, by giving a limited right to surrogates to rebut the legal presumption of 
motherhood, Greek law still partly promotes the ‘traditional’ sexual family ideal, 
while also partly moving away from it. 
In the following chapter, we will see that UK law has reached a starkly different 




The UK regulatory framework for surrogacy 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes how surrogacy is regulated in the UK. As opposed to Greece, 
where law only accommodates gestational surrogacy (in clinics), UK regulation 
allows traditional and gestational altruistic surrogacy, and pregnancy can be achieved 
in a clinic, where the practice is regulated, or informally at home, which is unregulated. 
Greek surrogacy agreements are enforceable, and the IPs’ parenthood is automatically 
acknowledged upon the child’s birth. UK regulation provides for non-enforceable 
surrogacy agreements, and a post-birth judicial scrutiny leading to the transfer of legal 
parenthood from the surrogate (and any partner she may have) to the IPs through a 
PO, if the legal requirements are met. 
The UK’s first recommendation towards formal recognition and regulation of ARTs 
was made by the government-appointed Committee on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, chaired by the then Dame (now Baroness) Mary Warnock in 1984 
(Warnock Report).1 This led to legislation that criminalised commercial surrogacy,2 
and later to legislation regulating ARTs practice in clinics and parenthood following 
the use of regulated technologies.3 These Acts, along with subsequent legislative 
amendments, professional guidance (with no legal force)  issued by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), and common law principles (for 
example for the determination of parenthood in cases not involving ARTs), form the 
UK legal framework for surrogacy. 
While my analysis focuses primarily on regulated aspects of surrogacy, some 
reference is made to UK informal surrogacy arrangements,4 which are largely 
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unregulated and potentially dangerous.5 As in the previous chapter, I begin with an 
historical account of how UK surrogacy law has developed and proceed to set out how 
regulation has addressed the concerns laid out in Chapter 2 in the context of three 
broad themes: access, regulation of surrogacy arrangements, and parenthood. 
Throughout, I emphasise the major differences from the approach followed in Greece. 
4.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UK SURROGACY 
LAW 
As discussed earlier, Greek birth rates are among the lowest in Europe, and the 
infertility rate is quite high, while ARTs, including surrogacy, are considered 
acceptable ways to create a family. Moreover, the protection of ‘the family’ is a very 
important concern reflected in ART law and policy, and various legal provisions of 
ART support the supremacy of the ‘traditional family’.6 
According to demographic data, the UK population was 64.6 million in 2014.7 A 
downward trend in births started in mid-2012,8 although the population has increased 
quite considerably in recent years due to immigration.9 Around one in seven UK 
couples suffer from infertility.10 Unlike Greek law,11 UK law does not expressly 
recognise a right to have a child. As Riley notes, the rights conferred by the ECHR12 
                                                          
5 As proven by surrogacy cases involving deception: Re N (A Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 1053; H v S 
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Lanzieri, Towards a 'baby-recession' in Europe? Differential fertility trends during the economic 
crisis (Eurostat, European Union 13/2013, 2013). See also, Jessica Brown’s study on pro-natalism in 
British printed media between 2000 and 2003 ('In Praise of Good Breeding: Pro-Natalism and Race in 
the British Print Media' (2003) 15(3) Journal of Women's History 161-165). 
9 BBC, 'UK population increases by 500,000 official figures show' (25/06/2015) 
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11 The Greek Constitution recognises a right to have a child through ‘traditional’ and artificial means as 
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only provide fertile people with a negative right of non-interference,13 and do not 
create ‘a duty [on the state] to assist in the founding of families for those who cannot 
do so naturally’.14 
Since the late 1970s and the birth of the first ‘tube-baby’,15 the UK has led the way in 
the practice and regulation of ARTs. In 1982, the UK government appointed the 
Warnock Committee to consider how recent and potential developments in assisted 
reproduction should be regulated.16 One of the issues to be explored was surrogacy, 
which was identified as a practice that ‘can cause public concern’.17 The Committee 
was primarily interested in the possibility of exploitation in commercial surrogacy 
arrangements.18 
The majority agreed that commercial surrogacy is ‘contrary to public policy’,19 ‘a risky 
undertaking for those involved’,20 ‘totally ethically unacceptable’,21 because it distorts 
‘the relationship between mother and child’,22 and ‘is the wrong way to approach 
pregnancy’.23 The Committee advised commercial surrogacy be made a criminal 
offence,24 and all surrogacy agreements be unenforceable.25 An acceptable remedy to 
infertility would be adoption (rather than ARTs).26 
However, the Committee’s dissenters were more sympathetic towards the pressures 
that might lead one to resort to commercial surrogacy. They believed the risk of 
exploitation in commercial surrogacy was not ‘clear-cut’,27 and the exchange of 
                                                          
13 Concerning the availability of free contraception and access to abortion services (under the conditions 
of the Abortion Act 1967). Stone J, 'Infertility treatment: a selective right to reproduce?' in Byrne, P. 
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16 Warnock Report, Terms of reference. 
17 Ibid [1.3]. 
18 Ibid [8.12],[8.17]. 
19 Ibid [8.5]. 
20 Ibid [8.6]. 
21 Ibid [8.17]. 
22 Ibid [8.11]. 
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24 Ibid [8.18]. 
25 Ibid [8.19]. 
26 Ibid [8.20]. 
27 Ibid, Expression of Dissent, A[3]. 
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money should not prevent the IPs from adopting the child.28 They also maintained that 
surrogacy should be run by a state-licensed non-profit surrogacy agency and operate 
like an adoption agency.29 Although Baroness Warnock agreed with the majority’s 
opinion at the time, she later stated that ‘probably this minority was right’,30 and that 
she now feels ‘ashamed’ of her earlier stance towards surrogacy.31 
After the Warnock Report was published, news emerged about ‘Baby Cotton’, a baby 
born to a UK surrogate, Kim Cotton, in exchange for money.32 This was at a time 
when UK surrogacy was completely unregulated. Mrs Cotton was commissioned by a 
US surrogacy agency to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of the male partner 
of a childless Swedish couple. She gave birth to a baby-girl in a London hospital on 4 
January 1985 and received a payment of £6,500.33 She was subsequently forced to 
leave the hospital without the baby, after the Social Services Department obtained a 
place of safety order in respect of the child,34 and was prevented from handing the 
child over to the intended father. The father applied to the High Court requesting that 
he and his wife be recognised as the child’s caretakers, and be granted permission to 
take the child back to the US.35 The judge found that Ms Cotton had consented to 
relinquishing her parental rights, and that it was in the child’s best interests to be with 
her biological father and his wife, because they were able to provide for the child’s 
material and emotional needs and offer a suitable home. Also in 1985, a UK court 
ruled on another ‘alarming’ surrogacy case. In A v C,36 the surrogate was paid £3,000 
and decided to keep the child, while the intended father was awarded limited access, 
but not custody. On appeal, the surrogate succeeded in keeping the child, who was 
deemed to be the product of a ‘sordid commercial bargain’.37 
                                                          
28 Ibid [7]. 
29 Ibid [5],6]. 
30 Warnock M, Making Babies. Is there a right to have children? (OUP 2002) 88, 93; Horsey, K. and 
S. Avery. 'Meeting Mary Warnock' 
<http://www.bionews.org.uk/page.asp?obj_id=611935&PPID=611933&sid=452> accessed on 
1/02/2016. Parts of the interview can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Rf5ujW_vg. 
31 Horsey and Avery (ibid), at 8:50’. 
32 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846; Cotton K, 'The UK's antiquated laws 
on surrogacy: a personal and professional perspective' (2016) 4(3) JMLE 229-235. 
33 Ibid 
34 Under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. 
35 Re C [1985] (n32). 
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37 Ibid at 455. 
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Amid panic that commercial surrogacy would become common in the UK, as in some 
parts of the US,38 and due to a concern to protect and preserve ‘the family’,39 a Bill 
‘was rushed through Parliament’ to prevent commercial agencies from being 
established in the UK,40 with the Surrogacy Arrangements Act (SAA) enacted in 
1985.41 While the SAA aimed at regulating surrogacy practice,42 it merely defined the 
term ‘surrogate mother’,43 and criminalised commercial surrogacy activities by 
prohibiting: surrogacy brokering;44 payments for negotiations for surrogacy;45 and 
advertisement of surrogacy services.46 The SAA did not go as far as the Warnock 
Committee recommended; it only targeted surrogacy agencies and brokers, not 
persons.47 Later in 1985, an draft bill proposed the criminalisation of all forms of 
surrogacy,48 but it fell.49 
Due to the SAA’s name and the ambitious aims laid down in its long title, there is, 
arguably, a misconception that UK law provides a comprehensive regulatory response 
to surrogacy. In fact, the SAA does not regulate altruistic surrogacy, or the activity of 
non-profit surrogacy organisations or legal parenthood following surrogacy. It merely 
ensured that surrogacy ‘could survive without thriving’.50 Mainly due to the haste with 
which the SAA was adopted, it has been described ‘an ill-considered and largely 
irrelevant panic measure’,51 which created a perception that surrogacy was immoral 
and against public policy.52 
In 1989, UK Parliament considered how to regulate ARTs in clinics, and legal 
parenthood following such treatments.53 Initially, surrogacy was not part of this action. 
                                                          
38 Warnock (n30) 89; Harry Greenaway MP, Hansard vol.77, col.45. 
39 Peter Bruinvels MP, ibid, col.43. 
40 Warnock (n30) 89. 
41 SAA 1985 (16/07/1985). 
42 Ibid, in the SAA’s long title. 
43 s.1(2) ibid. 
44 s.2 ibid. 
45 s.1(4) ibid. 
46 s.3(3)(4) ibid. 
47 The reasoning behind this was to ‘avoid the birth of a child whose mother or family are subject to the 
taint of criminality’ (Warnock Report [8.19]). In Re An Adoption Application (Surrogacy) [1987] 2 All 
ER 826, Latey J held that payments to a surrogate were a compensation for her time and inconvenience, 
and there was no breach of s.57(3) Adoption Act 1976 (rendering payments or reward in consideration 
of the adoption of a child unlawful). 
48 Surrogacy Arrangements (Amendment) Bill 1985. 
49 Hansard, HL Deb 08 April 1986, vol.473, cc.60-186. 
50 Lee RG and Morgan D, Human Fertilisation and Embryology. Regulating the Reproductive 
Revolution (OUP 2001) 6. 
51 Freeman M, 'Is surrogacy exploitative?' in McLean, S. (ed), Legal Issues in Human 
Reproduction (Gower Publ., Aldershot 1989) 165. 
52 Re P (Minors) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1987] FLR 421. 
53 Later leading to the enactment of the HFE Act 1990 (1990 Act).
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Johnson argues that surrogacy was only included in the 1990 Act because it may 
involve the use of donated genetic material, which must take place in a licensed clinic, 
as the Act prescribes.54 Before the 1990 Act, IPs’ established their parenthood through 
adoption, and compensation to surrogates was unregulated. 
While the HFE Bill was being considered by Parliament, Michael Jopling MP received 
a complaint by a couple in his constituency that they had to foster and adopt twins they 
had through surrogacy and who were biologically related to the couple, while the 
surrogate had relinquished custody. The couple had also initiated legal proceedings in 
the High Court to decide on the twin’s parenthood.55 Jopling proposed an amendment 
to the Bill regarding a legal mechanism to transfer parenthood to IPs that would act as 
a fast-track adoption process.56 This was subsequently included in the 1990 Act.57 The 
1990 Act also inserted a section in the SAA stipulating the non-enforceability of all 
surrogacy agreements,58 and established the HFEA, a government-appointed 
organisation with licensing, advisory, and monitoring roles for ARTs (including 
surrogacy in clinics).59 
The 1980’s perception that surrogacy was immoral initially influenced professional 
engagement with surrogacy. In the 1980s, the British Medical Association (BMA) 
considered the practice ‘unethical’ and advised against it,60 but, in 1996, it recognised 
surrogacy as a last resort solution to alleviate female infertility.61 A year later, another 
problematic surrogacy case made headlines in the UK. Karen Roche, a British woman, 
acted as a surrogate for a Dutch couple, and received a payment of £12,000 as 
                                                          
54 Johnson MH, 'Surrogacy and the HFE Act' in Cook, R., S. Sclater and F. Kaganas (eds), Surrogate 
Motherhood: International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2003) 93; Blyth E, 'Parental Orders and 
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55 Re W (Minors) (Surrogacy) [1991] 1 FLR 385. 
56 HFE Bill, Explanatory Notes, HL 5 February 2008 [Bill 70] 33. 
57 s.30 1990 Act. The PO provisions came into effect on 1/11/1994, a lot later than other provisions of 
the 1990 Act (effective since August 1991), because the issues arising from this were ‘considerably 
more complex than they first appeared’ (Tom Sackville MP, Official Report, House of Commons 
(26/10/1994), col.974). Parents who had had a child through surrogacy until April 1995 could ask a 
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59 s.5 1990 Act. 
60 BMA, Annual report of council, 1989– 0, Appendix V: surrogacy report (British medical journal 
300 (6728), 1990) 39–48. The HFEA’s first CoP did not include surrogacy-related guidance. Its 1993 
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61 BMA, Changing Perceptions of Motherhood. The Practice of Surrogacy in Britain (Wiley-Blackwell 
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‘expenses’.62 The parties were put in touch through a non-profit surrogacy 
organisation founded by Kim Cotton in 1988.63 Mrs Roche initially claimed a 
miscarriage, but then announced to the media that she and her husband would keep 
the child.64 Various media reports at the time presented the UK ‘as the surrogacy 
capital of western Europe’.65 
In response, the then Health Minister, Tessa Jowell, ordered a Committee, chaired by 
Professor Margaret Brazier, to consider ‘whether payments, including expenses, 
should continue to be made to surrogate mothers; whether a recognised body or 
bodies should regulate such arrangements; and if changes are required as a result to 
the [SAA 1985] and/or the [HFE Act 1990]’.66 The Brazier Report was published in 
1998, and marks the point where ‘surrogacy becomes an “acceptable alternative” to 
other fertility treatments’.67 The Committee made a number of recommendations for 
tighter regulation of altruistic surrogacy through a new Surrogacy Act and a new Code 
of Practice (CoP),68 but advised that agreements should remain unenforceable.69 
Commercial surrogacy should continue to be illegal, although surrogates should still 
receive payments for expenses related to pregnancy and actual loss of earning.70 The 
PO scheme for the transfer of parenthood should be preserved with some 
modifications,71 but surrogacy would be perceived as more akin to adoption than other 
forms of ARTs.72 
In 2005, the Department of Health announced a review of the HFE Act,73 and an 
amending statute was enacted in 2008.74 However, ‘not one of the Brazier Review’s 
                                                          
62 BBC News 'Biological Father to Fight for Custody of Surrogate Baby' (3/11/1997) 
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2005). Later, the DoH published a White paper containing ART-related policy recommendations 
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recommendations [was] formally implemented’.75 The only legislative change relating 
directly to surrogacy was the extension of PO eligibility to same-sex couples and those 
in ‘enduring family relationships’.76 Single people have no statutory access to  POs, 
which has been criticised as ‘anachronistic and discriminatory’,77 especially since they 
have adoption rights.78 Nevertheless, this change and that to the WoC criterion for 
access to ARTs, which will be discussed, legitimised alternative families, and 
promoted equality and reproductive autonomy.79 
However, the 2008 reform was not a wholesale review of UK surrogacy, as had been 
hoped,80 and little progress has been made since then. The only recent changes in 
surrogacy regulation were the acknowledgement of the IPs’ right to paid parental 
leave,81 and the provision of limited funding for ARTs.82 But things might change. In 
a Parliamentary debate in 2014, Jessica Lee MP described UK surrogacy law as 
‘outdated and ill-equipped’.83 Following this, the then Minister for Public Health 
stated that the government might consider potential future reform of UK surrogacy 
                                                          
75 Horsey and Sheldon (n5) 68. 
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and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance, (Assessment and Treatment for People with Fertility Problems 
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law.84 In December 2016, the House of Lords held a surrogacy debate supporting legal 
reform,85 and, in late 2017, the government laid a draft remedial order that, if 
approved, will extend PO eligibility to single IPs.86 Moreover, in December 2017, the 
Law Commission confirmed that surrogacy would form part of its 13th Programme of 
Law Reform.87 
Despite the difficulty in estimating the prevalence of surrogacy,88 there is evidence 
that UK surrogacy is increasing in recent years.89 Crawshaw et al note various 
developments which ‘indicated a potential for [the numbers of PO applications] to 
rise’;90 for example, the growing social acceptance of surrogacy,91 its gradual 
acceptance by medical professionals,92 its regular appearance in media stories,93 the 
operation of surrogacy agencies in the UK and overseas, and the extension of the PO 
eligibility criteria. Crawshaw et al found that 887 POs were registered in England and 
Wales between 1995 and 2011, 133 of which were made in 2011 alone.94 The Children 
and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass), a non-departmental public 
body that represents children in family court cases, suggests surrogacy arrangements 
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(57.4%) did not (Norton W and others, 'A survey of UK clinics' approach to surrogacy arrangements' 
(2015) 21 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 329). 
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are increasing: ‘there were 138 applications for parental orders in April 2011-March 
2012 rising to 241 applications in April 2014-March 2015’.95 More importantly, 
overseas surrogacy, which brings about different and even more complex problems,96 
is reportedly increasing.97 Nevertheless, with traditionally conceived ‘commercial 
surrogacy hubs’, such as India, slowly but steadily restricting or complicating access 
to non-natives,98 IPs have fewer destinations to choose for overseas surrogacy. The 
upward trajectory is also evidenced by the ever-growing number of PO applications 
involving an international element.99 However, the PO applications may not accurately 
reflect how many surrogacy arrangements occur; some IPs never apply for a PO, 
which essentially means that some children are being cared for by individuals who do 
not have legal parenthood.100 Lastly, some IPs ‘illegally register themselves as the 
child’s parents (sometimes on the explicit advice of lawyers)’.101 
4.3 UK LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR SURROGACY 
4.3.1 ACCESS 
Under UK law, access to surrogacy in clinics is limited to those who satisfy the welfare 
criteria, and who provide valid and informed consent. Accordingly, the statutory 
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accessed on 25/03/2016. Also, Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030. 
97 Crawshaw et al (n90); Stuhmcke A, 'New wine in old bottles and old wine in new bottles: The judicial 
response to international commercial surrogacy in the UK and Australia' in Horsey, K. (ed), Revisiting 
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moves to ban commercial surrogacy' (18/08/2014) http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_446318.asp 
accessed on 27/09/2014; Nepal’s Supreme Court also suspended the provision of such services to 
foreigners (Ilic, A. 'Nepalese court suspends commercial surrogacy' (1/09/2015) 
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also banned in Cambodia (Sidhu, T. 'Cambodia moves to permanently ba  commercial surrogacy' 
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criteria for access to ARTs in the UK essentially rest upon ‘two pillars’: welfare, and 
consent.102 This is different in Greece, where law allows only gestational surrogacy 
that must take place in clinics, and establishes various eligibility criteria (medical 
need, age, WoC, relationship status, and, until recently, permanent residence). Also, 
the Greek regime provides for intense state-monitoring on the outset through judicial 
scrutiny and an assessment in the clinic. 
UK law does not, in principle, exclude anyone from accessing ARTs, including 
surrogacy.103 However, depending on the type of the surrogacy arrangement 
(traditional or gestational), and the place where the insemination takes place (in a 
clinic or at home), there are certain statutory limitations. If using traditional surrogacy, 
the parties can achieve pregnancy either in a clinic or at home. In the latter case, the 
parties enter into an informal surrogacy agreement, which is practically impossible to 
regulate. If the parties choose a clinical setting, either for insemination (traditional) or 
IVF (gestational) surrogacy, the statutory conditions for access to ARTs apply.104 
• WoC assessments in clinics 
As in Greece, the UK regime prioritises the welfare of the child (WoC) when 
considering access to ARTs. The welfare clause was heavily contested during the draft 
1990 Act debates,105 but was later included in the Act.106 Initially, it required clinics 
to consider ‘the child’s need for a father’ when deciding whether to provide access to 
ART. This provision was considered unfair and discriminatory, specifically against 
same-sex couples and single women,107 and a ‘tax on the infertile who must prove 
their ability to parent’.108 Further, it was criticised as ‘disingenuous and 
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illegitimate’,109 ‘incoherent and essentially meaningless’,110 and an unjustifiable 
intrusion to individual reproductive autonomy.111 
These criticisms and a few other legislative developments, such as the prohibition of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation,112 and the formal recognition of same-sex 
couples as partners,113 and as parents,114 motivated the legislature to re-consider the 
WoC criterion. In 2008, the statutory limitation regarding the child’s ‘need for a father’ 
was replaced by ‘the child’s need for supportive parenting’.115 The Act left it to the 
HFEA to decide what this would include. The child’s ‘need for supportive parenting’ 
was defined as 
‘a commitment to the health, well-being and development of the child. (…)Where [ART] 
centres have concern as to whether this commitment exists, they may wish to take account of 
wider family and social networks within which the child will be raised’.116 
Moreover, the CoP required the clinic to take into account the IPs’ medical history,117 
and various other factors to evaluate how the child-to-be would enjoy ‘supportive 
parenting’,118 and ‘decide whether there is a risk of significant harm or neglect’ to the 
child-to-be ‘or any other child who may be affected by the birth’.119 Additionally, in 
surrogacy cases, the CoP advised clinics to consider ‘the possibility of breakdown’ in 
the arrangement, and its potential effect on the child-to-be and on any other existent 
child (the surrogate’s child, if she has one).120 
Though the reform to the WoC criterion meant the two-parent sexual family norm 
became less important, some problems remained; WoC can still influence some 
people’s access to ARTs, and surrogacy in clinics, which makes medical professionals 
‘the gatekeepers’ of ARTs.121 On the other hand, surrogacy arrangements that occur 
outside clinics escape the welfare assessment completely. Further, some argue that the 
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welfare of a not-yet conceived and possibly never-to-be conceived child should not be 
prioritised over the IPs’ autonomy,122 especially since there is no certainty whether the 
WoC provision does indeed protect the child’s best interests.123 
Despite the criticisms of the WoC assessment, empirical studies performed in the early 
1990s reported that it made little difference in clinical practice, and single women and 
lesbian couples were not excluded from ARTs merely based on welfare concerns,124 
but primarily on ideas about the ‘appropriate’ family.125 A recent study confirmed that 
the legislative reforms ‘represented a case of the law changing to reflect clinical 
practice rather than vice versa’.126 It also showed that usually clinics base their 
decisions on a presumption to treat, and there are very few cases of refusal of access 
based on WoC, though couples still have more preferential treatment than singles.127 
Nevertheless, the study highlights that ineligibility for public funding for ARTs may 
sometimes prevent access,128 although it is not a statutory access requirement. Also, 
clinics impose their own access requirements, for things which may impact their 
success rates,129 and possibly prevent some people from accessing ARTs. 
• Consent 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the provision of unconditional, free, and fully informed 
consent is very important in ARTs. Unsurprisingly, consent was and remains at the 
heart of UK law on ARTs.130 As in Greece, UK law requires all ART participants to 
provide clinics with written consent prior to treatment.131 The use of gametes or 
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embryos without consent ‘may breach the licence issued by the HFEA to the ‘person 
responsible’ for the clinic where the treatment services are offered;132 it may amount 
to a criminal offence; and it may affect the status of any child born of those treatment 
services’.133 
Additionally, UK law requires consent to be informed, which can be achieved through 
the offer of information and counselling.134 This should include a discussion directed 
at enabling participants to understand the implications of the treatment.135 Counselling 
is not mandatory, but it should be offered,136 and it should be aligned with professional 
guidance on good practice in infertility counselling.137 Moreover, the clinic should 
offer information about the financial cost of treatment,138 and legal parenthood,139  and 
discuss its implications for the future parents and the child-to-be.140 In cases of 
surrogacy, clinics should offer specific information about the effect of POs,141 advise 
the parties that surrogacy agreements are unenforceable, and prompt them to seek legal 
advice.142 Additionally, the CoP clearly states that IPs and surrogates who provide 
their own gametes when a surrogate pregnancy is attained in a clinic are considered 
donors.143 
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As becomes apparent, UK law shows great respect for fully informed, free and 
unconditional consent prior to treatment in a clinic. However, consent to (traditional) 
at-home surrogacy is wholly unregulated, and it is unlikely that parties receive 
counselling, medical, and/or legal advice, especially if they do not go through a 
surrogacy organisation.144 This may endanger the rights and the interests of the parties 
and the child.145 In Greece, where only gestational surrogacy is allowed, all users of 
formal legal surrogacy must go through a clinic, where they are offered information, 
advice, and counselling. 
4.3.2 REGULATION OF SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
As mentioned above, there is a common misconception that UK surrogacy is regulated 
by the SAA 1985. The 1990 Act, as amended in 2008, and the establishment of the 
HFEA possibly further promoted the view that UK surrogacy is closely monitored and 
strictly regulated, but this is perhaps true only in cases where the treatment takes place 
in UK clinics. Also, the current framework focuses less on the regulation of surrogacy 
arrangements, and more on parenthood after the child’s birth, which will be discussed 
in the next section. This is different from Greece, where the law is more concerned 
with the regulation of surrogacy arrangements from the outset, and there is no state-
involvement after the child’s birth. My analysis here focuses on the UK statutory 
provisions regarding payments in surrogacy, the role of surrogacy organisations, and 
the role of the HFEA in regulating surrogacy. 
• Payments in surrogacy 
As in Greece, UK law only allows altruistic surrogacy.146 Arguably, the SAA made it 
difficult for surrogacy to exist. However, as Jackson notes, ‘largely due to the result 
of the internet, the picture is now rather different’.147 Indeed, potential surrogates, 
gamete providers, and IPs can now ‘meet’ on-line through ‘introduction’ websites or 
social media,148 or through ‘consumer’-style conferences, and have traditional 
surrogacy at home, where everything occurs ‘in a regulatory vacuum’.149 Lastly, IPs 
can also search on-line for commercial agencies operating outside the UK, travel 
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overseas, and return a few months later with a child. This is admittedly very difficult 
to police,150 and, again, falls outside the r mits of UK law and the HFEA’s monitoring 
responsibilities. 
Furthermore, the SAA does not prohibit payments to surrogates,151 and the 1990 Act 
stipulates that surrogates can only incur payments for ‘reasonable expenses’, which 
would be under judicial review following the child's birth.152 However, this will 
become relevant only if the IPs apply for a PO.153 Moreover, the law did not specify 
what these expenses may include, and what the acceptable amount is or should be. 
Lastly, it permitted discretion to the court to retrospectively authorise excess 
payments.154 Therefore, the provision against payments is arguably more of a 
disincentive than a ban.155 
The Brazier Committee considered whether payments for surrogacy in general should 
continue to be illegal,156 and heard evidence that surrogates had been paid for their 
services.157 A UK surrogacy organisation reported that between 1988 and 1999 there 
were payments of up to £11,520 over and above ‘reasonable expenses.158 Moreover, 
COTS admitted to having a policy that around £10,000 should be paid to the surrogate 
as ‘compensation’ for the risk to her and for placing her life and her family’s life ‘on 
hold’.159 Most surrogates who responded to Horsey’s recent survey said they received 
less than £15,000, and no-one received more than £20,000 as expenses.160 This 
confirms evidence produced by Cafcass that surrogates’ expenses ‘rang[e] from 
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nothing to £12,000’,161 and there is no other substantive evidence to claim that UK 
surrogacy operates on a commercial basis. 
However, the ambiguity and confusion regarding ‘reasonable expenses’ remains. 
According to a recent study, many Cafcass PO Reporters, who meet with IPs and 
surrogates before the court’s consideration of a PO application, expressed “unease” 
about determining whether payments incurred by surrogates were ‘reasonable’, and 
were unsure about whether to seek relevant guidance from the court.162 Furthermore, 
recent PO decisions have established and reinforced the view that judges will indeed 
retrospectively authorise excess payments, unless there is a clear abuse of public 
policy, which sets a very high threshold.163 This is because WoC is the court’s 
paramount consideration when making a PO, Stuhmcke, thus, rightly argues that UK 
judicial practice diminishes the weight of the prohibition on payments, and, to an 
extent, public policy, compared to the WoC.164 Further, due to lack of guidance on 
what constitutes ‘commercial’ surrogacy, the courts ‘imput[e] layers of altruism into 
the commerciality of the arrangement’.165 
Moreover, Scott suggests that judicial practice is inconsistent regarding payments in 
surrogacy: the magistrate’s courts, which decide the outcome of POs for most intra-
UK surrogacy arrangements, show little concern about the amount and purpose of the 
payments, but the High Court,166 which decides POs following international surrogacy 
arrangements, scrutinises payments.167 Importantly, there is evidence that, despite the 
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statutory ban, payments for the negotiation and drafting of a surrogacy agreement have 
taken place in the UK, but no charges have been brought against the offenders.168 
Perhaps in an effort to address these concerns, the government issued guidance in 
February 2018 stipulating an indicative list of costs that have been accepted as 
‘reasonable expenses’: the surrogate’s (and her partner’s/spouse’s) loss of earnings, 
additional childcare to support the surrogate pregnancy and the clinic and antenatal 
visits, help with additional cleaning, additional food and other supplements, travel and 
accommodation, maternity clothes, a modest recovery break for the surrogate and her 
family, and other incidental expenses relating to the treatment and the pregnancy.169 
• The role of non-profit surrogacy organisations 
UK law prohibits surrogacy brokering, but there is nothing to prevent UK non-profit 
surrogacy organisations from operating. Three years after the implementation of the 
SAA, Kim Cotton launched COTS.170 Since then, two more reputable surrogacy 
organisations have emerged: Surrogacy UK,171 and, more recently, Brilliant 
Beginnings.172 Also, in 2011, a branch of a Californian surrogacy organisation was 
founded in the UK to help mainly same-sex couples have surrogacy, but it has a bad 
reputation.173  
As noted in Re P,174 surrogacy organisations cannot charge for their operational costs 
and services, but may advertise that they hold lists of potential surrogates and IPs, 
introduce one to another, and run background checks.175 In reality, these organisations 
                                                          
168 In JP v LP & Others [2014] (n5), Mrs Justice King found that the solicitors who drew up a surrogacy 
agreement for a fee committed a criminal offence under s.2 SAA 1985, but no criminal charges were 
brought against the solicitors. This case may deter people from seeking legal advice for surrogacy. 
169 Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), Care in Surrogacy. Guidance for the care of 
surrogates and intended parents in surrogate births in England and Wales (28/02/2018). 
170 n63. 
171 Surrogacy UK (SUK), http://www.surrogacyuk.org/about_us  
172 Brilliant Beginnings (BB), http://www.brilliantbeginnings.co.uk/about  
173 British Surrogacy Centre (BSC), http://www.britishsurrogacycentre.com/. It operates from an Essex 
address, and was set up by Barrie and Tony Drewitt-Barlow, the first gay male UK couple who had 
children through surrogacy (Kendrick, K. 'Britain's First Gay Dads Set Up Surrogacy Clinic For Same-
Sex Couples' (22/05/2015) <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/03/14/britain-s-first-gay-dads-set-
up-surrogacy-clinic-for-same-sex-couples_n_7379676.html> accessed on 20/04/2016). Former BSC 
users have described its practices ‘abusive and aggressive’ (Graham, C. 'Surrogate fathers tore my life 
apart: Used, abused and called trailer trash. How UK poster boys for gay fatherhood turned on woman 
hired for her womb' (04/01/2015) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2895772/Surrogate-
fathers-tore-life-apart-Used-abused-called-trailer-trash-UK-poster-boys-gay-fatherhood-turned-
woman-hired-womb.html> accessed on 20/04/2016). 




are self-regulated, staffed by people who are usually not professionals in surrogacy,176 
and charge a registration fee, which falls out of the statutory ban on surrogacy 
brokering. Since they are not public bodies, they cannot order a full criminal record 
check, as can some fostering and adoption organisations.177 
In Re G, McFarlane J said, referring to COTS, that ‘it is questionable whether the role 
of facilitating surrogacy arrangements should be left to groups of well-meaning 
amateurs’,178 though he recognised the value of the advice and support offered by 
reputable UK surrogacy organisations. Re P is a sad example of how a surrogacy 
arrangement which had been “checked” and facilitated by such an organisation can go 
wrong.179 Nevertheless, the important (and positive) role of UK surrogacy 
organisations recently gained formal state recognition.180 
• Licensing and monitoring of fertility clinics 
The 1990 Act established the HFEA to regulate ARTs. It licenses and monitors ART 
clinics,181 it formally documents and publishes, where appropriate, ART-related 
information,182 and issues guidance about ‘good practice’ in ARTs.183 However, ‘there 
is clear evidence that inspections were inconsistent from the inception of the 
HFEA’.184 In 2008, the amending statute introduced new rules about the HFEA’s 
operation to allow for more effective monitoring of ART centres.185 However, recent 
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court cases show that the legislative reform has not fully addressed the problems; the 
complexity of some of the guidelines led some clinics to make mistakes, which have 
negatively affected some individuals’ parenthood rights.186 
The Brazier Committee examined whether regulation of all forms of surrogacy should 
come under the HFEA,187 but advised against it, because surrogacy arrangements 
should not be viewed ‘as merely another treatment for infertile people’.188 In Greece, 
surrogacy is considered a form of ARTs. This perhaps explains why all state-
involvement in Greek surrogacy takes place at the preconception stage, as in all other 
cases of ARTs. 
4.3.3 DETERMINATION OF PARENTHOOD FOLLOWING SURROGACY 
As discussed earlier, Greek law provides for an intention-based model of parenthood, 
including cases where the child has no genetic link to the IP(s), and for enforceable 
gestational surrogacy agreements. In the UK, surrogacy agreements are unenforceable, 
motherhood depends almost exclusively on gestation and birth, and fatherhood 
depends importantly on relationship status. However, UK law provides for the 
possibility of a review after the child has been born, if the IPs seek a PO. Moreover, 
to establish parenthood, the UK model requires at least a partial biological relationship 
between at least one of the IPs and the child. 
• Non-enforceability of surrogacy agreements and determination of motherhood 
In Greece, the IM is the child’s legal mother at birth, based on a legal presumption 
specifically designed for surrogacy recognising intention as the basis of parenthood.189 
This also leads to surrogacy agreements being enforceable after the child’s birth.190 
Under UK law, surrogacy agreements are non-enforceable.191 The woman who 
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gestated and gave birth to the child (here, the surrogate) is always considered to be the 
legal mother at birth.192 Moreover, she has an absolute right to change her mind at any 
time during the arrangement or after its completion (but before the IPs obtain a PO or 
an adoption order),193 and to keep the child.194 On the other hand, the IM will never be 
the child’s legal mother at birth, whether she is genetically related to her or not:195 she 
must acquire legal parenthood through a PO or adoption. Furthermore, the UK non-
enforceability rule means also that the IPs cannot be compelled to take the surrogate-
born child and will not (usually) be considered the child’s parents at birth.196 These 
rules apply even if the birth takes place outside the UK following an overseas 
surrogacy arrangement.197 
Horsey has argued that the UK legal parenthood schema ‘creates a less than ideal 
situation which must stem from an overarching distaste for surrogacy’, and, further, 
that it does not reflect the realities of surrogacy.198 Others suggest the non-
enforceability rule does not take into consideration the preconception intentions of 
either of the parties,199 and does not reflect the true story of the child’s birth.200 
• Determination of fatherhood/second parenthood following surrogacy 
As seen earlier, in Greece, fatherhood is based on intention and consent; the intended 
father is the legal father at birth, if he was married to or had been in an enduring 
relationship with the IM and had consented to the surrogacy arrangement and the 
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197 s.27(3) 1990 Act. In case of an overseas arrangement, even if th  IPs are recognised as parents of 
the surrogate-born child by another jurisdiction, they must obtain a PO to have their parenthood 
recognised in the UK. 
198 Horsey K, 'Unconsidered Inconsistencies. Parenthood and Assisted Conception' in Horsey, K. and 
H. Biggs (eds), Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Reproducing Regulation (Routledge-Cavendish 
2007) 159. 
199 McCandless J and Sheldon S, 'The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity 
of the Sexual Family' (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review 183; Gamble, N. 'Time For A Regulated 
Process for Surrogate Parents?' (12/05/2016) http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed144719 
accessed on 16/05/2015. 
200 Elsworth and Gamble (n96) 157; Blyth (n54); Re A & B (Children: POs: Time Limits) [2015] EWHC 
911 (Fam) [41]. 
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surrogate’s IVF.  In the UK, the rules about fatherhood and/or second parenthood (in 
case of a female couple) following surrogacy are not as clear-cut as those for 
motherhood and are based on general family law rules.201 Hence, parenthood is based 
on relationship status, consent, and, in some cases, on a genetic relationship with the 
child. 
If the surrogate is married or in a legally recognised civil partnership at the time of 
treatment, her husband, wife or civil partner is the child’s other parent at birth,202 
unless evidence exists that he/she had not consented to it.203 This rule applies whether 
the treatment took place in the UK or abroad,204 and whether the sperm belongs to the 
intended father or a donor. If the surrogate is unmarried but has a partner, the latter 
will be the child’s legal parent at birth, if he/she has provided prior consent to the 
treatment.205 For this rule to apply, the treatment must have taken place in an HFEA 
licensed UK fertility centre.206 Lastly, if the surrogate is single and pregnancy has been 
attained in a clinic, it is possible for the intended father (or second IM) to be registered 
as the child’s second parent (together with the surrogate) at birth, if the surrogate 
consents to it.207 
If the child was born following an informal surrogacy arrangement (where pregnancy 
was attained through artificial insemination at home), the surrogate’s husband, wife, 
or partner, if she has one, is the second legal parent by virtue of their relationship.208 
If the surrogate is single, or has a non-consenting partner, the biological (intended) 
father can be registered as the c ild’s father on the birth certificate, with the surrogate’s 
consent.209 If the surrogate does not consent to this, he can acquire parental 
responsibility,210 which enables him to make decisions about the child’s life until he 
acquires legal parenthood through a PO or adoption. 
                                                          
201 Probert R, Family Law in England and Wales (7th edn, Walters Kluwer 2011) 224. 
202 s.35(1)(a) and 42, 2008 Act. 
203 s.35(1)(b) ibid. Note that s.35 does not influence the presumption under s.38(2)(3) ibid that ‘any 
child born within marriage is those parties’ legitimate child’. There is no similar provision for civil 
partners. See Explanatory Notes, HFE Act 2008 [175]. 
204 s.35(2) 2008 Act. 
205 ss.35-37, 42 ibid. 
206 s.36(a) ibid. If the treatment took place abroad, the child will have no father at birth. 
207 HFEA, 'Commencement arrangements for the parenthood provisions in Part 2 of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008' (2009) 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/parenthood_commencement_guidance.pdf accessed on 21/10/2015. 
208 Based on the common law presumption of fatherhood (Probert (n201)). 
209 Until a PO or adoption order transfers parenthood to the man’s partner/wife/husband, the man will 
share legal parenthood with the surrogate. 
210 Under ss.2(2),4(1)(a) Children’s Act 1989. 
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If the IPs are in a female same-sex relationship, none of the IMs will have legal 
parenthood at birth. However, the woman (one of the IMs) whose egg was used for 
the surrogate’s IVF can register her name on the child’s birth certificate, if the 
surrogate is single or has a non-consenting partner, and if the consent requirements 
have been met.211 The situation is similar in the case of a male same-sex couple. If the 
surrogate is single or has a non-consenting partner, the biological intended father can 
register as a legal parent and share parenthood with the surrogate, if she consents to it. 
The non-biological parent can only acquire parenthood through a PO or adoption.212 
According to McCandless and Sheldon, the fatherhood and same-sex parenthood 
conditions were modelled around the parenthood provisions for heterosexual 
couples,213 which reflects UK law’s concern to promote the ‘traditional’ 
heteronormative two-parent family ideal.214 
• Legal process for the transfer of parenthood to the IPs 
In the first years of the SAA’s implementation, parenthood could only be achieved 
through adoption. However, after a much-publicised case,215 the legal provisions 
regarding POs were inserted in the 1990 Act and came into effect in 1994.216 The PO 
is unique to surrogacy, but, arguably, it is not a very innovative construct. POs are 
described in the Explanatory Notes of the HFE Bill as a ‘fast-track adoption’ 
process.217 The 2008 amendments extended eligibility for a PO to same-sex couples 
                                                          
211 The second female parent will be the child’s parent (but not “mother”) together with the surrogate 
(HFEA guidance,n207). This exception was put forward as an analogy to the situation where the 
surrogate is single, and the intended biological father is the child’s legal father at birth (if the surrogate 
consents). 
212 Ibid 
213 McCandless J and Sheldon S, ''No father required'? The Welfare Assessment in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008' (2010) Feminist Legal Studies 201-2 5. 
214 Ibid; Fenton et al (n77) 279. This is also evidenced by the non-recognition of a right to apply for a 
PO to single IPs. However, things may change. Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act: Parental Order) [2015] EWFC 73 concerned a single man’s application for a PO in respect of his 
child (Z), born following a gestational surrogacy arrangement in USA. Munby P dismissed the 
application having considered the adoption legislation and the legislative developments in parenthood 
following surrogacy. Moreover, he ruled that UK law does not include an express right to have a child, 
therefore, the single man’s argument based on Article 12 ECHR failed, as did the argument based on 
articles 8 and 14 ECHR. However, the man can still succeed on appeal through a declaration based on 
article 4 ECHR (per Munby P at [24]). In Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam), the President 
of the Family Division made a declaration that s.54(1)(2) HFEA 2008 was incompatible with Art.8 and 
Art.14 ECHR, and the government conceded. In November 2017, the government submitted a remedial 
order, which, if passed, will extend PO eligibility to single IPs (n86). Recently, a judge noted that, until 
the law regarding single IPs’ right to apply for a PO changes, single IPs cannot be granted POs (M v F 
& SM (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) [2017] EWHC 2176 (Fam)). 
215 Re W [1991] (n55). 




and to partners in non-legally recognised partnerships, but otherwise the parenthood 
regime remained unchanged. 
The effect of a successful PO is similar to that of an adoption order: it extinguishes the 
surrogate’s (and her husband’s/partner’s) original parenthood towards the child, and 
acknowledges the IPs as that child’s legal parents.218 Further, the child, if not already 
one, becomes a British citizen.219 Importantly, not all IPs will be able to get a PO, as 
POs are subject to eligibility criteria and judicial scrutiny after the child has been born, 
and lived with the social parents (IPs) for some time.220 
• Eligibility criteria 
The after-birth transfer of parenthood to the IPs is subject to several eligibility criteria, 
which must be satisfied whether the child was born within or outside the UK,221 and 
judicial scrutiny. Consequently, while UK parenthood provisions provide certainty as 
to who the parent is at birth (the surrogate and her husband/wife/consenting partner), 
it is uncertain who the child’s legal parents will ultimately be. This is different in 
Greece, where legal motherhood is recognised at birth, and there is very little room to 
change the parenthood status. 
Under UK law, the applicants must be a couple (heterosexual or same-sex),222 who are 
married, in a civil partnership or in an enduring (non-legally recognised) family 
relationship.223 Single IPs are currently ineligible for a PO.224 In Greece, single 
infertile women, and possibly single infertile men,225 can become the surrogate-born 
child’s parent, but (shared) same-sex parenthood following surrogacy is unregulated. 
Moreover, in the UK, at least one of the IPs must be genetically related to the child,226 
which is different from Greece, where parenthood is based purely on intention, and 
the child may or may not be genetically related to the IP(s). 
Hence, UK law imputes a genetic view of parenthood in surrogacy without justifying 
why the surrogate-born child’s welfare requires two parents when an adopted child’s 
                                                          
218 s.54(1) 2008 Act. 
219 PO Regulations 2010, Sch.4 [7]. 
220 Elsworth and Gamble (n96) 158. 
221 s.54(10) 2008 Act. 
222 s.54(1) ibid 
223 s.54(2)(a)-(c) ibid 
224 But single people can have a child through gamete donation and adoption. 
225 There are contradicting court decisions about this (see Chapter 3, ‘Relationship status’). 
226 s.54(1)(b) 2008 Act. 
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welfare is satisfied by one parent,227 or why genetic ties play such an important role. 
Presumably, the rule about the genetic relationship between the IPs and the child is 
aimed at preventing pure ‘social families’ from being created through surrogacy, 
because this can be done through adoption, and, arguably, shows ‘a desire to 
discourage surrogacy’.228 However, if surrogacy is a substitute for adoption, then 
arguably the same rules should apply to both situations, rendering the requirement for 
a genetic link unnecessary. If surrogacy is an infertility treatment, on the other hand, 
the rules for gamete donation and IVF should apply (whereby double donation is 
possible and does not affect parenthood). 
Furthermore, applicants must be at least 18 years old,229 but there is no upper age limit. 
This is also different from the provisions described for Greece, where the IM must be 
younger than 50 years old, and the surrogate, under a new rule, should be younger than 
45 (and older than 25). Additionally, in the UK, at least one of the IPs must be 
domiciled in the UK when the application is lodged.230 Notably, mere residence in the 
UK will not suffice for a PO.231 As we saw, in Greece, the residence requirement for 
surrogacy was lifted in 2014, and currently only one of the parties must have at least 
temporary residence in the country. Another PO eligibility criterion is that the 
surrogate pregnancy has been achieved through artificial insemination (at home or in 
a clinic),232 and not through sexual intercourse between the surrogate and the intended 
father.233 Again, there is a difference between the Greek and UK models: under Greek 
law, the egg must not belong to the surrogate, and surrogacy must take place in a clinic. 
Additionally, the PO application must be lodged between six weeks and six months 
after the child’s birth.234 However, the six-months’ deadline has been successfully 
challenged in courts recently, and deemed ‘nonsensical’.235 Accordingly, time-limits 
                                                          
227 Fenton et al (n77) 281. Recently, the government stated that the rationale behind the legal 
requirement for a couple to apply for a PO was that ‘a fuller [adoption-like] assessment (…)was more 
likely to ensure that a person on their own was able to cope with the demands of bringing up a child’ 
(DHSC, The Government’s Response to an incompatibility in the Human Fertilisation & Embryology 
Act 2008: A remedial order to allow a single person to obtain a parental order fllowing a surrogacy 
arrangement, Cm 9525, November 2017[2.6]). 
228 Johnson (n54) 94; DHSC report 2017, ibid. 
229 s.54(5) 2008 Act. 
230 s.54(2) ibid 
231 Re G [2007] (n178); Re A [2015] (n99). The Brazier Committee had recommended that habitual 
residence ‘is more straightforward’ (Brazier Report [7.24]), but the proposal was rejected. 
232 s.54(1) 2008 Act. 
233 However, it is practically impossible to check that this legal requirement has been met. 
234 s.54(3) 2008 Act. 
235 In Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) [2015] 1 FLR 349, Munby P 
granted the PO although the child was already 2,5 years old.  The same rule was applied by Ms Justice 
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no longer affect PO applications. The court must also be satisfied that no payments 
have taken place other than ‘reasonable expenses’,236 though as discussed earlier, an 
exception is that excess payments can be authorised by the court, and do not prevent 
IPs from obtaining a PO. 
Further, a PO is subject to the surrogate’s and, where relevant, the other legal parent’s 
consent.237 For consent to be effective, it must be ‘free and unconditional’ and given 
specifically for the making of a PO;238 it must be in writing;239 and it must have been 
given six weeks after the child’s birth.240 This time-limit operates as a ‘cooling-off’ 
period, during which the surrogate can decide whether to consent to the PO. If the 
surrogate cannot be found or is incapable of giving her consent for other reasons, the 
court can dispense with the consent requirement.241 Lastly, the child must be living 
with the applicants when the application and the PO is made.242 This offers another 
way for the parties to show their true intentions. However, it is arguably impractical, 
since the child ‘is required by law to live for some time with persons’ who are not 
legally recognised as the child’s parents,243 which may cause various problems. 
The eligibility criteria are checked by a judge, who must also consider the child’s best 
interests, namely the welfare checklist, when deciding whether to grant a PO.244
Nonetheless, even with the help of this checklist, it is difficult to define the true 
meaning of WoC. Importantly, since the introduction of the 2010 PO Regulations, 
WoC is to be the court’s paramount consideration when making POs, whereas before 
it was merely one of the important factors that the court considered. Therefore, for a 
                                                          
Russell in Re A and B [2015] (n200), and POs were made for two children aged 5 and 8 years old. Also, 
Theis J in Re A and B (No 2 - Parental Order) [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam), granted a PO for 3-year-old 
twins. 
236 s.54(8) 2008 Act. 
237 s.54(6) ibid. 
238 Ibid 
239 Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Direction 5A, 3.1, Table 2. Form A101A is available on the 
website of the Ministry of Justice. Where consent is given outside of the UK, rule 13.11(4) Part 13 
Family Procedure Rules 2010 applies. 
240 s.54(7) HFE Act 2008. 
241 Ibid. See R & S v T [2015] (n163), and Re D & L (minors) (surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631; A & B 
[2016] EWFC 34. 
242 s.54(4)(a) HFE Act 2008. This was challenged in Y v Z & Ors [2017] EWFC 60 and X (A Child: 
foreign surrogacy) [2018] EWFC 15. 
243 McCandless J, 'Reproducing the Sexual Family: Law, Gender and Parenthood in Assisted 
Reproduction' (thesis for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, Keele University 2010) 334. 
244 PO Regulations 2010 [7.4]. 
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PO to be made, the child’s interests must take absolute priority in the balance with 
everyone else’s (the IPs’ and the surrogate’s) interests, as Hedley J noted in Re L.245 
This leads judges to grant POs even where the statutory criteria are not met (except 
where the applicant is single). For example, we saw that judges may have no other 
choice but to retrospectively authorise payments to the surrogate or a surrogacy agency 
that were obviously above and beyond the legally allowed ‘reasonable expenses’, or 
to dispense with the requirement for the surrogate’s consent if she cannot be found, if 
the PO serves the child’s interests. Admittedly, it is very difficult to imagine a situation 
where a judge will refuse to grant a PO. 
Nevertheless, under this interpretation, WoC may sit in tension with other important 
principles, such as the IPs’ reproductive autonomy, and may lead to inconsistencies in 
the law’s application.246 Conversely, the Greek interpretation of WoC as one of the 
factors to be considered during the preconception judicial scrutiny shows more regard 
to reproductive autonomy. Perhaps the reason for this difference is the timing of the 
judicial assessment of WoC; in Greece, this happens when the child is not yet in 
existence, whereas in the UK it occurs when the child already exists and lives with the 
IPs, thus WoC gains more importance. 
• Procedural matters 
After a PO application has been submitted to a Family Procedures Court, a PO 
Reporter, who is a Cafcass social worker, is appointed to check whether the PO 
eligibility criteria are satisfied.247 The PO Reporters make an initial assessment and 
submit a report to the court.248 Following this, there is a court hearing, during which 
the judge decides whether to grant the PO. 
A recent study showed that PO Reporters are not provided with a structured framework 
about how they should produce their reports. Rather, they are ‘left to develop their 
                                                          
245 Re L [2010] (n99). The House of Lords had since the 1970s defined ‘paramount’ as constituting the 
sole factor in decision-making, as trumping every other concern: J v C [1970] AC 668. 
246 Reece H, 'The Paramountcy Principle. Consensus or Construct?' (1996) 49(1) Oxford Journals, 
Current Legal Problems. 
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own processes’,249 and there is lack of consistency in their practices.250 Many 
Reporters also worry about the lateness of their involvement, notably after all 
transactions and other arrangements have taken place, and the child has lived with the 
IPs for some time.251  
After a PO has been granted to the IPs, it is registered in a confidential PO Register, 
and the child’s birth registration is amended (and a new birth certificate is issued) to 
capture the new parenthood situation.252 Upon reaching adulthood, the child can 
access his/her long certificate including all the information about his/her birth 
history.253 This process is similar to that followed in UK adoption cases. In Greece, no 
such process is necessary; the IPs are the legal parents at birth. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an overview of the background and historical development of 
UK surrogacy regulation, and highlighted the key elements that are interesting, 
significant, potentially problematic, and different from those in Greece. Under UK 
law, access to surrogacy is available to all individuals, subject to a WoC assessment 
performed in clinics, and consent. Additionally, UK surrogacy is altruistic. Payments 
to surrogates are not illegal but if they are above ‘reasonable expenses’, they must be 
authorised by the judiciary at the PO stage. Surrogacy practice in clinics falls under 
the responsibility of the HFEA, which monitors ARTs and issues regulation with no 
legal force. Informal surrogacy arrangements that take place outside a clinic are 
unregulated. Likewise, UK non-profit surrogacy organisations are unregulated. 
The most significant differences between the two regimes relates to the way in which 
parenthood is determined. In Greece, surrogacy is perceived as a form of ARTs, 
parenthood following surrogacy is based on intention, and surrogacy agreements are 
enforceable after the child’s birth. In the UK, parenthood is based on gestation and 
birth, and the surrogate and her husband, wife, or partner, are the child’s legal parents 
at birth. Surrogacy agreements are non-enforceable, and parenthood is transferred to 
the IPs post-birth through a PO, which is subject to numerous eligibility criteria and a 
                                                          
249 Crawshaw et al (n161) 5. Horsey’s survey had similar results: PO Reporters reported ‘feel[ing] 
poorly treated by medical and other professionals’, and that ‘the DoH should produce guidance for 
professionals in the field’ (n88: 36). 
250 Crawshaw et al (n161) 6. 
251 Ibid 7,15,16. 
252 s.10(1) Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, as amended. 
253 PO Regulations 2010, Schedule 1[1(a)]. 
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judicial scrutiny. The PO process is essentially a fast-track adoption process, which 
does not work for all surrogacy arrangements. However, because the WoC is the 
court’s paramount consideration when deciding on a PO, judges have been forced to 
‘read down’ the statute and grant the PO even without all legal requirements being 
met, except in a case where the IP was single.  
Having set out the law in Greece and the UK, I will now evaluate how access to 
surrogacy in Greece and the UK operates in practice, drawing on my empirical work, 




Access to Surrogacy in Greece and the UK 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, I laid down some ethical standards against which any surrogacy regime 
should be measured. I argued that, in principle, and in the absence of harm, autonomy 
grounds a strong presumption that individuals should be free to form surrogacy 
arrangements. Moreover, I suggested that a ‘good’ surrogacy regime should ensure 
equal, fair and affordable access to all interested parties, and that the welfare of 
everyone involved in surrogacy, including the child-to-be, is, as far as possible, 
protected. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I considered how Greece and the UK regulate surrogacy. I now 
evaluate the extent to which the law set out there is working to achieve the ethical 
goals regarding access to surrogacy laid out in Chapter 2, drawing on my own 
empirical data and on existing literature and other studies. I begin by discussing the 
factors which influence access to surrogacy in these countries. I focus on two 
categories of restrictions: those set by regulation (Section 5.2), and those not set by 
law but nevertheless limiting access in certain ways (Section 5.3). While my research 
investigated formal legal and informal barriers to surrogacy, it makes its major 
contribution regarding the latter, which is much less researched. 
5.2 Regulatory restrictions on access to surrogacy 
Greek law guarantees a prima facie individual right to have a child and makes ARTs 
and surrogacy expressly available to heterosexual couples and single women. 
However, it remains unclear whether surrogacy in Greece is legally available, as of 
right, to single men and same-sex couples. Additionally, ARTs, including surrogacy, 
are restricted to individuals with a medical need for treatment and to women who are 
under 50 years old. Furthermore, only gestational surrogacy (in clinics) is legal, and 
access depends on a preconception judicial scrutiny of the surrogacy agreement and a 
WoC assessment in clinics. 
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On the contrary, UK law does not explicitly recognise a right to have a child, but it 
allows both gestational and traditional surrogacy, provided that pregnancy is achieved 
in clinics, leaving at-home (traditional) surrogacy completely unregulated. UK non-
profit surrogacy organisations are likewise unregulated. Access to formal legal 
surrogacy depends on consent and WoC. The welfare criterion is subject to an 
assessment by clinics, and access is not restricted to any groups and/or individuals, but 
parenthood following surrogacy is still only available to couples (heterosexual and 
same-sex).1 This potentially deters some people (fearing they do not fulfil the 
parenthood criteria) from accessing formal regulated surrogacy in the UK. 
Based on the theory, regulation, and my own evidence, the following statutory factors 
clearly influence access to surrogacy in Greece and the UK: medical need, age, 
relationship status, WoC, residence, and the judicial scrutiny of surrogacy agreements. 
5.2.1 Medical need 
Under Greek law, ARTs, including surrogacy, are allowed only if their use is justified 
by a medical need, namely infertility. The IM must prove she is medically unable to 
attain a pregnancy and/or bring it to term.2 This presumably aims at ensuring ARTs 
are not used ‘for convenience’, and at limiting the risk of exploitation in surrogacy.3 
One Greek academic has argued that ‘infertility’ must be understood more broadly to 
include ‘unexplained’ infertility.4 However, little is known about how the medical 
need restriction works in practice. 
My evidence suggests that Greek clinicians involved in surrogacy consider this 
requirement very important and will recommend surrogacy only if it is absolutely 
necessary for medical reasons. Importantly, my interviewees gave a narrow 
interpretation to ‘medical need’, which links strictly to physical infertility. For 
example, Dr Pantos (Greek clinician) said: 
                                                          
1 This was challenged in Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryolog  Act: Parental Order) 
[2015] EWFC 73, and Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 119 (Fam). The government recently laid 
a remedial order, which, if passed, will make POs available to single IPs (Written statement-
HLWS282). 
2 Chapter 3, ‘Medical need’. 
3 Memorandum-3089/2002 II, art.1455 GCC; Trokanas T, The application of medically assisted 
reproductive methods and the welfare of the child to be born (Papachristou, T. K. and others eds, 21st 
Century Family Law: Coincidental and Fundamental Reforms - Law and Society in 21st century, 
Sakkoulas 2012) 173. 
4 Papazisi T, 'Surrogate mother or mater semper certa est' in Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-
Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou (eds), Medical Assistance in Human Reproduction. 10 
years of the application of Law 3089/2002 (Sakkoulas 2013) 78. 
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If it’s a case of unexplained infertility, we can do other things, not surrogacy. 
(…)There must be a medical reason for surrogacy. (...)I get this question from a lot of 
couples. They’ve had many failed IVFs and they think they need surrogacy. No. If the 
uterus and the endometrium are in perfect condition, they don’t need surrogacy. The 
cause of infertility is elsewhere.  
Two other clinicians confirmed the view that surrogacy is only permissible if the 
woman is physically unable to carry a child, citing variously the case where a woman 
lacks a uterus, where chronic illnesses make pregnancy difficult or dangerous,5 o  the 
case of a previous liver transplant, cancer or blood problems.6 
However, within my sample, there was evidence that a Greek lesbian couple, who did 
not fulfil the ‘medical need’ criterion, accessed “surrogacy” in Greece (albeit in an 
unusual form). This suggests that exceptions may be made, and doctors may help some 
individuals bend the rules. Aria and Katerina had a child using Aria’s egg, donor 
sperm, and Katerina’s uterus. In the UK, this couple would be able to legally access 
ARTs in a clinic, and they would both be considered legal parents, if they met all other 
statutory criteria. In Greece, the only option available to the couple was surrogacy,7 
but the clinic would not treat them unless they acquired the court’s permission. For 
this to happen, there had to be misrepresentations in court: the clinician gave Aria a 
false affidavit declaring her medical need for surrogacy, and Katerina was presented 
as Aria’s friend, who would act as her surrogate. Although one Greek clinician 
interpreted ‘medical need’ for surrogacy broadly and did a lot to accommodate the 
desires of a lesbian couple, it is uncertain whether other clinicians would do the same. 
Furthermore, surrogacy is an important option for gay male couples, who are not 
physically infertile but are unable to have a child without a surrogate. Greek law does 
not expressly provide a right for gay male couples to access ARTs (and formal legal 
surrogacy), which reflects a clear tension between the overarching principle of the 
right to have a child and the non-recognition of gay male couples’ right to access 
formal legal surrogacy. Nevertheless, it is possible that gay male couples are involved 
in informal surrogacy arrangements in Greece, which were unlikely to be captured by 
my sample.8 Although my sample is small and partly self-selected, it suggests that 
                                                          
5 Dr Tarlatzis. List of all interviewees with short biographies included in Appendix C. 
6 Ms Chatziparasidou. 
7 Access to ARTs for same-sex couples (and same-sex parenthood) is unregulated. 
8 My focus was on formal legal surrogacy arrangements, and my sa ple was recruited based on their 
experience with primarily regulated aspects of surrogacy. As we will see below, one Greek clinician 
said he would allow foreign gay male couples to access surrogacy in his clinic. 
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medical need for surrogacy is broadly accepted amongst Greek clinicians and presents 
a significant limitation on access to surrogacy. 
In the UK, medical need is not legally required, and no evidence exists in the literature 
about surrogacy being tied to a medical need. Dr Sue Avery, a leading UK clinician, 
considered medical need to be quite significant for surrogacy, but not in the same way 
as Greek clinicians. She stated that surrogacy is usually chosen in cases where 
pregnancy would be very risky for the woman and/or the child; therefore, medical 
need would be a significant factor for ensuring the support of a clinic, because 
surrogacy eliminates those risks. Additionally, she interpreted gay male couples’ 
inability to have a child as a form of ‘medical need’. 
Other UK interviewees suggested that medical need neither operates as a restriction 
nor a justification for access to surrogacy in UK clinics. I also found that, nowadays, 
UK doctors are aware and supportive of surrogacy, which suggests that the 1996 BMA 
guidance to medical professionals to be more accepting and supportive of surrogacy 
has filtered into medical practice,9 as was also confirmed by a recent UK study.10 For 
instance, Sarah (SUK surrogate and SUK Chair) said: 
Medical professionals are passing on more information now. [Surrogacy is] more 
recognised as [an] improved method to have a child. (…)[D]efinitely the medical 
professionals have helped to grow the number of couples that are looking into 
surrogacy now, which is great. (…)IPs, loads of them, come to us [SUK], especially 
heterosexual couples, by recommendation by a medical professional(…). 
Additionally, some interviewees remarked that women suffering from serious medical 
conditions that render them unable to carry healthy pregnancies (or carry a pregnancy 
at all) are being presented with the option of surrogacy and can access UK clinics 
without any problem, but this approach is new.11 Natalie stated: 
[Women are] being spoken to about surrogacy much earlier on in their diagnosis, 
especially cancer patients (…). Five years ago, [surrogacy] was hardly spoken about 
with cancer patients as part of their own options if their fertility was affected, whereas 
now I think there’s more awareness. 
In summary, Greek law does not specify whether medical need only refers to 
physical/biological inability to have a child, but clinicians interpreted ‘medical need’ 
                                                          
9 BMA, Changing Perceptions of Motherhood. The Practice of Surrogacy in Britain (Wiley-Blackwell 
1996) 59. 
10 Lee E, Macvarish J and Sheldon S, 'Assessing Child Welfare Under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008: a case study in medicalisation?' (2014) 36(4) Sociology f Health and Illness. 
11 Sarah, Natalie (SUK mother and SUK Trustee), and Marina (COTS surrogate and COTS Trustee). 
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strictly. Although there was evidence that exceptions may be made, social infertility 
was not enough, hence a lesbian couple and the clinician pretended that the IM was 
physically infertile to get the court’s support. My Greek data imply that the medical 
need criterion may prevent some individuals from accessing formal regulated 
surrogacy. As one would expect from the law and the existing literature, my UK 
evidence showed that medical need plays no role in access to surrogacy in clinics. 
Based on my data, UK clinicians’ awareness of surrogacy, especially in cases of 
physical infertility, has increased, and surrogacy is presented as an option now more 
so now than in the past. 
5.2.2 Age 
Under Greek law, access to ARTs is restricted to women who are under 50 years old. 
According to the literature, this requirement was guided not just by a concern for 
women’s and children’s welfare,12 but also by a rejection of motherhood in old age.13 
Nonetheless, my interviewees tended to suggest that the upper age limit shows concern 
for the future child’s welfare (not being raised by older parents) rather than for 
women’s health.14 For example, Mr Cazlaris said: 
(…)It’s not in the child’s best interests to have a mother who’s 65 years old; a line 
should be drawn there. There should be an age limit. (…)[W]e didn’t want to leave 
gaps in ART law. We wanted the law to be clear. 
Nevertheless, many Greek interviewees were against the statutory age limit for 
women. For instance, Dr Pantos considered it ‘foolish’, because it prevents some 
women from accessing ARTs, which intensifies the low birth rate problem. Lena was 
one of the few that considered this restriction a strength of the law. In her view, the 
child should be raised by a younger mother, which shows she perceives the age 
restriction as a tool to protect the child’s (presumed) welfare. However, this concern 
is not supported by any evidence of harm;15 hence, the age restriction sits in tension 
with the express right to have a child enshrined in the Constitution. 
                                                          
12 Papazisi T, Legal and ethical issues regarding assisted reproduction after menopause (Medical 
Assistance in Human Reproduction - Critical Review Library, Sakkoulas 2002) 77. 
13 Ibid 
14 Haris Cazlaris (embryologist, policy-maker and former NAMAR member), Lena (surrogate and 
clients’ manager in a large Greek clinic), Professor Aristides Hatzis (legal academic), Takis Vidalis 
(legal academic and advisor at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission). 
15 There are no Greek studies about the effects of ARTs and surrogacy n children, but arguments can 
be drawn from the UK literature. Many UK studies reveal that children are not harmed by ARTs, and 
surrogacy (Chapter 2,n171; Pennings G, 'Measuring the welfare of th child: in search of the appropriate 
evaluation principle' (1999) 14(5) Human Reproduction).  
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A few interviewees noted that the lack of effective monitoring of Greek clinics by 
NAMAR while it was not fully operating has left scope for differences in practices, 
with some clinics refusing to treat older women, and other clinics offering them 
treatment.16 They also thought this ambiguity makes it impossible for an environment 
of trust to be created, which they believed is important in ARTs. Dr Pantos thought 
trust is particularly important in the context of reproductive tourism. Generally, all 
Greek clinicians talked very openly and positively about developing ‘reproductive 
tourism’ in Greece, as they thought it would increase reproductive autonomy.17 This 
finding is surprising, especially considering the controversy that surrounds 
‘reproductive tourism’ and the negative connotations regarding the commercialisation 
of ARTs.18 Greek clinicians identified various possible reasons for the positive stance 
towards ‘reproductive tourism’: the high-quality ART services provided in Greece, 
their low-cost (compared to other countries), and the innovative, liberal and protective 
legal regime. 
As regards the surrogate, the only legal requirement was (until recently) that she is 
physically and emotionally able to carry a pregnancy. Both the literature and my data 
show the upper age limit entrenched in the 2005 Law concerns the IM, not the 
surrogate.19 This, however, changed in 2017. The Greek Authority for ARTs 
(NAMAR) issued new rules (with legal force) that surrogates should be between 25 
and 45 years old, should have at least one child of their own, and should have had no 
more than two caesarean sections.20 NAMAR justified this decision by a concern for 
women’s health.21 Since my interviews were completed before this change, I was 
unable to explore how this rule operates in practice. In any case, clinics could refuse 
                                                          
16 Ms Chatziparasidou (clinician), Dr Pantos. 
17 Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Tarlatzis. 
18 Jackson E, 'UK Law and International Commercial Surrogacy: 'the very antithesis of sensible'' (2016) 
4(3) JMLE 197-214; Spar D, The baby business: How money, science, and politics drive the commerce 
of conception (Harvard Business School Press 2006); Whittaker A and Speier A, '‘Cycling overseas’: 
Care, commodification and stratification in cross-border reproductive travel' (2010) 29 Medical 
Anthropology 363–383; Culley L and others, '”What are you going to do, confiscate their passports?” 
Professional perspectives on cross-border reproductive travel' (2013) 31( ) Journal of Reproductive and 
Infant Psychology). Greek doctors’ openness is probably owed to recent moves and expressed desire of 
the state to develop medical tourism in Greece (Varvara, F. 'Greece [to become] the 'Mecca' of medical 
tourism' (4/12/2014) http://www.karfitsa.gr/2014/12/04/mekka-toy-iatrikoy-toyrismoy-i-ellad/ 
accessed on 18/04/2017). Additionally, a 2012 official report considered future and advantages of 
developing medical tourism in Greece (A. Doksiadis, A. Katsapi and K. Souliotis, Development of 
Medical Tourism in Greece (Hellenic Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, 2012). 
19 Skorini-Paparrigopoulou F, Greek Civil Code, Articles 1455-1456, vol.8 (Georgiadis, A. and M. 
Stathopoulos eds, Law and Economy, 2nd edn, Sakkoulas 2003) 29. 
20 Article 9, Decision 73/24-1-2017 (NAMAR Code of Practice for ARTs professionals). 
21 NAMAR press release (19/04/2017) http://eaiya.gov.gr/deltio-typou-19-04-2017/  
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a surrogate for medical reasons, which renders the surrogate’s age limitation legally 
irrelevant. This was also suggested by Mr Cazlaris to justify why the 2005 Law 
included no criteria for the surrogate. 
Unlike Greece, UK regulation does not set an age requirement for access to ARTs and 
surrogacy, and none of my UK interviewees mentioned it as an issue. However, that 
may be because it does not arise often as an issue rather than because of any approval 
or disapproval of postponed motherhood. Also, it is possible that age could be an 
informal barrier to access, because it could impact clinics’ success rates.22 
5.2.3 Relationship status 
Under Greek law, ARTs and surrogacy are available to single women and heterosexual 
couples, married or in civil partnerships (a status only available to opposite-sex 
couples until recently). Same-sex couples have no express right to access ARTs, but 
it could be a future possibility since the 2015 change in the civil partnership regime,23 
as well as the recent change in the child adoption and fostering law.24 Moreover, the 
literature and judicial practice are unclear about whether single men can have 
surrogacy in Greece. As noted in Chapter 3,25 there have been two cases of infertile 
single men having been successful in formal legal surrogacy, but one of them was later 
overturned by the Supreme Court, meaning it remains unclear whether single men can 
have formal legal surrogacy in Greece. 
There is no published research on how the relationship status criterion operates in 
practice. My evidence suggests it does not always exclude people from accessing 
ARTs, and surrogacy, in clinics. As mentioned above, lesbian partners Aria and 
Katerina were successful in accessing IVF ‘surrogacy’ and sperm donation in a Greek 
clinic. Aria said the doctor was disinterested in their relationship status and wanted to 
help them achieve their aim, although there were various obstacles. 
Aria: Katerina wanted to carry my own child. We both thought this was a brilliant 
idea, because each could have a certain link to the child. We went to a fertility centre 
and told the doctor about our desire to have a child this way. 
                                                          
22 Various CCGs around the country have upper age limits for the provision of IVF funding (Chapter 
4,n129). 
23 Law 4356/2015. Hatzis A, Gay Adoption in Greece (Baros, V. and others eds, Childhood and 
Migration: Challenges for the Pedagogy of Diversity, Diadrasi 2016). 
24 Since May 2018, same-sex couples have formally been allowed to adopt and foster children (Law 
4538/2018). 
25 Section 3.3.1, ‘Relationship Status’. 
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Interviewer: Did you go to the doctor as a couple? 
Aria: He never asked, and we never explained. They [doctors] rarely ask. They’re not 
interested in it. At the time, I was 42 years old. The doctor told us that I couldn’t be 
an egg donor, because, under Greek law, egg donors must be younger than 35, so we 
couldn’t use my egg. (…)Then, he suggested we do surrogacy. 
Since formal legal surrogacy cannot happen without the court’s permission, the couple 
had to follow the formal legal process, because the clinic would not treat them 
otherwise. I found that some clinicians will find ways to offer ARTs to same-sex 
couples, even though this is not formally provided for in law and even if it involves 
deceiving the authorities. Additionally, there was evidence that same-sex couples may 
attempt to deceive clinicians to achieve access. An anonymous Greek lawyer reported 
that she drafted a surrogacy agreement between a gay male couple and their surrogate. 
The parties signed the agreement, and then the surrogate and one of the men appeared 
to the clinic as a couple seeking ARTs and accessed treatment. 
Some Greek interviewees suggested the current law reveals a tension between the 
overarching principle of the right to have a child and the non-recognition of same-sex 
couples’ right to access ARTs, including surrogacy.26 Takis Vidalis argued that this 
imbalance could easily be remedied if the interpretation of the term ‘partnership’ was 
broadened to include partners in a same-sex relationship. 
The right to reproduce is everyone’s right. (…)I think the current law could be 
interpreted to extend access to ART to same-sex couples. The law talks about ‘intended 
parents’; there is no differentiation based on gender and relationship status(…). If we 
interpret the word “partners” as “partners in civil partnership”(...), there wouldn’t 
be a problem. 
Furthermore, my data imply that the legal ambiguity regarding same-sex couples’ right 
to access ARTs leaves scope for differences in clinical practices across Greece, with 
some doctors saying they would treat same-sex couples under certain conditions, and 
others saying they would not. For example, Dr Pantos said he would treat gay male 
couples if they were foreigners who were legally married or in a legally recognised 
civil partnership in their jurisdiction, and that now that the Greek civil partnership law 
has changed, he would consider treating Greek same-sex couples. In contrast, Ms 
Chatziparasidou said her clinic has a strict policy against treating same-sex couples, 
which would only change when ARTs law changed accordingly. 
                                                          
26 Dr Pantos, Dr Tarlatzis, Professor Hatzis, Vidalis, Cazlaris, anonymous lawyer, Lena. 
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In the UK, access to ARTs does not rest on a relationship criterion. As originally 
drafted, the 1990 Act, included a requirement for clinicians to take account of ‘the 
child’s need for a father’ before providing access to ARTs, which could arguably 
exclude lesbian couples and single women.27 However, in 2008, this was changed to 
the child’s ‘need for supportive parenting’, making it clear that there was no 
requirement for a woman to be in a relationship in order to receive treatment. 
Moreover, clinics were regularly treating single women and lesbian couples, as some 
UK studies performed in the 1990s suggest.28 Recent studies show that UK clinics 
operate under a presumption to treat, and same-sex couples can access ARTs, although 
there is still some suspicion of single women.29 
Dr Avery stated that no social groups are barred from treatment, and same-sex couples 
and single people have no problems accessing ARTs nowadays. However, she 
indicated this is due to fears of accusations of discrimination and bad publicity. 
I think if you do have censorship or you do have individuals who would like to restrict 
access to particular groups, it is very much harder for them to do so than it was. Not 
from a legal point of view, but from a profile point of view. Now it’s not at all 
uncommon [to treat singles and same-sex couples]. (…)[I]f you were to attempt to 
make an exception on the basis of surrogacy, it would be very hard to do it very 
obviously, and, being cynical about it, the other thing that worries people is people 
going to the press and saying “they wouldn’t let me have treatment because…”. 
(…)You can’t refuse anybody. 
Some UK interviewees referred to unverified anecdotal evidence of gay male couples 
having been refused access in UK clinics after the 2008 legal reform.30 Steven and 
Simon said these stories caused them a lot of anxiety, so much so that they initially 
wanted to avoid going through a clinic for surrogacy. Nevertheless, when they did so 
at the request of their surrogate, they met no legal restrictions and had a positive 
experience. Two other UK surrogates who were treated in UK clinics together with 
same-sex IPs, said their access was legally unproblematic. This reveals that it can take 
                                                          
27 Chapter 4, ‘WoC assessments in clinics’. 
28 G. Douglas, Access to Assisted Reproduction: Legal and other criteria for eligibility. Report of a 
survey funded by the Nuffield Foundation (1992); Blyth E, 'The United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990 and the Welfare of the Child: A Critique' (1995) 3 The International Journal 
of Children’s Rights; Lieberman BA, Matson P and Hamer F, 'The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act: How Well is it Functioning?' (1994) 9 Human Reproduction; Patel JC and Johnson 
MH, 'A Survey of the Effectiveness of the Assessment of the Welfare of the Child in UK In-Vitro 
Fertilization Units' (1998) 13 Human Reproduction. 
29 Lee, Macvarish and Sheldon (n10); Sheldon S, Lee E and Macvarish J, ''Supportive Parenting'. 
Responsibility and Regulation: The Welfare Assessment under the Reformed Huan Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (1990)' (2015) 78(3) MLR 461-492. 
30 Sarah, Lauren, Simon and Steve (SUK gay fathers). 
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time for legislative changes to filter into public consciousness and clinical practice, 
and it confirms findings of recent UK studies that same-sex couples no longer face 
legal restrictions in accessing ARTs in UK clinics.31 
5.2.4 Welfare of the child (WoC) 
As discussed earlier, UK law requires clinics to perform a WoC assessment before 
providing access to ARTs. Some UK commentators have noted the WoC criterion 
regarding the child’s ‘need for supportive parenting’ (and previously the child’s ‘need 
for a father’) could have operated as a limitation on access to ARTs.32 In fact, recent 
studies have shown that WoC assessments nowadays are very light-touch, and 
clinicians promote access.33 The latter was confirmed through my sample. For 
example, Dr Sue Avery said: 
I do think it is much harder for people to decide not to offer treatment on the basis of 
some general prejudice these days. (…)Possibly, if we have a problem, it goes the 
other way, and that’s not to do with surrogacy. It’s where people are worried about 
not providing treatment even when you have serious WoC concerns, because they 
don’t want to say no, and they’re worried about appearing to be discriminatory. 
She also considered assessing WoC was difficult, but noted there are processes in 
place to ensure wide agreement in case of possible concern during the assessment.34 
Furthermore, she stated that access will be refused in very specific circumstances, such 
as domestic violence or an unstable relationship, which are not to do with surrogacy 
specifically, or due to concerns about possible exploitation of the surrogate by the IPs: 
I think we’ve had one surrogacy case where, due to concerns, we didn’t go ahead, but 
that was where the proposed surrogate was the niece of the IM, quite young, living in 
their house, and it became clear that this wasn’t something she was consenting to quite 
as freely as we would’ve liked her to. 
Moreover, I found that access does not depend merely only on clinics’ WoC 
assessments, but also on assessments done by surrogacy organisations.  This theme is 
largely overlooked in the UK literature and emerged strongly in my data. Notably, 
such assessments do not affect legal access to surrogacy, but they may set practical 
barriers. Marina from COTS said:  
                                                          
31 Lee, Macvarish and Sheldon (n10); Sheldon, Lee, and Macvarish (n29). 
32 Chapter 4, n107-111,124 and accompanying text in the main body.
33 Lee, Macvarish and Sheldon (n10); Sheldon, Lee, and Macvarish (n29). 
34 The clinic holds multidisciplinary meetings to discuss concerns. 
155 
 
We do a police-check. (…)We ask them [IPs] if they have any involvement in social 
services. (…)At the end of the day we think of the safety of the child. (…)We have 
stringent rules. 
Similar processes were noted by other interviewees, with Helen Prosser from Brilliant 
Beginnings (BB) describing a rigorous process for background checks that can take 
up to four months, and Sarah from SUK mentioning that prospective SUK members 
must provide background clearance to be accepted. Additionally, Lauren (SUK 
surrogate) underwent an interview with an experienced SUK surrogate to gain an 
approval of registration, which is another form of assessment. 
Notwithstanding the way in which independent surrogacy is sometimes 
characterised,35 I found that rigorous processes and checks to ensure WoC are common 
in that sector, too. Jamie (UK independent surrogate) and her IPs shared the results of 
their police-checks but, for them, trust was more important than any ‘formal’ check. 
In fact, Jamie found background checks ‘silly’, because, in her opinion, ‘it just means 
you haven’t been caught on paper’. 
In Greece, WoC is assessed by the court at the preconception stage and later by the 
clinic. Greek literature considers WoC very important in ARTs,36 but, according to 
some, it can restrict autonomy because it offers unlimited discretion, first, to judges 
and, secondly, to clinicians to assess peoples’ suitability to become parents.37 There is 
no published evidence about how WoC assessments are conducted in Greek clinics 
and whether they are onerous or not. However, Greek judicial practice suggests that 
WoC concerns do not limit access to surrogacy.38 This is confirmed by my evidence. 
Takis Vidalis explained that WoC does not act as a significant limitation, because the 
court cannot do a full review of surrogacy arrangements. Moreover, clinics cannot 
refuse access if a judicial permission for gestational surrogacy has been obtained. 
Therefore, the clinical WoC assessment, if it happens, is light-touch. 
                                                          
35 Many UK judges described it as ‘dangerous’: Re N [2007] EWCA Civ 1053; Re TT [2011] EWHC 
33, [2011] 2FLR 392; Re X [2016] EWFC 54, [2016] EWFC 55; Re M [2017] EWCA Civ 228; JP v 
LP & Others (Surrogacy Arrangement: Wardship) EWHC 595 (Fam),[2015] 1 FLR 307, and others. 
By ‘independent’ I mean surrogacy arrangements where the parties do not go through a surrogacy 
organisation. 
36 Koutsouradis A, 'Issues of Surrogate Motherhood after the Law 3305/2005' (2006) 54 Legal Library; 
Fountedaki K, Human Reproduction and doctor liability, vol.4 (Publications of Medical Law and 
Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2007).  
37 Trokanas (n3) 123; Koutsouradis (ibid) 357. 
38 Generally, in Greece, WoC is weighed equally to the interests of the IPs and the surrogate during the 
judicial scrutiny of surrogacy arrangements. In some cases (Chapter 3, n140-141), WoC operated as a 
tool to assess the IPs’ parenting abilities but access was granted. 
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Vidalis: There is nothing that can be done [by the court] regarding [WoC]. The court 
only checks the surrogacy agreement, and there’s no child at that point. (…)The judge 
will check whether the circumstances guarantee a relatively safe pregnancy and 
delivery, nothing more. 
Interviewer: How about the next stage? At the clinic. Can a doctor assess [WoC]? 
Vidalis: Since the court’s permission is in existence, there is no other check, as we 
have for example in adoption, about the suitability of the parents-to-be. There is no 
check specifically for surrogacy. 
Generally, there was clear agreement across my Greek sample that judges and clinics 
very rarely refuse access on WoC grounds, with some saying that this would only 
happen in very specific circumstances; for example, if there is history of violence, or 
if the IPs’ relationship appears to be unstable (also cited by Dr Avery in the UK).39 
Moreover, there was agreement between the UK and Greek clinicians about the 
difficulty associated with assessing WoC.40 Lastly, Greek clinicians considered 
counselling very significant in assessing WoC and revealed that they make it 
mandatory in their clinics,41 although it is not a statutory access requirement. This also 
happens in the UK, as noted by previous studies,42 and as confirmed by many of my 
interviewees.43 
In summary, my data showed that both Greek and UK clinics, and UK surrogacy 
organisations, consider WoC assessments very important. Although very rare, WoC 
may be used to justify refusals of access to surrogacy. It is, though, possible that 
refusals are so rare because cases raising serious WoC concerns do not reach clinics 
(or surrogacy organisations) at all, since people may be screening themselves out, 
which was unlikely to be captured by my sample. 
5.2.5 Residence 
Residence was never a statutory access requirement in the UK. In Greece, until July 
2014, permanent residence was an absolute legal requirement for access to surrogacy 
and was monitored by the court at the preconception stage. As noted in Chapter 3, 
there were concerns that the residence rule was not working effectively,44 and one 
                                                          
39 Dr Pantos, Dr Tarlatzis, and Ms Chatziparasidou. Moreover, some said access would be refused if 
the medical need criterion is not fulfilled (Dr Pantos, Ms Chatziparasidou, Professor Hatzis, anonymous 
Greek lawyer). 
40 Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Pantos, and Dr Avery from the UK. 
41 Ibid 
42 Lee, Macvarish and Sheldon (n10); Sheldon Lee, and Macvarish (n29). 
43 Dr Avery said surrogacy counselling is mandatory in her clinic. Lauren, Sarah, Simon and Steve, and 
Natalie received counselling in UK clinics, which was presented to them as mandatory. 
44 Chapter 3, n163-164,166 and accompanying text in the main body.
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commentator described it as ‘nonsensical’.45 In 2014, the law was amended to require 
merely that either the IM or the surrogate has at least temporary residence in Greece. 
The change was explained as an effort to modernise the law and facilitate state-
monitoring of ART practice,46 but the literature and the media saw it as aiming to 
increase ‘reproductive tourism’ for surrogacy.47 
Greek interviewees confirmed that the residence requirement never worked well, 
because its enforcement was patchy,48 and effective monitoring by judges was 
virtually impossible because there was no mechanism in place to help them do so. This 
meant that judges had to rely on the statements of the parties and one witness.49 
Furthermore, some suggested that one could find ways to work around the requirement 
if one tried hard enough,50 and that there have been misrepresentations in court to 
overcome the residence rule.51 
Lena: It used to be more time-consuming and harder to [have surrogacy in Greece]. 
Now we don’t have to prove residence. We used to submit an electricity bill, and a 
witness statement, someone who would say they were the IPs’ neighbour. In most cases 
the IPs would stay in Greece during the surrogate’s pregnancy anyway, so they would 
rent a house, etc. 
Moreover, in line with the commentators mentioned above, many of my interviewees 
believed the legislative change was politically-driven, aiming at increasing 
reproductive tourism,52 which would be unsurprising considering the state’s interest 
in accepting and promoting such a development.53 Some interviewees viewed the 
change as potentially dangerous, fearing it could increase the risk of exploitation,54 
and others noted that it does not sit comfortably with the principle of altruism 
                                                          
45 Kounougeri-Manoledaki E, Assisted reproduction and family law. The Gr ek legislation: Laws 
3089/2002 and 3305/2005 (Sakkoulas 2005) 65. 
46 Memorandum-Law 4272/2014. 
47 Papachristou TK, 'An unfortunate choice by the lawmaker' (2014) 8 Private Law Chronicles; Kovacs, 
Stéphane. 'Greece, The Eldorado of surrogacy', Le Figaro (3/10/2014) http://www.lefigaro.fr/mon-
figaro/2014/10/03/10001-20141003ARTFIG00288-en-grece-l-eldorado-de-la-gpa.php, accessed on 
23/05/2015 (in French). 
48 Anonymous lawyer, Takis Vidalis. 
49 Ibid, and Professor Hatzis. 
50 Lena, anonymous lawyer, Professor Hatzis, Takis Vidalis. 
51 Ibid 
52 Dr Tarlatzis, Dr Pantos, Takis Vidalis, Professor Hatzis, anonymous lawyer, Haris Cazlaris. 
53 n18. 
54 Mr Vidalis thought that, due to the refugee crisis Greece is dealing with, there are now many 
vulnerable women of no or low income who could be tempted to become surrogates for money. Also, 
an anonymous Greek lawyer worried that new regime facilitates trafficking for surrogates. 
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underpinning Greek surrogacy law. However, some thought these dangers could be 
minimised, if not eliminated, through tighter monitoring by NAMAR.55 
5.2.6 Judicial scrutiny of surrogacy agreements 
Greek law requires that the court approves the surrogacy agreement at the 
preconception stage; therefore, judges could be viewed as the main gatekeepers of 
surrogacy. In the UK, there is no equivalent to the judicial pre-approval process. 
Again, there is little evidence about how the judicial scrutiny operates in Greece. One 
commentator noted that judges do not examine surrogacy cases in detail, and regularly 
provide access if the medical need requirement is met,56 and another described it a 
‘rubber-stamping’ service.57 
Although I was unable to gather evidence directly from Greek judges, I found relevant 
information through my other interviewees. Greek clinicians emphasised the 
significance of the judicial scrutiny requirement, noting that they do not proceed to 
treatment in the absence of the court’s authorisation, which was also confirmed by 
Greek surrogates and IPs.58 Many interviewees also suggested that the judicial scrutiny 
acts as a ‘safety valve’ against exploitation.59 For example, Takis Vidalis said: 
[L]aw has provided tools to detect and prevent exploitation. (…)[It] requires 
provision of clear and unconditional informed consent, and there is a judicial process. 
(…)[T]here are certain rights, especially on the part of the surrogate, that are 
irrefutable whatever the agreement says. (…)No one can make her do anything she 
doesn’t want to do, and the court process is there to make sure the parties know about 
it. 
However, a few others emphasised that, in practice, the detection and prevention of 
exploitation is problematic, because judges lack the necessary training and 
knowledge.60 Additionally, my findings confirm assumptions in the literature that the 
judicial scrutiny does not involve a full review of the surrogacy arrangement. Takis 
Vidalis said that ‘there is no effective judicial monitoring(…). It’s a conventional 
check of the evidence [and documents] that should be there (…)because the law says 
                                                          
55 Takis Vidalis, Haris Cazlaris, Professor Hatzis. 
56 Papazisi (n4) 85. 
57 Hatzis A, 'From soft to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surr gate motherhood in Greece' 
(2009) 49(3) Portuguese Economic Journal. As will be seen in Chapter 7, UK judges will rarely refuse 
PO applications, which renders the post-birth judicial scrutiny of surrogacy a rubber-stamping service. 
58 Dr Pantos, Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Tarlatzis, Elina (surrogate), Aria (lesbian IM). 
59 Takis Vidalis, Professor Hatzis, Dr Tarlatzis, Dr Pantos, anonymous lawyer, Giota (IM), Lena, Elina, 
Areti (mother of twins through surrogacy). 
60 Professor Hatzis, Vidalis. 
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so’.61 He later stated that judges rarely ask questions about the parties’ true 
relationship, and about the existence of altruism, and, if they do, they only rely on the 
parties’ statements. 
Usually, if this examination takes place, parties just say they’re friends. (…)[T]he 
judge cannot dispute this. In many cases, it is clear they’re not ‘friends’, but the judges 
cannot do anything. 
Further, an anonymous Greek lawyer said the judicial scrutiny for surrogacy is far less 
rigorous than other family law processes, such as that for adoption, and that ‘the court 
merely ratifies the parties’ agreement’. Also, some interviewees stated that Greek 
judges very rarely refuse surrogacy applications, especially if the medical need 
requirement is fulfilled.62 Greek surrogates and IPs said the judicial process was a 
quick, positive, and relatively straightforward experience.63 For example, Aria, Greek 
lesbian mother through ‘surrogacy’, said: 
[T]he whole process went by smoothly. (…)The judge asked if Katerina is my friend, 
and I said yes. Then [the judge] asked if Katerina was going to be paid at all, and I 
said no. Nothing more. (…)I think the hearing was less than 15 minutes long. (…)We 
got the court’s written permission a few days later, [and] went back to the clinic. 
Likewise, Elina, a Greek surrogate for IPs living in Germany,64 said that the judge did 
not ask any questions to affirm the parties’ residence in Greece, although the hearing 
took place before the legislative change to the residence rule. Also, the judge only 
examined the IM’s father, who appeared as a witness. However, Lena described a far 
more rigorous process than this. She was asked a series of questions, including her 
opinion about the IPs’ suitability to become parents.  
I attended the [surrogacy court] hearing. The judge asked me if I know the couple, if 
we’d agreed on a payment more than my expenses, if I consent to becoming a 
surrogate for them, if we work and what it is that we do, if I know what surrogacy 
involves, and if I think they will be good parents. 
My data confirmed the existing literature: the preconception judicial scrutiny of 
surrogacy agreements does not pose important limitations on access, but it does not 
help detect exploitation either, because judges lack proper knowledge and training. It 
is, though, possible that the prospect of needing to undergo a judicial process, the 
                                                          
61 The evidence consists of a medical affidavit certifying the IM’s medical need for surrogacy, the 
results of the surrogate’s physical and psychiatric evaluation, and the signed surrogacy agreement. 
62 Professor Hatzis, anonymous lawyer, Ms Chatziparasidou. Interestingly, as noted above 
psychological, ‘unexplained’, and social infertility do not meet the medical need requirement. 
63 Aria, Areti, Elina. 
64 The IM was a Greek national, whose parents lived permanently in Greece. 
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additional expense of potentially needing a lawyer, and the length of time till approval 
is obtained,65 deters some people from accessing formal legal surrogacy in Greece. In 
fact, Professor Hatzis believed that the legal cost is the reason that illegal surrogacy 
possibly occurs in Greece. Given the nature of my sample, and the paucity of research 
in Greece, it was impossible to find a response to this claim. 
5.3 Practical (non-regulatory) restrictions 
Up to this point, I have explored how regulatory restrictions influence access to 
surrogacy in Greece and the UK. As Nelson explains, it is important to explore not 
only whether law promotes reproductive autonomy, but also ‘whether conditions exist 
that actually permit (or foster) the meaningful exercise of reproductive choice’.66 
Moreover, it is important to examine how legal provisions impact in practice to see if 
any forms of discrimination (not expressed in the formal rules) still exist.  
I will now discuss other (non-regulatory) factors posing difficulties and/or barriers to 
access to surrogacy in Greece and the UK. This issue is severely under-researched, 
and thus my evidence makes a significant contribution to the existing literature. Based 
on my interviews, potential barriers here include the availability and quality of 
information, the difficulty in finding surrogates, the surrogates’ preferences, and cost 
and lack of public funding. 
5.3.1 Availability and quality of information and support in accessing surrogacy 
Access to accurate and easily understood information enables decision-making and 
supports the exercise of reproductive autonomy.67 It is important to explore how 
people interested in surrogacy in Greece and the UK find relevant information, 
because this has strong implications for who can access the information, what quality 
the information is likely to possess, and for how independently the parties in such an 
arrangement are able to operate (if access is controlled by formal gatekeepers). Hence, 
this investigation allows us to see how easy, fair, and equitable access is. I focus on 
                                                          
65 This ranged from 24 days (in smaller courts outside the capital) to 6 months (in the capital) with most 
interviewees mentioning 2-4 months (Ms Chatziparasidou, anonymous lawyer, Lena, Elina, Giota, 
Aria). 
66 Nelson E, Law, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2013) 50. 
67 Beckman LJ and Harvey SM, 'Current Reproductive Technologies: Increased Access and Choice?' 
(2005) 61(1) Journal of Social Issues 7-9. 
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the role of the Internet and the media, and of other key actors of surrogacy, namely 
surrogacy organisations and medical and legal professionals. 
• The role of the media and the Internet 
Jackson argues that nowadays the Internet plays an important role in surrogacy 
practice,68 but there is little evidence on how parties interested in surrogacy in the UK 
find relevant information. Horsey’s study included evidence about how IPs and 
surrogates found each other (for example, through surrogacy organisations, online 
forums, and friends or relatives),69 but not about how they found information about 
surrogacy in the first place. Recent UK court cases revealed that the Internet offers 
new possibilities regarding information, support, and matching for surrogacy, but it 
can be dangerous.70 As to Greece, my research has not uncovered any studies 
exploring this topic. As such, while my study sample was small, it offers unique 
evidence. 
My data suggest that people use different sources to find information about surrogacy 
in each country, including the Internet, mainly Google and social media (Facebook 
groups, and parenthood and/or (in)fertility online forums) and the media (for example 
TV shows and editorials in magazines and newspapers). The Internet and the media 
appeared to be much more important in the UK than in Greece. All UK participants 
identified them as the main source of information about surrogacy, whereas, as we 
will see below, Greek participants referred to medical professionals, and less so to 
lawyers, to gather relevant information. This shows that people interested in UK 
surrogacy choose independent sources to find information, while Greeks depend on 
information that formal gatekeepers decide to share with them. 
Steven and Simon, gay fathers, used ‘Google’ to find information about surrogacy. 
This led them to the websites of two UK surrogacy organisations, and they later 
registered with SUK. Lauren also gathered information about UK surrogacy law and 
the work of surrogacy organisations through Google and registered with SUK. Others 
emphasised that the use of the Internet for information about surrogacy is a new 
                                                          
68 Jackson E, 'The law and DIY assisted conception' in Horsey, K. (ed), R visiting the Regulation of 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge 2015) 31. 
69 Horsey K, Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform, Report of the Surrogacy UK Working 




phenomenon,71 but some noted the difficulty of distinguishing accurate and good 
quality from misleading information,72 and believed practising surrogacy over the 
Internet is dangerous.73 
H.Prosser: I think the biggest source is the internet(…). Google, and Facebook, and 
also friends and family. (…)I’d say three years ago people were cluttered with 
information. Now I think people have done quite a lot of research, and information is 
improving almost daily, so they’ve got a rough idea. But what they’re needing testing 
is the validity of that information. That’s when they come to us [lawyers and other 
surrogacy professionals]. 
N.Gamble: [P]eople access information from each other as well. A lot of people go 
on online forums and share the experiences of other people that have done surrogacy 
in different ways. (…)[I]t’s changed very radically very recently. (…)It can be very 
dangerous. 
On the other hand, I found that the Internet, and more specifically social media, can 
provide certain advantages to some users of surrogacy. Jamie explained that online 
forums offer new (and quite possibly improved) ways of making contact for the 
purposes of surrogacy,74 finding out how to go about surrogacy, and receiving support. 
Facebook offered Jamie a sense of empowerment, and she proceeded to create her own 
Facebook group of surrogates and IPs. Notably, these opportunities might be lost with 
tighter regulation.75 
Jamie: Since I was about 17 I’ve wanted to be a surrogate(…). [Years later], I saw an 
advert on Facebook about egg donation. I started talking to (…)a girl, who is a 
surrogate herself, on Facebook. (…)[S]he introduced me to the group, and that kind 
of re-sparked everything. I wanted to be a surrogate. (…)We [Jamie and her IPs] did 
everything by ourselves. (…)I felt like the decisions were ours. (…)I had a support 
network, my [Facebook] group. (…)I created my own support network based on what 
I needed rather than having a support network that was ‘one size fits all’. 
Furthermore, although many UK interviewees noted that surrogacy often receives bad 
publicity,76 some identified the media as a valuable source of information about 
                                                          
71 Kirsty Horsey (legal academic), Natalie Gamble (solicitor and BB co-founder) and Helen Prosser 
(BB co-founder). 
72 Helen Prosser, Natalie Gamble, Vasanti Jadva (psychology academic). 
73 Also purported by legal precedent (n34). 
74 ‘Improved’ because information is easily and widely accessible and communications more 
immediate. 
75 This has been noted by a recent study exploring the work of Cafcass PO Reporters: Crawshaw M, 
Purewal S and van den Akker O, 'Working at the Margins: The Views and Experiences of Court Social 
Workers on Parental Orders in Surrogacy Arrangements' (2012) British Journal of Social Work 1238-
1240. Moreover, tighter regulation or prohibition could drive the practice und rground, thus worsen 
any problems with it (Freeman M, 'Does Surrogacy Have a Future after Brazier?' (1999) 7 Med Law 
Rev 20). 
76 Lately there have been many positive surrogacy stories in the press, which could indicate a change 




surrogacy. Marina decided that she wanted to become a surrogate at an early age, after 
she watched a TV interview with Kim Cotton, the UK’s first surrogate and founder of 
COTS. Sarah said that many IPs and prospective surrogates find information through 
the media. She also suggested that media stories help women decide to become 
surrogates, whereas IPs use other sources. 
[Most people find out through] the media. (…)The moment we have a media story out, 
we see an increase in surrogate enquiries. (…)[I]t isn’t something that you would 
normally think yourself. I think you need that push so you can see that surrogacy is a 
viable option. (…)IPs find out elsewhere. 
Unlike in the UK, Greek interviewees did not mention the Internet as a significant 
source of information. Areti was the only exception. Just like Natalie in the UK, Areti 
was informed by her doctor at a young age that she was physically unable to carry a 
pregnancy, with surrogacy being her only route to biological parenthood. Years later, 
she used an online parenthood forum to work out how to have surrogacy in Greece. 
My doctor told me around 2004 that surrogacy was an option for me to have a 
biological family. (…)A few years later, and with my family’s encouragement, I started 
looking into surrogacy, and I posted a comment on a parenthood forum. Two months 
later a girl replied saying that a lawyer can find a surrogate for me and gave me his 
contact details. 
Another interviewee said the Internet and the TV are important in finding out about 
clinics dealing with surrogacy but emphasised that Greek IPs usually get initial 
information from clinicians.77 This will be discussed in the next section.  
One of my most interesting and important findings is that surrogacy is still a taboo 
issue in Greece, although, according to my interviewees, the secrecy around it has 
started to decrease.78 Lena noted that Greeks have only recently started sharing 
surrogacy stories on online forums, and there is very limited information available 
online and the media, which may hinder some people’s access to surrogacy. 
                                                          
surrogate-pregnancies-are-on the-rise-a3646061.html accessed on 04/01/2018; Mowbray, N. 'To Have 
and To Hold: The Rise of Surrogacy In Britain' (27/09/2017) 
http://www.vogue.co.uk/article/surrogacy-in-the-uk accessed on 04/01/2018. Also, many celebrities 
have used surrogacy, and help raise awareness: Clemmons, R. V. '28 Celebrities that have used 
gestational surrogates' (6/12/2017) https://www.metro.us/entertainment/celebrities/28-celebrities-
have-used-gestational-surrogates#.WiiBjMuJ-Qg.facebook accessed on 5/01/2018; Dailymail.com 
Reporter. ''We are so in love!' Kim Kardashian and Kanye West welcome a 'healthy' b by girl and thank 
surrogate for making their 'dreams come true'' 
(16/01/2018) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-5275785/Kim-Kardashian-Kanye-West-
welcome-girl-surrogate.html#ixzz54Wu9j57Q accessed on 17/01/2018. 
77 Lena first heard about surrogacy through a popular Greek TV show. 
78 Lena, Elina, Professor Hatzis, Mr Cazlaris, Ms Chatziparasidou, anonymous lawyer. 
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Surrogacy is still very much a taboo issue, much more than any other ART. Greeks 
are not open to discuss IVF, so you can imagine how much more difficult it is to talk 
about surrogacy. (…)Only recently people have started opening up about surrogacy, 
mostly on Facebook groups, but you won’t find much information about it online and 
on TV. 
Although there is no data from other studies to support these claims, the frequent 
appearance of surrogacy in popular culture could possibly indicate a change in 
perceptions.79 
• The role of medical professionals 
In the UK, only surrogacy that takes place in clinics is regulated and, if the parties do 
not go through one, it is likely that medical professionals will be involved only after 
pregnancy has been achieved. Two UK interviewees said only a few people get initial 
information from medical professionals, whereas the majority primarily use the 
Internet, the media, and/or surrogacy organisations.80 However, as discussed above, 
UK doctors present surrogacy as an alternative to infertile heterosexual couples, and 
doctors’ awareness about surrogacy has increased over the years.81 
For gay male couples, medical professionals may not be a source of information about 
surrogacy, because they already know that this is their only way to (partial) biological 
parenthood, as Sarah explained. She also said these couples gather relevant 
information ‘in various ways: by recommendation, or a social event’ (organised by 
surrogacy organisations), through consumer conferences,82 and/or the Internet and the 
media. 
Although there is no evidence in the literature about this, most Greek interviewees 
suggested that doctors are usually the first point of call for couples interested in 
surrogacy. However, doctors will only suggest surrogacy if there is a medical need for 
it and only as a last resort solution.83 Moreover, my Greek data revealed a strong 
presence, at least amongst my interviewees, of medical paternalism.84 Takis Vidalis 
said: 
                                                          
79 For example, the popular Greek TV story of a surrogacy arrangement between two childhood friends: 
'Under the Moonlight', Sto Fos tou Feggariou (Mega TV 2004). Also, surrogacy is the central topic in 
a current TV series titled ‘Virgin Life’, Parthena Zoi (ANT1 TV 2017). 
80 Dr Avery, Vasanti Jadva. 
81 This chapter, 5.2.1. 
82 Such as the annual Families Through Surrogacy conferences and The Fertility Show. 
83 Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Pantos, Dr Tarlatzis. 
84 Mr Vidalis, Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Pantos, Professor Hatzis, Mr Cazlaris, Elina, Le, Aria. 
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Generally, the doctor’s advice is very important in Greece. Someone with problems 
conceiving a child will seek advice from an obstetrician-fertility specialist. (…)There 
is a high degree of trust from the patient towards the doctor, and sometimes it is 
unjustified. (…)Medical paternalism (…)remains very strong in Greece, although 
Greek laws are not paternalistic any more at any level and in any area of medicine. 
Professor Hatzis also thought paternalism exists in Greek medical practice, adding that 
‘the doctor is the absolute decision-maker, and doesn’t share the knowledge with the 
patient’, and this level of control could prove dangerous. For instance, he believed that 
the parties ‘may do things they wouldn’t have been willing to do in any other case, 
only because the doctor said so. They won’t doubt the doctor’s advice; they will follow 
it till the end’, even if this means that they have little, or no, freedom to make their 
own decisions during their arrangement. He also noted that Greek doctors are probably 
involved in matching for surrogacy, although it is illegal. While all clinicians I 
interviewed in Greece denied being involved in surrogacy matching, evidence from 
other interviewees suggested that at least some clinics provide matching services, as 
we will see later.  
Trust in doctors and clinics was also deemed important in the UK, but not in the same 
way as in Greece. Two surrogates said they would follow their doctors’ advice, and 
they trusted the doctors’ knowledge and expertise for all matters regarding the medical 
aspects of surrogacy,85 but did not indicate that the doctor was an important decision-
maker. Moreover, Dr Avery said there is no involvement of UK clinics in surrogacy 
matching.86 However, this role, as we will see below, is largely undertaken by UK 
surrogacy organisations, which do not exist in Greece. 
Regarding the content of information, my data revealed that UK medical professionals 
may provide information about surrogacy organisations and other helpful sources of 
information. This usually consists of a list with websites of reputable surrogacy 
organisations, according to Dr Avery. This is in line with government guidance 
recently published in the UK.87 In Greece, medical professionals have a more active 
role; they offer information which covers a wider context: the medical and the legal 
process for surrogacy. Also, Greek clinicians disclosed that they routinely refer 
interested parties to experienced lawyers specialised in surrogacy.88 
                                                          
85 Lauren, Sarah. 
86 Dr Sue Avery. 
87 Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), Care in Surrogacy. Guidance for the care of 
surrogates and intended parents in surrogate births in England and Wales (28/02/2018) 8. 
88 Dr Tarlatzis, Ms Chatziparasidou, and Dr Pantos, and confirmed by Lena, Areti. 
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In summary, the role of medical professionals in providing information about 
surrogacy is pivotal in Greece but less important in the UK, where my interviewees 
indicated the main sources of information are the Internet, the media, and surrogacy 
organisations. This has implications for who can access surrogacy, since medical 
professionals in Greece will only suggest surrogacy if there is a medical need, which 
is a legal requirement that does not exist in the UK. On the other hand, the quality of 
information provided by medical professionals, is most likely better compared to that 
on the Internet and the media.89 
• The role of UK surrogacy organisations 
An issue that is mostly overlooked by the UK literature is the role of non-profit 
organisations in providing information and support for surrogacy.90 Although they are 
currently unregulated, their important role in UK surrogacy practice has received 
formal recognition from the DHSC recently.91 In Greece, there is no evidence that any 
such organisations are operating. 
My evidence revealed that UK surrogacy organisations raise awareness about 
surrogacy, and provide information and support through their websites, their accounts 
on social media, social events, conference attendances, and media stories. Almost all 
UK interviewees noted the important function of those organisations, with all 
mentioning the moral and emotional support and information offered, as well as noting 
the space, both physical and online, to raise and think through issues in a supportive 
environment, and to help new members understand the practical and legal aspects of 
UK surrogacy.92 If necessary, surrogacy organisations may provide legal support. 
Marina: I always felt that COTS was giving me the back-up if (…)something went 
wrong. I needed COTS at one stage, because social services planned to take one of 
the children(…), after my first arrangement. The couple were from Holland, and it 
was illegal there. 
                                                          
89 van den Akker has noted that gestational surrogates ‘are potentially better informed ‘because of their 
greater level of contact with health professionals’ (van den Akker OBA, 'Genetic and Gestational 
Surrogate Mothers' Experience of Surrogacy' (2003) 21(2) Journal of Reproductive and Infant 
Psychology 147). 
90 Except for Horsey’s study (n69). There are four main surrogacy organisations in the UK: Surrogacy 
UK (https://www.surrogacyuk.org/), COTS (https://www.surrogacy.org.uk/), Brilliant Beginnings 
[BB] (http://www.brilliantbeginnings.co.uk/), and the British Surrogacy Centre [BSC] 
(http://www.britishsurrogacycentre.com/). However, the BSC has a bad reputation (Chapter 4, n173). 
91 DHSC guidance for medical professionals (n87); DHSC, ‘The Surrogacy Pathway. Surrogacy and 
the legal process for intended parents and surrogates in England and Wales’ (28/02/2018). 
92 Natalie, Sarah, Lauren, Steven and Simon (all from SUK), Marina (COTS), Natalie Gamble nd 
Helen Prosser (BB). 
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As I discuss below, UK surrogacy organisations support their members by also putting 
them in touch. However, the processes and costs involved in accessing information 
and support through these organisations (although it is a one-off cost) may deter some 
people, as Jamie said. More specifically, she thought that the membership fee charged
by those organisations sits in tension with the principle of altruism underpinning the 
law. No other IPs and surrogates mentioned any feelings of discontent with the 
processes and costs of UK surrogacy organisations, but it was unlikely they would 
since they have used those services. 
• The role of lawyers 
Due to the legal requirement for the preconception judicial scrutiny of surrogacy 
agreements, the involvement of lawyers in surrogacy is presumably common in 
Greece, although no evidence exists about it. I found that Greek lawyers provide 
information about the legal process, help parties draft their agreements, and handle 
surrogacy applications in court.93 There was no evidence within my sample that Greek 
lawyers are involved in negotiations about surrogacy (which would be illegal); this 
was rather presented as a matter the parties decide between them.94 Although only one 
Greek lawyer agreed to be interviewed (on condition of full anonymity), the evidence 
gathered is illuminating. 
The parties negotiate the financial side of their surrogacy agreement on their own. We 
don’t get involved in this. We do advise them to account for reasonable expenses for 
the surrogate’s dietary, clothing, and medical needs, as well as other living expenses. 
(…)I couldn’t have known if they agreed on a further payment. 
In addition, some noted that lawyers often collaborate with clinics to help with 
surrogacy cases.95 
In the UK, surrogacy at the early stages is largely unregulated, hence I did not expect 
to find evidence of lawyers’ involvement regarding access to surrogacy, and this was 
confirmed by some UK surrogacy professionals.96 A few also noted that lawyers may 
provide initial legal advice to people seeking to confirm the information found on the 
                                                          
93 Anonymous Greek lawyer, Dr Pantos, and Lena. 
94 Anonymous lawyer, Giota, Elina. 
95 Dr Pantos said his clinic has in-house lawyers, who explain the legal process to the couples and 
handle the application to the court. Lena said the clinic she works at collaborates with lawyers, who are 
outsourced and specialised in ART law. Lastly, Giota said her doctor refer ed her to a lawyer with 
experience in surrogacy cases. 
96 UK barrister Andrew Powell said lawyers only get involved when a case is problematic, usually 
concerning international or informal surrogacy arrangements, and/or cases that challenge the legal rules. 
Natalie Gamble and Helen Prosser agreed with the above. 
168 
 
Internet.97 It is possible for the UK to see an increased involvement of lawyers in 
surrogacy, because the DHSC now advises IPs and surrogates to seek legal advice on 
the outset and draft a written surrogacy agreement, though it will have no direct legal 
force.98 Nevertheless, this could be problematic if lawyers are not specialised in 
surrogacy cases, as recent cases show.99 
Moreover, the UK recently saw the emergence of a lawyer-run surrogacy organisation 
(BB), which, as discussed in the previous section, provides a range of services to its 
clients, including information, advice, and support.100 Although there are some 
differences in the processes and the way of operation between the reputable UK 
surrogacy organisations, the advice they offer can at least help those involved navigate 
various legal risks.  
5.3.2 Difficulty in finding surrogates and matching services 
A lack of available surrogates is likely to be one of the most important practical 
limitations on access to surrogacy, especially if there are no systems to support 
interested parties find each other. Although this is speculative, it is perhaps owed to 
the fact that advertisement and (paid) mediation for surrogacy are illegal in both 
countries. 
Several interviewees identified the difficulty in finding surrogates as an important 
practical barrier to surrogacy in Greece,101 and one believed it is the main reason why 
surrogacy is still relatively rare.102 The anonymous lawyer I interviewed confirmed 
the lack of formal systems through which IPs can find surrogates and remarked that 
‘it’s a matter of the IPs’ social networks and personal contacts’. According to Giota, 
advertising for surrogacy online is the only way to find a surrogate, although this is 
probably illegal,103 and even then, the search can be long.104 
                                                          
97 Natalie Gamble, Helen Prosser. 
98 DHSC guidance to surrogates and IPs (n91) 9,11,15. 
99 In JP v LP & Others [2014] (n35), Mrs Justice King found that the solicitors who drew up a surrogacy 
agreement for a fee committed a criminal offence, but this was because they were unware it was illegal. 
100 Alghrani, A. and D. Griffiths. 'What is so brilliant about 'Brilliant Beginnings'?' (30/09/2013) 
<http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_348102.asp> accessed on 04/01/2018. 
101 Anonymous Greek lawyer, Giota, Lena, Mr Cazlaris, Dr Pantos, Dr Tarlatzis, Ms Chatzipar sidou. 
102 Dr Tarlatzis. 
103 Under Article 26(8) Law 3305/2005, anyone who publicly, or privately, hrough documents, pictures 
or performances, announces or advertises the need for or provision of surrogacy services or provides 
paid mediation services for surrogacy will be imprisoned for at least two years and pay a €1,500 fine. 
It is, though, uncertain whether online posting for surrogacy falls under this prohibition. 
104 Giota’s search took a little over than two years. 
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In the UK, some interviewees believed the demand for surrogates is greater than the 
number of surrogates available, which obliges surrogacy organisations to regularly 
close their lists and stop accepting new IPs.105 Marina thought the scarcity of 
surrogates is due to negative perceptions against surrogacy, but others noted a positive 
change towards surrogacy both by medical professionals and the media. Others said 
the lack of surrogates in the UK leads some IPs to go abroad for surrogacy, which 
could prove dangerous or raise ethical considerations, if surrogacy is done in countries 
with less regulation.106 Lastly, I found that some IPs may change their criteria for their 
‘ideal’ surrogate because they fear they will not find one. 
Steven: [T]the application forms [to become a member in SUK] have those big 
questions: how far away do you want your surrogate [to be]? 
Simon: [S]o we put 400 miles because we didn’t know. At that point you don’t know 
how many surrogates there are. You think if there’s only one available and she lives 
in Scotland, you don’t want to say “it’s too far for me”. (…)It said “would you 
consider a surrogate who smokes?”. We put ‘yes’ because we thought, if there’s only 
one surrogate available, then…. But we’d prefer it if she didn’t smoke. (…)We would 
travel a long way and accept many things, because we wanted to meet someone. 
Nevertheless, in the UK, there are at least better systems for finding surrogates than in 
Greece. Surrogacy organisations put surrogates and IPs in touch, although each of 
them has different processes and practices for doing so. BB matches one-to-one,107 
whereas COTS and SUK have lists of IPs and surrogates. In SUK, new members gain 
access to the lists which contain online profiles of all the members, and surrogates 
choose the IPs.108 In COTS, experienced members narrow down a few profiles of IPs 
for the surrogate, who then chooses the IPs.109 Representatives of SUK and COTS, 
said there is a fee paid by new members, so that they can access the lists and other 
services.110 
Although UK surrogacy organisations generally facilitate access, they do so within 
limits. Again, this issue is previously unstudied. My evidence suggests that 
organisations may set certain requirements, which are additional to those set by law. 
                                                          
105 Marina, Sarah, Kirsty Horsey. 
106 Helen Prosser, Vasanti Jadva. 
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Lauren, SUK surrogate, said that SUK has a minimum age limit for surrogates, 
although there is no such legal requirement. 
I saw that they wouldn’t take people on as surrogates unless they were 23, and I was 
22 at the time, so, I thought, OK, I’ll wait. 
Other criteria mentioned by UK interviewees for the approval of new members were 
the surrogates’ good health,111 and a clear background check.112 Additionally, I found 
that SUK has a policy of rejecting memberships if the IPs do not fulfil the PO 
criteria.113 However, due to the already high and ever-increasing demand for surrogacy 
in the UK,114 surrogacy organisations do not turn any applicants away,115 but the 
imbalance in IP and surrogate numbers in their books means that the search for a 
surrogate may be long. 
Moreover, I found that online communities, such as Facebook,116 play an important 
role in matching for surrogacy both in Greece and the UK. According to Jamie, UK 
independent surrogate, Facebook is the main tool for matching if the parties do not 
wish or are unable to register with a surrogacy organisation, for example, because they 
cannot afford it, or because the lists are closed. In Greece, I found that there are 
matching websites where Greek IPs and surrogates can find each other,117 but it is still 
difficult to do so due to the scarcity of surrogates. Furthermore, as noted above, the 
use of the Internet for surrogacy is not as prevalent in Greece as in the UK.  
Nevertheless, these communities (surrogacy organisations and online groups and 
forums) are currently unregulated in both countries and operate informally. Although 
the regulation of these communities could facilitate surrogacy, it could also mean that 
the practice of surrogacy will become less independent, which would be perceived by 
some as a negative development, as Jamie explained. 
                                                          
111 Lauren. 
112 Natalie, Sarah (SUK), Marina (COTS), Helen Prosser (BB), as well as the literature (Crawshaw M, 
Blyth E and van den Akker O, 'The changing profile of surrogacy in the UK–Implications for national 
and international policy and practice' (2012) 34(3) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 267; Horsey 
(n69)). 
113 See: https://www.surrogacyuk.org/intended_parents/joining-surrogacy-uk and evidence from Sarah.  
114 Based on all UK interviewees, and evidence from the literature (Chapter 4, p.12 -125). 
115 Natalie, Marina, Helen Prosser. 
116 These Facebook groups are ‘closed’, meaning that an interested party has to request to join, and wait 
for the administrator’s approval. Based on my experience, before the approval, the administrator of the 
group messages the interested person and asks a few questions about the reasons for the request. 
117 Dr Pantos mentioned the website www.surrogatefinder.com, a global database of agencies, 
surrogates and IPs, some of whom are Greek. 
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As opposed to the claims often made about the dangers of online surrogacy 
matching,118 Jamie thought that meeting IPs through Facebook is better than meeting 
through surrogacy organisations:119 through informal chats on Facebook groups, she 
could observe how prospective IPs communicate with others online, which provided 
her a deeper knowledge of who they ‘really are’. She also suggested that the Facebook 
group offered her and her IPs a sense of liberation and empowerment which, according 
to Jamie, they would have lost by going through an organisation. 
Jamie: There was nothing that we ourselves couldn’t do that [the surrogacy 
organisation] did as the middle man. We had that trust which we just built ourselves 
just by spending time together without anybody else having to interfere. That was a
big thing for us. (…)I felt like the decisions were ours. We made the decision about 
what tests we wanted, what paperwork we wanted, about what scans we wanted, about 
the money, about how everything was going down. We didn’t have anybody breathing 
down our necks. 
On the other hand, representatives from all three UK surrogacy organisations were in 
favour of regulation. Interviewees from SUK and COTS emphasised the need for the 
state to offer better support to those organisations, for example by providing funding 
or by recognising their work and licensing them,120 and a few suggested that 
advertisement for altruistic surrogacy be made legal to make it easier for IPs to find a 
surrogate.121 Representatives from BB said that there is no urgent need for regulation, 
but it would be good to find a system of good practice and regulation in the long-
run.122 
My evidence from Greece did not provide a clear answer as to how IPs find surrogates, 
but there were indications that matching services are undertaken by key actors in 
surrogacy practice. Areti said that her lawyer found a surrogate for her, but the Greek 
lawyer I interviewed denied offering matching services. This response was not 
surprising, since a positive answer would most likely have involved an admission of 
criminal activity (if there was payment for it),123 and other interviewees noted that 
lawyers were often unwilling to help in this way.124 
                                                          
118 As recent court decisions note (n35), and as Natalie Gamble said in her interview. 
119 Jamie had initially contacted a surrogacy organisation, but did not like their approach in matching, 
and decided to operate independently. 
120 Marina, Natalie, and Sarah. 
121 Marina, Sarah. 
122 Natalie Gamble, Helen Prosser. 
123 Article 26(8) Law 3305/2005. 
124 Giota, Lena. 
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Additionally, some said clinicians may provide matching services for surrogacy in 
Greece.125 Lena stated that a large Greek clinic is indeed involved in matching IPs and 
surrogates.126 Giota disclosed that a Greek clinician offered to find her a surrogate 
when they spoke on the phone and through emails, but later told her there were no 
available surrogates at the time, and prompted her to advertise her interest in a 
newspaper.127 Again, unsurprisingly, all clinicians I interviewed denied being 
involved in matching, and two of them, referred to a common misconception that 
clinics can find a surrogate for IPs, the same way as they can find a gamete donor.128 
This, according to Dr Pantos, reveals the law’s hypocritical stance towards surrogacy 
because, on one hand, it allows it and, on the other hand, it makes it difficult to happen 
and thrive. If this is right, there is no evidence in the literature to suggest that this is 
intentional, as has been argued with regard to the UK.129 
In summary, my evidence shows that there is a lack of available surrogates both in 
Greece and the UK, which limits some IPs’ access to surrogacy. In the UK, this 
problem is mitigated through non-profit surrogacy organisations which provide 
matching services. Some of my interviewees suggested that, if these systems received 
better state support and were properly regulated, access might be enhanced.130 In 
Greece, IPs can find surrogates only informally (through personal contacts and online 
communities), and possibly through medical and legal practitioners, who may, 
however, be accused of acting as mediators, which is illegal (if paid). 
5.3.3 Surrogates’ preferences 
Based on my sample, another important factor potentially limiting access to surrogacy 
is the criteria that surrogates set for their ‘ideal’ IPs, which is also unstudied. For 
example, Lauren wanted to match with gay male IPs because, first, she feels more 
compatible with men than with women; secondly, she thought there would be no 
antagonism between them; and, thirdly, she presumed access to surrogacy would be 
more difficult for same-sex IPs. In contrast, Elina, a Greek surrogate, said she would 
                                                          
125 Giota, Lena, Takis Vidalis, Professor Hatzis. 
126 Lena works at this clinic. Representatives from this clinic regularly attend international consumer 
conferences advertising their surrogacy programme. 
127 Giota. 
128 Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Pantos. However, since our interview, Ms Chatziparasidou’s clinic has 
stopped taking on surrogacy cases (evidence from personal communication). 
129 Freeman (n75) 3; Horsey K, 'Not withered on the vine: The need for surrogacy law reform' (2016) 
4(3) JMLE 181-196. 
130 However, Jamie disagreed. 
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never work with same-sex couples because she believed a child should have both a 
female and male role model. Other surrogates mentioned different factors that would 
prevent them from forming an arrangement with certain groups of IPs. For instance, 
Sarah stated: 
My first deal-breaker is that I don’t work with anyone who has cancer. (…)My first 
couple (…Inaudible…) the lady had got breast cancer, and while we were trying for 
a baby(…)[,] she unfortunately died. It really upset me, and I thought I can’t try to get 
pregnant again. (…)For me the choice of who to work with is about who I get on with, 
so actually their story about why they’re infertile doesn’t matter to me. (…)Age doesn’t 
matter to me. Whether that friendship will be real after surrogacy, that’s important to 
me. 
Lastly, Lauren would only work with IPs who accepted her chosen surrogacy type.131 
Lauren had chosen gestational surrogacy for personal reasons. Although her IPs 
(Simon and Steve) initially wanted to do traditional surrogacy, they accepted Lauren’s 
choice. 
Lauren: Simon and Steve said in their diary in SUK blackboard, “we feel that it would 
have been easier if we used straight surrogacy”(…). When I offered, they knew I was 
going to do [gestational surrogacy], and they [said] “ t’s fine”. (…)I didn’t know that 
[traditional] surrogacy really existed. (…)But, also, because I hadn’t had any children 
of my own, I kind of didn’t want anybody else to have a child that was linked to me, 
and, [from] speaking to my mum,[I realised] she would’ve seen that as her grandchild, 
and, even though you stay in contact, she said that wouldn’t be enough. 
Though these criteria are merely indicative, and will probably be different in different 
cultural contexts, they should be taken into consideration, because they may pose 
informal barriers to some people’s access to surrogacy in these countries. 
5.3.4 Cost and lack of public funding for surrogacy 
Cost 
In Chapter 2, I argued that respect for autonomy and justice require a ‘good’ surrogacy 
regime to ensure that access to surrogacy is fair and affordable, because cost can 
significantly limit reproductive autonomy and cause (or increase) social disparity.132 
In Greece, where only gestational surrogacy is allowed, the IPs must bear the cost of 
                                                          
131 This option exists only in the UK, since Greek law does not allow traditional surrogacy. This was a 
deliberate choice, aiming to protect the surrogate from possibly forming a bond with the foetus, which 
the legislature thought was more likely to happen if there was a genetic link (Parliamentary debates 
2002). Nevertheless, the ‘gestational only’ rule arguably limits reproductive autonomy, as well as the 
pool of available surrogates. 
132 Riley L, 'Equality of access to NHS-funded IVF treatment in England and Wales' in Horsey, K. and 
H. Biggs (eds), Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Reproducing Regulation (Routledge-Cavendish 
2007) 84; Nelson (n67) 280. 
174 
 
the IVF, the legal cost associated with the judicial scrutiny of the surrogacy agreement, 
and the surrogate’s expenses. In the UK, surrogacy can happen privately at home 
(where the cost can be minimal), or in a clinic. The IPs will also have to account for 
the surrogate’s expenses. 
According to estimates, IVF in Greece costs around €3,500-4,500 (approximately 
£2,500-3,500),133 and £3,000-6,000 in the UK.134 My Greek evidence suggests that 
IVF surrogacy costs around €3,000 (approximately £2,640),135 whereas in UK clinics 
it ranged between £3,500 and 10,000,136 which is higher than the amounts typically 
cited in the literature. Within my sample, cost was cited as a very (if not the most) 
important factor influencing access to surrogacy both in Greece and the UK. Some 
UK interviewees mentioned that cost may entirely deter some people, or force them 
to choose independent surrogacy, because they cannot afford or do not wish to pay a 
service fee to UK surrogacy organisations.137 Moreover, some UK surrogates 
expressed their annoyance that surrogacy in clinics costs IPs so much money,138 a d 
one considered the financial cost to conflict with the altruistic principle underpinning 
UK surrogacy law. 
Jamie: The biggest reason [why she did not go through an organisation] was the 
expense. (…)I’ve got a massive issue with the fact that it costs IPs so much money. 
(…)The last time my couple looked into it, it was £750 simply to get on the list [of 
surrogacy organisations]. It’s gone up again. But there’s also other fees: the costs for 
counselling, CRB checks, psychiatric evaluations, administration fees. I think it would 
come around £1,200 or maybe £1,500. And you have a matching fee. (…)The cost of 
[UK] surrogates [for their expenses], on average, is £12-15,000. If you’re then adding 
up £7,000 per time for an IVF treatment, it becomes expensive, and that goes against 
the whole basis of surrogacy. It’s supposed to be altruistic. (…)It’s just too expensive 
for some people. 
In the UK, cost also influences people’s decisions about whether to go through a clinic 
and about which type of surrogacy to choose. Traditional surrogacy at home is much 
cheaper, and it could be a preferable option for some IPs who cannot afford the clinic 
                                                          
133 Paraskou A and Babu GP, 'The market for reproductive tourism: analysis with special reference to 
Greece' (2017) 2(16) Global Health Research and Policy, table 1. 
134 Chambers GM and others, 'The Economic Impact of Assisted Reproductive Technology: A Review 
of Selected Developed Countries' (2009) 91 Fertility and Sterility 2281,2288; Riley (n132: 84). 
Respondents in Horsey’s study mentioned £6,774 as medical costs for surrogacy (n69: 23) 
135 Elina, Katerina, Areti, Dr Pantos. Other sources mention that the cost of IVF (not only for surrogacy) 
ranges between €2,500-4,000 (Kalou, K. 'Questions and Answers about IVF [in Greece]' (12/02/2014) 
<http://www.tovima.gr/vimagazino/interviews/article/?aid=566568> accessed on 25/05/2017). 
136 Simon and Steve, Sarah, Jamie, and Natalie. 
137 Jamie, Marina. See n109 for membership fees to UK surrogacy organisatio s. 
138 Sarah, Marina, Jamie. 
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costs.139 Jamie revealed she had an honest and open discussion with her IPs about cost, 
which helped them build a strong relationship and gave them a sense of empowerment. 
We did obviously all the sexual health checks [in] a clinic, but everything else was 
basically done at home ourselves. There was no clinic, no IVF costs or anything like 
that. (…)[We] set [our] expenses based on what they [IPs] could afford. (…)Nothing 
was off boundaries; we literally discussed everything. (…)I don’t think I’d have gotten 
that relationship by going through an agency or a clinic. 
Furthermore, some interviewees noted that some IPs may even get into debt to try 
surrogacy, if this is their only chance to attain biological parenthood.140 For example, 
Marina said: 
My IM (…)knew that surrogacy was the only way that she could have a child other 
than adoption. (…)She had to borrow money (…)from her mother, and her family 
rallied around to make sure she could have her dream. (…)[T]o get there it cost her 
probably around £20,000-30,000. (…)They were just a standard couple. A hairdresser 
and a builder. (…)People will do whatever they can. And they are so vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, not everyone within my UK sample found the cost of surrogacy 
restrictive. Simon and Steve maintained surrogacy requires certain financial sacrifices 
on the IPs’ part, but the cost ‘is not out of reach’. They also believed that having a 
limited budget for the surrogate’s expenses does not necessarily prevent IPs from 
accessing surrogacy, because surrogates will have different needs and expenses, and 
it is a matter of negotiation and good will from both parties. However, they showed 
some level of annoyance and aggravation when they said surrogacy costs are ‘a charge 
for being gay’, since it is their only option to (biological) parenthood. 
In Greece, Katerina, a lesbian mother who acted as a ‘surrogate’ for her female partner, 
said that the medical cost for surrogacy was ‘quite considerable’.141 Moreover, three 
interviewees (Katerina, Elina, and Giota) cited the legal costs of formal legal 
surrogacy in Greece as an additional expense,142 which was around €1,000-3,000 
(approximately £880-2,640). Also, the cost for the surrogates’ expenses is borne by 
the IPs. This, based on my evidence, ranged from nothing to €20,000 (approximately 
£17,600) in Greece, and £5,000-12,000 in the UK, which is line with findings of a 
                                                          
139 Jamie, Lauren. 
140 Marina, Simon and Steven, Sarah, Jamie. This possibility was also noted by Elina and Areti in 
Greece. 
141 Katerina offered a breakdown of medical costs: ‘An IVF cycle cost around €3,000. The hormonal 
drugs cost around €1,500, and I think every egg collection was €500.’ 
142 For submitting the application to the court, and for legal representation by a lawyer. 
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recent UK study.143 Lastly, as UK surrogates, Elina, a Greek surrogate, found it 
upsetting that surrogacy is so expensive for IPs, adding that law leaves scope for some 
doctors to take advantage of IPs’ desperation.144 
Since my sample was recruited because of their experience of surrogacy, and everyone 
was able to cover all costs involved, it was unlikely to find that cost was an important 
limitation. However, these sums will be very significant for some IPs. To explore 
whether surrogacy laws and policies in these countries have achieved fair and equal 
access, it is important to consider the issue of public funding, which will be discussed 
next. 
Public funding 
In Greece, there is a policy for the provision of limited funding for ARTs. The 2012 
Greek government founded the National Organisation for the Provision of Health 
Services (NOPHS), an organisation which allocates health funding. Under this regime, 
if ARTs take place in a public hospital, the cost is fully covered by NOPHS. If ARTs 
take place in a private clinic, then NOPHS covers the total cost of IVF medication, 
and successful applicants receive €352 (approximately £310) per IVF attempt for up 
to four attempts.145 However, this depends on the decision of an IVF funding 
Committee.146 
All non-expert interviewees who had completed their surrogacy arrangements in 
Greece went through private clinics, and all costs were paid privately by the IPs. Only 
Katerina received partial reimbursement for certain medical costs from her work 
insurance.147 Two expert interviewees mentioned that the cost covered by NOPHS is 
minor compared to the total costs for IVF.148 According to Dr Pantos, the cost of IVF 
medication (which may be partly funded by NOPHS) amounts to €1,500-2,000 
(approximately £1,300-1,757), while each IVF cycle costs between 2,000 and 3,000€ 
                                                          
143 Horsey’s study noted a mean average of £10,000-£15,000 for the surrogates’ expenses (n69: 23). No 
Greek studies explore this issue. 
144 Elina described her IPs as ‘a normal working couple’ and the IVF doctor as a ‘businessman’ who 
‘will try to get as much as they can from the couple’. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
145 Information and documentation for the application to IVF Committees are available at 
www.eopyy.gov.gr, Regulation of 6/06/2014; Greek Infertility Society ‘Magna Mater’, The extreme 
difficulties of IVF <http://www.magnamater.gr/show/el/media/article05.aspx> accessed 20/05/2017. 
The article mentions that many ART users do not consider going through the funding application 
process worthwhile, since the amount of funding is that low. 
146 Ibid. There are eight IVF funding Committees across Greece. 
147 She considered herself ‘lucky’ for having received funding for the IVF drugs, the labour, and the 
antenatal care, and said she paid approximately 20% of the total medical costs out f her own pocket. 
148 Dr Pantos, Mr Cazlaris. 
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(approximately £1,757-2,640). Moreover, the process to secure public funding for 
ARTs (through the IVF funding Committee) is long, bureaucratic and complicated, 
and many applications are rejected, according to Mr Cazlaris. 
In the UK, there is, in principle, public funding for ARTs, but it is very limited, and 
its provision is mostly a matter of a ‘postcode lottery’, with a tendency to reduce, or 
even eliminate, IVF funding in many areas within the UK.149 Generally, the cost of 
surrogacy in clinics is paid privately by the IPs, who also have to account for the 
surrogate’s expenses,150 and, possibly, the registration fees in surrogacy organisations. 
The literature notes that public funding may restrict access to ARTs, and the lines 
between WoC and NHS funding eligibility criteria often get blurred.151 This was 
confirmed by Dr Avery, who stated that standards vary from clinic to clinic, but 
eligibility for public funding influences access in many UK private clinics. It was also 
obvious that the public sector has WoC criteria and additional eligibility criteria for 
public funding, which are far more rigorous than WoC.152 This confirms findings of 
Lee et al’s study.153 
In summary, my evidence revealed that surrogacy is costly both in Greece and the UK, 
especially when all costs involved are combined, such as for treatment in the clinic, 
for legal costs (mainly in Greece), for registration with surrogacy organisations (in the 
UK), and the surrogate’s expenses. The scarcity of public resources means that any 
decision regarding public funding must be weighed against other public interests and 
needs. However, both jurisdictions fail to provide the conditions for fair and equal 
access to surrogacy, because they only offer very limited funding for surrogacy, 
meaning that it is an option more readily available to the wealthy.154 Lastly, a question 
is raised about whether access to public funding for ARTs in Greece and the UK 
depends on criteria other than wealth, such as relationship status, which we currently 
have no knowledge of. 
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In Chapter 2, I argued that there is a duty to respect reproductive autonomy unless 
there are good harm-based reasons for limiting it, and that the principle of justice 
dictates that equality of access is important. This chapter has focused on statutory and 
practical limitations on access to surrogacy in Greece and the UK, drawing both on 
existing literature, academic studies, and my interview data. Due to the paucity of 
research on the legal experience of surrogacy in these countries, Greece especially, 
my evidence offers valuable insights. 
The literature and the findings of my own research suggest that WoC is the only formal 
legal restriction to affect access to UK surrogacy, whereas in Greece there are various 
statutory restrictions, such as age, medical need, relationship status, WoC and, until 
recently, permanent residence. Based on my Greek evidence, only medical need and 
age appeared to pose important limitations. Moreover, the statutory upper age limit 
demonstrates concern for the future child’s welfare (not being raised by older parents) 
rather than for women’s health, as the literature suggests. 
Unlike UK law, which makes access available to all social groups, Greek law sets a 
relationship status criterion, thereby reflecting a clear tension between the overarching 
principle (the right to have a child) and the non-recognition of same-sex couples’ right 
to access surrogacy. I found that some Greek clinicians may restrict same-sex couples 
from accessing surrogacy, though one lesbian couple within my sample was able to 
have surrogacy (albeit in an unusual form) with the clinician’s permission and help. 
Additionally, WoC does not generally act as a barrier to surrogacy in Greece and the 
UK, because such assessments are very light-touch, which confirms evidence from 
previous UK studies. However, clinics in both countries may make counselling 
mandatory and essential in establishing WoC, although it is legally required in neither. 
Furthermore, I examined a range of informal barriers to access, which have been 
largely unstudied. Though they will probably be different in different cultural 
contexts, they should be considered, because they may significantly limit some 
people’s access to surrogacy. I found that the availability and quality of information 
about surrogacy has increased in recent years. The Internet was identified as the main 
source of information in the UK, whereas in Greece interested parties appeared to 
gather information through medical practitioners, who are formal gatekeepers of 
surrogacy. The stark difference between Greece and the UK on this could be an 
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extension to the law’s perception that surrogacy is a medically supervised form of 
ARTs in Greece, whereas UK surrogacy is not to be viewed ‘as merely another 
treatment for infertile people’.155 
Also, my data suggested that, at least on occasion, online matching can be positive and 
empowering, and greater regulation may have a negative impact. UK surrogacy 
organisations, which are unregulated, also play an important role in providing 
information and support. These organisations have developed their own processes and 
checks, and seem to be working effectively, yet they appear to want more regulation. 
This issue will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
Importantly, there is a serious lack of available surrogates in both countries, but the 
UK at least has better systems to put interested parties in touch (through surrogacy 
organisations and other communities), although they are unregulated. Moreover, I 
found that surrogates have their own preferences and deal-breakers, which may limit 
access even more. Lastly, based on my evidence, the most important limitation on 
access to surrogacy in both countries is cost and neither of them provides adequate 
public funding. Hence, both regimes fail to effectively address fair and equitable 
access to surrogacy to all.  
The next chapter discusses how regulation during a surrogacy arrangement operates 
in Greece and the UK. 
                                                          




Regulation during a surrogacy arrangement in 
Greece and the UK 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses how the Greek and UK regimes regulate issues that arise (or 
may arise) during surrogacy arrangements, and how well they respond to the concerns 
laid out in Chapter 2. There I argued that one has a prima facie right to enter into 
surrogacy arrangements, unless there is a reason, based on harm concerns, to impose 
limitations. Having focused on access to surrogacy in Chapter 5, I now consider first 
how specific measures and requirements serve to protect and promote autonomy 
during surrogacy arrangements (section 6.2), and, secondly, how far regulatory 
limitations on autonomy can be justified as a legitimate response to welfare concerns 
(section 6.3). Justice concerns are important primarily in the context of access to 
surrogacy and to parenthood following it, hence, they do not form a central part of the 
analysis of this chapter, but they do emerge occasionally. 
6.2 Respect for and promotion of autonomy 
Three themes emerged from my interviews in Greece and the UK relating to autonomy 
during a surrogacy arrangement. The vast majority of my interviewees in both 
countries attached importance to consent (6.2.1); Greek interviewees talked about the 
significance of the preconception agreement in ensuring respect for autonomy during 
the arrangement (6.2.2); and, lastly, interviewees in both countries talked about the 
role of counselling in ensuring valid consent (6.2.3). 
6.2.1 Importance of consent and the role of regulation in ensuring its validity 
Greek law mandates that consent should be monitored by the judge during the 
preconception scrutiny of the surrogacy agreement. After the court’s permission has 
been secured, the parties can seek IVF-surrogacy in a clinic,1 but the treatment must 
not begin until they have provided written consent; and received information about 
                                                          
1 Since only gestational surrogacy is allowed, they must go through a clinic.
181 
 
health risks and the social, legal, and financial implications of the treatment. 
Furthermore, medical professionals are required to have a thorough discussion with 
all ART participants prior to the treatment to ensure that their decision is serious, 
conscious, and well-informed.2 Therefore, consent is also monitored by clinics. 
Although this is unstudied, there may be some traditional arrangements in Greece 
which go under the radar and are therefore unmonitored. UK law requires written 
consent from all participants in ART, including surrogacy, when it takes place in 
clinics.3 However, some UK surrogacy arrangements occur privately at home. Hence, 
in some arrangements, consent is completely unmonitored, and some recent cases 
demonstrate how problematic this can be.4 
Interviewees in both countries showed overwhelming support for the principle of 
informed and uncoerced consent. Greek interviewees believed regulation provides 
sufficient tools and processes to guarantee that consent to surrogacy is, as far as 
possible, valid and robust. For example, several Greek interviewees considered the 
requirement for the surrogate to undergo physical and psychological evaluation at the 
preconception stage a good measure, because it helps assess the validity of her 
consent.5 
Dr Tarlatzis: [The doctors] examine the surrogate to ensure she is [physically] 
healthy; (…)then we [doctors] will refer her to a psychologist, who will evaluate her 
emotional state. The psychologist will determine whether she fully understands the 
consequences of her decision and whether she has thought it thoroughly. If all goes 
well, we will provide an affidavit confirming that she can indeed carry a child and she 
is mentally healthy. This is then submitted to court along with the surrogacy 
application. (…)It’s good that law provides for all these. Consent is very important. 
Additionally, most Greek interviewees remarked that clinics generally follow the legal 
mandate to offer thorough information before asking ART participants to sign any 
consent forms. All IPs and surrogates in Greece said they had received adequate 
information from medical and legal professionals and were able to provide valid 
consent. 
                                                          
2Article 5 Law 3305/2005; Article 5 Greek Code of Practice (GCoP) 2017. The GCoP was introduced 
after I completed my empirical work. 
3 Sch.3 HFE Act 1990 (the 1990 Act), as amended. 
4 For example: H v S (Surrogacy Agreement) [2015] EWHC 36; Re N (A Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 
1053; Re TT (Surrogacy) [2011] EWHC 33, [2011] 2FLR 392; JP v LP & Others (Surrogacy 
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[2016] EWFC 55; Re M (Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 228. 
5 Dr Tarlatzis (clinician and policy-maker), Ms Chatziparasidou (clinicia), Lena (surrogate and clients’ 




Furthermore, some Greek interviewees believed that the preconception judicial 
scrutiny process is important in ensuring valid consent, noting that it adds formality to 
the private agreement between the parties and affirms that consent is valid and well-
considered.6 Others believed the waiting period between the submission of the 
surrogacy application and the surrogacy hearing offers ample time for the parties to 
gather all necessary information, and to reflect upon their decision to participate in 
surrogacy.7 Further, some emphasised that Greek judges do ask the parties to show 
they have made a conscious and informed decision to participate in surrogacy by 
asking them if they understand exactly what this arrangement means and by repeating 
the rules set by law,8 but, as we will see below, this possibly depends on the judge and 
it is not followed by all judges. Moreover, several said that women acting as surrogates 
in Greece generally choose to do so freely,9  and, based on my limited evidence, there 
was clear contentment with the status quo. 
However, some interviewees referred to cases that raised concerns about whether the 
surrogates were truly making a free and fully informed choice due to the existence of 
certain socio-economic conditions that may be influencing their decisions.10 These 
concerns were, though, nuanced by the recognition that surrogacy most likely offered 
these women a chance to improve their lives; that even in such cases valid consent is 
possible; and that it is important that surrogates know that they retain their autonomy 
rights and can withdraw consent any time before or during the arrangement. For 
example, Ms Chatziparasidou said: 
In the cases we’ve seen so far, the women offering to be surrogates are foreigners 
living in Greece, of a lower socio-economic status, and in dire need of money. (…)We 
live in a state of financial crisis, and there may be a woman who has a child and she 
has no other income. State benefits are not a given anymore. This woman has little 
choice. (…)Surrogacy can provide her with some income, and she can be with her 
child and take care of her. (…)It doesn’t mean that she can’t consent. She goes through 
psychiatric evaluation and the court, and she can withdraw her consent. We had a 
case of a surrogate who changed her mind and didn’t go through the IVF, even though 
                                                          
6 Takis Vidalis (lawyer and advisor at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission), Professor Aristides 
Hatzis (legal academic), anonymous lawyer, Dr Tarlatzis. 
7 According to my interviewees, this can take ‘several months’, especially if the application is submitted 
in a large court, such as that of Athens and Thessaloniki (anonymous lawyer, Lena, Areti (mother 
through surrogacy), Vidalis, and Professor Hatzis). Added to that is the waiting period between the 
surrogacy hearing and the judge’s final decision, which can range from 24 days to 4 months (Chapter 
5, n64). 
8 Lena, Elina (surrogate), Areti. Also, see Lena’s statement in Chapter 5, p.159. 
9 Lena, Elina, Giota (IM), Areti, Professor Hatzis, Vidalis. 
10 Elina, Giota, Vidalis, Professor Hatzis, anonymous lawyer, Ms Chatziparasidou. 
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she had gone through the judicial process. There was another surrogate who didn’t 
consent to the embryo transfer and the treatment stopped. 
According to Ravdas’ study, which is the only other source of evidence about Greek 
surrogacy, more than half of the women who have acted as surrogates in Greece are 
foreigners, with most of them having come from Eastern European countries and the 
Balkans.11 However, there is no evidence that these women did not consent validly. 
This also emerged from my data. For instance, Elina disclosed that her bad financial 
situation at the time she made her decision to act as a surrogate did not impede her 
ability to consent. 
[I] t all started with my divorce. I had to leave my husband to make a better life for my 
two kids. (…)That period I had nothing, I had no money at all, so that money [from 
surrogacy] was important. (…)I wanted a small apartment for me and my kids (…)and 
I wanted to help my mum out financially(…). I was determined to do this for a specific 
reason. (…)I knew what it entailed. I’m glad I had that choice. (…)I never 
reconsidered or wavered. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the mere existence of socio-economic pressures does not 
necessarily invalidate the surrogate’s consent,12 but it does raise concerns that should 
be addressed and mitigated through proper regulation.13 While my sample is relatively 
small and partly self-selected, it suggests that the processes employed by the Greek 
model are sufficient to ensure, as far as possible, that consent is robust and that it 
remains so during the arrangement. This view was supported by Greek IPs, surrogates 
and by professionals who between them have experience of many surrogacy cases.14 
As in Greece, the vast majority of my UK interviewees recognised consent as an 
important part of a surrogacy arrangement. Nevertheless, some noted that the system 
and processes set by regulation for ensuring valid consent are weak and do not fully 
achieve their aims,15 with many adding that some tools that UK clinics routinely use 
to assess consent are ineffective. For instance, some remarked that consent forms 
                                                          
11 Ravdas P, Surrogate Motherhood: The legislator's expectations tested by statistical 
data (Papachristou, T. K. and others eds, 21st Century Family Law: Coincidental and Fundamental 
Reforms. Law and Society in 21st century, Sakkoulas 2012). 
12 Chapter 2, p.64-68. 
13 Ibid and Andrews LB, 'Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists' (1988) 16 Law, 
Medicine & Health Care 75; Petchesky RP, Beyond “a woman’s right to choose”. Feminist ideas about 
reproductive rights (Ehrenreich, N. ed, The Reproductive Rights Reader- Law, Medicine and the 
construction of motherhood, NY University Press 2007); Lane M, Ethical Issues in Surrogacy 
Arrangements (Cook R., Schlater S.and Kaganas F.eds, Surrogate Motherhood:  International 
Perspectives, Hart Publishing 2003) 133 and more. 
14 All Greek surrogates and IPs, all clinicians, anonymous lawyer, Vidalis. 
15 Dr Sue Avery (UK clinician), Andrew Powell (UK family law barrister), Helen Prosser (co-founder 
of Brilliant Beginnings, hereafter BB), Sarah (experienced SUK surrogate and SUK Chair). 
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provided to clinics by the HFEA are confusing and completely out-dated.16 Sarah 
recounted her experience with having to sign two contradictory consent forms at the 
clinic: 
[My] first three surrogacy pregnancies came about without a clinic, but the last time 
we tried at-home insemination I didn’t get pregnant and found out I had blocked 
fallopian tubes.  (…)So, I had to go through IVF in a clinic. (…)[W]e decided to use 
my eggs again. But that meant that practically, (…)I had to be my own egg donor. 
(…)I had to sign one piece of paper for one thing [waiving parental rights as a donor], 
and another piece of paper for the opposite [acknowledging legal parenthood as a 
surrogate]. (…)I told them “I can’t sign both, because they’re saying the opposite 
thing. You have to choose which piece of paper you want me to sign”. 
Others highlighted that UK courts have recently dealt with numerous cases involving 
the use of ‘the wrong paperwork’, which subsequently affected some people’s 
parenthood.17 Dr Avery explained that these errors are due to lack of proper training 
of the people who take the patients’ consent in clinics. She added that proper consent 
requires the provision of information about a range of issues including legal issues, 
especially regarding legal parenthood, but ‘clinics are not particularly engaged with 
legal issues’, and medical professionals may not have the knowledge and ability to 
provide all the necessary information. Both Dr Avery and Marina (experienced COTS 
surrogate) identified a need for specific training for medical professionals about 
consent and, more specifically, consent to surrogacy, which, according to Dr Avery, 
is ‘an even more complex issue’. Lastly, she suggested that lack of understanding of 
consent issues sometimes means that medical professionals are confused about the 
timing of consent, with consent taken after treatment has started. This, she believed, 
is not only against the rules but also renders consent-provision meaningless. 
Despite the complaints about the weaknesses of the current systems followed by UK 
clinics, all interviewees who went through formal legal surrogacy in clinics reported 
feeling secure and well-supported before and during the treatment.18 They also 
remarked that, as in Greece, UK clinics generally follow the guidance regarding the 
provision of information and support prior to ARTs,19 and continue to offer that 
support throughout the treatment. This suggests that things work well despite the faults 
in regulation. For example, Lauren (SUK surrogate) said: 
                                                          
16 Dr Avery, Helen Prosser, Sarah. 
17 Kirsty Horsey, Andrew Powell. Also, case citations concerning mistake  made by UK clinics 
regarding consent-provision in Chapter 4, n133. 
18 Lauren, Sarah, Marina, Simon and Steve, Natalie (SUK mother and SUK Trustee). 
19 HFEA CoP (2009) [4],[6]. 
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I was always thinking, we’re using the clinic; they know what they’re doing there. 
(…)I never felt pressured. (…)I felt very supported in terms of understanding what was 
going on, they [the clinic] explained everything. (…)[T]hey sent a timetable of what to 
take and when, and I always felt that, if I had any problems or questions, I could ring 
or email them, and they would get back to me pretty much on the same day(…). 
Moreover, my interviewees suggested that, apart from clinics, UK surrogacy 
organisations have a significant, although informal, role in ensuring valid consent to 
surrogacy, but one that is currently overlooked in the literature. Interviewees with an 
active role in three reputable UK surrogacy organisations (SUK, COTS, BB) reported 
the use of information sessions, where the parties learn about surrogacy; and 
agreement sessions, where the parties discuss possible eventualities and draft their 
agreement in the presence of another member of the organisation.20 M re specifically, 
my interviewees noted that SUK has a strict policy regarding a three-month ‘getting-
to-know’ period, which allows the parties time to develop a trusting relationship,21 and 
to give valid consent.22 Marina from COTS and Helen Prosser from BB, also referred 
to a ‘getting-to-know’ period. 
Other interviewees emphasised that, while the information, advice and support offered 
by UK surrogacy organisations is vital, there should be more professional resources 
available to help the parties make a fully informed choice.23 Natalie and Marina, 
however, noted that, although UK surrogacy organisations are mostly run by 
volunteers, they are fully professional in their operation. 
Natalie: Even though we [SUK] are volunteer-led, we offer 24/7 support for our 
members. (…)[A]s an organisation we’re 100% professional. (…)We have links with 
lawyers, we have them on the Board, we have a GP [general practitioner] on the Bard. 
(…)[T]he processes that we have in place as an organisation are very robust. (…)We 
are a proper organisation that has been functioning for 12 years, and functioning well, 
and we have hands-on experience, so I think that makes us professional. 
                                                          
20 Sarah, Lauren, Simon, Steve, Natalie, Marina, Natalie Gamble (solicitor and co-founder of BB), 
Helen Prosser. 
21 Which, due to the UK non-enforceability rule, is very important, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Also, Beier K, 'Surrogate Motherhood: A Trust-Based Approach' (2015) 40(6) Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 633-652. 
22 Sarah, Lauren, Simon and Steve, Natalie. 
23 Vasanti Jadva (psychology academic), Kirsty Horsey (legal academic), Helen Prosser, Natalie 
Gamble, Andrew Powell. 
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All UK interviewees commended the work of the three major UK surrogacy 
organisations and believed that their role should be formally recognised in regulation, 
which has recently been done by the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC).24 
Conversely, Jamie (UK independent surrogate) emphasised that not going through an 
organisation can be both liberating and empowering, adding that there are important 
advantages in allowing the parties to decide the terms of their arrangement and discuss 
the issues that matter to them. 
I felt like the decisions were ours. We made the decision about what tests we wanted, 
what paperwork we wanted, about what scans we wanted, about the money, about how 
everything was going down. We didn’t have anybody breathing down our necks. We 
wouldn’t agree on anything that I wasn’t happy with, and it was all down to us, nobody 
else. 
Jamie further rejected the assumption frequently made in the literature and by the 
judiciary that valid consent is less likely in independent surrogacy arrangements.25 
However, other UK interviewees, who have dealt with many surrogacy cases, 
remarked that information-sharing outside clinics and surrogacy organisations can be 
misleading and dangerous,26 and may influence the validity of the parties’ consent and 
lead to legal disputes,27 while also noting that these cases are exceptional. Although 
the positive perception of independent surrogacy is a result of only one interviewee’s 
account, and while there is evidence about the negative aspects of that practice, my 
data shows that the practice provides certain advantages and that risks could be 
mitigated through appropriate regulation. 
Lastly, all UK interviewees believed that most UK surrogates know their minds and 
can provide valid consent with or without advice and support through a clinic, which 
challenges the assumption sometimes made in the literature and which underpins the 
UK surrogacy law.28 Nonetheless, several believed this is mainly due to the good 
                                                          
24 DHSC, Care in Surrogacy. Guidance for the care of surrogates and inte ed parents in surrogate 
births in England and Wales (DHSC guidance for medical practitioners); DHSC, The Surrogacy 
Pathway. Surrogacy and the legal process for intended parents nd surrogates in England and Wales 
(28/02/2018), DHSC guidance for IPs and surrogates. Both guidance notes list these three organisations 
and recommend that IPs and surrogates should consider joining them. 
25 Case citations in n4; Jackson E, 'The law and DIY assisted conception' in Horsey, K. (ed), Revisiting 
the Regulation of Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge 2015); Horsey K and Sheldon S, 
'Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy' (2012) 20 Med Law Rev. 
26 Natalie Gamble and Helen Prosser, Marina, Sarah. 
27 This possibility is noted in the literature (e.g.: Jackson (n25); Elsworth M and Gamble N, 'Are 
Contracts and Pre-Birth Orders the Way Forward for UK Surrogacy?' (2015) IFL 159) and recent case 
law (n4). 
28 Chapter 2, section 2.3.1 ‘Autonomy-based objections’. Nevertheless, some interviewees also believed 
it is good that regulation provides for the surrogates who do not or cannot consent validly. 
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intentions and sense of responsibility shown by the parties in UK surrogacy 
arrangements: in other words, surrogacy works despite, rather than because of, the 
law.29 
Professor Brazier: [Where the parties have] adequate information, and allowed 
adequate time for consultation and agreement, and the whole of the surrogacy 
arrangement is located within the UK, the current system seems to work reasonably 
well, (…)but partly, I think, that’s because surrogates and IPs themselves (…)have 
done so much work on how to make it work in practice. 
 
6.2.2 The role of the preconception agreement in ensuring valid consent 
In Greece, written surrogacy agreements are legally mandated and have force,30 whi h 
was explained by the legislature and in the literature as aiming to show the law’s 
respect for the parties’ autonomy during a surrogacy arrangement.31 Contrastingly, in 
the UK, written surrogacy agreements are neither legally required nor have direct legal 
force. Nevertheless, their significance was formally recognised through governmental 
guidance issued recently.32 Although regulation in these countries clearly places 
different weight on written surrogacy agreements, based on my evidence, many of 
those involved in the practice consider the agreements significant and useful in 
ensuring valid consent and promoting reproductive autonomy. 
Several Greek interviewees emphasised the importance of the legal mandate for a 
written surrogacy agreement and the legal force given to it. More specifically, they 
suggested it helps the parties have a thorough discussion about the many issues that 
may arise during the arrangement, and ensures, as far as possible, that they make a 
conscious and well-thought-out decision to enter a surrogacy arrangement.33 
Although some scholars have claimed that a surrogacy agreement infringes the 
surrogate’s autonomy to make decisions about her pregnancy (such as for medical 
interventions, her diet, her life activities, and the delivery, among other issues),34 many 
                                                          
29 Vasanti Jadva, Professor Brazier, Helen Prosser, Natalie Gamble, Dr Avery, Jamie. 
30 The IPs automatically attain legal parenthood after th  child’s birth (Article 1464GCC). This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
31 2002 Committee Meeting Minutes, 5/10/2002. Trokanas T., Human Reproduction. Personal 
autonomy and its limits (Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-
Kastanidou eds, Publications on Medical Law and Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2011) 373; Hatzis A, Just in 
the oven: A Law and Economics Approach to Gestational Surrogacy Contracts (Boele-Welki, K. ed, 
Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, Intersentia 2003) 417. 
32 DHSC guidance for medical practitioners (n24) 7; DHSC guidance for IPs and urrogates (n24) 9. 
33 Vidalis, Professor Hatzis, anonymous lawyer, Areti, Giota, Elina, Lena. 
34 Chapter 2, p.71-73. 
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Greek interviewees explicitly said this was untrue, because the surrogate retains 
control throughout the pregnancy through her right to consent to medical 
interventions.35 Additionally, Greek commentators note that surrogates have an 
undisputed right to terminate the pregnancy,36 which is usually expressly stated in the 
agreement .37 While there is no evidence in the literature, my data suggest that the view 
that these agreements limit the surrogate’s autonomy is weak.38 Rather, many 
interviewees in Greece, including both surrogates I interviewed there, considered the 
agreement as fostering the development of a relationship between the parties and as a 
tool that helps them make a well-considered decision to participate in that 
arrangement.39 For example, a Greek lawyer said: 
[T]he agreement is (…)merely an agreement between the parties. It just clears things 
up from the start and helps the parties build their relationship, but it’s important in 
helping them realise what they’re getting into. It doesn’t impact on the surrogate’s 
freedom at all. You can’t force her to do anything she doesn’t want to do. 
While under UK law surrogacy agreements have no direct legal force, many UK 
interviewees considered them very important. Surprisingly, all UK surrogates and IPs 
I interviewed had signed an agreement, while they were aware it would have no legal 
effect. Moreover, all UK interviewees believed that it provides the opportunity for the 
parties to discuss things thoroughly from the start, it helps them make a conscious and 
informed decision to participate in surrogacy, and it limits the possibility of legal 
disputes.40 Again, this suggests that autonomy is respected in practice, but this is 
despite the law not because of it. Lastly, the vast majority of my UK interviewees were 
in favour of written surrogacy agreements being legally mandated and binding if it 
were guaranteed that the surrogate can control all medical and day-to-  decisions 
during her pregnancy,41 as in Greece. This confirms evidence of a recent UK study.42 
                                                          
35 Lena, Elina, Areti, Giota, anonymous lawyer, Dr Tarlatzis. 
36 Trokanas (n31) 358; Vidalis T, Life without the person. The Constitution and the use of human genetic 
material (Sakkoulas 2003) 118; Papachristou T, The right to have a child and its limits (Tsinorema, S. 
and K. Louis eds, Issues of Bioethics. Life, Society and Nature before the biomdical challenges, Cretan 
University Press 2013) 55. However, they suggest that a surrogate who proceeds to a non-medically 
necessary abortion may be liable for damages due to breach of contract. 
37 Ibid 
38 Vidalis, anonymous Greek lawyer, Lena. 
39 Areti, Lena, Elina, Giota, Dr Pantos, Dr Tarlatzis, anonymous Greek lawyer. 
40 Vasanti Jadva, Professor Brazier (UK legal academic), Natalie Gamble, Helen Prosser, Jami , Sarah, 
Marina, Natalie, Simon. 
41 As will be seen in Chapter 7, some worried about the message that comes with enforceability, namely 
loss of autonomy. 
42 Horsey K, Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform (Report of the Surrogacy UK Working 
Group on Surrogacy Law Reform, Surrogacy UK November 2015) 2 . 
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Therefore, while the legal frameworks in the two countries look very different on 
paper, the practice is actually quite similar. 
6.2.3 The role of counselling in ensuring valid consent 
Some commentators have argued that professional counselling helps ensure valid 
consent to surrogacy,43 with one going so far as to argue that the mere availability of 
counselling is sufficient to show the law’s respect for autonomy.44 Under both 
regimes, clinics should inform ARTs participants about a wide range of issues related 
to their chosen treatment and should offer counselling to everyone seeking treatment 
with donor gametes and surrogacy.45 However, this option is only available if the 
parties go through a clinic, and not if they have surrogacy at home, which is allowed 
in the UK but not in Greece. 
All Greek clinicians I interviewed considered counselling instrumental in ensuring 
robust consent in surrogacy and emphasised that many clinics have policies making 
surrogacy counselling mandatory, although it is not legally required.46 However, my 
data suggest that there is scope for differences in the medical practice regarding 
surrogacy counselling. For example, a few Greek interviewees revealed they were not 
offered counselling but they did not consider it necessary,47 and another said she was 
offered counselling but did not take it up.48 Based on previous studies and my own 
findings,49 in the UK, counselling is likewise seen as fundamental in ensuring valid 
consent to surrogacy, and it is generally treated as mandatory, though legally only the 
offer of counselling is mandatory. Dr Avery said: 
ARTs counselling is absolutely vital. (…)[I]t gives us [clinics] a bit of reassurance that 
they [ART participants] have had the option to talk through the implications, 
particularly when it’s a more complex treatment, where it involves donated gametes 
or surrogacy or PGD, for example. (…)Everyone who’s having donated gametes, 
surrogacy, PGD will see a counsellor. We make it compulsory to them. 
                                                          
43 Appleton T, Emotional Aspects: Effective Counselling and Support (Cook et al n13) 203; van den 
Akker O, 'Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of Surrogacy' (2003) 21 Journal of 
Reproductive and Infant Psychology 179. 
44 Cook R, Safety in the Multitude of Counsellors: Do we Need Counselling in Surrogacy? (Cook et al 
n13). 
45 In Greece: Article 5 Law 3305/2005, 22 GCoP (2017); In the UK: s.13(6) HFE Act 1990; Sch.3ZA 
HFE Act 2008; HFEA CoP (2009) [3.2]. 
46 Dr Tarlatzis, Ms Chatziparasidou, Dr Pantos. The GCoP and Law 3305/2005 stipulate that medical 
professionals “should” (not “must”) offer information and counselling to ART participants. 
47 Elina, Aria and Katerina (Greek lesbian couple who had a child through “surrogacy”). 
48 Lena. 
49 Lee E, Macvarish J and Sheldon S, 'Assessing Child Welfare Under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008: a case study in medicalisation?' (2014) 36(4) Sociology f Health and Illness. 
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UK IPs and surrogates I interviewed agreed with the above: some said they undertook 
counselling because they thought it was mandatory,50 and others knew it was optional 
but took it up because it was suggested.51 Notably, one interviewee remarked that, if 
the parties go through a surrogacy organisation, then counselling in clinics is 
considered almost redundant not only by the parties themselves, but also by the clinics, 
since clinics know that the parties have gone through processes that encouraged them 
to think through the most significant issues. 
Natalie: We had one counselling session [in the clinic], but it was more process than 
anything meaningful. (…)[E]specially because they [the clinic] knew we had come 
through SUK, we were pretty sorted with it all. (…)They knew we’d spoken about 
everything already, they know SUK’s processes. We showed them our agreement 
forms, and it was obvious we’d already gone through all different aspects. They knew 
(…)that we had a strong relationship, and that we were all involved in each other’s 
lives (…). So, it wasn’t like we hadn’t considered it properly. 
Other interviewees suggested that counselling in clinics is not always helpful. Some 
reported that it caused unnecessary nervousness,52 and one gay male IP couple 
reported feelings of bias.53 Although recent UK studies note that same-sex parenting 
through ARTs has become common and widely accepted,54 Simon and Steve said the 
clinic counsellor questioned their parenting abilities in a way which they saw as both 
suspicious of same-sex parenting and lacking an understanding of surrogacy. 
Simon: The counsellor asked if we were in an enduring relationship, and we talked a 
lot about our relationship, and our relationship with Lauren [surrogate]. 
Steve: [The counsellor] asked a lot of questions like ‘how do you know it’s not going 
to be co-parenting?’ and ‘how do you know you can bring up a child?’ (…)[The 
counsellor] was a bit homophobic, we think. 
Simon: Yes, and one of the things that came up in counselling is ‘how you’re going to 
stop Sophie wanting to be with her surrogate mother?’. I think [the counsellor] called 
her [the surrogate] “mother”, which is something that we wouldn’t have said. 
 
                                                          
50 Lauren, Simon, Steve, Natalie. 
51 Natalie and Sarah. Sarah said she found it ‘funny’ that the clinic asked her to undergo counselling 
(because by that time she had already had three successful surrogacies), and the feeling was shared by 
the counsellor, too. 
52 Lauren, Simon. 
53 Lauren, Simon, Steve. Lauren had a positive experience with counselling, whereas Simon and Steve 
did not. 
54 Lee, Macvarish, and Sheldon (n49); Sheldon S, Lee E and Macvarish J, ''Supportive Parenting'. 
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Other interviewees commented that some people express fear and suspicion of 
counselling, associating it with a sense of stigma, and considering it a ‘check’.55 On 
the other hand, some said counselling is useful in some cases, especially where there 
is concern about coercion in consent, as in the case referred to in Chapter 5, where Dr 
Avery’s clinic refused to go ahead with the agreement between a couple and their 
niece living with them.56 
Dr Avery: She’d [the niece] come from abroad to live her aunt and uncle, and it [her 
acting as a surrogate] was more or less a condition for remaining in their house. All 
these came up in counselling. 
In summary, the literature suggests that consent, which is one strategy for 
operationalising the concern with autonomy, is very important in the Greek and UK 
surrogacy regimes, with the Greek system appearing to be doing a better job than the
UK did. My evidence suggests that people are generally clear in their wishes and aware 
of what they are agreeing to do, which challenges assumptions that valid consent is 
impossible in surrogacy. Counselling was seen as an integral part of ensuring respect 
for autonomy in Greek and UK clinics, with some making it mandatory, thereby 
confirming evidence of previous UK studies. Nevertheless, in each country, opinion 
was divided regarding the utility of the role played by counselling in promoting 
autonomy. Also, in the UK, I found that respect for autonomy is sometimes 
operationalised outside formal legal structures, for example, through surrogacy 
organisations and other unregulated communities. However, my UK sample allowed 
me to capture and discuss a wider range of kinds of surrogacy relationships, including 
those which are less regulated, than my Greek sample did. In both countries, respect 
for autonomy seemed to work well, but sometimes this was despite, rather than 
because of, the law. 
6.3 Protection from harm 
In Chapter 2, I argued that regulation should only limit autonomy and equality based 
on well-grounded welfare concerns that such limitations are necessary. In this section, 
I explore whether and to what extent the specific mechanisms employed by the Greek 
and UK surrogacy regimes sufficiently and successfully address the welfare concerns 
laid out in Chapter 2, focusing on harms to the parties during the surrogacy 
                                                          
55 Dr Avery, Jamie. 
56 Chapter 5, p.154. 
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arrangement.57 I begin by examining who may cause harm and what kinds of harms 
might occur (6.3.1). I then discuss how regulation responds to these concerns, focusing 
on the prohibition of commercial surrogacy (6.3.2), the monitoring systems during the 
arrangement (6.3.3), and the residence requirements (6.3.4). 
6.3.1 Who may cause harm and what kinds of harms may occur? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the literature notes that surrogacy could be harmful 
in various ways, for example because surrogates are unnecessarily exposed to certain 
physical and emotional risks; because one of the parties decides to renege on the 
agreement; because one party may want to exploit the other party; or because 
surrogacy agencies may intentionally exploit the parties.58 Many commentators focus 
on the risk of exploitation during a surrogacy arrangement, which involves the 
unethical and improper use of the person to achieve someone else’s (the exploiter’s) 
aims, arguing that surrogacy should be banned on this ground.59 
However, there are others who believe harm is impossible if one is not used solely as 
means to an end,60 if surrogacy is mutually beneficial (to the IPs and the surrogate), 
and if both parties validly consent to it.61 Some suggest that the risk of harm is higher 
in case of commercial surrogacy arrangements,62 whereas others argue that 
commercial surrogacy can be empowering and valuable to surrogates and to society.63 
Previous studies show that in the UK and US context surrogates do not feel harmed,64 
                                                          
57 Concerns relating to harm to the child would necessarily need to be considered before the child’s 
birth. Hence, they relate to issues of access, which have been discussed in Chapter 5. Other WoC 
concerns regarding the status of parenthood are discussed in Chapter 7. 
58 Chapter 2, ‘Harm to the surrogate’ and ‘Harm to the IPs’. 
59 Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2, ‘The surrogate is harmed because she is degraded by being exploited, 
commodified and objectified’ (p.70-77). 
60 Ramsey J, 'Paying for Reproduction: The Case Against Paid Surrogacy' (2006) 4 Juridical Review 
331. 
61 Wilkinson S, Bodies for Sale. Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade (Routledge 2003) 
12. 
62 The literature refers to exploitation, commodification, and objectification as harms that may arise in 
surrogacy. These terms are closely connected and sometimes used interchangeably. All three imply that 
one is ‘wrongfully’ used by another, and the literature suggests that the risk of harm is higher when 
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and there is evidence that UK IPs have had positive experiences of surrogacy,65 
although the potential harm to IPs is largely understudied. Additionally, little is known 
about whether exploitation happens in UK surrogacy and what kinds of harms this 
may entail, while there is virtually no knowledge about the Greek situation. Therefore, 
my evidence makes a significant contribution. 
Despite the assumptions of many commentators and many Greek surrogacy 
professionals in my sample that surrogates are more susceptible to exploitation, the 
surrogates that I interviewed did not identify as being the most vulnerable party in the 
arrangement. Rather, they said they had a sense of power and that they were being 
taken care of by their IPs and the IPs’ families, with whom they still enjoy close 
relationships of friendship. These confirm findings of previous UK and US studies.66 
Some Greek interviewees remarked that, while regulation does a lot to ensure that the 
surrogate is protected from exploitation by the IPs, it does not sufficiently protect the 
IPs,67 who were described as equally, if not more, vulnerable to exploitation by 
surrogates.68 For instance, Takis Vidalis said: 
[The IPs] will be the child’s parents. They have a strong interest in ensuring that the 
pregnancy goes well, so they take good care of the surrogate. (…)We forget that 
exploitation can come from either side. The surrogate may exploit the IPs’ 
hopelessness; they are already in a difficult position because surrogacy is their last 
resort solution.69 
Additionally, some provided anecdotal evidence of IPs having been financially 
extorted by surrogates. Some said they had heard that surrogates threatened to 
terminate the pregnancy to get more money from the IPs,70 and Areti revealed that her 
surrogate had insisted on extra payments during their arrangement, which Areti 
perceived as an attempt of exploitation. 
Our surrogate asked for more money after she found out she was pregnant with twins. 
(…)I felt like we were being exploited. (…)[The lawyer] explained to her that we had 
already agreed on a payment for her expenses, and that it was unfair for her t  ask 
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for more. She understood, and she backed down. We didn’t want to exploit her, and 
neither did she [want to exploit us]. (…)I guess she was afraid. The issue was resolved 
quickly, and we went back to being friends. 
Moreover, Giota mentioned that she had formed an agreement with a surrogate, but 
decided to break it off early, because there were signs the surrogate would attempt to 
exploit her financially. 
I had already agreed with her about her compensation, and she asked for an advance
payment which wasn’t part of our original agreement. She was insisting so much on 
it. (…)Of course I’d pay for her travel expenses and accommodation and whatever 
else she wanted. She asked us to rent her a flat, and we were willing to do that too. 
We’d also pay for the care of her children. (…)I thought she cared a bit too much 
about the money, and I was afraid of being exploited. 
Other interviewees referred to the possibility of IPs being exploited by medical 
professionals,71 and both surrogates I interviewed showed that surrogates sometimes 
try to protect the IPs from such harm. For example, Elina described IVF clinicians as 
‘businessmen’, and mentioned an incident she viewed as financial exploitation of her 
IPs by the physician who monitored the pregnancy. 
My couple are normal working people. The IVF doctor is a businessman. (…)They 
[doctors] will try to get as much as they can from the couple. (…)I’ve always been 
anaemic, but my body works perfectly. (…)During the surrogate pregnancy, the tests 
showed anaemia again, and the doctor suggested treatment. (…)When I refused, the 
doctor told [the IM] that it’s very dangerous and scared her a lot. So, [the IM] said 
she’d pay as much as necessary to prevent all risks for me and the baby.(…)I decided 
to have the treatment, though I knew it wasn’t necessary, and the mother had to pay 
€300 for it. This is exploitation! 
Others expressed fears that unregulated aspects of surrogacy which do happen in 
practice, such as matching over the internet, also leave IPs open to exploitation by 
surrogates and other people acting as agents-mediators.72 However, Giota, who used 
a surrogacy mediator she found through an online advertisement, said she never felt 
exploited but, rather, was grateful to that person. 
As in Greece, despite the perception that surrogates are most vulnerable and in need 
of protection from regulation, my interviews found that UK surrogates express a sense 
of empowerment, act as volunteers, and have positive experiences.73 Thi  is in line 
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with evidence from other studies.74 Also, my data suggest that, as for Greece, IPs may 
be more vulnerable to exploitation than are surrogates.75 For example, some said: 
Vasanti Jadva: [IPs] desperately want to have a child, and almost this is their last 
hope, and often they’ve tried everything. (…)If you’re going to say a surrogate is 
vulnerable, then you can also say the IPs are vulnerable, because [it] is a highly 
stressful situation. (…)I don’t think that the surrogates that we’ve spoken to felt 
vulnerable. If anything, they know that they they’re the decision-makers, because they 
know that the IPs are desperate to find someone to act as a surrogate for them. 
Sarah: People tend to forget the IPs, and they’re focused on the surrogate a lot. 
(…)There is always a possibility that somebody is going to be exploited, whether that 
will be the surrogate or the IPs. Sometimes IPs are much more vulnerable. 
Jamie: [T]he IPs are more open to exploitation than the surrogates are. (…)[IPs may] 
have done IVF countless times. They’ve tried everything, and they become desperate. 
I’ve seen it myself when I first signed up to become a surrogate.(…)You’ve got people 
throwing themselves at you(…), and that leaves them so vulnerable and so open to 
being exploited. 
Generally, several interviewees argued that it is largely a matter of luck that very few 
exploitation cases have been reported in the UK,76 and that no serious harm has been 
caused,77 while some said there are more exploitation cases which go under the radar.78
Additionally, though these are mostly unverified anecdotes, some referred to cases 
where surrogates used the need for their consent to the PO as a leverage over the IPs,79 
and others said there are cases where the surrogate may claim money for her expenses 
and then fake a miscarriage,80 as we know happened in Re N.81 Others noted concerns 
about surrogates potentially exploiting the IPs financially, for example, by claiming 
false expenses,82 and some spoke about unreported cases where the IPs exploited the 
surrogate, leaving her with the child.83 
Sarah: I do know of surrogates who have been left with the children because the IPs 
said they didn’t want them anymore. These have not been publicised at all. So, we 
were all really unaware. When the [SUK] Board of Trustees started looking at 
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proposals for reform they found this case which was not reported, and it certainly 
wasn’t a SUK case, where the surrogate has been left with three children. 
Moreover, some assumed that the current system leaves surrogates at risk of being 
deceived by IPs who, in their desperation to have a child, may promise to retain contact 
after the completion of their arrangement and disappear afterwards.84 However, none 
of the UK surrogates I spoke to said she felt exploited by her IPs in these ways and 
several interviewees noted the motivations of UK surrogates are usually not 
exploitative,85 which matched both my evidence from Greece, and evidence from 
previous UK studies.86 Furthermore, some UK interviewees noted that IPs and 
surrogates may be exploited by surrogacy agencies, especially if the IPs choose to go 
abroad for surrogacy, where it is practised on a commercial basis, which they believed 
potentially increases the risk of exploitation.87 This concern is often mentioned in the 
literature and case law.88 
Both the literature and my data suggest that there is potential for everyone involved in 
surrogacy practice to cause harm and everyone is potentially vulnerable to be harmed. 
Although it is possible that my sample does not represent the whole variety of 
experiences of surrogacy in these countries, it clearly challenges the theoretical 
assumption that surrogates are the most vulnerable party in a surrogacy arrangement. 
I now focus on how well the mechanisms employed by the Greek and UK regimes 
safeguard the parties in surrogacy arrangements from the harms noted above. 
6.3.2 Prohibition of commercial surrogacy 
As a response to the concern that harm is more likely when surrogacy is practiced on 
a commercial basis, Greece and the UK employed a mixed altruistic compensatory 
model for surrogacy, whereby only payments for ‘reasonable expenses’ are allowed. 
Under Greek law, payments for surrogacy other than for ‘reasonable’ expenses, 
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advertisement and paid mediation for surrogacy are all illegal.89 In 2008, the non-
governmental body that monitors and regulates ARTs in Greece (NAMAR), issued 
guidance specifying what ‘reasonable expenses’ could entail, and set a limit for a 
legally acceptable compensation up to €10,000 (approximately £8,800).90 The 
altruistic character of a formal legal surrogacy arrangement is assessed at the 
preconception stage during the judicial scrutiny of the surrogacy agreement. However, 
regulation does not stipulate any process for monitoring commercial activities during 
the surrogacy arrangement or after its completion. Consequently, the sanctions 
prescribed are possibly intended to have a ‘chilling effect’. In 2013, the National 
Bioethics Commission reported that commercial surrogacy takes place in Greece.91 
Also, Hatzis notes that “under the table” payments of over €12,000 are taking place 
for surrogacy in Greece,92 but does not provide concrete evidence of this happening, 
and he does not specify whether these payments covered more than the surrogate’s 
expenses. Generally, though, evidence of excess payments is largely anecdotal, while 
no harm resulting from that has ever been reported. 
My Greek data suggest a broad approval of the principle of altruism enshrined in 
regulation. Yet, as Professor Hatzis remarked, Greek regulators have not always been 
against commercial surrogacy: the draft 2002 law was deliberately vague as to whether 
surrogacy should be altruistic or commercial. Parliament revised the law to clarify the 
illegality of commercial arrangements. Despite a shared sense of approval of the 
principle of altruism, some Greek interviewees believed the regulation creates 
inequalities: law recently allowed for the compensation of gamete donors for ‘physical 
strain’ but did not change the ‘reasonable expenses’ rule for surrogacy, although the 
surrogate’s physical strain is much more intense than that of donors.93 
Several Greek interviewees believed that some surrogacy arrangements in Greece 
present commercial elements,94 with the amount of compensation paid to surrogates 
often exceeding the €10,000 limit set by NAMAR. Vidalis said that one study of 
surrogacy court applications in which he was involved found that at least 50 per cent 
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of surrogacy arrangements in Greece are truly altruistic (whereby the surrogate is a 
close friend or family of the IM), but in the rest of cases the surrogates are usually 
foreign women, especially from Eastern European countries, living in Greece,95 
raising the possibility that they might be motivated primarily by economic concerns. 
Nevertheless, the study did not provide robust evidence that payments over and above 
‘reasonable’ expenses take place and that harm has come out of it.  
Additionally, some thought the parties in surrogacy arrangements use the vagueness 
implied by the ‘reasonable expenses’ rule to conceal payments.96 However, my data 
did not provide a clear basis for the claim that surrogacy in Greece is indeed 
commercial or that this is harmful. For example, Elina, a Greek surrogate said she 
received compensation of €20,000 from her IPs. Two Greek IMs said that, in their 
experiences, compensation for surrogacy in Greece ranged between €20,000 and 
40,000,97 and others referred to ‘rumours’ about payments of €30,000.98 Although 
these amounts are higher than the NAMAR limit, they might be judged to represent 
‘reasonable’ expenses. My interviewees said these payments mostly covered the 
surrogates’ cost for pregnancy clothing, vitamins and drugs during pregnancy, rent, 
and compensation due to loss of earnings.99 
Lena, a Greek surrogate, said she received no compensation at all the first time she 
acted as a surrogate for her best friend. The second time, where the IPs were not close 
friends, she received a monthly fee of €200 to cover the cost of transportation for 
medical checks during pregnancy, which would fall under the ‘reasonable expenses’ 
definition. Additionally, other interviewees stated that, to their knowledge, only 
‘reasonable’ expenses are being paid to surrogates, but also emphasised that there can 
be no certainty there are no ‘under the table payments’.100 For instance, an anonymous 
Greek lawyer said: 
A breakdown of expenses is usually included in the surrogacy agreement for the court 
to see. Most times it’s approximately €100 per month for the cost of food for the 
surrogate. Sometimes the parties agree on a monthly salary to be paid to the 
surrogate, which is calculated against the cost of expected loss of wages, and medical 
checks and medicine. The amount of compensation is agreed between the parties. We 
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[lawyers] don’t get involved in this. To my knowledge, it’s just reasonable 
compensation for food, clothing, and medicine, and the cost of the surrogates’ living 
expenses. I couldn’t know if they’ve agreed on any other payments. 
Other interviewees confirmed the lawyer’s statement of what ‘reasonable expenses’ 
usually include.101 However, there are currently no other sources of evidence about 
the effectiveness of the ‘reasonable expenses’ rule or the kinds of harm that have arisen 
through excess payments, and my data offer no clear answer either. In any case, as 
most Greek interviewees suggested, there are likely to be altruistic elements in most 
surrogacy arrangements, and, although money could be an important motivation, it is 
usually not the main one.102 Moreover, some believed there are advantages in 
tolerating and/or formally allowing payments in surrogacy: this can provide the parties 
with a sense of empowerment, thereby increasing the parties’ autonomy, and 
promoting their welfare.103 Further, some interviewees thought the criminal sanctions 
against the commercial surrogacy were ‘too strict’ and should be reconsidered.104 
All the Greek clinicians I interviewed emphasised that they were not involved in 
mediation for surrogacy for a fee,105 although it would be unlikely that they would 
share such information, since they would thereby be admitting criminal liability. My 
findings rather suggested that, despite the legal prohibition, advertisement of 
surrogacy services by surrogates, IPs, and clinics, as well as mediation for matching 
for surrogacy (for a fee) often takes place on Internet platforms,106 which are probably 
illegal. Also, Professor Hatzis expressed fears of a ‘black market’ of surrogacy 
operating in Greece but offered no supporting evidence. 
Furthermore, many Greek interviewees said that there is no effective mechanism to 
monitor payments for surrogacy,107 and others that judges monitoring surrogacy 
arrangements at the preconception stage do not ask, and, in some cases, even tolerate 
payments.108 Takis Vidalis also said that NAMAR, which can bring claims of 
commercial surrogacy to the court if a formal complaint is made, had seemed 
unwilling to act in the past. Although this is speculative, NAMAR’s lack of 
involvement with surrogacy could be seen as an effort to demarcate the boundaries of 
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its remit in a way which excludes surrogacy. However, since NAMAR is responsible 
for all ARTs, and surrogacy is considered a form of ARTs, NAMAR cannot waive 
responsibility for formal legal surrogacy. Lastly, though a move to commercial 
surrogacy was not favoured by almost half of my Greek interviewees,109 many said 
they would accept it if regulation would set an effective mechanism to monitor 
payments.110 
As in Greece, UK regulation allows altruistic surrogacy, with an exception for 
payments for ‘reasonable’ expenses. Excess payments are not illegal per se, but they 
must be authorised by the court post-birth if the IPs apply for a PO, which severs the 
parenthood of the surrogate (and her husband or consenting partner, if she has one) 
and confers it on the IPs. As in Greece, advertisement and paid mediation for 
surrogacy are illegal.111 Nevertheless, UK surrogacy practice during the arrangement 
is largely unregulated, and there is no mechanism to monitor payments and 
commercial activity. However, studies indicate that surrogates and IPs have had 
positive experiences of surrogacy in the UK.112 
My UK findings parallel with those for Greece in many respects. UK interviewees 
were content that the principle of altruism is the basis of surrogacy regulation. Whilst 
reporting that money still changes hands in many cases, most interviewees believed 
that this is usually to ensure that surrogates are not ‘out of pocket’ during the 
arrangement, and, in most cases, that surrogates do not use surrogacy to profit from it 
financially.113 On the other hand, the vast majority of my UK interviewees suggested 
that there is a common misconception that law prohibits all payments, which is untrue, 
and causes a lot of worry,114 and some said there is another common belief that 
£12,000-15,000 must be paid as expenses, which is equally untrue.115 
Simon: They say normally it’s around £15,000, so when it is that much, so long you 
can justify why, it’s fine. 
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Several interviewees said surrogates do not charge IPs extortionate amounts of money, 
with the surrogates’ compensation ranging from zero to £20,000.116 Marina said COTS 
has a policy of £15,000 as a maximum amount, and that many UK surrogates receive 
that amount as compensation. All SUK members said the organisation helps the parties 
with agreeing what are reasonable expenses and provides an indicative list of what can 
be claimed.117 Although they did not specify whether SUK advocates for a maximum 
amount for compensation, they explained that surrogates’ expense claims usually 
range between £5,000 and £12,000. 
Contrary to the view expressed both in the literature and by some UK interviewees 
that payments over ‘reasonable’ expenses take place especially in the independent 
world of UK surrogacy, Jamie said that the total cost of their arrangement was 
£10,000.118 However, she suggested that other independent surrogates ask for more 
money, and ‘give independent surrogacy a bad name’. The amount of compensation 
for ‘reasonable’ expenses mentioned by my interviewees confirms findings of a recent 
study, which reported that UK surrogacy ‘is very much undertaken by women on an 
altruistic basis’, with compensation ranging from nothing to £15,000.119 Also, all 
interviewees noted that UK surrogates and IPs have positive experiences of surrogacy, 
emphasised that money is a secondary motivation, and argued that there are altruistic 
elements in all UK surrogacy arrangements. Again, this confirms findings of other 
studies,120 and matches my Greek findings. 
Furthermore, many UK interviewees highlighted the lack of an effective system to 
monitor payments before or during the arrangement and criticised the regulation for 
failing to clarify which expenses should be considered ‘reasonable’. Though the 
Brazier Committee emphasised that lawful payments should be defined and limited by 
regulation,121 this proposal, as most of the Brazier proposals, was not implemented by 
formal regulation. In her interview, Professor Brazier, referred to the shortcomings of 
UK regulation, but noted that surrogacy works well despite that. 
[I]n practice, in intra-UK arrangements there don’t seem to be very pressing 
problems, partly I think because surrogates themselves and surrogates working with 
commissioning couples have done so much work on how to make it work. (…)At the 
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moment we’re dishonest about expenses and there’s a policy vacuum. (…)We [Brazier 
Committee] asked for this to change. (…)The Report must be turning yellow 
somewhere on the shelves of the DoH. (…)I just think the 2008 reform for surrogacy 
was a waste of time and space. 
My findings confirm those in the Brazier Report regarding the work of surrogacy 
organisations filling the policy vacuum.122 All interviewees said that those involved in 
UK surrogacy are doing a good job, and try hard to make regulation work well, citing 
this as the major reason for why no problems have arisen yet. Moreover, many UK 
interviewees said IPs and surrogates are self-regulated; they keep track of expenses 
paid during the arrangement, and follow the guidance given by experienced members 
of surrogacy organisations.123 
Others revealed that there is also a lot of information on expenses available through 
online platforms (such as surrogacy groups on Facebook, and other forums), but noted 
that misinformation may exist.124 The same interviewees added that UK courts do not 
monitor or define what ‘reasonable expenses’ include, which confuses those involved 
in UK surrogacy. 
Natalie Gamble: [T]here’s no real forensic analysis of what’s going on. I think it 
perpetuates the myth that surrogates are being paid expenses when actually they’re 
being very clearly compensated, and nobody has a problem with that, but it’s just not 
done very transparently, and it’s so confusing to people. 
Helen Prosser: And then you get those Facebook groups and forums that are saying 
“just put in this”, and surrogates’ groups are saying “this is what my IPs gave me”. 
Natalie Gamble: We see people fabricating expenses to fit the figure. (…)It just doesn’t 
seem clear. 
Additionally, Natalie Gamble clarified that payments are not that important for the 
making of the PO. Other interviewees agreed, adding that the rule requiring the judge 
to prioritise the WoC when deciding for a PO means that it will be extremely difficult 
for a PO to be refused just because there were payments over ‘reasonable’ expenses.125 
This is also evident in case law.126 Furthermore, many noted that the courts often do 
not ask about payments,127 and others believed there is no need for increased 
monitoring of payments in intra-UK surrogacy arrangements.128 
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Simon: We were worried that in the PO they [Cafcass and the judge] would question 
some of the expenses, whereas it was kind of the opposite. They didn’t even care. 
(…)Even if you can’t really justify it, I don’t think there would be a problem. It 
wouldn’t have been a case where the judge would say “you seem to have paid a lot of 
money, so we’re going to take the baby off you”, if that’s not in the best interests of 
the baby. What else can judges do? 
Further, some interviewees emphasised that the UK system of monitoring payments 
does not work well because there are different approaches between the Magistrate’s 
Court, which processes PO applications arising from intra-UK surrogacy 
arrangements, and the High Court, where PO applications arising from international 
surrogacy arrangements are heard.129 In their view, this creates inconsistencies and 
confusion regarding the issue of payments, which, in some cases, sits in tension with 
the important principles regarding autonomy and WoC. 
Natalie Gamble: There’s a different approach in the High Court and the Magistrate’s 
Court. In the High Court they want to know absolutely down to the last penny what’s 
paid. They separate out the bits that are actual expenses, which means actually 
identified, receipted costs, lost wages, travel costs, etc. You must provide receipts. 
(…)It’s very different in the Magistrate’s Court. (…)The PO Reporter and Cafcass 
will go and see the parents, they’ll ask them what they paid; they’ll ask the surrogate 
what she was paid. They always set out in the report what they’re told, and then they 
come to an analysis of that amount. They rarely ask for receipts. They often are just 
told that the surrogate was paid a lump sum and they kind of accept that on a face 
value, and they don’t go in any great detail (…)In any case, [judges] always authorise 
the payment, so much so that it’s now become just routine. (…)The courts always act 
in the child’s best interests so the rules are unenforceable and completely 
meaningless. 
According to some interviewees, many users of surrogacy, whether they go through 
an organisation or do it independently, often take advantage of the vagueness 
regarding ‘reasonable expenses’ and of the disinterest of the court, to conceal 
payments,130 which I also found to be the case in Greece. For example, Jamie said: 
There are too many things that you can exaggerate as “expenses”. I know some 
surrogates that expect holidays after they’ve had a baby. (…)It’s not the same for all 
surrogates. One surrogate got a Tiffany necklace from her IPs after she had their 
baby(…). [I]’ve seen surrogates getting mobility scooters from their IPs. (…)One 
surrogate expected her IPs to rent a flat for her near to where they lived, because she 
didn’t agree with the distance. (…)Money is going under the table, gifts are handed 
over under the table, cars, mobile phones, tablets. (…)That’s what you get when there 
are no questions being asked about the level of expenses. The courts don’t really care. 
                                                          
129 Andrew Powell, Natalie Gamble, Helen Prosser. 
130 Andrew Powell, Natalie Gamble, Professor Brazier 
204 
 
Although most UK interviewees criticised the vagueness around ‘reasonable’ 
expenses, there were also some who believed that it may offer significant advantages 
to the parties, the most important of which is a sense of empowerment because they 
could decide themselves what counts as a ‘reasonable’ expense.131 This finding also 
emerged from my Greek sample. However, many noted that more guidance on what 
is ‘reasonable’ is absolutely necessary.132 
Steve: It never crossed our minds that she [surrogate] would take a penny more. If 
anything, she’d probably give it back. She did give some money back to us in the end. 
Simon: [S]he wanted to itemise everything from the start. We were lucky we had that 
information and guidance from SUK. We might have just thought “a gay average 
surrogacy journey would cost £12,000, so we can give you £1,000 a month for a year”. 
She was really taking everything into consideration. 
Steve: It was her project. (…) It can be a thorny issue, and there’s only so much that 
SUK can help you with. Some guidance would be good. 
To address these concerns, the DHSC recently published guidance (with no legal 
force) on what ‘reasonable expenses’ could entail,133 but my interviews were 
performed before that time. Hopefully, this new guidance will resolve some of the 
problems noted above. 
Generally, UK interviewees were against commercial surrogacy, because they were 
worried that that a surrogacy industry could be created, which could out-price some 
IPs and change the surrogacy relationship, as well as the motivations of UK surrogates, 
who now act mostly out of altruism.134 However, most of them indicated that their 
disapproval of commercial surrogacy is due to the stigma still associated with it. 
Although it should be remembered that this evidence comes from people who use the 
current system, which works for them, my findings suggest that the prohibition of 
payments beyond ‘expenses’ to surrogates does not work well in in practice neither in 
Greece nor in the UK. However, there was no evidence of harm resulting from these 
payments. 
                                                          
131 Kirsty Horsey, Andrew Powell, Natalie, Marina. 
132 Natalie, Lauren, Simon and Steve, Sarah, Jamie, Helen Prosser, Natalie Gamble. 
133 DHSC guidance for IPs and surrogates (n24) 9,10. 
134 Lauren, Natalie, Steve, Marina, Sarah, Jamie, Dr Avery, Natalie Gamble, Helen Prosser, Kirsty 
Horsey, Professor Brazier. Only Andrew Powell favoured a commercial model for surrogacy in the UK, 
if regulation guaranteed effective monitoring processes that protect the parties from expl itation. 
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6.3.3 Monitoring during the pregnancy 
ARTs, including IVF-surrogacy, have been available in Greek clinics since the early 
1990s, but there was no oversight until 2005, when NAMAR was established. 
However, NAMAR never functioned fully,135 and it ceased its operations between 
2010 and 2015, when it was formally re-instated.136 More recently, NAMAR has 
undertaken the monitoring and licensing process of all Greek clinics performing 
ARTs.137 
Several Greek interviewees commented on the lack of oversight in surrogacy practice 
in clinics, which they believed leaves everyone, including surrogates, IPs, and 
surrogacy professionals, potentially open to exploitation.138 Two Greek clinicians, 
though, highlighted that Greek clinics were self-regulated, and had processes in place, 
such as mandatory counselling, filling the gap left by regulation.139 Indeed, several 
interviewees were worried that more intense oversight and monitoring would lead to 
overregulation that would complicate surrogacy practice. For instance, Mr Cazlaris 
said:  
The law hasn’t been fully applied yet. It prescribes monitoring processes that can 
prevent and eliminate harm. It’s a good law. It’s correctly designed. We knew what 
we were doing when we drafted it. We don’t need any more regulation. We just need 
to apply this law first. Clinics have been unregulated for too long.140 We now have to 
wait and see how this pans out, and whether law will be correctly applied from now 
on. 
In the UK, the 1990 Act established the HFEA to monitor ARTs practice in UK clinics. 
Since surrogacy may require treatment in a clinic, it is assumed that the HFEA is 
responsible for monitoring this practice, but there is no evidence on how this operates. 
                                                          
135 Paparrigopoulou F, 'National Authority of Medically Assisted Reproduction: Experiences and future 
perspectives' in Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou eds, 
Medical assistance in Human Reproduction: 10 years of the application of Law 3089/2002 (Sakkoulas 
2013); and evidence from Dr Tarlatzis, Mr Cazlaris, Ms Chatziparasidou, 
136 Presidential decree (31/07/2015). 
137 NAMAR’s Chairman, Dr Arntsaklis, recently reported that there are currently 44 fertility clinics in 
operation, and they have all received licenses by the Authority (Kougiannou, A. 'Huffington Post's big 
study on IVF in Greece' (05/12/2017) http://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/e-meyale-ereena-tes-
huffpost-yia-tis-exosomatikes-sten-ellada_gr_5a25615de4b0a02abe928cf3 accessed on 10/12/2017). 
138 Dr Pantos, anonymous Greek lawyer, Vidalis, Professor Hatzis, Dr Tarlatzis, Ms Chatziparasidou, 
Mr Cazlaris. 
139 Dr Pantos, Ms Chatziparasiou. 




As with Greece and NAMAR, many UK interviewees noted the lack of oversight by 
the HFEA, which they believed leaves users of surrogacy unprotected.141 
Natalie: [The HFEA] said to me that they don’t deal with surrogacy. They said they 
deal with clinics, but they have nothing to do with surrogacy other than the IVF side 
of it. I mean, it’s odd, isn’t it? That it’s the HFE Act that governs how surrogacy works, 
but the HFEA doesn’t have any responsibility for us? To listen to us, or to report data. 
I think that’s hugely missing. 
Dr Avery similarly noted that the HFEA is not involved in the surrogacy practice, 
suggesting this shows the HFEA’s desire to demarcate the boundaries of its remit in a 
way that excludes surrogacy. Moreover, all UK interviewees said that the lack of 
oversight means that informal support mechanisms had to be developed to protect the 
parties from potential harm, and that surrogacy organisations often fill this gap.142 
Both based on Horsey’s recent study,143 and on my own evidence, the three reputable 
UK surrogacy organisations work well, although they are completely unregulated and 
unmonitored. However, given that these organisations are unlikely to allow an 
arrangement to proceed in those cases where people are not prepared to follow their 
processes and rules, this might be considered as a kind of regulation, namely self-
regulation.144 For example, Natalie said: 
The UK system (…)involve[s] putting a lot of trust onto somebody. (…)I felt 
particularly vulnerable when we were looking into surrogacy. (…)We were afraid that 
someone might take advantage of us. The way the law is set up it kind of leads you to 
worry about these things. [T]he way that we felt we could do it was by going through 
a reputable organisation that had processes and checks and that whole 
community;(…) we felt that we were very safe there from those risks. (…)The 
surrogacy community has had to sort out themselves; we’ve put good practice in place 
to mitigate the risks that the system presents. 
Some interviewees (who were involved in surrogacy organisations) believed there is 
possibly a need for greater regulation of UK surrogacy organisations, suggesting that 
they do not see the space left by regulation as ‘productive’ in a good way. 
Sarah: I have faith that Brilliant Beginnings are doing a great job, and I have faith 
that COTS are doing a great job. (…)We [SUK] recommend these organisations 
because we know the people who are running them, and we know they have the same 
processes that we have, the same checks. (….)However, there’s no one making sure that 
we [surrogacy organisations] are acting appropriately. (…)[W]e are very lucky that 
                                                          
141 Sarah, Marina, Professor Brazier, Kirsty Horsey. 
142 Natalie, Marina, Sarah, Lauren, Steve and Simon, Helen Prosser and Natalie Gamble. 
143 Horsey’s study (n42). 
144 This confirms evidence in Brazier Report [3.1]. 
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we do have a community where we all know each other and work well together. (…)I 
genuinely think we should be accountable to somebody. 
However, Natalie who is involved in SUK noted the possibility of state-monitoring 
possibly making it difficult for the organisation to handle the increased costs and 
bureaucracy that such a process would bring. 
In some respects, I can see that regulation of surrogacy organisations would be good, 
but I think the reality of it would be that organisations like SUK, which don’t have 
huge amounts of money or resources would find it very hard to survive having to go 
through so much administration. (…)And that would meet my concern about possible 
over-professionalisation of it. 
Furthermore, despite the assumption in the literature and case law that informal 
independent surrogacy arrangements can be dangerous,145 because they are completely 
unmonitored, Jamie noted that such processes and checks are common in practice, 
which is again evidence of self-regulation filling the gap left by formal regulation. 
On the other hand, the lack of efficient monitoring of UK surrogacy organisations 
leaves room for other less ‘well-intentioned’ surrogacy organisations to operate, which 
appear to be an exception. Although no cases of exploitation of IPs and surrogates by 
such organisations have been publicised, my data suggest that some IPs have been 
harmed financially by a profit-making surrogacy organisation that used to operate in 
the UK. 
Marina: There was an organisation called […].146 I knew about four or five couples 
that handed over £30,000-4 ,000. They lost it all. Now they’ve got children, but 
they’ve got them through COTS. I don’t even know if that organisation has been 
punished. 
Despite the concerns and discontent evident in my UK sample due to the lack of formal 
monitoring processes, the great majority of my interviewees emphasised that 
surrogacy works well because the parties form strong relationships of trust and 
friendship.147 This confirms the findings in Horsey’s study,148 and shows that law is 
largely irrelevant to preventing exploitation during UK surrogacy arrangements. 
Natalie: The reality of surrogacy in the UK is that it works really well in spite of he 
regulation. (…)I don’t think that exploitation is an issue in the UK at all. Everyone I 
know from SUK has a relationship of friendship and trust with their surrogates and 
                                                          
145 n4; Jackson (n25). 
146 The name of the organisation has been removed to avoid potential libel. 
147 Vasanti Jadva, Lauren, Natalie, Simon, Steve, Marina, Sarah, Natalie Gamble and Helen Pross r, 
Professor Brazier, Jamie, Kirsty Horsey. 
148 Horsey’s study (n42) 34. 
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surrogates have good relationships with IPs. (…)Actually, I’ve spoken to independent 
surrogates and it is very similar. 
In summary, my data showed that surrogacy generally works well both in Greece and 
the UK, although there is little formal oversight. In the UK, informal systems of self-
monitoring have developed, mostly through surrogacy organisations, which appear to 
be working well, apart from the case of a rogue organisation noted above. Many UK 
interviewees who are involved in those organisations were in favour of their practices 
being formally regulated, but there were also fears that overregulation could have 
adverse effects.   
6.3.4 Residence requirements 
In the UK, residence is only a criterion for the acknowledgement of the IPs’ 
parenthood following surrogacy; it is monitored after the child has been born, if the 
IPs apply for a PO. In Greece, until 2014, law required both the surrogate and the IM 
to live permanently in Greece, and residence was monitored at the start of the 
arrangement by the judiciary. The residence rule was presented as guarantee against 
commercialisation and exploitation,149 but there is little evidence regarding whether it 
achieves its aims. 
In 2012, Ravdas tried to gather evidence of potential exploitation by researching the 
transcripts of judicial hearings for surrogacy, and this is the only source of evidence 
currently available in Greece. He found that 38 per cent of surrogates were foreigners 
who lived in Greece, but, in most cases, there was a reference to a close friendship 
between the IPs and the surrogate,150 and no evidence that the surrogates had been 
trafficked merely to act as surrogates.151 While the data available to Ravdas was 
inevitably limited, he concluded that the profile of surrogates alone cannot lead to safe 
generalisations about whether exploitation takes place. In 2014, regulators lifted the 
residence requirement, and now either the surrogate or the IM must live in Greece at 
least temporarily.152 This change was explained as an attempt to bring the law in line 
with the modern realities of surrogacy, referring to the phenomenon of ‘reproductive 
                                                          
149 Minutes of the parliamentary proceedings (27/11/2002, 3/12/2002). This was also noted by Vidalis, 
Dr Tarlatzis, anonymous lawyer. 
150 However, it is possible that this is something the parties felt that they should say to secure approval, 
with the judge having no way of checking whether it is genuine. 
151 Ravdas (n11). 
152 Article 17 Law 4272/2014. 
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tourism’.153 However, it is possible that the legislative change increases the risk of 
exploitation. 
My interviewees were divided on this issue. Some remarked that the profile of women 
who usually offer to become surrogates in Greece raises concerns about 
exploitation;154 Vidalis said it is mostly foreign women living in Greece, and Ms 
Chatziparasidou that it is usually women who are unemployed or of low income, 
whereas IPs are usually wealthier (though not necessarily rich). On the other hand, 
some interviewees said surrogates are mostly friends or relatives of the IPs, and that 
there is no exploitation.155 However, the possibility of exploitation in surrogacy 
arrangements that occur within the family cannot be excluded, as the surrogate in such 
cases may be subject to many forms of subtle coercion.156 
Additionally, for some, the financial crisis, paired with the refugee crisis in Europe, 
and the 2014 legislative change regarding residence for surrogacy in Greece, 
intensified their concerns that vulnerable women of lower socio-economic status may 
be tempted to act as surrogates.157 However, speculative considerations of harm are 
insufficient to counteract the importance of respecting autonomy, and here it is 
uncertain whether harm is or will ever be incurred. Also, some interviewees criticised 
the regulation as ‘hypocritical’ because, on one hand, it prohibits commercial 
surrogacy, but, on the other hand, it promotes reproductive tourism.  
Lastly, several Greek interviewees noted that there is no evidence in the media or 
through cases appearing in the courts to suggest exploitation.158 Yet, one interviewee 
emphasised that exploitation cases possibly do not go through the formal legal route, 
meaning that we have no knowledge of them.159 Generally, my sample, though small 
and partly self-selected, suggested that the residence rule never worked effectively, 
that there is generally a strong environment of mutual respect, friendship, care and 
support during and after the surrogacy arrangement, and revealed no instances where 
anyone felt exploited.160 
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156 Raymond JG, 'Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman' (1990) 20(6) The 
Hastings Center Report 7.
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In this chapter, I explored how well the Greek and UK surrogacy regimes address 
concerns related to autonomy and welfare during a surrogacy arrangement. In both 
countries, the autonomy concern is operationalised primarily through the requirement 
of consent. I found that Greece has a more robust formal system of ensuring valid 
consent through monitoring by the judiciary and clinics. In the UK, consent is formally 
monitored by clinics only, meaning that regulation fails to provide oversight of 
mechanisms to ensure valid consent in surrogacy arrangements not going through 
clinics. Nevertheless, there could be informal surrogacy arrangements happening 
under the radar in Greece that we know nothing about. Also, my UK interviewees 
expressed complaints about the way consent is operationalised in clinics. 
Based on my evidence, UK surrogacy organisations play a significant, informal role 
in consent-provision, but their role is under-studied, and they are currently 
unregulated. The latter was highlighted both as a good a bad thing by my interviewees. 
Nonetheless, the DHSC recently acknowledged their significant role in UK surrogacy 
practice through new guidance to medical professionals and surrogates and IPs. 
Further, I found that clinics in both countries usually make surrogacy counselling 
mandatory, though it is not legally mandated, and counselling is seen as another way 
to operationalise autonomy concerns. Another important finding is that UK 
interviewees considered surrogacy agreements very important, and had signed one, 
though they are not legally mandated and have no direct legal force. Within my 
sample, there was a high level of contentment with the status-quo regarding respect 
for autonomy in surrogacy in both countries, although it was suggested that this often 
happens despite the law, not because of it. 
With regards to welfare concerns, I found that IPs are possibly at a greater risk of being 
harmed, which challenges the widely held assumption that surrogates are most 
vulnerable. My interviews failed to uncover any direct experience of exploitation in 
either country and few are reported in the literature. However, there may well be some 
cases of exploitation which go unreported, as for example the exceptional case of a 
rogue UK organisation that disappeared having taken large payments from IPs noted 
by one interviewee. 
Further, my evidence showed that UK surrogacy arrangements are largely 
unregulated, and informal systems have been developed to fill the gap in formal 
211 
 
regulation. Again, this is evidence of things working despite, not because of, the law. 
Additionally, in both countries, I found an overwhelming support for the principle of 
altruism, but it was suggested that the ‘reasonable’ expenses rule does not work well 
in either country, because there is a lot of vagueness around what it entails. However, 
some believed this offers a sense of empowerment to the parties in a surrogacy 
arrangement, and there was no evidence of harm from excess payments. Despite 
criticisms about the lack of effective regulation of surrogacy practice in both countries, 
surrogacy appears to work relatively well, and some expressed fears about the negative 
effects that overregulation might bring. 





Parenthood following surrogacy in Greece and the 
UK 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with how and to what extent the Greek and UK parenthood 
provisions for surrogacy meet the criteria for a ‘good’ law laid out in Chapter 2. In this 
context, respecting the principles of autonomy, welfare, and justice entails that 
regulation has clear rules and transparent processes guaranteeing certainty of 
parenthood, and processes on how to resolve potential disputes. Moreover, a ‘good’ 
surrogacy regime should ensure that the intentions of the parties in a surrogacy 
arrangement are respected and enforced, unless harm may be caused as a result. This 
would guarantee that, in so far as possible, the ‘right’ people are recognised as parents; 
children are recognised as part of the ‘right’ family; and the best interests of everyone 
involved in the arrangement receive due regard. Lastly, a ‘good’ surrogacy law should 
guarantee equality of all social groups in accessing legal parenthood, again subject 
only to constraints imposed by welfare concerns. 
Before turning to this critical evaluation of the legal provisions, it is worth first 
recalling the main contours of the legal position regarding parenthood under the Greek 
and UK regimes. Greek law stipulates a full intention-based model of parenthood 
following surrogacy based on a preconception, court-authorised, gestational, altruistic 
surrogacy agreement that becomes enforceable after the child’s birth.1 As a result, the 
IM is presumed to be the legal mother at birth. The IM’s husband or consenting 
partner, if she has one, is also automatically acknowledged as the legal father at birth. 
Additionally, neither party can renege on the agreement after the child is born. 
However, the legal presumption of motherhood is refutable: if the surrogate has 
evidence that the child is genetically linked to her, she can apply to the court within 
six months of the birth and dispute the parenthood status. 
                                                          
1 Articles 1458,1464 GCC. 
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UK law allows both traditional and gestational surrogacy, and the surrogate and her 
husband or consenting partner are considered the legal parents at birth, with the IPs 
having the possibility of gaining parenthood through a PO (or adoption) several 
months after the child’s birth.2 Therefore, in the UK, parenthood is based on gestation 
and birth, not on intention, as in Greece, and surrogacy agreements are non-
enforceable. UK law lays out several PO eligibility criteria, relating to the mode of 
conception, the altruistic character of the surrogacy arrangement, the IPs’ relationship 
status, the surrogate’s consent, a time limit, the child’s residence with the IPs at the 
time of the PO application, and the child’s genetic relationship with at least one of the 
IPs. Lastly, and most importantly, the PO must be in the child’s best interests, which, 
since 2010, is the court’s paramount consideration.3 If the PO is granted to the IPs, a 
new birth certificate is issued to capture the new parenthood status. From the above, 
the Greek and UK regimes differ considerably regarding determination of parenthood 
following surrogacy. I now discuss how well these provisions operate in practice. 
7.2 Respect for and promotion of autonomy 
The Greek parenthood provisions for surrogacy (and other ARTs) came into effect in 
2002,4 and have been described, mostly by Greek commentators, as very progressive 
and liberal.5  Greece is one of only few countries worldwide to employ an intention-
based model of parenthood, and to make surrogacy agreements enforceable. Through 
the enforceability rule, regulation aims to show that it trusts the sincerity of the parties’ 
intentions, and respects their reproductive autonomy.6 However, to date, there has 
been no evidence about whether these provisions achieve these aims. 
My Greek interviewees voiced overwhelming support for intention-based parenthood 
and enforceability.7 According to some, the automatic acknowledgement of the IPs’ 
                                                          
2 s.30 1990 Act, as amended. 
3 PO Regulations 2010. The rule was established by Hedley J in Re L (a minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 
(Fam). 
4 Law 3089/2002 (2002 Law), which reformed parts of the GCC. 
5 Kounougeri-Manoledaki E, Assisted reproduction and family law. The Grek legislation: Laws 
3089/2002 and 3305/2005 (Sakkoulas 2005) 6; Hatzis A, 'From soft to hard paternalism and back: the 
regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece' (2009) 49(3) Portuguese Economic Journal 207; 
Trokanas T., Human Reproduction. Personal autonomy and its limit  (vol 13 (Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., E. 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki and E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou eds, Publications on Medical Law and 
Bioethics, Sakkoulas 2011) 407; McCandless J. et al, A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy 
in EU Member States (European Parliament, 2013). 
6 2002 draft law Committee, 5/10/2002. Secondly, Greek law aims to protect the parties, and the child, 
from potential harm, which will be discussed later. 
7 Vidalis (legal academic and advisor of the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission), Dr Tarlatzis 
(clinician and policy-maker), Professor Hatzis (legal academic), Giota (IM), Lena (surrogate and 
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parenthood shows the law’s respect of the IPs’ intentions, and provides them comfort 
and security.8 Areti, a Greek mother of twins through surrogacy, recounted her 
experiences of dealing with infertility,9 and noted her satisfaction with the Greek rule 
acknowledging the IPs’ need to be legally recognised as the surrogate-child’s parents 
at birth, and to be certain they will remain so: 
Ever since I was 18 years old (…)I’ve known that surrogacy was my only chance of 
becoming a mother. (…)When you can’t have a child, you want it even more. I know 
now that there’s life without a child, but I couldn’t see it back then. (…)[The fact] that 
we [Areti and her husband] would be legal parents from the moment of birth gave us 
a sense of comfort and security. (…)I like the rules about parenthood here. It’s a shame 
for law to make it difficult for IPs to become legal parents, because everyone who’s 
going through surrogacy has certainly had many difficult experiences in their past 
[due to infertility]. 
 
Additionally, the great majority of my Greek interviewees considered the intention-
based model a positive measure, because it guarantees the IPs’ parenthood even in 
cases where they have no genetic link to the child.10 Also, they described this model 
of parenthood as ‘fair’ and ‘justified’ by the IPs’ great investment in the process. For 
instance, Professor Hatzis stated: 
The IPs are investing greatly; they’re the ones who invite the surrogate, who 
compensate her, and possibly provide their genetic material; therefore, they should 
have priority. We should only give priority to the surrogate if she’s offering her genetic 
material as well. However, here [in Greece] the surrogate is acting as a donor. D s 
don’t intend to parent any children that may be created from their genetic material. 
The intention-based model of parenthood was welcomed by both surrogates I 
interviewed in Greece, which is surprising and disputes assumptions often made in the 
literature. Each saw it as recognising the correct respective roles of the parties in a 
surrogacy arrangement, and as safeguarding the surrogates’ autonomy. They believed 
it protects the surrogate from having to raise a child she never intended to, ensures she 
will never be forced to be financially and legally responsible for that child, and allows 
her to return to her family and her ‘normal’ life soon after the completion of the 
                                                          
clients’ manager in large Greek fertility clinic), Areti (mother of twins through surrogacy), Elina 
(surrogate). Complete list of interviewees and short biographies in Appendix C. 
8 Areti, Giota, Elina, Lena. 
9 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, surrogacy in Greece is only allowed if there is a medical need for 
it. 
10 In contrast to the UK, Greek law allows double donation in surrogacy. The argument presented in the 
main text was endorsed by Dr Tarlatzis, Professor Hatzis, Dr Pantos (clinician), Areti, Giota, Vidalis, 
anonymous lawyer, Elina, Lena. 
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agreement without legal complication.11 Importantly, not one of my Greek 
interviewees was critical of the intention-based parenthood model. 
Moreover, many interviewees suggested that surrogacy is primarily a path to (at least 
partial) biological parenthood, since double donation and surrogacy cases are 
extremely rare.12 Additionally, IPs revealed they chose surrogacy because it offered 
them the chance to have a genetic offspring, which they considered important.13 All 
Greek surrogates and IPs said they had very positive experiences at the fertility clinic 
and the hospital, and that everyone involved in the practice (lawyers, medical 
professionals, officials at the Registry of Births) was generally aware of and 
understanding towards the particularities of surrogacy.14 Professionals in Greek 
surrogacy practice presented the same image, noting this is due to the clear-cut rule 
that the IM is the legal parent from birth.15 This shows that the law is embedded into 
the consciousness of those involved in surrogacy in Greece, although it is possible for 
some amount of bias to exist within my sample. 
To avoid discrepancies and doubts regarding the process for registering the child 
following a surrogate birth at the hospital, NAMAR issued guidance in 2005 
instructing midwives to register surrogate-born children under the IM’s name 
immediately after birth, as Dr Tarlatzis explained. However, Professor Hatzis 
suggested that, a year after this guidance was issued, midwives in Greek public 
hospitals were unaware of it and rather too ready to register the child under the IM’s 
name without supporting legal documentation. 
When I presented my research at a midwifery conference in 2006, I met three midwives 
who recounted their experiences with (…)surrogacy. When I described the legal 
process and the preconception court decision to them, they were surprised. They told 
me there was no court decision (…)[and] that the surrogates they had helped were 
admitted to the hospital under the [IM’s] name without supporting documentation. 
This is the black market, and it’s very dangerous. Both the IM and the surrogate would 
be unprotected. 
This suggests that there have been some discrepancies in Greek surrogacy practice, 
some informal surrogacy arrangements have taken place, and some children have been 
                                                          
11 Lena, Elina. 
12 Professor Hatzis, Dr Pantos, Dr Tarlatzis, Ms Chatziparasidou (clinician). 
13 Areti, Giota, Aria (lesbian mother through ‘surrogacy’), Katerina (lesbian woman who acted as her 
partner’s ‘surrogate’). 
14 Aria, Areti, Elina, Lena. Areti and Lena considered it a positive measure that the child is registered 
under the IPs’ names right away, and there is no mention of surrogacy at all. 
15 Dr Tarlatzis, Dr Pantos, Mr Cazlaris (embryologist and policy-maker), anonymous lawyer. 
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registered under the IPs’ names illegally, nonetheless without causing subsequent 
problems and disputes over parenthood. Furthermore, it indicates that there is a need 
to explore whether medical professionals have gained more knowledge and awareness 
about surrogacy law, and whether the law is now being properly applied. Though the 
medical professionals I spoke to in Greece demonstrated detailed knowledge of and 
significant commitment to the formal legal process of surrogacy, it is possible that 
others are far less well-informed. 
The UK parenthood provisions for surrogacy have received much criticism by 
scholars. McCandless and Sheldon suggest that they do not value the intentions of the 
parties in a surrogacy arrangement and reproduce ‘traditional’ ideas about the 
‘family’.16 Some note the parenthood rules perceive surrogacy as a type of adoption 
rather than ARTs,17 and fail to reflect the realities of surrogacy.18 According to Horsey, 
the UK parenthood regime for surrogacy ‘creates or maintains ambiguity by failing to 
recognise and legally acknowledge this visible social family unit that is intended to be 
formed’.19 Others comment that the UK parenthood model is ‘grudging[,] 
incomplete…[and] deficient’,20 ‘clumsy and convoluted’,21 ‘thoroughly confused’,22 
and ‘incoherent and inadequate’.23 Moreover, some suggest the non-enforceability 
rule shows no respect for the parties’ autonomy,24 while case law shows that surrogates 
                                                          
16 McCandless J and Sheldon S, 'The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity 
of the Sexual Family' (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review 183. 
17 Brazier Report 1998 [6.13]. For criticisms: Elsworth M and Gamble N, 'Are Contracts and Pre-Birth 
Orders the Way Forward for UK Surrogacy?' (2015) IFL 157,160; Blyth E, 'Parental Orders and Identity 
Registration: One Country Three Systems' (2010) 32(4) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 345; 
Re A & B (Children: POs: Time Limits) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam) [41]. 
18 Horsey K, 'Unconsidered Inconsistencies. Parenthood and Assisted Conception' in Horsey, K. and H. 
Biggs (eds), Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Reproducing Regulation (Routledge-Cavendish 
2007) 159. 
19 Ibid 160. 
20 Johnson MH, 'Surrogacy and the HFE Act' in Cook, R., S. Sclater and F. Kaganas (eds), Surrogate 
Motherhood: International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2003) 95. 
21 Fox M, 'The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: Tinkering at the Margins' (2009) 17 
Feminist Legal Studies 334; McCandless and Sheldon (n16) 175,180. 
22 Warnock M, Making Babies. Is there a right to have children? (OUP 2002) 88. Here, she says she 
came to regret the Warnock Committee’s recommendations which were hostile towards surrogacy. 
23 Horsey K, Swept Under the Carpet: Why Surrogacy Law Needs Urgent Review, vol 5 (Wrigley, A. 
and N. Priaulx eds, Ethics, Law and Society, Ashgate 2013), Introducti n. 
24 Nelson E., Law, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2013) 347. 
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very rarely change their minds,25 and Horsey’s recent study reveals that many UK 
surrogates disagree with the legal right to change their minds following birth.26 
The vast majority of my UK interviewees agreed with these critiques. Almost all of 
them said UK law does not recognise the ‘right’ people as parents at birth, and does 
not promote the autonomy of the parties in a surrogacy arrangement,27 and some 
remarked that the UK parenthood rules fail to reflect the social reality of UK 
surrogacy.28 Others thought the IPs’ intention to have a child and their commitment to 
their parental role starts even before pregnancy and birth, and expressed resentment as 
to why they are not treated as legal parents.29 Also, some noted it is difficult for IPs, 
particularly those who are the child’s genetic parents, to understand why the 
surrogates’ (and, if she’s married, their husbands’) names go on the birth certificates,30 
and that UK IPs are often surprised when they find out they are not legal parents of 
the child they are raising.31 
Further, some interviewees revealed that, due to the way parenthood is determined in 
the UK, they experienced ‘uncomfortable’ situations: for example when the surrogate 
had to complete the birth register or had to sign all legal paperwork for the child.32 
Most UK interviewees reported that surrogates do not wish to be named as the child’s 
mother after birth, because it does not represent their real feelings and intentions.33 
For example, Sarah said: 
The biggest problem for me is that the surrogate is considered the mother and [so] my 
husband is considered the father. The surrogate doesn’t want to be known as the 
mother. It’s an uncomfortable situation when you have to go and register the birth. 
                                                          
25 CW v NT & another [2011] EWHC 33; Re N (A Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 1053; H v S (Surrogacy 
Agreement) [2015] EWHC 36 (which was presented as a case of enforceability, but it was a child 
welfare decision). 
26 Three quarters of the surrogate respondents in Horsey’s study said so (Horsey K, Surrogacy in the 
UK: Myth busting and reform, Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy Law Reform 
(Surrogacy UK, November 2015) 21). 
27 Vasanti Jadva (psychology academic), Andrew Powell (family law barrister), Kirsty Horsey (legal 
academic), Natalie (SUK mother and SUK Trustee), Sarah (SUK surrogate and SUK Chair), Jamie 
(independent surrogate).  
28 Natalie, Sarah, Andrew Powell, Kirsty Horsey, Marina (COTS surrogate), Natalie G mble (family 
lawyer and BB co-founder) and Helen Prosser (BB co-founder). 
29 Vasanti Jadva, Kirsty Horsey, Lauren (SUK surrogate) Simon and Steve (gay fathers through SUK), 
Jamie, Sarah. 
30 Vasanti Jadva, Professor Brazier, Kirsty Horsey. 
31 Kirsty Horsey, Andrew Powell, Natalie Gamble. 
32 Vasanti Jadva (referring to evidence from her own studies), Sarah, Natalie, Steve. 




She doesn’t want to do that. It’s a really special time and the parents should go and 
register their own child. My husband doesn’t want to go on as the father.  
Jamie also described the law’s lack of respect towards the IPs’ intentions: 
It’s a bit of a backward issue that I’ve got more rights as the birth mum of this baby 
than the man who’s bringing her up,34 who’s going to work to put food on the table, 
who’s putting a roof over her head. (…)I think that whole perception is wrong. 
Most UK surrogates I interviewed thought that law awards them the ‘wrong’ identity 
by identifying them as mothers, which confirms findings in Horsey’s recent study.35 
For example, Marina said that having been called a mother for the surrogate-children 
made her ‘feel offended for [her] own kids’, and thought she should be called ‘an 
incubator, not a mum’. Sarah identified as an ‘egg donor, not a mum’, while Jamie 
described surrogacy as ‘an extreme version of babysitting’. Only Lauren (SUK 
surrogate) mentioned that, although she never felt like the child’s mother,36 it was 
‘right’ that her name was on the birth certificate, as this consists a formal recognition 
of her contribution to the creation of this child. 
Lauren: I didn’t really feel like a mum. (…)I went on that birth certificate because I 
gave birth to her, and even though I wasn’t her mum, I was the mum in the eyes of the 
law. That’s just the way it is. (…)The child’s still going to be living with you [IPs]. 
You’re still going to be a parent to her, so what’s the big deal really? (…)It’s just a 
piece of paper. 
Professor Brazier (a leading UK legal authority on surrogacy) said that the problems 
arising from the principle of motherhood enshrined in UK surrogacy law are due to 
bad design, and that they reflect of the 1990s regulators’ lack of real understanding of 
the particularities of surrogacy, and the society’s unpreparedness to accept and 
comprehend surrogacy at the time. 
[T]he problem is the maternity provisions are designed to deal with the much more 
common process of egg donation, not surrogacy. (…)I remember in 1990 sitting down 
and trying to draft a Bill that would provide two separate routes to parenthood, and 
it’s hellishly difficult. (…)And, social attitudes have changed a lot since when I was 
[working on] surrogacy. 
Although the UK surrogacy law was revisited in 1998 by the Brazier Committee, most 
of the Committee’s proposals were ignored by the 2008 regulators. Some scholars 
                                                          
34 Jamie’s IPs were a gay male couple. 
35 Horsey (n26) 34. 
36 Although Lauren was a gestational surrogate, she showed signs of some maternal feelings towards 
the child. She said: ‘They say that when you’re giving birth, you get that overwhelming sense of love 
and bond for that child, and I did get that, but I didn’t get it for her as like “my baby”, I’ve got it for 




argue that the regulators missed the opportunity to fully review and update the 
surrogacy parenthood provisions, and to make law more ‘fit for purpose’.37 During our 
interview, Professor Brazier emphasised that the government that commissioned the 
Brazier Committee was indeed interested in reforming surrogacy law, but later lost 
interest. 
The people who engaged us [the Brazier Committee] to carry out the review, including 
the then Minister of Health, Tessa Jowell, (…)seemed to be genuinely interested and 
genuinely concerned, very helpful, and quite measured in their approach. Having 
produced the report and the “hoo-ha” of recent cases having died down, I think other 
people from the DoH [Department of Health] just lost interest. 
Other UK interviewees struggled to find positive elements in the current UK 
parenthood provisions, with most indicating that the law is outdated and ripe for 
reform.38 Although gestational surrogacy is more popular nowadays, there are still 
many UK traditional surrogates.39 While only half of the surrogates I interviewed (two 
out of four women) had a genetic relationship with the surrogate-born children, the 
rest of them said they would try traditional surrogacy if they could,40 and all thought 
the genetic link was not important at all. 
Additionally, several interviewees believed the UK parenthood rules offer a less than 
ideal schema, because it is founded on the false supposition that surrogacy is a type of 
adoption,41 which does not represent the views of the parties in UK surrogacy 
arrangements.42 Professor Brazier, considered this hypothesis to be false (and in need 
for reform) now, but true at the time when the parenthood provisions were constructed. 
                                                          
37 Horsey K and Sheldon S, 'Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy' (2012) 
20 Med Law Rev 74; Fenton R, Heenan S and Reece J, 'Finally fit for purpose? The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008' (2010) 32(3) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law282; Horsey K and 
Neofytou K, 'The fertility treatment time forgot: What should be done about surrogacy in the UK?' in 
Horsey, K. (ed), Revisiting the Regulation on Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge 2015) 
119,120,132. 
38 Except for 4 interviewees: Dr Sue Avery (clinician) stated that the rule of motherhood is difficult to 
change, and we should focus on resolving parenthood sooner but definitely after birth. Lauren, Simon 
and Steve believed the parenthood provisions are largely fine, but language and attitudes must change. 
39 Kirsty Horsey said she was ‘surprised’ by how many women wanted to be traditional surrogates, 
adding that this is probably down to cost. In her survey, 35.1% of the surrogate respondents were 
traditional surrogates (Horsey (n26) 20). 
40 Marina said she regrets having had elective sterilisation at a younger age (after she completed her 
own family and before she became a surrogate), and that she would have liked to be a traditional 
surrogate. Lauren only offered to be a gestational surrogate, because she ‘didn’t know that straight 
[traditional] surrogacy really existed’, and ‘just assumed that if you had straight you’d have to have 
sex’ but she now knows this is false. Also, she wanted to wait to have children of her own and then 
offer her eggs for surrogacy, but has now reconsidered, because she realised ‘genetics are not important 
when you’re building a family’. 
41 Brazier Report 1998 [6.13]. 
42 Kirsty Horsey, Andrew Powell, Natalie Gamble, Helen Prosser, Professor Brazier. 
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I suppose in 1990 we never really thought in terms of [IPs]; it kind of seemed to be a 
starker choice for the genetic parent, the genetic mother, or the gestational mother. 
(…)I’ve come to the view that you have to accept surrogacy is a hybrid. (…)I 
remember then gestational surrogacies happened but they were very rare, so there 
were largely partial [traditional] surrogacies. Probably in our minds (…)we were kind 
of [looking] more towards the adoption model then than we do now. (…)I would want 
to look more at how far we could re-define the notion of commissioning parents as 
[IPs], and how it might be easier then to grant them the status they want without having 
to wait [for the PO]. 
Andrew Powell, went further than Professor Brazier and remarked that the perception 
of surrogacy as akin to adoption is a mismatch, because it awards a false identity to 
the surrogate-born child. 
[Surrogacy is] more like assisted conception than it is adoption, because with adoption 
you’re dealing with a child whose birth family is not the same as the actual legal 
parents(…). With surrogacy, the conception of the child comes from the IPs. The 
effects of the PO and the adoption order are very similar; they terminate the birth 
parents’ parental rights and vest full parentage on the IP or adopter. But I think that’s 
about it. (…)The life story of an adopted child is so different to a surrogate-born 
child’s. The only family that a child born through surrogacy knows in theory is the IPs 
[or the IP]. 
Additionally, although under UK law surrogacy agreements have no legal force, all 
the IPs and surrogates I interviewed had signed a surrogacy agreement,43 and many 
were displeased that the law did not enforce the intentions of most UK surrogates, who 
do not want to keep the child after the completion of the arrangement.44 Furthermore, 
many participants disagreed with the rule regarding a six-week ‘cooling-off’ period 
following birth, after which the surrogate can legally consent to a PO. They suggested 
it only causes anxiety to the parties, and limits the surrogate’s autonomy, since it 
prevents her from returning to her ‘normal’ personal and family life.45 
Notwithstanding the criticisms and problems mentioned by UK interviewees about the 
failures of UK law in respecting and enforcing the intentions of the parties in a 
surrogacy arrangement, some identified as an important positive development that UK 
regulation allows the genetic father to register as the child’s father even before the PO, 
if the surrogate is single.46 
Based on my evidence, the Greek parenthood provisions for surrogacy clearly better 
reflect the intentions of the parties in a surrogacy arrangement, and, thus, more 
                                                          
43 Including Jamie, which challenges the claim often made about parties in independent surrogacy 
arrangements not signing an agreement. 
44 Sarah, Natalie, Lauren, Jamie, Natalie Gamble, Vasanti Jadva. 
45 Vasanti Jadva, Sarah, Marina, Jamie, Natalie. 
46 Dr Sue Avery, Jamie, Lauren. 
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effectively promote their autonomy. In the UK, I found a lot of discontentment with 
the parenthood provisions for surrogacy, and many interviewees indicated that the 
law’s idea of legal parenthood is significantly out of line with their views. Lastly, 
though it is possible that there are (or were) good policy reasons for the law to limit 
the extent to which autonomy is recognised (for example, to protect the welfare of the 
surrogate who might change her mind), none of the surrogates in my sample felt they 
needed or wanted this protection. This will be further discussed later. 
7.3 Achieving equality of access to legal parenthood 
Under Greek law, ARTs, including surrogacy are available to single infertile women, 
and heterosexual couples married or in a partnership (of opposite sex), either legally 
acknowledged as a civil partnership or de facto relationships. Nevertheless, Greek law 
does not expressly make surrogacy available to same-sex couples, and it remains 
unclear whether it is available to single infertile men, with clear implications for their 
ability to be accorded legal parenthood. As discussed in Chapter 3, there have been 
two cases of single infertile men who sought and obtained permission from Greek 
courts to access formal legal surrogacy,47 which meant that they could automatically 
benefit from the parenthood provisions. One of these cases was dismissed on appeal 
and the man had to share legal parenthood with the surrogate, who was recognised as 
the legal mother by birth.48 However, no appeal was sought against the other case, so 
it remains a moot point whether single men can benefit from the Greek parenthood 
provisions for surrogacy. 
Some Greek interviewees commented on this issue and suggested that the law’s failure 
to recognise legal parenthood rights to single men reveals inequalities that are entirely 
unjustified and potentially harmful.49 Takis Vidalis referred to the Appeal Court 
decision above, and deemed it as ‘unfair’ and ‘incorrect’, while also arguing for the 
need ‘to change the law and remove the limitation to surrogacy based on gender’. 
Moreover, there is a gap in Greek law regarding same-sex couples’ right to attain 
(shared) legal parenthood following ARTs, including surrogacy. The latter is a major 
and topical concern, especially since the recent recognition of a statutory right of 
                                                          
47 Single-Member Court of Athens no.2827/2008; Single-Member Court of Thessaloniki 
no.13707/2009. 
48 The 2008 case cited above was dismissed by the Appeal Court of Athens no.3357/2010. 
49 Professor Hatzis, Dr Tarlatzis, Vidalis, Cazlaris. 
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same-sex couples to form legal civil partnerships and to adopt and foster children.50 
Finally, although same-sex parenting is not legally recognised, reports suggest that 
there are at least 200 children being raised by same-sex couples in Greece,51 but in a 
situation of legal limbo.  
Recent surveys show that a large percentage of the Greek public still does not support 
same-sex parenting,52 but the vast majority of my interviewees clearly identified the 
ambiguity regarding same-sex couples’ ability to attain legal parenthood following 
surrogacy as Greek law’s weakness.53 Only Elina strongly disagreed with such a 
development, because she believed a child should have both a female and male role 
model. However, empirical evidence suggests there is no basis for Elina’s belief in 
terms of child welfare.54 
                                                          
50 Law 4356/2015 for same-sex civil partnerships and Law 4538/201 for same-sex couples’ right to 
adoption and fostering. Kipouridou K and Milapidou M, 'Homosexuals' right to procreation in Greece' 
(2015) 1(1) Bioethica 39; Papadopoulou L, Restrictions in medically assisted reproduction in 
Greece (Kantsa, V. ed, Kinship and medical technology. Assisted reproduction in Greece, Aleksandreia 
2015) 13. 
51 G. Brekoulakis, M. Papafilippou and S. Belia, Same-sex Parenting in Greece and Internationally 
(Attachment Parenting Hellas, 2017). 
52 A 2016 poll shows that 85% of respondents were against same-sex par nting (Kostopoulou M, 
'Attitudes towards same-sex civil partnership' Public Issue 10/07/201 
<http://www.publicissue.gr/12596/varometro-jan-2016-coh/>. Also, Thanopoulos, V. 'In favour of 
rights to civil partnership but against adoption by same-sex couples' (11/02/2016) 
<http://avmag.gr/61882/iper-tou-simfonou-simviosis-alla-kata-tis-iiothesias-apo-omofila-zevgaria/> 
accessed on 10/07/2017). A 2016 survey reports a lower rejection rate: 77% (Georgakopoulos T, 'What 
do Greeks think: A Survey' (February 2016) DiaNeosis 10/07/2017 
<http://www.dianeosis.org/2016/02/what_greeks_believe_post/>). 
53 Takis Vidalis, Dr Tarlatzis, Dr Pantos, Professor Hatzis, anonymous Greek lawyer, Aria (lesbian 
mother through ‘surrogacy’), Katerina (lesbian mother who acted as a ‘surrogate’), Lena. Cazlaris had 
reservations as to whether children should grow up in same-sex families but recognised that law should 
nevertheless allow it for equality reasons. Others noted that law should not make it difficult for any IPs 
to have a child through surrogacy in Greece (Areti and Giota). 
54 Blake L and others, 'Gay father surrogacy families: relationships with surrogates and egg donors and 
parental disclosure of children's origins' (2016) 106(6) Fertility and Sterility 1503; Jadva V, and others, 
'Surrogate mothers 10 years on: a longitudinal study of psychologica  well-being and relationships 
between the parents and child' (2015) 30(2) Human Reproduction 373. Golombok S and others, 
'Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements: Parent–Child Relationships in the 1st Year of 
Life' (2004) 40(3) Developmental Psychology; Golombok S and others, 'Surrogacy families: parental 
functioning, parent–child relationships and children’s psychological development at age 2' (2006) 47(2) 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 213; Golombok S and others, 'Non-genetic and non-
gestational parenthood: consequences for parent–child relationships and the psychological well-being 
of mothers, fathers and children at age 3' (2006) 21(7) Hum Reprod; Golombok S and others, 'Families 
created through surrogacy: Mother-child relationships and children’s psychological adjustment at age 
7' (2011) 47(6) Dev Psychol; Readings J and others, 'Secrecy, dis losure and everything in-between: 
decisions of parents of children conceived by donor insemination, egg donation and surrogacy' (2011) 
22(5) Reproductive BioMedicine Online 485; Golombok S and others, 'Children bor  through 
reproductive donation: a longitudinal study of psychological adjustment' (2013) 54(6) J Child Psychol 
Psychiatry 653. The children’s positive attitude towards surrogacy was also noted by Vasanti Jadva 
during our interview. 
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Finally, Vidalis noted that the vagueness regarding single men’s and same-sex 
couples’ right to attain legal parenthood following surrogacy sits in clear tension with 
the constitutional right to have a child.55 However, Mr Cazlaris indicated that this is 
owed to lack of foresight rather than design: 
[I]t couldn’t have been foreseen back in 2002 that there would be such cases. It was 
almost 20 years ago. (…)Surrogacy and parenthood after that can be accessed by 
single women; why not by single men too? There’s inequality here. The 2002 Greek 
society wasn’t ready to accept single men or gay couples having a child through 
surrogacy. This needs re-looking at. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, although Greek surrogacy law does not expressly allow access 
to ARTs in clinics to same-sex couples, Aria and Katerina, a lesbian couple, have been 
able to have a child through ‘surrogacy’ with the clinician’s permission and help. 
Nevertheless, the couple could not attain shared legal parenthood, since this is 
currently unregulated. Katerina explained how they found a way to acknowledge 
Aria’s role in the child’s life by making her proxy for all decisions relating to the child. 
They also described the regulatory and public approach towards same-sex parenting 
as ‘hypocritical’ and ‘unfair’, and suggested discontent because the reality of their 
family is not formally recognised. Additionally, some interviewees reported the 
incidence of surrogacy in cases of gay male couples in Greece but emphasised that 
these are informal arrangements.56 
On balance, UK law appears to be more effective in achieving equality in parenthood 
following surrogacy, as it makes POs available to heterosexual couples who are 
married, unmarried, in formally recognised civil partnerships or in enduring family 
relationships, and, since 2008, POs are open to same-sex couples. However, it has yet 
to do so for single people, and people needing double donation and surrogacy,57 and, 
as discussed in the previous section, it has been criticised for not representing the 
realities of the family created through surrogacy. Recently, the discrimination against 
single IPs was recognised in Re Z,58 and the government has now submitted a proposal 
for a remedial order, which, if approved, will make single IPs eligible for POs.59 
                                                          
55 Article 5(1) Greek Constitution. 
56 Anonymous lawyer, Dr Pantos. 
57 PO applicants must be a couple and at least one of them to be genetically related to the surrogate-
born child ((s.54(1) HFE Act 2008). 
58 Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam). 
59 Hansard (29/11/2017) Written statement-HLWS282. Also, the Law Commission confirmed that 
surrogacy will feature in its 13th Programme of Law Reform (LawCom No.377,2017). Note that my 
UK interviews were completed before the submission of the remedial order. 
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UK interviewees unanimously considered the non-recognition of single parenting as a 
major weakness of UK surrogacy law, especially since law allows single parenting 
through adoption and ARTs. Moreover, some said it shows the law’s attachment to 
‘traditional’ ideas about the family and an unjustified disapproval of certain people’s 
parenting abilities.60 Additionally, UK participants were in favour of making POs 
available to people in need of double donation, but a few expressed their concern about 
surrogacy becoming a substitute for adoption, if double donation were allowed. Their 
concern was, however, based on the assumption that ‘there are many children waiting 
to be adopted’,61 which the literature notes as probably untrue.62 
In summary, neither regime currently achieves full equality regarding access to legal 
parenthood following surrogacy, compounding the inequalities in access to the 
practice discussed in Chapter 5. However, UK law is better at making parenthood 
following surrogacy available to a wider group of people than is Greek law. Most 
interviewees in both countries supported developments towards opening the 
boundaries of legal parenthood. 
7.4 Protection from harm and promotion of welfare 
In this section, I explore to what extent Greek and UK surrogacy regulation meets the 
aspiration of protecting IPs and surrogates from harm, and whether existing limitations 
on autonomy and equality are justified by reference to welfare considerations. I focus 
on harm that may arise due to legal uncertainties regarding parenthood (7.4.1), due to 
one of the parties reneging on the surrogacy agreement (7.4.2), due to welfare concerns 
regarding donor anonymity (7.4.3), and due to stigma (7.4.4). 
7.4.1 Lack of certainty regarding parenthood 
In Chapter 2, I argued that a ‘good’ surrogacy regime should minimise harm that may 
be caused due to ambiguities in parenthood.63 In Greece, due to the legal presumption 
of motherhood in favour of the IM, the IPs’ (or IP’s) parenthood is automatically 
recognised upon the child’s birth. Consequently, there is little room for ambiguity and 
                                                          
60 Natalie, Sarah, Marina, Andrew Powell, Professor Brazier. 
61 Jamie, Andrew Powell. 
62 Due to the rising numbers of infertile persons, the demand for adoption is higher than the supply of 
children available to be adopted (Freundlich M, ‘Supply and Demand: The Forces Shaping the Future 
of Infant Adoption’ (1998) 2(1) Adoption Quarterly 21). 
63 Chapter 2, ‘Harm-based arguments’. 
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dispute, which meets the law’s aim.64  Greek literature commends the law’s 
approach.65 However this arrangement may raise concerns for the surrogate’s welfare: 
she cannot change her mind following birth if she is not biologically linked to the child 
and may thus be harmed by having to give up a child who she has now decided she 
wants to keep. My study is the first to offer some (albeit limited) empirical evidence 
about whether the Greek law’s response to these potential welfare concerns is 
adequate. 
My Greek interviewees showed overwhelming support for, and satisfaction with, the 
legal presumption of motherhood in favour of the IM at birth. They described the rule 
as ‘the strongest element’ of the law,66 noting that it promotes and protects the child’s 
interest to have certainty of parenthood immediately after birth and recognises the 
‘right’ people as parents at birth.67 For example, two interviewees said: 
Professor Aristides Hatzis: This clear-cut rule [legal presumption of motherhood at 
birth] is very important, because it is in the best interests of the child to have clarity 
regarding parenthood as soon as possible. (…)I don’t find it cruel to the surrogate. 
(…)[T]here’s an agreement in place and no biological link. 
Takis Vidalis: [I]t is important that the child (…)is not genetically linked to the 
surrogate at all. I believe it is fair. If there’s a genetic link, she [surrogate] can reverse 
the legal parenthood status. (…)I believe that, in general, it is a guarantee for the 
child’s best interests if her parents desire her deeply. (...)It is in the child’s best 
interests to be with them, not with someone who may have formed a bond with her. I 
believe that bond will be short-lived. 
Others suggested that this rule guarantees legal clarity, which then facilitates the 
building of more straightforward and less emotionally charged relationships between 
the parties,68 and reduces the possibility of disputes during and after the surrogacy 
arrangement.69 Moreover, all IPs and surrogates I interviewed in Greece fully 
supported the Greek parenthood provisions, with surrogates noting they did not feel 
the need to be protected by the law, because they were certain they would complete 
the agreement and never wavered. Additionally, they said they still enjoy close 
relationships with their IPs.70 Moreover, a few interviewees believed the exception to 
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the legal presumption of motherhood protects the surrogate’s welfare by not forcing 
her to permanently waive her parenthood rights if she is genetically related to and has 
bonded with the child.71 
Moreover, several interviewees disclosed that some Greek medical practitioners have 
adopted further measures and processes to preserve certainty of parenthood and limit 
harm that may arise from a parenthood dispute later in the child’s life. Dr Pantos 
described how his clinic performs a DNA test to affirm the lack of genetic link between 
the surrogate and the child, and Elina and Lena said it is common for surrogates to 
receive contraception prior to their IVF treatment to eliminate the possibility of the 
child being genetically related to the surrogate. 
The UK legal model provides for the PO, a post-birth process which transfers 
parenthood from the surrogate and her husband/consenting partner, if she has one, to 
the IPs. However, it offers far less legal certainty regarding the IPs’ parenthood, since 
the PO is subject to several eligibility criteria, judicial scrutiny, and the surrogate’s 
consent. Also, the most important requirement is that the PO must serve WoC, which 
is the court’s paramount consideration when making the Order. The UK parenthood 
rules have been described by scholars as inconsistent, uncertain, and heavily 
dependent on judges’ discretion.72 In a recent study, some Cafcass officials involved 
in the PO process criticised the lateness of the point at which the state takes part in 
regularising UK surrogacy arrangements.73 
According to Horsey’s recent study, the UK parenthood model ‘creates or maintains 
ambiguity’,74 thereby harming the parties in a surrogacy arrangement and the child. 
Others suggest that,  due to the uncertainty of legal parenthood in the UK, many IPs 
choose to travel abroad for surrogacy and some do not apply for POs,75 whereas others 
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‘illegally register themselves as the child’s parents (sometimes at the explicit advice 
of lawyers)’.76 Lastly, the majority of Horsey’s respondents had numerous complaints 
against the parenthood provisions, and called for better laws which would simplify 
domestic surrogacy, and would ensure easier and more automatic recognition of 
parenthood of the IPs.77 
The vast majority of my UK interviewees shared these criticisms and noted that the 
concern to protect the surrogate’s welfare does not justify uncertainties in legal 
parenthood.78 Natalie Gamble and Helen Prosser described the PO framework as 
‘clumpy’, ‘clumsy and problematic’. Also, many UK interviewees suggested that 
uncertainties regarding parenthood harms the IPs, the surrogates, and the child.79 For 
example, Vasanti Jadva said: 
I think IPs are always a bit anxious about the fact that the surrogate is the birth mother 
and is named on the birth certificate. There’s uncertainty. (…)IPs have to wait for six 
weeks before they can apply to become the legal parents of their child, and that’s [a] 
really anxious six weeks. And it’s a big thing. You’ve got to go to court, and there’s a 
legal process, and (…)a lot of anxiety.(…)The other thing is that the (…)surrogate has 
to sign all the paperwork. And that’s really difficult for IPs because on the one hand, 
their child’s just arrived, they’re parents, and someone else has to sign all the 
paperwork. And the surrogate doesn’t want to be doing this either. They want it to just 
be their responsibility up until the birth and then they’ve got their own family to go 
back to. (…)Also, the child is vulnerable because (…)there’s a lot of uncertainty 
regarding parenthood. 
Natalie, SUK mother of twins and SUK Board Member, emphasised the significance 
of the legal acknowledgement of the IPs’ parenthood, and noted the frustration and 
anxiety she and her husband felt when their legal parenthood was questioned. 
Our anxiety was more around the PO and the hospital. All the areas where there was 
a question about ‘who was the parent’ from the system; that was where we felt more 
frustrated and anxious. (…)Practically and legally [the PO] is very important because 
of inheritance rights, medical decisions, and legal parenthood. And for [the surrogate] 
as well; she doesn’t want to have responsibility for our children, (…)and make 
decisions about schools and travelling, getting passports. So practically it’s 
important, emotionally it’s important. And for the children it’s important. It’s a huge 
part of their identity. 
 
                                                          
76 Blyth (n17) 345. 
77 Horsey (n26) 37-38. 
78 As we will see below, UK surrogates do not wish to have a right to change their minds and keep the 
child. 
79 Vasanti Jadva, Andrew Powell, Helen Prosser, Natalie Gamble, Professor Brazier, Kirsty Horsey, 
Lauren, Natalie, Simon, Marina, Sarah. 
228 
 
The surrogates I spoke to also confirmed the above.80 Others remarked on the 
emotional harm that children may experience when they find out that the people they 
recognise as parents (IPs) were not their legal parents for some time.81 Some also 
believed the law’s perception of parenthood awards children the ‘wrong’ identity, 
which could be harmful.82 Marina, COTS surrogate, noted the possibility for the 
surrogates’ children to feel upset when they find out that their mothers were considered 
the legal mothers of the surrogate-born children. Although recent studies report that, 
generally, surrogacy is a non-issue for children,83 two interviewees suggested that 
some distress was experienced by children (the surrogate’s children and the children 
born through surrogacy), which, according to their parents, was due to the legal 
uncertainties created by the UK parenthood provisions.84 
Some UK interviewees also remarked on the harm caused by the extended waiting 
times until a PO is legally obtained,85 and some referred to administrative errors, which 
further delayed and/or complicated the process, which increased the angst and 
frustration felt by IPs and surrogates.86 Moreover, they emphasised that no serious 
harm has been incurred so far, but this is despite, rather than because of, the law. For 
instance, Sarah said: 
It’s absolutely crazy that the genetic parents of the child have to wait for so long to be 
recognised as the child’s legal parents. (…)The children need to be protected. They 
need to know who their parents are without waiting for a year or a few months fr t e 
courts to hear the case and grant them a PO. (…)It’s bad for the surrogate, too. It’s a 
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long time to be financially and legally responsible for that child. (…)[I]t’s only down 
to everybody’s good graces that something bad hasn’t happened. 
Additionally, other UK interviewees mentioned practical problems that arose due to 
the uncertainty regarding legal parenthood.87 For instance, Natalie complained about 
awkwardness in the hospital following the birth of their children. She mentioned that 
they (IPs and the surrogate) were ‘ignored a lot’ by the medical staff in the hospital 
after the twins were born, and that ‘no one came and sat with [her] as the new mum 
and treated [her] like one’. Others reported the lack of policies that respects the IPs 
and the new-born child after a surrogate birth, and a few revealed their discontent with 
the hospital insisting that the new-born children must leave the hospital premises with 
the legal mother, namely the surrogate.88 Sarah said such cases are very common and 
that the reason why, in most cases, surrogacy works well is due to the good will of 
medical professionals, therefore, despite the law, not because of it. 
 [W]e’ve had surrogates who have been in hospitals, and the hospital has asked the 
IPs to leave after the babies were born, and she [the surrogate] had to look after the 
child. We [SUK] had another surrogate who wanted to leave the hospital, and the 
midwife said: “if you go, I would have to call social services”. [I]t’s confusing for the 
midwives and the health care professionals, because the surrogate is the legal mother. 
It’s only on the good graces of the hospital that the IPs are there for the birth, and 
[that] they [can] look after the child, that they make the medical decisions. Sometimes 
the hospital will not have any consideration for the IPs at all, which is a real problem. 
(…)Most of the time common sense prevails, but it would be different if the law was 
clearer. 
Furthermore, some UK interviewees said the uncertainty of legal parenthood creates 
practical difficulties, especially when children born via surrogacy need emergency 
medical care before a PO is granted to the IPs. For example, Natalie (mother through 
SUK) had to take the twins to the hospital for emergency treatment, but the surrogate 
was not there to provide consent. When Natalie was asked if she was the mother, she 
replied ‘yes’, although legally she was not, which made her feel very vulnerable. 
Steven and Simon likewise said they felt unsupported by the medical system, and had 
trouble registering the child with their local doctor, because their parenthood status 
was unclear at the time. 
Steven (gay father through SUK): Before [the child] was born I really wanted to meet 
the midwife to talk about post-birth care, and my [local doctor] said the midwives 
aren’t going to see us [IPs]; they see the woman [the surrogate]. (…)When I went to 
register [the child] at the [local medical centre] they told me to put [the child] under 
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Lauren’s [surrogate] name, because she hadn’t been registered under our names yet. 
That was annoying, and very problematic. 
These findings are confirmed by other sources. Respondents in Horsey’s study 
revealed their unhappiness with how they were treated in the hospital, and called for 
policies that ensure better treatment of those concerned.89 Cases of hospitals insisting 
the baby leaves with the surrogate, and of surrogate-born babies changing hands in 
hospital car parks, were also recently reported by the media, and re-sparked public 
debate about a legal reform of the UK parenthood rules.90 Recently, the DHSC 
addressed these problems through new guidance clarifying that IPs should be offered 
the support that all new parents receive, that the parties should be able to be discharged 
separately, and that the ‘hand-over’ of the child should take place inside the hospital 
premises.91 
Moreover, it was evident in my UK sample that the uncertainty regarding parenthood 
leads many IPs and surrogates to find comfort and security in UK surrogacy 
organisations.92 For Jamie, a UK independent surrogate, the relationship of trust she 
built with her IPs provided that sense of security. Furthermore, it is often noted in the 
literature that some UK IPs, namely those who can afford it, will go abroad for 
surrogacy mainly because UK law fails to guarantee certainty of parenthood.93 
Although my sample comprised only of people who have done surrogacy within the 
UK and of people with professional experience of UK surrogacy, I heard this claim 
from many interviewees.94 
Many also noted that international surrogacy could be harmful, especially if the IPs 
choose destinations where surrogacy is not well-regulated.95 Additionally, some 
interviewees revealed that IPs who have undertaken surrogacy abroad often do not 
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apply for a PO in the UK,96 because they think they have already gained legal 
parenthood, most likely because they have been provided with a birth certificate 
abroad with their names on it, or because they do not see why a PO is required.97 
Lastly, the literature suggests that some IPs do not apply for a PO because they are 
afraid of the legal scrutiny and the legal costs.98  While Horsey’s study found no 
evidence to support this concern,99  it was reported to me by an experienced family 
law barrister.100 
It is clear both from the wider literature and from my own evidence that the uncertainty 
of parenthood stemming from the UK parenthood rules has had a negative effect on 
the experiences of IPs, surrogates, and surrogate-born children. Importantly, UK 
surrogates, whose welfare these rules assumingly protect, were as critical of them as 
other groups. My relatively small data-set confirmed the findings of other studies that 
UK surrogacy is mostly unproblematic, and the experiences are primarily positive.101 
However, it was suggested that surrogacy works despite the law, not because of it. My 
data offered a particularly powerful confirmation of the importance of trust in 
surrogacy, a theme which has also been noted in the literature.102 Lastly, while my 
interviewees noted the important role played by the sympathy and flexibility of the 
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judges deciding POs in the UK,103 they equally highlighted the need to update the PO 
rules, because ‘there will be a case [where] judges will not be able to grant a PO’.104 
In Greece, where parenthood is certain at birth, I found no complaints and negative 
experiences. Rather, all Greek participants considered the automatic intention-based 
model of parenthood a positive measure that protects from delays and minimises 
disruptions in the life of the family created through surrogacy. Lastly, my data suggest 
that the Greek parenthood provisions are better at fostering and promoting trust in 
surrogacy. 
7.4.2 Protection from harm if someone changes their mind 
In Chapter 2, I argued that if one reneges on the agreement, the other party may be 
harmed legally, financially, and emotionally. However, this risk could be minimised 
through proper and effective regulation. In Greece, surrogacy agreements are 
enforceable upon the child’s birth, which is an extension of the intention-based 
parenthood model. As I mentioned earlier, little is known about Greek surrogacy, and 
evidence is largely anecdotal, therefore, my data make a significant contribution to the 
literature. 
All Greek interviewees commended the legal rule for the after-the-birth enforceability 
of surrogacy agreements, and many believed it reflects the real intentions of the parties 
and promotes the surrogate’s autonomy.105 Further, all Greek IPs and surrogates 
emphasised that Greek surrogates do not have maternal feelings towards the child. 
Evidence from Greek surrogates also suggests that they are content with the law 
recognising that free, autonomous surrogates have the right to make legally binding 
commitments. For example, Elina stated: 
No one forced any woman to be a surrogate. She shouldn’t have the right to change 
her mind. She should know why she’s doing it and what it means. I knew why I was 
doing it. Why would I cause more pain and heartache to this woman [IM]? She should 
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be protected by law. If the surrogate is initially cool with everything, and she then 
changes her mind and keeps the child… It’s just wrong! (…)The IPs give their time, 
money, their soul. (…)You can’t treat them like fools. 
Moreover, both Greek surrogates referred to a sense of pride and relief, not sadness, 
when their arrangements were completed, which challenges an assumption often made 
in the literature that a surrogate needs the law’s protection because of being forced to 
give up a child when she has changed her mind, or feels harmed in other ways if she 
does give up the child.106 In fact, both said this protection would be unnecessary and 
inappropriate, because they did not want to keep the child. Also, they mentioned they 
had a good relationship with their IPs, which was retained long after the completion 
of the arrangement. 
Elina: I didn’t want to keep that child(…). I would never bond with that child, I knew 
it from the start. Even during the pregnancy, I never felt affection for the baby. 
(…)[I]t’s a different kind of love. It’s like I love my niece and nephew. (…)I have no 
regrets. (…)I felt relieved when it was over, not sad. (…)We are still very close with 
[the IM] and her family. (…)I’m very proud of what I’m doing. (…)[The law] should 
provide more protection to the IPs, not the surrogates, and it does, so it’s good. 
Lena: I’ve had two surrogate journeys with two sets of IPs. (…)I have no bond with 
the children. I made a very conscious and well-thought-out decision to be a surrogate. 
(…)I often say I’m the kids’ first nanny. I never felt like their mum. (…)I feel very 
proud about this, because I helped those couple become parents, but I also created 
aunts and uncles and grandparents. (…)We have very close relationships, and both 
sets of IPs were always there for me when I needed them. (…)I felt protected by the 
law. There was no way I would have to care for a child I never wanted to raise.
(…)There are no negative aspects in the Greek surrogacy law. 
While it is impossible to know with certainty whether there are cases where surrogates 
change their minds, it is worth noting that no cases of surrogates leaving with the child 
or disputing parenthood have been reported in Greek media or the courts, and neither 
first-hand nor anecdotal accounts of such problems emerged during my interviews. 
Some Greek interviewees said the IPs initially experience ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’ about 
the surrogate potentially leaving while she is pregnant with the child,107 or about the 
surrogate potentially refusing to give the child over to the IPs.108 However, they 
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recognised that Greek law minimises, as far as possible, these possibilities through the 
enforceability rule.  
Others emphasised that enforceability only impacts on parenthood issues after birth, 
while it also supports the development of strong and trusting relationships between the 
parties.109 For example, a Greek lawyer who spoke under terms of anonymity, said: 
The parties usually sign the agreement because they have to, not because they want it 
enforceable. In any case, the agreement is not enforceable per se, it’s not like other 
contracts. It’s merely an agreement between the parties. It just clears things up from 
the start and helps the parties build their relationship. It doesn’t impact on the 
surrogate’s freedom at all. She can’t claim for any expenses the IPs haven’t paid for. 
She can even leave the country, and the court can’t do much about it. 
(…)[Enforceability] is just an extension of the legal presumption of the [IM’s] 
parenthood rights upon the child’s birth, nothing more. 
The above points were supported by all Greek surrogates and IPs I interviewed. Elina 
disclosed she never signed an agreement with her IPs and enforceability was, thus, 
irrelevant, because she trusted that her IPs would honour their agreement. However, 
she agreed that the rule of enforceability is helpful and useful, because it asks the 
parties to clarify important issues from the start of the surrogacy relationship. The rest 
said the written agreement was ‘merely a safety net’ rather than a binding contract, but 
that they liked that it has legal force.110 Additionally, some interviewees believed 
enforceability guards against exploitation.111 For example, Takis Vidalis said: 
I see the right of the surrogate to change her mind as grounds for potential exploitation 
of the IPs. She can claim she has bonded with the child and extract more money from 
the IPs after the birth. But the IPs can’t change their mind and leave the child with the 
surrogate either. So, it’s good for both parties. 
In the UK, surrogacy agreements are non-enforceable. Mackenzie notes that the UK 
non-enforceability rule aims at protecting the parties from exploitation, and that it was 
retained due to the Brazier Committee’s ‘assumption that surrogacy should be 
governed by family values’,112 though it is difficult to understand what this means. 
Although non-enforceability shows a concern for the surrogate’s welfare, namely that 
she will not have to give up a child she has bonded with and wants to keep, in reality, 
there have only been two reported cases where UK surrogates wished to keep the 
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child.113 Lastly, most surrogates who responded to Horsey’s survey said the IPs should 
be the legal parents at birth, whether they are genetically related to the child or not, 114 
and three quarters of surrogate-respondents believed they should not have the right to 
change their minds.115 
My UK interviewees were generally critical of the non-enforceability rule. The 
surrogates I interviewed unanimously agreed that, in the great majority of cases, 
surrogates are clear about their intentions from the start, and their determination does 
not waver during pregnancy or after the birth. Many UK participants said the surrogate 
bonds with the IPs, not with the child,116 and surrogates believed they should not be 
permitted to change their minds, because this is unfair both towards the IPs and the 
child. For instance, Jamie said: 
I think once you’ve decided to become a surrogate and fall pregnant, you have entered 
into an agreement, and you should know that this is what’s going to happen. You 
should not have a right to keep the baby(…). It’s unfair for the IPs. 
Furthermore, UK surrogates unanimously agreed that they are not in need of 
protection. Professor Brazier likewise noted that ‘clearly the surrogate holds all the 
cards as long as she can threaten not to hand the baby over’, and others thought the 
non-enforceability gives a lot of control to the surrogate, who could exploit the IPs.117 
On the other hand, some said there have been unreported cases in the UK where the 
IPs have changed their minds, and surrogates have been left legally and financially 
responsible for those children. Therefore, non-enforceability can be potentially 
harmful to either party in a surrogacy arrangement. Some interviewees suggested that 
due to the non-enforceability rule, no one is protected under UK law,118 and many 
argued that the rule causes a considerable amount of anxiety to IPs and surrogates, 
who fear that the other party will renege on the agreement, thus harming the parties’ 
relationships.119 Hence, UK parenthood provisions, in their current form, not only 
potentially cause harm, but also fail to foster the development of trust between the 
parties, which, again, threatens their welfare. For example, Marina said: 
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If the surrogate doesn’t feel that the couple are doing it her way or they’re being a bit 
awkward or difficult, it’s because they’re petrified that she could keep the baby. So, 
they act inappropriately because they’re out of control. There’s no relaxation about 
it. It’s very hard for the couples. (…)Sometimes the surrogate is afraid, too. (…)[She’s] 
depressed, or [thinks] that the couple have just dumped her or going to dump her. 
(…)Things would be clearer if agreements were enforceable. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, much of the literature tends to focus on the potential 
exploitation of the surrogate by the IPs, and almost completely ignores that 
exploitation might equally occur in the other direction. My interviewees in both 
countries strongly endorsed the view that the IPs are at least as vulnerable to 
exploitation as the surrogate, if not more, especially in countries where surrogacy 
agreements are unenforceable, as in the UK. Whereas this possibility was noted in 
Greece, there was less worry about one party reneging on the agreement. 
The vast majority of my UK interviewees argued for a parenthood model that 
recognises the IPs’ intention. While they did not use the language of ‘enforceability’, 
they were basically calling for a model which resembled the Greek one. Many argued 
for a legal regime that would ensure the IPs’ parenthood rights pre-birth or at-birth, 
through a preconception agreement probably with a strong presumption of 
enforceability that would not be final and an option to enforce the agreement, if 
necessary.120 Others argued for a model which would ensure the IPs’ parenthood rights 
as soon as possible after birth, and definitely sooner than the current regime does 
now.121 Some interviewees also emphasised that the UK is probably edging towards a 
model that resembles enforceability due to the rule that makes WoC the paramount 
consideration of the court when making a PO.122 
Kirsty Horsey: I don’t agree we should enforce [surrogacy agreements]. But I’m not 
entirely sure you’d need to. If you already have the rule that [WoC] is paramount, 
that’s already enforcing orders; we’re just not calling it an enforceable order. That’s 
already enforcing people’s intentions. We’ve had cases where the child was given to 
the IPs, because it wouldn’t be in its best interests to be removed from there and taken 
away. 
However, although the judge will ignore various things if it is clearly in the child’s 
best interests to award a PO to the IPs, it could not be deemed that enforceability is 
accepted or adopted by the UK regime, given that the surrogate needs to consent to 
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the PO.123 Yet, the evidence noted above suggests that the discontentment with 
enforceability is more of an issue of language rather than an issue of disagreement 
with the principle itself. 
In summary, UK law is ostensibly more closely concerned with the prevention of harm 
to a surrogate than is Greek law. However, it fails to recognise the realities of UK 
surrogacy without providing a convincing justification for the choice of non-
enforceability, especially considering that, according to my evidence and findings of 
relevant UK studies, UK surrogates do not wish to have a right to change their minds. 
Surrogates in Greece also rejected this option. Additionally, my evidence suggests that 
enforceability better supports the development of the surrogacy relationship, posing 
no real threat to the surrogate. Although some UK interviewees disagreed with 
enforceability, many of them supported a future legal reform which would place more 
weight on the intention of the IPs and would help IPs attain legal parenthood sooner 
than they do now.  
7.4.3 Welfare concerns regarding donor anonymity 
The ethical standards for a ‘good’ surrogacy law laid out in Chapter 2 dictate that law 
should promote and protect the WoC, thereby preventing harm to the child. One 
important WoC concern relates to donor anonymity.124 Some commentators argue that 
the establishment and preservation of donor anonymity could violate the child’s right 
to know her genetic origins, and harm the child’s sense of identity, while also limiting 
the child’s autonomy rights.125 This would suggest that the law should prioritise the 
child’s right to know her origins above the intention of the adults who act as donors 
(and surrogates). A striking difference between the Greek and UK models is that Greek 
law endorses donor anonymity in all forms of ARTs,126 as an extension of the 
intention-based perception of parenthood underlying Greek law,127 hereas UK law 
                                                          
123 Except if she cannot be found: Re D & L (minors) (surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631; A & B [2016] 
(n103). 
124 Though I do recognise that this is an important welfare concern, my main focus is on other important 
ethical values that relate more closely to surrogacy than gamete donation. This discus ion forms part of 
this chapter because it was considered important to many interviewees as a welfare concern that may 
come into play in deciding parenthood following surrogacy. 
125 Turkmendag I, 'The Donor-Conceived Child's 'Right to Personal Identity': The Public Debate on 
Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom' (2012) 39(1) Journal of Law and Society 58-75; Blyth E and 
Farrand A, 'Anonymity in donor-assisted conception and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child' 
(2004) 12 International Journal of Children's Rights; Turner and Coyle (n84). 
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has, since 2005,128 abolished donor anonymity. The Greek rule that foregrounds 
intention and protects the autonomy of the adults arguably sits in tension with child 
welfare concerns.  
Again, there is no empirical data about how the Greek rule of donor anonymity works 
in practice. Many Greek interviewees did not agree with preserving donor anonymity. 
In fact, some perceived it as the law’s failure to protect the child’s identity, and her 
right to know and potentially trace her biological family.129 However, others 
considered it a good and fair measure, because it reduces the donor shortage problem, 
it enables the free exercise of reproductive autonomy, and is line with the intention-
based parenthood model.130 
Interviewees in the UK, where known donation is now very well embedded, 
considered it ‘good’ law.131 Yet, a few believed there is an imbalance between the 
child’s right to access the genetic donor’s identity and the inability of the child to know 
the surrogate, unless the IPs decide to disclose her identity.132 However, it does not 
seem to be a big problem, given the good relationships and ongoing contact during 
and after the surrogacy arrangement shown by my sample. 
Although it could be accepted that the child has a prima facie right to know her 
biological origins, it is also important to note that this right needs to be balanced 
against the adults’ privacy rights. This choice will, however, be culturally contingent. 
It is possible that donor anonymity plays a useful role in Greek surrogacy. As I argue 
in the next section, surrogacy is still a taboo issue, and the importance placed on donor 
anonymity might be read as representing an attempt to minimise and challenge stigma. 
7.4.4 Entrenching or challenging stigma 
While surrogacy is now established as a legally accepted practice both in Greece and 
the UK, recent research on ARTs in Greece suggests that it is still subject to significant 
stigma.133 This also emerged as a clear theme in my interviews. Despite the Greek 
                                                          
128 HFEA (Disclosure of Donor Anonymity Information) Regulations 2004, and s.33(1) HFE Act 2008. 
129 Haris Cazlaris, Dr Pantos, Aria and Katerina (lesbian couple who had a child through anonymous 
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identity. 
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133 A. Chatjouli, I. Daskalaki and V. Kantsa, Out of Body, Out of Home. Assisted Reproduction, Gender 
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law’s liberal position on surrogacy, there is still a lot of secrecy and suspicion around 
it.134 For instance, Lena said:  
[S]urrogacy is still a taboo, more so than any other form of ARTs, and nine out of ten 
IPs are secretive about surrogacy in this country. 
Additionally, she disclosed that some IMs, especially if they live in the countryside 
and not in a large city, may wear a prosthetic stomach to conceal the surrogacy 
arrangement. Elina agreed that surrogacy is still a taboo issue, adding that people often 
judge her when she reveals she is a surrogate. Furthermore, an anonymous Greek 
lawyer suggested that many IPs choose to submit their surrogacy applications to 
Athenian courts, because there is then less chance that it will become known. The very 
fact that this lawyer spoke on condition of anonymity is perhaps symptomatic of that 
stigma.135 On the other hand, all Greek IPs and surrogates I spoke to showed signs of 
openness, pride, and disclosure.136 Lastly, all Greek professionals in surrogacy had a 
very positive view about surrogacy, and said they can see a change, though slow, in 
public perceptions about the practice. 
Although more research is needed to make a strong claim, arguably enforceability 
provides some acceptance of surrogacy, but at the same time, recognising the IPs’ 
parenthood at birth makes it easier to maintain privacy and that fosters secrecy, which 
then feeds stigma. According to Carol Sanger, ‘secrecy’ and ‘privacy’ are two distinct 
concepts: ‘secrecy’ is ‘more desperate and more necessary…, a much darker, more 
psychologically taxing, and socially corrosive phenomenon’,137 often being ‘a 
response to the threat or prospect of harm, whether harassment, stigmatisation, loss of 
one’s self-conception, or fear of violence’.138 Based on my data, surrogacy 
concealment in Greece is less associated with privacy and more with secrecy, which 
maintains stigma that could be harmful. 
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134 Mr Cazlaris, Dr Pantos, anonymous Greek lawyer, Ms Chatziparasidou, Elina, Lena, Ar ti, Giota. 
135 Additionally, Lena presented herself as the clients’ manager at a Greek fertility clinic, and two 
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In the UK, I found that, although the public perception of surrogacy has become more 
positive in recent years, the parenthood rules entrench and preserve some stigma 
against surrogacy,139 which confirms an assumption made in the literature.140 For 
instance, Natalie said: 
Surrogates don’t feel the way people assume them to. And that’s exactly what’s wrong 
with the principle of parenthood, (…)because actually it’s reinforcing this false truth 
that surrogates are giving away their babies. [T]hey’re saying to everyone “we’re not 
giving away our babies, we’re giving them back to their parents”. But the law itself is 
saying something different in the way it is set up, and that’s just not helpful. 
The same interviewees noted that the UK parenthood provisions show that regulators 
did not have a clear idea about the realities of surrogacy when they introduced 
surrogacy legislation, and approached it with some suspicion, which remained until 
today. Dr Avery noted: 
[B]ack in the 1980s, before the Act [SAA] came in, I remember going to a meeting(…), 
and somebody from the statutory licensing authority, which was one of the things we 
had before the HFEA, said: “surrogacy is a big yuck factor; we don’t like talking 
about it”. And it has moved on hugely since then. (…)Though they changed the law in 
1990, they didn’t change the law for surrogates [meaning the parenthood rules], and 
at that time really it did say “we really don’t like this. We’re really uncomfortable 
with this, because we think it’s a step too far”. 
Other interviewees noted that the law’s suspicion of surrogacy has a negative effect 
on some professionals involved in the practice. For example, Marina said the doctor 
who dealt with her pregnancy and delivery at the hospital treated her badly, because 
she and her IPs ‘put a strain on the NHS’ by choosing surrogacy. Moreover, some 
interviewees said the PO process is set in a way that involves IPs having to prove 
themselves, and routinely being questioned about their intentions and their abilities to 
become parents.141 
Despite the complaints about UK parenthood rules promoting a negative image of 
surrogacy, I found a far more pronounced environment of honesty, openness, and 
disclosure in the UK than in Greece. Most UK IPs had told their children about 
surrogacy from a very young age, and those who had not were planning to do so soon. 
UK surrogates followed the same paradigm. These findings confirm evidence from 
previous UK studies,142 and mirror what is recommended (and written about) in 
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relation to donor conception. Nevertheless, a few interviewees noted that there are 
layers of openness, since many IPs do not disclose that the child is genetically related 
to the surrogate in cases of traditional surrogacy until later,143 a possibility also noted 
in Readings et al’s study.144 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, I explored the extent to which the parenthood provisions in these 
countries fulfil the criteria of a ‘good’ surrogacy law I laid out in Chapter 2, namely 
the promotion and protection of autonomy, equality, and welfare. In terms of achieving 
equality of access to parenthood, my findings suggest that both laws have some 
weaknesses, but, on balance, UK law is more effective at making legal parenthood 
available to a wider group of people than is Greek law. I found that the non-recognition 
of legal parenthood to same sex couples and possibly single men, who have a child 
through surrogacy in Greece, sits in clear tension with the constitutionally recognised 
right to have a child. Also, UK law does not make POs available to people who are 
single and people who need double donation. My evidence suggests general discontent 
with the inequalities enshrined in both regimes. 
The Greek parenthood rules were considered to promote the parties’ autonomy by 
recognising and respecting the parties’ intentions, and the rules appear to work well. 
In contrast, UK interviewees noted that UK law fails to sufficiently recognise 
autonomy and intention in how legal parenthood is determined and often leads to 
various practical problems. My evidence also confirmed the findings of previous 
studies in showing that surrogates think law awards them the ‘wrong’ identity by 
recognising them as mothers. Lastly, despite widespread unhappiness with the 
workings of the parenthood provisions, UK surrogacy arrangements appear to work 
well in practice, but this is often despite (not because of) the law. This, again, confirms 
findings of other studies. 
Moreover, based on my data, UK law is weaker in achieving certainty of parenthood 
after surrogacy, which can be harmful to IPs, surrogates, and children. I found that 
enforceability does not limit Greek surrogates’ autonomy or cause harm to them, 
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thereby challenging the assumption often made in the literature. Greek interviewees 
also perceived enforceability as supporting the development of strong relationships of 
trust and friendship between the parties in a surrogacy arrangement. Additionally, my 
evidence confirms findings of UK studies that, although the UK’s non-enforceability 
rule was introduced to protect the surrogates’ welfare, surrogates themselves do not 
feel that this is necessary or appropriate and do not wish to have a right to change their 
minds. Greek surrogates also rejected this option. While UK interviewees did not use 
the language of ‘enforceability’, they were calling for a model which resembled the 
Greek one, with the IPs’ legal parenthood coming into effect at birth or soon after it. 
Another important welfare concern relates to donor anonymity. Greek law protects 
donor anonymity, whereas UK law has, since 2005, abolished it. My data suggests that 
there are two concerns at play here, which sit in clear tension: the adults’ privacy rights 
and the child’s right to know her genetic origins. The majority of my Greek 
interviewees were, however, against the abolition of donor anonymity. Lastly, in both 
countries I found evidence of stigma surrounding surrogacy, which was, however, far 
greater in Greece. Although the evidence is sparse and mostly anecdotal, Greek law is 
arguably helping to entrench secrecy, which may foster stigma. In the UK, too, some 
interviewees thought the parenthood provisions entrench and maintain some stigma.  
In the next chapter, I summarise the key findings of this thesis, highlight its 





This concluding chapter provides a summary of the key arguments and findings 
presented in this doctoral research. I revisit the overarching question of this thesis, 
namely how surrogacy should be regulated in law, and re-evaluate how appropriately 
and successfully the Greek and UK legal frameworks address ethico-legal concerns 
regarding surrogacy based on the theoretical and empirical evidence gathered 
throughout this thesis. Finally, drawing on the theoretical and empirical knowledge 
gathered through this research, I propose the principles underpinning ‘good’ 
regulation in surrogacy. I then consider how this research contributes to academic 
knowledge as well as its limitations and suggest possible paths for further fruitful 
research in this area. 
8.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis explored how surrogacy should be regulated through a sustained feminist 
comparative socio-legal methodology, and it is the first study that compares the Greek 
and UK models. I began my investigation by reviewing the autonomy thesis (Chapter 
2). Although autonomy is a contested concept in the literature, it is undoubtedly very 
important in the reproductive context: it creates a rebuttable presumption that one 
should be free to enter into a surrogacy arrangement and helps us understand the 
responsibilities of the state in relation to surrogacy. I argued that the negative right to 
autonomy entails that the State should not impose barriers to surrogacy, but, once 
surrogacy is permitted, the State has a general duty to ensure equality of access to the 
practice and legal parenthood following surrogacy and prevent discrimination against 
certain groups. 
I then examined a range of objections to surrogacy that purport to offer ‘good’ reasons 
to limit reproductive autonomy: first, that true autonomy is impossible in surrogacy; 
second, that surrogacy causes harm; third, that surrogacy practices offend against a 
concern with justice. The autonomy-based arguments are linked to concerns that 
autonomy is impossible because the surrogate’s response to pregnancy and 
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relinquishment is unpredictable, because the surrogate’s consent is influenced by 
certain conditions, and because consent can never be fully informed. 
The harm-based arguments relate to harm that can be caused to the surrogate due to 
her unnecessary exposure to physical and emotional risks, due to alienation, due to the 
IPs’ reneging on the arrangement, or due to exploitation, commodification, and 
objectification. Moreover, there are claims in the literature that the child can be harmed 
due to legal uncertainties regarding parenthood, due to commodification, and due to 
finding out the story of her creation. Additionally, although this is severely under-
researched, some concerns relate to harm to the IPs if the surrogate reneges on the 
arrangement, if their parental status is uncertain, and if the surrogate and/or surrogacy 
agencies exploit them. Lastly, justice concerns might offer reasons to impose a ban or 
certain limitations because surrogacy risks fuelling inequality (allowing rich people to 
exploit poorer women by having them carry their babies). Also, if we think surrogacy 
should be permitted, we should be concerned with how it is made available, and this 
should reflect a concern for social justice. 
I found that much of the literature is very dismissive of surrogacy on a theoretical 
level, and many arguments against it are made primarily based on a presumed harm to 
surrogates and children, without any empirical evidence of such harm or despite such 
evidence as exists. Also, most harm-based arguments largely relate to commercial 
surrogacy, which presumably intensifies the risk of harm,1 again without evidence of 
generalised harm. I argued that a total prohibition on surrogacy is not the answer unless 
this is the only way of preventing the harms alleged, namely where appropriate and 
effective regulation is unable to remedy them. This requires a detailed, concrete 
consideration of how surrogacy operates in practice and what role regulation can play 
in respecting and promoting reproductive autonomy, protecting the welfare of key 
participants, and ensuring equal, fair, and affordable access to surrogacy and to legal 
parenthood following surrogacy. Having first explored whether these concerns might 
justify a ban, I found that these concerns could be dealt with through specially 
designed, appropriate and effective regulation informed by empirical evidence 
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representing, as far as possible, the ‘real’ experiences of those involved in the practice. 
I then envisioned what a ‘good’ law on surrogacy would look like. 
Surrogacy is governed by diverse regulation worldwide. To increase my 
understanding of how surrogacy should be regulated, I examined two regimes, namely 
those of Greece (Chapter 3) and the UK (Chapter 4). While they have both recognised 
the need to regulate surrogacy, they vary significantly concerning the content of 
regulation, and contrast very interestingly with each other, hence they offer the 
potential for an interesting and fruitful comparative study. Greek law provides for 
altruistic, gestational surrogacy agreements that, if approved by the judiciary at the 
preconception stage, become enforceable after the child’s birth, and parenthood is 
based on intention. In contrast, UK law allows for altruistic gestational and traditional 
surrogacy agreements but only regulates surrogacy performed in clinics. Surrogacy 
agreements are unenforceable, and parenthood is based on genetics. The IPs’ legal 
parenthood is subject to several eligibility criteria and a successful PO application, 
which is decided by the judiciary after the child’s birth, if the IPs apply for one. 
Although the Greek model offers an innovative response to surrogacy, it is currently 
severely lacking proper attention from Greek scholars, and is almost entirely missing 
from the international literature, while empirical data are extremely limited. Therefore, 
there is an important gap in scholarship. The UK model has long gathered the interest 
and attention of both national and international scholars and, although many have 
noted its inadequacies and failures, they have not investigated the possibility of the 
Greek regime becoming a model for a UK legal reform, and vice versa. Though there 
is some knowledge of the experience of surrogacy regulation in the UK, the available 
studies are, in their majority, out-dated, and provide little information about whether 
the UK regime has appropriately and effectively addressed the concerns raised by 
surrogacy. 
My analysis of the two regimes was based on the criteria of ‘good’ law identified in 
Chapter 2, and focused on three themes: access, regulation during a surrogacy 
arrangement, and determination of parenthood. These themes help bring out the 
features of the regulation that are interesting, significant, potentially problematic, and 
starkly different in each country, and allowed for a nuanced socio-legal comparison of 
the two legal models. In order to detect how regulation works in practice and how well 
the Greek and UK regimes address these ethico-legal concerns, I performed my own 
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qualitative research in these countries. I gathered evidence from 28 interviewees 
involved in surrogacy in different ways, namely surrogates, IPs, and other key actors, 
such as medical and legal practitioners, academics, policy-makers, and representatives 
from UK surrogacy organisations. My findings are presented in three chapters 
structured around the themes identified earlier: access (Chapter 5), regulation during 
surrogacy arrangements (Chapter 6), and determination of parenthood (Chapter 7). My 
analysis also draws on the wider literature and earlier analysis. 
8.1.1 Access to surrogacy 
In Chapter 2, I argued that a ‘good’ surrogacy law should promote and protect one’s 
autonomy in accessing surrogacy, and ensure that access to the practice is easy, equal, 
fair, and affordable. In Chapter 3, we saw that access in Greece is limited to women 
who are under 50 years old, who are married, single, in a legally recognised civil 
partnership (a status only available to opposite sex couples till recently), or in an 
enduring family relationship, and who demonstrate a medical need for surrogacy. 
Moreover, access to surrogacy depends on a preconception judicial assessment. Since 
only gestational surrogacy is allowed in Greece, all parties in surrogacy arrangements 
must go through a clinic, where they are also subjected to a WoC assessment. 
However, single men’s and same-sex couples’ access to surrogacy is unregulated and 
uncertain. In Chapter 4, we saw that access to surrogacy in the UK is dependent on 
two factors: consent and WoC. Access is available to everyone, subject to a WoC 
assessment in clinics, thereby making clinics the main gatekeepers to formal legal 
surrogacy, where it involves donated gametes or ex utero creation of embryos. 
Informal (at-home) traditional surrogacy arrangements are wholly unregulated at this 
stage. 
In Chapter 5, I combined my findings and evidence from the literature and discussed 
access to surrogacy. In Greece, I found that the IM’s age is a significant limitation, 
and that it reflects a concern with WoC rather than with women’s health, as the 
literature suggests. Additionally, the requirement for a medical need for surrogacy 
poses a significant limitation, not least because it is strictly perceived by medical 
practitioners as entailing a physical inability to attain a pregnancy and/or bring a 
pregnancy to term, which challenges assumptions that medical need also covers cases 
of ‘unexplained’ and social infertility. This, however, sits in tension with the 
constitutionally recognised right to have a child. My Greek interviews also revealed 
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that relationship status does not always exclude people from accessing ARTs, 
including surrogacy, in clinics. I found that a lesbian couple had been successful in 
accessing formal legal surrogacy (albeit in an unusual form) with the clinic’s help and 
support, even though it involved deceiving the Greek authorities. Nevertheless, access 
to surrogacy in Greek clinics is unlikely to be as easy for gay male couples (or fertile 
women) without deception. UK law does not set relationship status as an access 
requirement.2 Therefore, it makes surrogacy available to a wider group of people than 
does Greek law, and this is an area where Greek law could improve. 
Furthermore, my findings confirm assumptions in Greek literature that judges do not 
examine surrogacy cases in detail. Rather, judges generally facilitate access to 
surrogacy, where there is a medical need for it, which arguably decreases the value of 
the scrutiny process. Lastly, I found that WoC assessments in Greek clinics are 
generally light-touch, and access is rarely restricted (if justified by a medical need), 
but counselling for surrogacy in clinics is usually made mandatory, although only the 
offer of counselling is legally mandated, because it is regarded as a tool to ensure 
WoC. The latter was also purported from my UK interviewees, and it confirms 
evidence from other studies. 
My UK research showed that the clinical WoC assessment does not act as a 
considerable limitation on access for the same reasons as in Greece. Moreover, I found 
that WoC assessments are also performed by surrogacy organisations, which are 
currently unregulated and severely under-researched in the literature. Additionally, 
despite the judicial beliefs which are sometimes expressed about the risks of 
independent surrogacy,3 I found that rigorous processes and checks to ensure attention 
to the WoC are common in those arrangements. Generally, access to UK surrogacy 
works relatively well, but this is often despite, rather than because of, the law. 
Furthermore, my empirical work allowed the identification of various informal 
limitations on access to surrogacy in Greece and the UK, including the availability and 
quality of information for surrogacy, the difficulty in finding surrogates, the 
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1 FLR 307; Re M (Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 228. 
248 
 
surrogates’ preferences, cost and access to public funding. Though these factors may 
vary even within the same cultural and regulatory context, it is important to take them 
into account, because they may act as informal barriers to access to surrogacy. 
However, there is a question about whether reproductive autonomy imposes an 
obligation on the state to attempt to bring these barriers down, which could not be 
addressed in the space of this thesis. 
Those interested in UK surrogacy choose independent sources, such as the Internet 
and the media, to find information, while Greeks primarily depend on the information 
that formal gatekeepers (medical professionals and lawyers) decide to share with them. 
This may limit some people’s access to surrogacy. Interviewees in both countries 
noted the serious lack of available surrogates, but, the UK has a better, though 
informal, system to put interested parties in touch through non-profit surrogacy 
organisations. Moreover, clinics often refer interested parties to these organisations 
recommending them as places where people can find reliable information, advice and 
support. Also, I found that surrogates have their own preferences and red lines, which 
may limit access. Lastly, interviewees in both countries indicated that the most 
important limitation is cost, and that both regimes fail to secure public funding for 
surrogacy, thereby failing to ensure fair, affordable, and equal access to surrogacy.4 
8.1.2 Regulation during surrogacy arrangements 
In Chapter 6, I discussed how and how well the Greek and UK surrogacy regimes 
respond to concerns regarding autonomy, welfare, and justice during a surrogacy 
arrangement. Justice is more directly relevant to issues relating to access to surrogacy 
and to legal parenthood following it, but such concerns emerged occasionally in this 
context. The autonomy concern is primarily operationalised through the legal 
requirement for free, informed, and unconditional consent. In Greece, consent is 
monitored by the judiciary and the clinic where surrogacy takes place. In the UK, 
consent is formally monitored by clinics, if the parties decide to go through one, while 
informal surrogacy arrangements are wholly unregulated. Therefore, UK regulation 
appears to fail to ensure proper respect for autonomy in some arrangements that we 
know occur in practice and have been described as ‘dangerous’.5 
                                                          
4 This, in some cases (especially for the UK), might mean that some people will go abroad, where 




Based on my data, Greece has a robust system for ensuring valid consent in formal 
legal surrogacy, but we have no knowledge about how consent operates in informal 
surrogacy arrangements which likely happen. In the UK, surrogacy organisations play 
an important role in consent-provision, with these informal systems often filling the 
gap left by regulation. This was identified as both a good and a bad thing by my 
interviewees. While many recognised that the information, advice and support offered 
by UK surrogacy organisations is vital, they believed regulation should do more to 
help the parties make a fully informed choice. 
Further, as mentioned above, in both countries surrogacy counselling in clinics is used 
to ensure valid consent and it is usually made mandatory, though not legally 
mandated.6 Additionally, in both countries written surrogacy agreements were 
regarded fundamental in ensuring respect for autonomy. Contrary to Greece, in the 
UK, such agreements are neither legally mandated nor have legal force. I found that 
most UK interviewees were in favour of written surrogacy agreements being legally 
mandated and binding, and most IPs and surrogates I interviewed had signed one. 
Therefore, although regulation in each country has reached a starkly different position 
on this issue, the practice is actually quite similar, and, in the UK, this is evidence of 
things working despite, not because of, the law. 
Additionally, according to my interviewees, IPs are possibly at a greater risk of being 
harmed than are surrogates, which challenges the widely held assumption that 
surrogates are most vulnerable. Even though I did not find any direct experiences of 
exploitation in either country, it is possible that such cases happen under the radar, as 
for example the exceptional case noted by one interviewee of a rogue UK organisation 
that disappeared having taken large payments from IPs.  
Both countries employ a mixed compensatory model for surrogacy, whereby 
payments to surrogates are allowed but only for ‘reasonable’ expenses, which 
responds to the welfare concern that commercial practices increase the risk of harm. 
However, the ‘reasonable’ expenses rule was found to work badly in both countries, 
because of vagueness as to what it entails. On the other hand, no harm resulting from 
excess payments was reported by my interviewees. Also, some believed that the 
current system provides certain advantages, with some noting a sense of 
empowerment, because it offers the parties space to negotiate payments (both for 
                                                          
6 However, in both countries, the offer of counselling is legally mandated. 
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‘reasonable’ expenses and for other compensation) and build trust between them. 
Lastly, interviewees in both countries thought the lack of oversight meant that informal 
support mechanisms had to be developed to protect the parties from potential harm, 
but suggested that surrogacy works relatively well, with some adding that 
overregulation might create more problems. 
8.1.3 Determination of parenthood following surrogacy 
In Chapter 7, I explored how and how well the Greek and UK parenthood provisions 
for surrogacy meet the criteria for a ‘good’ law laid out in Chapter 2. It was seen that 
the Greek idea of welfare has translated into the provision that the people who intended 
the child to be born are her parents, whereas the UK model is predicated on the idea 
that welfare is best served by recognising the birth mother initially and only disrupting 
that when welfare considerations demand. The Greek parenthood rules appeared to 
work well and were considered to promote the parties’ autonomy by recognising and 
enforcing the parties’ intentions. Contrastingly, UK interviewees believed that law 
awards the ‘wrong’ identity to IPs, surrogates, and children born through surrogacy, 
and it can cause various practical problems. Despite the complaints and unhappiness 
with the UK parenthood provisions, I found that most arrangements and transfers of 
care of the child worked well in the experience of my interviewees, but this is despite 
the law. Also, both my research and other literature has shown that the uncertainty 
surrounding POs is one driver in people having surrogacy overseas, which introduces 
a different set of problems and concerns. 
In terms of achieving equality of access to parenthood, both laws have some 
weaknesses but, on balance, UK law is more effective at making legal parenthood 
available to a wider group of people than is Greek law. However, POs are still not 
available to single IPs and IPs needing double gamete donation, and because of this 
some people never apply for a PO, which has WoC implications. My interviewees 
expressed significant discontentment with the inequalities enshrined in both regimes. 
In Greece, I found that the non-recognition of parenthood rights to same-sex IPs and 
single men sit in clear tension with the constitutionally recognised right to have a child. 
Furthermore, in Greece, surrogacy agreements are enforceable after the child’s birth, 
with direct effects for the IPs’ parenthood rights. This mechanism was regarded as 
‘good’ law because, despite assumptions in the literature, it was seen as protecting the 
surrogate’s welfare and supporting the development of strong relationships of trust 
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between the parties. Moreover, I found that, although the UK’s non-enforceability rule 
was introduced to protect the surrogates’ welfare, surrogates themselves do not feel 
that this is necessary or appropriate and do not wish to have a right to change their 
minds. Surrogates in Greece also rejected this option. Importantly, UK interviewees 
were in favour of a parenthood model that resembles the Greek one and thought that 
UK law fails to recognise the realities of UK surrogacy without providing a convincing 
justification for the choice of non-enforceability. 
Another welfare concern in surrogacy relates to donor anonymity. Greek regulation 
maintains the donor anonymity rule, whereas the UK has abolished anonymity since 
2005. Although many Greek interviewees recognised that the protection of the adults’ 
privacy rights provided by donor anonymity potentially infringes the child’s right to 
know her genetic origins, they rejected a change in the current system. Lastly, my data 
suggested that some stigma is still attached to surrogacy in both countries. Although 
the evidence is sparse and mostly anecdotal, Greek law arguably helps to entrench 
secrecy, which may foster stigma. In the UK, some interviewees thought the 
parenthood provisions entrenched and maintained stigma, which suggests that legal 
reform is desirable. These data could feed into the reform process currently happening 
in the UK,7 and highlight potential avenues of a future change of the Greek regime. 
For example, the IPs’ parenthood in the UK could become more immediate, and 
parenthood following surrogacy could become available to a wider group of people 
than is now in both countries. 
Due to the paucity of empirical research in both countries, Greece especially, my 
findings make an original contribution to the literature. Although my sample is small 
and partly self-selected, it serves to pinpoint elements of the regulation in each country 
that work well and others that are potentially problematic. My evidence revealed that 
both regimes are guided by the same principles, namely autonomy, equality, and 
welfare. However, the weight ascribed to those principles by each jurisdiction is 
different, which explains why they have reached starkly different positions on many 
issues, with significant implications for who can access surrogacy, how surrogacy is 
regulated during the arrangement, and how parenthood is determined. 
                                                          
7 In December 2017, the Law Commission announced that surrogacy forms part of its 13th Programme 
for law reform (Law Com Report No.377, 2017). 
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In the UK, WoC is the court’s paramount consideration when determining parenthood 
following surrogacy, whereas, in Greece, WoC is one of a number of important 
considerations, weighed in the balance with the IPs’ and the surrogate’s rights to 
autonomy. Also, in Greece, the WoC assessments occur at the preconception stage (by 
the judge and the clinic), when the child is not yet in existence, while, in the UK, there 
are two different types of WoC considerations occurring at different stages. In IVF-
surrogacy and clinically-undertaken traditional surrogacy, not only is there greater 
scrutiny of WoC than home-based traditional surrogacy, but also the WoC assessment 
by clinics considers slightly different factors than judges do during the PO process. 
Further, I found that the broader perception of ‘surrogacy’ within the parenthood 
provisions is different in these countries: in Greece, surrogacy is perceived as a form 
of ART, whereas, in the UK, surrogacy is considered a form of fast-track adoption, 
with direct implications for who is considered the child’s parent at birth. 
My evidence challenges and, in some cases, confirms, various assumptions made in 
the literature and other studies about surrogacy. Especially regarding Greece, where 
evidence is sparse and largely anecdotal, my evidence makes an original contribution 
to the literature. Another contribution of this thesis lies in its use of a feminist, more 
fluid methodological approach to the analysis of qualitative data, which challenges 
and escapes the theoretical binary of classifying interviewees as ‘experts’ and ‘non-
experts’, according to their presumed expertise and knowledge. I suggest that there 
may be cases, as in this research, where people who would traditionally be considered 
‘non-experts’ may actually have more expert knowledge due to their personal or 
professional experiences with the subject of research. Namely, in this research, 
surrogates and IPs were experts, and it was important for their knowledge to be treated 
equivalently to that of traditionally conceived ‘expert’ interviewees. This approach 
enables a more nuanced understanding of the experience of regulation and could lead 
to proposing legal changes that better reflect the variety of those experiences. 
8.2 The principles underpinning ‘good’ surrogacy law and the 
implications of this research for feminist ethics 
Based on the above analysis, a ‘good’ surrogacy law would permit surrogacy (albeit 
within limits) and would offer carefully designed, appropriate and effective rules and 
guidelines which are capable of regulating the practice; determining legal parenthood 
resulting from it, and, so far as possible, protecting all parties from potential harms. It 
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should also ensure equal, fair and affordable access to surrogacy, within the constraints 
of current health budgets, and offer effective provisions for ensuring fully informed 
and voluntary consent from all parties. Additionally, a ‘good’ law would provide 
clarity regarding legal parenthood and regarding how to resolve disputes that might 
arise in this context. 
I have also argued that the theory, policy and regulation of surrogacy must be grounded 
in the ‘real’ experience of surrogacy, and especially the question of ‘who’ is most 
vulnerable in a surrogacy arrangement, something that is currently notably lacking. 
Based on my research, although regulation (particularly in the UK) is founded on the 
assumption that surrogates are the most vulnerable party in a surrogacy arrangement, 
I found that IPs are at least as vulnerable as surrogates, if not more so in some cases. 
Therefore, a ‘good’ surrogacy law should not begin from this assumption but should 
rather weigh the interests of IPs along with the interests of surrogates and children in 
the surrogacy context. This would entail that the legal determination of parenthood is 
clear and, as far as possible, certain, and that parenthood should be awarded to IPs 
sooner than the current UK regime does now. 
As regards Greece, although I found a high level of contentment with the current 
parenthood rules for surrogacy, it was suggested that there is a need for the 
development of monitoring mechanisms which, however, would leave space for the 
parties to form their own rules regarding the surrogacy relationship. Furthermore, a 
‘good’ surrogacy law should provide access to the practice of surrogacy and 
parenthood following it to a wider group of people than is currently the case in Greece 
and the UK. It should ensure that no one is unjustifiably formally or informally 
excluded from surrogacy, subject always to public budget constraints. 
Additionally, I showed that many positive aspects of surrogacy practice in both 
countries, especially in the UK, work well despite the regulation rather than because 
of it. Although the lack of regulation was criticised as a negative element in many 
respects, it was also recognised that too much law and regulation could do more 
damage than good in this area. Moreover, many interviewees felt that the lack of 
current regulation has left a productive space for individuals and groups to develop 
informal regulation which works for them. Hence, law and policy should ensure that, 
on one hand, they provide support and protection to the parties in surrogacy 
arrangements, as well as to other individuals who are involved in the practice, and, on 
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the other hand, they should leave room for an appropriate level of self-regulation, 
which was seen as offering a significant amount of empowerment and satisfaction. 
For example, according to many of my interviewees, regulation should leave it up to 
the parties to decide how they meet each other (through informal pathways, such as 
the Internet, through surrogacy organisations, or through surrogacy professionals, for 
example as clinicians and/or lawyers); it should be up to the parties to decide how 
pregnancy should be achieved for the purposes of surrogacy (through artificial 
insemination at home or through ARTs in a clinic); and they should be free to decide 
whether they should sign and be bound by a written surrogacy agreement, or what 
compensation (for ‘reasonable’ expenses) surrogates should receive. 
Although the options of enforceability and of commercial surrogacy arrangements 
were rejected by many of my interviewees, it was also suggested that this rejection 
was mainly due to stigma attached to these terms rather than by a principled 
disagreement with their essential elements. Tentatively, then, it is suggested that 
surrogacy regulation should perhaps attempt to disrupt the binary categorisation of 
‘enforceability’ and ‘non-enforceability’, and ‘commercial’ and ‘altruistic’ surrogacy. 
These divides appeared to no longer reflect the experiences of modern surrogacy, at 
least in Greece and the UK and within the limitations of my sample. It would be 
desirable to formulate new language in the surrogacy context that will better express 
these ‘real’ experiences. 
Importantly, it was evident in my sample that law can make surrogacy more 
empowering for women as a collective by re-defining ‘motherhood’ more in the terms 
of having the intention to have and raise a child rather than in the terms of gestation 
and birth, and by re-conceptualising and reforming the law so as surrogates are not 
deemed as necessarily most ‘vulnerable’ in the surrogacy arrangement. Moreover, 
surrogacy can be empowering for women collectively if law allows space to women 
to decide the terms of their arrangement, should they choose to enter into one. Lastly, 
along with the above, law should be concerned with removing stigma from surrogacy, 
and with resolving wider structural issues that can cause and maintain the oppression 
of women; for example, public policy should support research on the causes, effects 
and treatment of infertility; it should raise awareness about why people might use 
and/or need ARTs and/or surrogacy; and it should offer guidance on how best to 
pursue them.  
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8.3 Limitations of this research and avenues of future research 
Despite its larger significance and contributions, this thesis has certain limitations. 
Notably, the empirical arguments made in this thesis are based on a small pool of 
evidence (14 interviews in each country), and all interviewees were selected because 
of their experience of ‘formal’ legal surrogacy in these countries.8 Hence, my findings 
may not represent the full range of experiences of surrogacy in these countries. People 
with experience of surrogacy which goes ‘under the radar’ may be more likely to 
reveal instances of abuse that my sample could not uncover. 
Further, from its outset, this thesis acknowledged that it could not conclusively address 
all the questions surrounding surrogacy. Nonetheless, my sample has allowed the 
identification of the strengths and limitations of the surrogacy regulation in Greece 
and the UK and the elements that are interesting, significant, potentially problematic, 
and different, and has facilitated the evaluation of the two regimes. Lastly, the high 
degree of agreement within my sample gives some grounds for confidence in the 
robustness of the conclusions reached. 
The comparative socio-legal qualitative feminist methodology employed in this 
research has hopefully made a solid contribution to knowledge that future research can 
refer to and expand upon. More extensive qualitative research is necessary both in 
both countries, Greece especially, and future legal reforms should make sure to reflect, 
as much as possible, the ‘real’ experience of surrogacy in these countries and 
elsewhere. Equally, future researchers should perform more qualitative work in the 
national contexts that have not been included in this project and cast more light into 
how surrogacy is practised in other jurisdictions and inform legal reforms beyond 
Greece and the UK, which could not be conducted in the space of this thesis. Such 
projects will be invaluable, especially considering the upward trajectory regarding the 
incidence of surrogacy at national and international levels.
                                                          
8 Admittedly, I am missing evidence from people who have not been successful in their surrogacy 
arrangements and from people who have had particularly negative experiences, but this is not due to 
my lack of trying to gather such data. My assumption is that people who had positive experiences were 
more open to share them with me, which is a risk that exists in empirical research in general. Also, I 
am missing evidence from IPs and surrogates from the UK organisation Brilliant Beginnings, the HFEA 
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Information on research participants - List of interviewees 
The interviewees are listed here as ‘professionals’ and ‘non-professionals’, which 
reflects whether one receives payment for the role that gives one the relevant expertise. 
List of Greek interviewees - Non-professionals: 




Mother of twins through surrogacy in 
Greece 





4. Giota Intended mother who was looking for a 
surrogate in Greece 
5. Katerina Lesbian woman who acted as a 
gestational ‘surrogate’ for her partner 
(Aria, above) 
6. Lena Surrogate and clients’ manager of a 
large Greek fertility clinic involved in 
surrogacy practice. I interviewed Lena 
twice.1 
 
List of Greek interviewees – Professionals: 
Name Way of involvement with 
surrogacy 
                                                          
1 Lena initially spoke under her role as a clients’ manager in a large Greek fertility centre. Three months 
later, because she saw that all my efforts to find potential interviewees had been fruitl ss, she confided 
in me that she had twice acted as a surrogate and agreed to be interviewed by mail. 
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1. Anonymous Greek lawyer Lawyer experienced in handing 
surrogacy cases in Greek courts 
2. Cazlaris Haris, Mr Embryologist, policy-maker (member 
of the 2005 draft law committee) and 
former member of NAMAR 
3. Chatziparasidou Alexia, Ms Clinician 
4. Hatzis Aristides, Professor Legal academic 
5. Pantos Konstantinos, Dr Clinician 
6. Tarlatzis Basil, Dr Clinician, medical academic 
(Professor), policy-maker (member of 
the 2005 draft law committee) and 
former member of NAMAR 
7. Vidalis Takis, Mr Legal academic, practising lawyer and 
advisor at the Hellenic National 
Bioethics Commission 
 
List of UK interviewees – Non-professionals: 
Name Way of involvement with 
surrogacy 
1. Jamie Independent surrogate (traditional 
surrogate [genetically related to the 
child]. Did not go through a surrogacy 
organisation or a clinic.) 
2. Lauren SUK surrogate for gay male IPs 
(Simon and Steve, below. Gestational 




3. Marina COTS surrogate (traditional) and 
professional counsellor at COTS 
4. Natalie Mother of twins through SUK and 
SUK Trustee 
5. Sarah SUK surrogate (traditional) and SUK 
Chair 
6. Simon Gay father through SUK 
7. Steve Gay father through SUK 
 
List of UK interviewees – Professionals: 
Name Way of involvement with 
surrogacy 
1. Avery Sue, Dr Clinician 
2. Brazier Margaret, Professor Legal academic 
3. Gamble Natalie Solicitor and co-founder of surrogacy 
organisation Brilliant Beginnings (BB) 
4. Horsey Kirsty Legal academic 
5. Jadva Vasanti Psychology academic 
6. Powell Andrew Family law barrister 




Invitation for an interview given to potential research participants 
 
Information Sheet 
Name and title of researcher: Aikaterini (Katia) Neofytou, PhD 
Candidate 
Researcher’s email: kn229@kent.ac.uk(academic email)/ 
katia_neof@yahoo.gr(personal email) 
 
Name of programme: PhD in Law 
Name of Institution: Kent Law School, University of Kent, 
Canterbury (UK) 
 
Academic Supervisors: Professor Sally Sheldon 
Dr Kirsty Horsey 
 
‘How I met my mothers’: Surrogate motherhood and the law: a comparative 
socio-legal analysis of the responses to surrogacy in Greece and the UK (working 
title) 
Who am I? 
I am a PhD Candidate and a Graduate Teaching Assistant, based in Kent Law School 
(KLS) in the UK. I completed my master’s degree in Medical Law and Ethics at KLS 
in 2012 and worked as a named research assistant for an EU-funded project evaluating 
the legal framework for surrogacy in EU that was completed and published in 2013. I 
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am also a qualified lawyer and a registered member of the Bar Association of 
Thessaloniki, Greece. My research interests focus on issues relating to law and 
reproduction, and my current project explores the law and practice of surrogacy in 
Greece and the UK. 
What is the project? 
My doctoral research engages in an exploration of how surrogacy, as a form of assisted 
reproduction, should be regulated in law. The project aims to recognise and assess the 
ethical and legal concerns relating to surrogacy, as well as the challenges for regulating 
this area. I have two case studies; Greece and the UK. With my research I wish to 
place the Greek surrogacy law at the centre of academic discourse, investigate its 
strengths and limitations, and explore the possibility of this law being a model for a 
reform of the UK legal framework. I also examine how the current UK model can be 
an inspiration for a Greek legal reform in some respects. 
Through the interviews I hope to gain a deeper understanding of how effective the 
Greek and the UK surrogacy laws are in medical, legal and social practice, and achieve 
a more complete knowledge of the ‘real’ experience of surrogacy in these two 
countries based on a variety of perspectives ranging from views of surrogates, intended 
and/or actual parents, and key actors involved in the regulation and practice of 
surrogacy (academic scholars, judges, legal and medical practitioners, and members 
of organisations relating to surrogacy). The interviews will take place in Greece 
(mainly in Athens and Thessaloniki) and the UK (mainly, though not exclusively, 
London and Southeast England). 
How will person-identifying information be used? 
Interviewing professionals (academics, judges, legal and medical practitioners, 
policy-makers, representatives of surrogacy organisations etc.): If you agree, the 
interview will be provided ‘on the record’. If you do not wish to speak on the record, 
then I will agree with you how anything you tell me may be used in project 
publications in a way that protects your anonymity. 
Interviewing individuals who have/ have had personal experience of surrogacy 
(surrogates, intended parents): If you agree, I will assign you with a pseudonym 
which will later be used in project publications. No mention will be made to person-
identifying information (your full real name, your address and/or other contact 
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details). If you so wish, all personal references will be removed from those data, so it 
cannot be linked to you. You may of course choose to remain identifiable, in which 
case I will use your real name. We will discuss and agree on which information can 
be made public (for example only your first name and way of involvement with 
surrogacy or full name). 
What will the interview involve? 
I will ask your permission to record the interview on a digital recorder, so that I have 
a full record of the conversation. If you agree to your interview being recorded, I will 
save the digital file containing your interview into a password protected folder, to 
which only I have access.  If you do not wish to have the interview recorded, I will 
ask to take detailed notes during the conversation.  
If I wish to quote from your interview in any publications that come out of this study, 
I will seek your prior approval of the quotation, using an e-mail account of your choice, 
offering you the opportunity to amend it to your satisfaction. A transcript of the 
interview will be sent to you once the data collection is completed. 
The interview will be semi-structured: I will ask some general questions, covering 
your role, experience and knowledge regarding surrogacy and your views on how well 
current law is working and how it might be improved. The interview will be run as a 
conversation, with open-ended questions following a general topic guide that I will 
supply in advance. We can skip any questions that are not relevant or that you do not 
wish to answer. 
I estimate that the interview will last around one hour to ninety minutes. You can stop 
the interview at any point. 
Some questions that you may have: 
Q: “How, precisely, will my interview be used in the research?”  A: Your interview 
will be used to help me understand how surrogacy works in practice and any problems 
that the regulation of surrogacy may cause (or has caused to you). Some quotations 
may be used in my PhD thesis and other future publications. 
Q: “Can I change my mind about participating?”  A: Yes. If you change your mind 
about being interviewed, you can say so at any point. You do not need to give a reason. 
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Q: “Can I ask you to turn the digital recorder off after we have started the interview?” 
A: Yes. You can ask me to turn off the recorder at any point. You do not need to give 
a reason. 
Q: “What will happen to the interview, when the project ends?”  A: the recording of 
the interview will not be accessible by anyone apart from me.  It will be destroyed five 
years after the end of the project (i.e. in 2022).  You can also ask for the recording to 
be destroyed at any point before that, without needing to give a reason. 
Q: “What will happen if you want to quote anything that I say in the interview?”  A: 
I would seek your prior approval before using any quotations from your interview in 
any publications or presentations drawing on the research.  However, once a quotation 
approved by you has been used in a publication, it will not be possible for you to 
change or to withdraw it. 
Q: “What else will I be asked to do, other than the interview?”  A: Nothing, with the 
exception that I may contact you by e-mail with a follow up question or to ask you to 
approve the use of a quotation taken from your interview.   
Q: “Will I get anything out of the research?” A: I hope that the research findings will 
be of interest and use to those involved with regulating surrogacy in Greece and the 
UK, as well as possibilities beyond these countries. I hope that my research becomes 
an inspiration for policy changes and for further academic research. My aim is to use 
your views to make recommendations for legal reforms that will better express and 
protect the experiences of all parties to a surrogacy arrangement and the resulting 
child. If you wish, you can ask for a summary of the research findings.  
Many thanks for agreeing to take part in this research.  If you have any questions or 
comments, please let me know:  k.neofytou@kent.ac.uk (academic email)/ 
katia_neof@yahoo.gr (personal email). 
Aikaterini (Katia) Neofytou 
PhD Candidate/ Graduate Teaching Assistant 
Kent Law School, Eliot College, Office: E3.N3 




Interview Consent Form 
 
‘How I met my mothers’: Surrogate motherhood and the law: a comparative 
socio-legal analysis of the responses to surrogacy in Greece and the UK (working 
title) 
Interview Consent Form  
If you feel that you have enough information and are happy to do so, please tick each 
of the boxes below. If not, please let me know. 
 





I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and 





I am aware that I can stop the interview at any point and/or withdraw from 
the research at any time, without needing to give a reason and that I can 













I agree for quotations to be attributed to me in any publications, reports, 
web pages, and other research outputs.  This is subject to my being given 






________________ ________________ _______________ _____________________________ 
Interviewee  Signature  Date    E-mail address to use for any  
         further communication 
 
Aikaterini (Katia) Neofytou 
_____________________ ________________________________ _____________________________ 
Researcher   Signature       Date 
 
Aikaterini (Katia) Neofytou 
PhD Candidate/Graduate Teaching Assistant 
Kent Law School, Eliot College,  
Kent University, Canterbury CT2 7NS 




Indicative Interview Questions – UK 
 
Information about the interview participants 
• Can you please provide some information about yourself and your involvement 
with surrogacy in the UK? 
Frequency of surrogacy 
• Based on your professional/academic/personal experience with surrogacy in this 
country, how often would you say people use surrogacy as a form of family-
formation is (domestic and cross-border arrangements)? 
• Do you believe that the demand surrogacy is increasing, decreasing, or the same 
as in previous years? How has this changed throughout the years? Why is that? 
• Do you believe that there are more IPs than women offering to become surrogates 
in the UK or the opposite? Why would you say that is? How do you know this? 
• In your opinion, who do you think uses surrogacy the most in this country? 
Heterosexual couples, female couples, male couples, single people? 
Source of information about UK surrogacy 
• In your opinion, how do interested parties find information about surrogacy in the 
UK? (e.g. through medical and legal practitioners, the internet, the media, 
surrogacy organisations) 
• In your opinion, how do IPs get introduced to and matched with potential 
surrogates and vice versa? How do you know this? 
• Who provides information on the legal process for surrogacy and parenthood, and 
the rights and responsibilities of the parties? How do you know this? 
UK regulation 
• How do you evaluate the UK surrogacy laws? What do you think are the strengths 
of the UK surrogacy law? Why? 
• Do you find any problems with the current UK surrogacy law? Why? How do they 
affect the practice of surrogacy in this country? 
• Who can access surrogacy in the UK and how does the law regulate this matter? 
Are any people excluded from surrogacy? How? Why? 
308 
 
• How do you evaluate the welfare of the child criterion regarding access to ART in 
this country? Does this affect surrogacy practice? How? Why? 
• Who would you say is most vulnerable in a UK surrogacy arrangement? 
• Do you believe that the UK surrogacy laws offer sufficient protection to all parties 
to a surrogacy arrangement? How? If not, how could these individuals be better 
protected? 
• How do you evaluate the UK laws’ provisions regarding consent to surrogacy? Is 
consent important in this area? Why? 
• How do UK surrogacy laws regulate payments in surrogacy and how does this 
affect surrogacy arrangements in this country? 
• To your knowledge, how much money do you think IPs pay surrogates in this 
country? Is this for ‘reasonable’ expenses or for something more? 
• How do you evaluate the role of non-profit surrogacy organisations in the UK? 
• How do you evaluate the role of the HFEA in relation to UK surrogacy? 
• How do you evaluate the parenthood provisions for the transfer of legal parenthood 
in the UK (POs)? What is the role of the judge in this process? 
• Do the best interests of the child play a significant role in the judge’s decision 
about whether to grant a PO? 
• What is the quality of the relationships between IPs, surrogates and children born 
through surrogacy? 
• Have there been, to your knowledge, any instances of exploitation taking place in 
the context of surrogacy in the UK? 
• Non-enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Why did the legislature choose this? Is 
it a positive or a negative feature of the law? Should the surrogate be allowed to 
change her mind after the birth of the child? 
• How would you like parenthood to be determined following surrogacy? 
Conclusions and future legal reform 
• How clear and effective would you consider the UK surrogacy law, in its current 
state, to be? How does this affect the practice in this country? Are there any 
problems with it? 




Indicative Interview Questions – Greece (translated from Greek to English) 
 
Information about the interview participants 
• Can you please provide some information about yourself and your involvement 
with surrogacy in Greece? 
Frequency of surrogacy 
• Based on your professional/academic/personal experience with surrogacy in this 
country, how often would you say people use surrogacy as a form of family-
formation is (domestic and cross-border arrangements)? 
• Do you believe that the demand surrogacy is increasing, decreasing, or the same 
as in previous years? How has this changed throughout the years? Why is that? 
• Do you believe that there are more IPs than women offering to become surrogates 
in Greece, or the opposite? Why would you say that is? How do you know this? 
• In your opinion, who do you think uses surrogacy the most in this country? 
Heterosexual couples, female couples, male couples, single people? 
Source of information about Greek surrogacy 
• In your opinion, how do interested parties find information about surrogacy in 
Greece? (e.g. through medical and legal practitioners, the internet, the media, 
surrogacy organisations) 
• In your opinion, how do IPs get introduced to and matched with potential 
surrogates and vice versa? How do you know this? 
• Who provides information on the legal process for surrogacy and parenthood, and 
the rights and responsibilities of the parties? 
Greek regulation 
• How do you evaluate the Greek legal model for surrogacy? What do you think are 
its strengths? Why? 
• Do you find any problems with the current Greek surrogacy law? Why? Is the 
practice of surrogacy affected by these? 
• Do you believe that the Greek surrogacy law protects the interests of everyone 
involved in the arrangement? 
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• Who is most vulnerable in a Greek surrogacy arrangement? Why? Are they 
sufficiently protected? 
• What is the judge’s role in Greek surrogacy? How does the preconception judicial 
scrutiny for surrogacy work? Are there any problems with it? 
• How do you evaluate the Greek rules regarding consent to surrogacy? Is consent 
important in this area? Why? 
• How does Greek surrogacy law regulate payments and how does this affect 
surrogacy arrangements in this country? 
• To your knowledge, how much money do you think IPs pay surrogates in this 
country? Is this for ‘reasonable’ expenses or for something more? 
• How do you evaluate the role of NAMAR in Greek surrogacy? 
• How do you evaluate the parenthood provisions enshrined in Greek regulation for 
surrogacy? Do you agree with the intention-based parenthood model and the 
enforceability of surrogacy agreements? 
• What is the quality of the relationships between IPs, surrogates and children born 
through surrogacy in Greece? 
• Have there been, to your knowledge, any instances of exploitation taking place in 
Greek surrogacy? 
Conclusions and future legal reform 
• How clear and effective would you consider Greek surrogacy law, in its current 
state, to be? How does this affect the practice in this country? Are there any 
problems with it? 
• If the Greek surrogacy regime changed, what kind of changes would you like to 
see? Why?
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